Comment and Discussion

China Is Protecting North Korea’s Nukes

(See J. A. Bosco, p. 10, December 2011; E. A. McVadon and D. Yoon, pp. 9, 84, February 2012; and J. A. Bosco, pp. 84-85, March 2012 Proceedings)

Rear Admiral Eric A. McVadon, U.S. Navy (Retired), senior adviser and director emeritus for Asia-Pacific Studies, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis—Mr. Bosco and I are obviously not going to agree on whether China wants North Korea to have nuclear weapons. We do, nonetheless, both want Beijing to play an effective role in getting Pyongyang to relinquish its nuclear-weapon programs. Many of us are conscientiously pursuing that, including via a series of senior-level Track 1.5 (government, think-tank, etc.) workshops organized by the U.S. Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis over almost a decade.

Those conferences have all included senior, influential Chinese participants. In China, the Shanghai Institute for International Studies and China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations in Beijing have been cosponsors. The next workshop will be in Beijing on 10 May, cosponsored by the China Institute for International Studies. The theme is “Rowing Together: Prospects for U.S.-China-ROK Trilateral Coordination on the Korean Peninsula,” derived from the consensus at the previous conference in Seoul in January 2011.

Despite our differing perspectives, the United States, China, and South Korea, as well as Japan and Russia (participants in past workshops), agree we are in the same boat with respect to the North Korean nuclear issue and need to act in concert.

The issues are complex, and we and the Chinese undeniably have different perspectives and priorities; e.g., Beijing could, as Mr. Bosco glibly suggests, halt its aid and spur North Korea’s collapse but, for a variety of reasons involving its own national security, considers that anathema. We ought not lightly dismiss what we have in common: Beijing takes seriously the possibility that Pyongyang, foolishly emboldened by its nuclear “deterrent,” could attack South Korea. Some Chinese also worry that a North Korean nuclear status might tempt Seoul, Tokyo, and Taipei to follow in Pyongyang’s footsteps. The 1998 tests of nuclear weapons by its South Asian neighbors were a sobering lesson for Beijing on the dangers of such proliferation—especially given China’s well known but unacknowledged role in Pakistan’s acquisition of a nuclear capability.

Chinese interlocutors have acknowledged to us, especially after 9/11, the danger that a chaotic or intemperate North Korea might offer fissile material or even nuclear weapons to terrorists, including those who might target China. Owing to such concerns, as well as an evident desire to work constructively with the United States and South Korea, Beijving has denounced Pyongyang’s nuclear tests and supported strong (if not the toughest) U.N. sanctions.

The Chinese are far from doing all we wish concerning North Korea. However, they do make strong public statements and compelling private arguments for denuclearization. We would be remiss if we failed to encourage, and thereby bolster, those arguments—just as we should make the most out of the moderately encouraging recent words heard from the new leadership in Pyongyang.

Lessons from the Golden Age

(See N. Friedman, pp. 90–91, March 2012 Proceedings)

Steven Hertz—Dr. Friedman mentions that commercial shipping lanes can become hostage to attack if U.S.-China competition explodes into war at some point. His column does not consider a second dangerous possibility: Our still emerging maritime competitor could decide to use commercial coercion, not war, against U.S. Pacific interests. China could present ships with a choice between maintaining accustomed access to China trade or choosing to keep their current U.S. commercial and military connection. In this scenario, merchant vessels would face Chinese boycott for calling at Seattle.

Such a situation, while not strictly a matter of military or naval strategy, should be explicitly addressed in national strategy now as we pull back from patrolling those commons. Naval retrenching is unavoidable, but less dangerous if the United States has sufficient flagged ships in regular trade in the Pacific.

Dr. Friedman’s analysis is sound as far as it goes. He sets the scene for successful warfighting (that we wish to avoid) over access if war develops. He does not address strangulation of U.S. prosperity in a quasi-peaceful but highly competitive environment against a fundamentally mercantilist, national-capitalist sea power.

We do have some partially analogous experience. The United States faced serious shipping shortages in both world wars when ships that served America were diverted from U.S. trade. Commercial shipping follows flag priorities. European sovereign interests pulled ships away in 1914, and we had no international ship-sharing agreements to protect our needs. The commercial effects on U.S. commerce in 1914 were catastrophic, part of a chain of events leading the United States to war in 1917. The memory remained as a persuasive argument for post–World War II NATO shipping arrangements.

Something similar could happen to us and/or to certain of our allies. Common Pacific and South Asian sea lanes cross Chinese-claimed zones, and China is no ally. While the United States seeks no confrontation, it is our settled policy to protect our Pacific maritime interests.

We must think hard about the armed side of maritime strategy, and Dr. Friedman has done so. We should now consider the unarmed commercial side. Our overall aim in each case is to avoid entrapment in situations where the United States might feel obliged to choose between initiating violence or sacrificing our interests.

