The U.S. Navy has a narrow window of opportunity to lay out a plan for future surface-combatant shipbuilding. Some may argue that with the upcoming budget cuts needed to deal with a multitrillion-dollar federal deficit, the Navy may have missed its chance. However, with adversity there is new opportunity. If a plan is chosen that can be shown to be affordable in both acquisition and sustainment, there is no better time than now to determine what that shipbuilding plan should be that will constitute the bulk of the Navy surface-combatant forces for the immediate future.
Since the beginning of the 20th century, the Navy always has been able to provide forward presence away from U.S. shores to deter aggression and deal with it if needed. It has been able to do this by fielding a balanced force of aircraft and vessels. Naval aviation has a solid plan for acquisition and sustainment of needed capabilities, with F/A-18, F-35, E-2, and P-8 programs all moving forward. The subsurface fleet also has a solid plan with continued acquisition of Virginia-class submarines and plans being drawn up to for a successor to the Ohio class.
The Issue on the Surface
Where the U.S. Navy is struggling is with its surface fleet, and in particular, its surface combatants. Historically, the surface fleet has been composed of a range of ship types that could deal with austere-to-sophisticated threats. The numbers of each type weere aligned both to the threat and to the affordability of each ship type. In the early 20th century, the battleship dominated the scene, but the bulk of the surface force consisted of smaller cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. While the Navy built battleships to counter the perceived battleship challenge from other nations, its smaller and more affordable ships were able to steam independently from battle groups and respond to regional crises with a capability appropriate for the threat. The mid-20th century saw a shift of focus to the aircraft carrier and away from the battleship. The Navy built carriers to counter the actual threat from the Japanese, but the bulk of the Navy’s forces were still the smaller cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. Fast-forward to the turn of the century, and not much has changed, except for the numbers of cruisers, destroyers, and frigates the Navy is building to represent the bulk of its Fleet.
Recent decisions to cancel additional DDG-1000s and CG(X) and to restart the DDG-51 production lines mean that the Navy has designated the DDG-51 class its high-end surface combatant. The reasons for this are obvious: the Aegis combat system, SPY radar, the vertical launch system, and multimission capabilities including ballistic-missile defense (BMD). These all come at a cost both in acquisition and sustainment, though, so the Navy needs to be careful when considering the affordability of putting too much of its surface-combatant shipbuilding resources only into high-end platforms. To do so risks running into similar problems as DDG-1000 and CG(X), especially as combat-system upgrades to Aegis—such as the new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) in new construction and the possible backfitting of solid-state SPY—use large amounts of dollars to develop and field these capabilities operationally.
The Navy continues to keep low-end surface-combatant construction active with the littoral combat ship (LCS). The LCS brings multimission capabilities—albeit one at a time with mission modules—and will fill the needs of the patrol gunboat, minesweeper, and special-operations delivery platform in the littoral environment in the near future. Its lack of organic antiair warfare (AAW) capabilities and its short-range antisurface warfare (ASUW) capabilities means that in most instances it will be used in a low-threat environment, or with support from other higher-threat-capable platforms. Mission packages may make up for some of this in the future, but using mission packages to support greater AAW or ASUW capabilities will be at the expense of other mission-area support.
Finding the Middle
What the U.S. Navy is missing in its future shipbuilding concept is the medium-end surface combatant. With the continued atrophy of the Oliver Hazard Perry–class guided-missile frigates (FFGs), and no immediate plans to replace them, the Navy will soon lose its medium-end surface combatants and their multimission capability. The attributes that made the Perry class a successful platform in the 1980s and ’90s are still relevant today. The real-world demands for increased sea control, antipiracy and visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) operations while dealing with more sophisticated threats are driving the need for the medium-end surface combatant.
An FFG has the mix of attributes to meet these demands, and a modern refresh of the Perry-class capabilities would meet the need. This type of combatant should have organic AAW capabilities to deal with the low to medium air-threat environments, since the proliferation and ease of access to relatively cheap cruise missiles and combat aircraft continue throughout the globe. AAW sensors have evolved considerably since the Perrys were first commissioned; several options are now available that would allow the medium-end combatant to have significantly more AAW capability than the Perrys, while avoiding the acquisition and sustainment costs associated with the high-end combatants. Additionally, the medium-end combatant should be able to handle ASUW and have multimission flexibility on par with both the high- and low-end combatants. This can be done via lower-risk incorporation of systems already resident in the high- and low-end combatants. These capabilities would put the medium-end combatant in between the LCS and DDG classes in size, weight, mission capability, and ship complement.
