For most of its existence, the aircraft carrier has been the centerpiece of the U.S. Navy. Forward-thinking visionaries predicted as much during the 1930s, but the Coral Sea campaign in May 1942 and the resounding victory at Midway a month later forever cemented the flattop’s prominent place in America’s battle fleet.
During its 90 years in the Navy, the aircraft carrier has come a long way, from the modest beginnings of the USS Langley (CV-1) in 1922 through the Essex-class workhorses of World War II and Korea, on to the nuclear-powered supercarriers of the Nimitz class that sail the world’s oceans today. That brief listing shows how the ship type evolved significantly over the decades. But although several Nimitz-class carriers have joined the Fleet in the past 15 years and will continue to serve until the middle of the century, the design itself originated in the 1960s. Now it’s time for the next generation—the Gerald R. Ford class.
We lead off this month with an illuminating look at the Gerald R. Ford and what she and her sister ships will bring to the future Navy. Authors Rear Admiral William Moran, Rear Admiral Thomas Moore, and retired Captain Ed McNamee, all of whom are working on the program, acknowledge that the new carriers come at a high cost per copy, but they also detail the capabilities the ships will provide that make the class a true “leap ahead.”
What will the air wing for these carriers and the remaining Nimitz class look like? Will its future complexion change much? Daniel Goure, a national-security analyst at the Lexington Institute, says no, at least not in the immediate future. Sure, the Navy will have the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and new unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to roll out, but most of the old-standby strike and reconnaissance aircraft aren’t going away anytime soon. And even unmanned systems still need people to run them.
But is the Navy running its unmanned systems properly? Lieutenant Lawrence Lederer and Commander John Byington don’t think so. They believe the Navy is stuck in a “brown-shoe” mindset when it comes to staffing UAS, and contend that a profusion of diverse skills and talent are being overlooked because of the myopic belief that only trained aviators can manage and operate these systems—when in fact a very different set of skills is involved.
While the aircraft carrier remains a top priority of the Navy, another vessel is much debated and discussed by service leaders and naval analysts alike these days. The Littoral Combat Ship continues to resurface in the news, its latest round of coverage coming on the heels of the Perez Report. As the third LCS, the Fort Worth (LCS-3), makes ready for her commissioning, retired Navy Captain Robert Carney Powers, who was present at the creation of the concept, provides us with a helpful overview of the 1990s origins of the program. Assessing how we got to where we are now, Powers asks where we go from here.
But lest we get too focused on platforms, we should not lose sight of some of the less-visible aspects of warfighting, such as networking and information technology. These capabilities are “just as core to an operationally effective Fleet as are new aircraft platforms, future nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, or new surface combatants and submarines” and must be funded appropriately, say Navy Captains James H. Mills and Jim Adams. They fear the Navy’s combat systems have become too dependent on off-site support and that as a result, the service’s network may not be able to endure a major conflict.
Technology and its attendant gadgets have certainly become ubiquitous in everyday life. But is it too much of a good thing? Does technology serve to stunt leadership by allowing commanders at all levels to micromanage their subordinates? Lieutenant Kermit Jones worries that we are producing a generation of leaders afraid to make decisions without guidance from their superiors. Technology is merely a tool, he reminds us, but only the commander at the scene can decide how that tool is used.
How technology manifests itself through social media can have even more insidious effects, especially on current and future warfare. Paul Scharre, who works in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, attributes such sweeping movements as the Arab Spring to tech-savvy militants who organized over social networks. He also fears the proliferation of GPS, which in the hands of adversaries could compromise U.S. troop movements. Our military fails to recognize this reality at its peril, Scharre warns.