The soft-power presence of U.S.-flagged merchant ships in the Pacific region provides a check on the sort of nonviolent coercive action an emerging sea power might otherwise effectively use against our interests and those of our regional allies. Let us consider adequacy and presence in our merchant marine and related American commercial shipbuilding as well as in U.S. warfighting power. Both are needed in the changed strategic environment.

So Much Strategy, So Little Strategic Direction

(See M. Junge, pp. 47–50, February 2012; and M. Cancian, p. 9, March 2012 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Matthew Klopfer, U.S. Navy—Commander Junge’s insightful article addresses an issue of certain importance and numerous intricacies.

In a world of uncertainty—in which external conditions are not easy to predict—there is undoubted value in broad strategic discussion. The conflicts of tomorrow will be faced by the Navy of that day, irrespective of a strategy document’s vision. Consequently, planners are asked to discuss a moving target.

Insofar as the Navy actually may adhere to published strategies, their profusion is not necessarily constructive, and there is cause for concern. However, such adherence may not be significantly observable.

The evident pattern, in practice, is a type of meta-strategy that straddles or balances various strategic objectives. Seapower 21 specifically described itself as broad and dialectic. The most recent strategy is accused of being overly so. As Commander Junge demonstrates, this may not be strategic direction at all.

However, a benefit of such a mindset is the respect it gives to the unpredictable nature of future circumstances and emergent threats. With that in mind, decision-makers may seek out the shared attributes of strategic priorities, emphasizing preparedness. The Navy has a natural interest in flexibility given lengthy acquisition schedules, varying political environments, and the indeterminable probability of high-impact risks.

Budgeting could be an impediment to the pursuit of a single strategy. However, it also could be a foil to overabundant strategic goals. It can drive decision-making that balances strategies and illuminates risk tolerance. As a result, we may hope to adapt to a greater variety of strategic frameworks. As a current example, budget pressure informs the debate over presence in the littorals, as well as mission-specific hardware to that end. However, that the budgeting process is opaque and esoteric is further evidence for its criticism.

A more vigorous strategic culture, as the author suggests, could be a great hope for the naval service. The challenge in agreeing on a single, focused strategy may be significant, but it is an affliction that may have some merit.

‘Useful Sentinels’

(See R. Parker and M. Brown, pp. 22–27, February 2012 Proceedings)

Commander David L. Teska, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve—Vice Admirals Parker and Brown gave a great update on the Coast Guard’s new fast-response cutter, sorely needed in the fleet. The Sentinel class is destined to get named after Coast Guard enlisted men (and I presume women). If all in the Sentinel class have not yet been named, I’d like to recommend First Class Machinery Technician (MK1) Jeffrey Palazzo and Second Class Port Securityman (PS2) Vincent Danz. Both died during the 9/11 terrorist attacks while performing their civilian duties with the New York Fire Department and Police Department, respectively. Naming fast-response cutters after MK1 Palazzo and PS2 Danz would truly honor these two Coast Guard heroes.

Sailors Need to Learn Navy History

(See T. D. Tavolazzi, p. 12, January 2012; and R. F. Dunn, p. 84, March 2012 Proceedings)

Ensign Kenneth G. Hagner, U.S. Navy Reserve—It was great to see another sailor acknowledge an observation I have long held: that today’s sailors want for a deep knowledge of the history of our service. It is even more impressive that this was put forth by a former Marine; I have long held that the Navy has a lot to learn from the Corps in how we imbue a sense of history and traditions in our people.

Lieutenant Commander Tavolazzi makes a great case for this need, and this naval-history education needs to be pervasive throughout a sailor’s career. It should not be a one-time lecture delivered in boot camp or officer-candidate school and then never again touched upon. To be serious about this, the Navy must make continual learning of its legacy a part of each and every advancement or promotion in rank.

What is more is that we have many wonderful stories to be told, from Stephen Decatur to the Battle of Mobile Bay to Midway, up to and including our present conflicts. Shame on all of us for not doing a better job of instilling this sense of connection to our past in all of our people.

I have often quizzed junior sailors on basics that I feel they all should know, and it is depressing to see how many have no idea who Esek Hopkins was (even though they should have learned this in boot camp or during their surface-warfare qualifications). At sea for many months as a civilian contractor, I interact with many junior sailors daily. Some have dual warfare qualifications on their chests, but they cannot articulate why the Battle of Leyte Gulf was significant, or who Alfred Thayer Mahan was. On more than one occasion I even have spoken with officers who have no clue as to what the significance was of the island-hopping campaign used by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, or who John Holland was.

Instilling a sense of history in our people will not happen simply through any program or directive. It needs to be a role that each of us embraces to ensure the past is not forgotten, and that it serves our shipmates as a guide for the future path of our Sea Services.