To reduce risk in the acquisition of this FFG and avoid the pitfalls of recent shipbuilding efforts, the program office will need to devote considerable time and focus on two key aspects. The first will be to minimize the amount of development that needs to be done within the platform. This can be accomplished by using government-furnished equipment (GFE) throughout the design where currently available systems will meet requirements. Such equipment that is currently supported, in production, and readily available to accomplish the mission needs of the platform will drive down the development risk and cost.
The second will be to minimize the amount of new integration that needs to be accommodated. There is always some risk in designating GFE to be integrated. This is mainly due to the experience level of the shipbuilders and lead system integrators. To manage this risk, the program office needs to make the request for proposals and the contract favorable to those shipbuilders and integrators who already have experience with the GFE proposed and/or already selected. This will require the program office to do its homework to ensure favorable proposals are backed up with demonstrated experience by the shipbuilders/integrators with the government equipment in other successful programs. The U.S. Navy has followed similar processes in the past with positive results.
One area of constant debate with every new surface-combatant design is crew size. The model that seems to be referenced constantly to support crew reductions is the modern-day large commercial cargo ship that transits the oceans daily with a minimal crew. That concept needs to be avoided; the requirements for a cargo vessel are not in the same realm as those of a surface combatant.
The main reasons to shun the commercial model are combat effectiveness and survivability. Sufficient manning must be on board to ensure all watch sections are manned to fight the ship’s full combat capabilities. Also, and just as important, the ship must be able to respond to battle damage effectively. Automation can help offset some of the crew workload, but even a cursory review of the 1987 USS Stark (FFG-31) incident shows that crew losses, faults to automated damage-control systems, and simple crew fatigue from the high stress of trying to control fires and flooding, make crew size vitally important. The Marines say that every Marine is a rifleman. In the Navy, every sailor is a damage controlman, and numbers matter.
Eyes Toward the Shore, Support From the Sea
To meet the increased demands of sea control, anti-piracy, and VBSS operations, the U.S. Navy continues to focus on two threat areas: neutralizing littoral seaborne threats and supporting near-shore U.S. sea- and land-based forces with supporting fires from over the horizon. Dealing with littoral seaborne threats has been, and continues to be, best addressed with naval gunfire. The possibility of swarm attacks from pirate- and terrorist-appropriated small boats has shown that the need for stabilized, optically sighted guns similar to the Mk 4, Mk 46, and Mk 49 is more vital than ever. Emplacing several rapid-fire guns in the 12.7-mm (.50 caliber) to 40-mm range will provide the lethality necessary to deal with this threat and at a cost that is commensurate with the threat costs.
To support near-shore U.S. sea- and land-based forces from over the horizon, something with longer range and accuracy is needed. The Mk 45 127-mm main gun will provide some capability in this area, but with the cancellation of the extended-range guided munition, as well as the loitering-attack missile and precision-attack missile for the LCS, the Navy has a gap in capability to provide littoral, over-the-horizon, time-sensitive, accurate fire support.
To provide the support for near-shore, land-based forces—including special operations, special operations–capable, counterinsurgency, and regular Marine, Army, and coalition forces—the Navy needs the capability of not readily exposing its own seaborne forces to coastal defenses while still providing accurate fire support at a reasonable cost. This will require the development of munitions that have ranges of up to 60 miles and the ability to deploy precision-targeting. Use of GPS is an obvious method for precision-targeting, but an additional targeting mechanism also should be available to ensure dynamic targets can be neutralized and to deal with situations where GPS may not be available.
Development of a direct-support missile with loitering capability, the targeting capabilities already mentioned, and a dual-mode lightweight warhead for soft and hard targets and launched from a mission module will give both this proposed medium-end surface combatant and the LCS the ability to provide precision attack from over the horizon. Employing this capability with manned and unmanned aircraft for target designation will provide operational commanders substantial capability to precisely target threats in the littorals and in blue water. Deploying this capability from ships will provide a level of weapons persistence and payload not available separately from any airborne platform, manned or unmanned.
The U.S. Navy has long been successful in supporting the needs of the nation by providing a mix of ship types with affordable capabilities matched to the most likely threats. History has shown repeatedly that having a diverse fleet is the best option both in peacetime and during war. To continue to support this diversity in capability, construction of a medium-end surface combatant needs to be started. This new FFG will be the key to meet the range of security demands placed on the U.S. Navy as it continues to move into the 21st century.