Maximizing Minimum Manning

(See J. Schonberg, p. 52–57, January 2012; P. L. Dragone, pp. 8–9, February 2012; and R. Poore, p. 85, March 2012 Proceedings)

Commander Ronald E. Swart, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Lieutenant Schonberg reminded me of the challenges that confronted the U.S. mine-warfare community after Operation Desert Storm––challenges we continue to face today. Our ability to respond to Iraq’s mining of the northern Persian Gulf stimulated a rapid expansion of the mineman rate, which exposed the pitfalls of minimum manning coupled with minimal training.

In 1992 the Navy’s mine-countermeasures (MCM) ships faced severe manning shortages in their most critical combat-systems rates. Experienced sonarmen, operations specialists, boatswain’s mates, and electricians were in short supply. The list of one-tour MCM “veterans” was impressively long, because multiple tours in MCM affected advancement. Expanding the mineman rate to assume these roles offered the promise of stable, experienced manning. Unfortunately, A-schools with comprehensive curriculums were deemed unaffordable, and there was enormous pressure to minimize entry-level training. When coupled with detailing pressures to fill sea billets with bodies, the agreed-on mineman-conversion plan quickly fell apart. In 2012 we have a rate with only the most basic of MCM skills and little, if any, ordnance training.

Putting trained minemen to sea would have been far more successful if personnel and training management had been more closely coordinated. Like the littoral combat ship (LCS) engineering rates Lieutenant Schonberg discussed, LCS mission packages will require a “hybrid” sailor, whose skills are not yet fully defined for unmanned systems and advancing technologies. Given the planned 55-ship LCS fleet, advancement potential for traditional rates should not be affected and skills might be compatible across mission packages.

Still, important lessons are to be learned from the early-1990s mineman-expansion experience. Once leadership determines which rates will maintain and operate unmanned systems, essentially that will be the birth of a new rating. Initial training and education will be critical. Detailing must accommodate multifaceted sailors to ensure that their promotion opportunities and sea-shore rotations are fair and equitable. Personnel management, education, and training for this new-breed LCS mission-package sailor must be cohesive, with all responsible communities evenly yoked to the task in order to meet the challenges that lie ahead––dramatically underscored by Iran’s threats to mine the Strait of Hormuz.

‘Up Ladder!’

(See K. Albaugh and J. Carriker, pp. 58–62, January 2012; R. Salta, p. 8, February 2012; and K. Albaugh, p. 8, March 2012 Proceedings)

Major Mark A. Traylor, U.S. Army (Retired)—As I read Lieutenant Albaugh’s and Chief Petty Officer Carriker’s article, it occurred to me that some of the staffing for the visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) teams could very well come from detachments of U.S. Marines embarked for the deployment. Having naval ratings in the team is obviously necessary for the reasons cited. Having a sub-element of the VBSS team focused on being prepared for the initial boarding, search, and seizure aspects with the concomitant possible tactical engagements could make the aid-rendering, rescue, or exploitation aspects of the visit more benign and thus more effective.

Rooted in tradition and practiced recently, this seems a promising avenue to explore as the Marines seek to rediscover their maritime roots, after a lengthy period of sustained land-combat operations.

The Marines of course originally were established, and so named, to serve with the Fleet. The Continental Congress’ personnel-selection criteria for the first two battalions in 1775 included “such as are good seamen, or so acquainted with maritime affairs as to be able to serve to advantage by sea when required.” The idea of using Marines and sailors together in VBSS teams is obvious enough to already have been done. The amphibious ready group built around the USS Peleliu (LHA-5) recently conducted just such a drill, with satisfactory results.

Commandant of the Marine Corps General John F. Amos, in discussing the results of the Marines’ Force Structure Review Group, announced that the Corps “will also explore options for employing Marines from a wider variety of Navy ships, seeking more integrated naval solutions. . . .” (See “U.S. Marines Corps in Review, pp. 84–90, May 2011 Proceedings.)

Lieutenant Albaugh’s and Chief Petty Officer Carriker’s solution for generating the VBSS teams would work, although possibly at the expense of team-building and relationships formed by virtue of being integral to the crew. A Marine detachment on board for the entire deployment, or even assigned to the ship as a normal tour of duty, would not be a waste of resources. With the current thrust toward ship-crew reductions, assigned Marines, as they were in the past, could be trained to perform duties to enable them to stand watches in various shipboard billets. Secondary battery, lookouts (does the Navy still use them?), communications, Combat Information Center, and helicopter operations come to mind. Overlaying them on, versus integrating them into, the duty roster would provide some flexibility that the authors mentioned was a detractor from VBSS readiness.

This appears to be an opportunity for both naval services to create some synergy, enhance capability, and put some of their initiatives into operation.