Punch Them in the Nose . . . and then Leave
(See J. T. Kuehn, pp. 24–28, July 2012 Proceedings)
Admiral James G. Stavridis, U.S. Navy; Commander, U.S. European Command; NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe—While I certainly sympathize with the thrust of Commander Kuehn’s title in his energetic article about the situation in Afghanistan, I’d like to offer a somewhat different perspective from my position as the Supreme Allied Commander for all NATO operations.
In comparison with the Soviet Union, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) coalition has devoted great resources to human capital and infrastructure development, and we have provided significantly greater troop numbers for kinetic operations; we already are well under way with a responsible and managed turnover of security responsibilities to Afghan National Security Forces. Most important, the international community’s commitment to Afghanistan after the majority of ISAF forces are withdrawn in 2014 is real and tangible: Detailed planning is in progress now in NATO.
A few key metrics to consider:
• NATO/ISAF is a 50-nation troop-contributing coalition with about a 2:1 ratio of the United States to other nations, both in troop levels and those killed in action. The Soviets were on their own and deployed far fewer troops.
• As witnessed by the Bonn and Tokyo international conferences on Afghanistan, a truly global coalition of more than 90 nations and hundreds of non-governmental humanitarian organizations is pledged for another decade of engagement in Afghanistan. Under the Soviets this was not the case.
• Afghan troops are in the lead for security in 75 percent of the country today as the third tranche of transition moves them to the lead.
• Independent polling shows approval ratings for Afghan security forces at well over 80 percent, while the Taliban poll less than 10 percent nationally.
• NATO/ISAF will leave a capable “train, equip, and mentor” mission in Afghanistan post-2014 when the bulk of the combat forces will be withdrawn.
• Afghanistan has 8 million children in school (3.5 million girls) as opposed to fewer than 500,000 under the Taliban.
• Electricity availability has increased sixfold in terms of population with access.
• Healthcare availability has gone from 6 percent to more than 60 percent, and infant mortality and maternal mortality rates are dropping rapidly.
• Coalition casualties are down 15 percent, ISAF-caused civilian casualties down 51 per cent, and casualties caused by insurgents down 15 percent (August 2011–August 2012).
• As an example of the broad base of international support, Russia is also assisting the current effort by allowing ISAF support material to be transported through its territory to and from Afghanistan and by participating in the NATO–Russian Council Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund and the Counter Narcotics Training Project.
Overall, our plan is indeed to “punch them in the nose,” but in terms that go beyond simple kinetic operations. We must and will continue engagement post-2014 with Afghans fully in the lead for security with NATO/ISAF mentorship, support, and assistance. This was the clear message from the recent Chicago Summit, and in NATO today we are doing the detailed planning to fulfill that message.
If we execute this plan I believe we have a reasonable chance at success in Afghanistan, despite the many challenges.
Needed: A Sub Change
(See N. Polmar, pp. 88–89, July 2012; and R. Butrovich, p. 84, August 2012 Proceedings)
Norman Polmar, author, Death of the Thresher—Mr. Butrovich disagrees “completely” with my statement that the initial event that caused the loss of the submarine USS Thresher (SSN-593) was the S5W reactor scram. He bases his views on his later experiences in the submarine Tinosa (SSN-606), which had been extensively modified and had new scram-recovery procedures. But he does not tell us what he believes was the initial event that sank the Thresher.
The last series of AN/UQC voice messages from the Thresher on 10 April 1963 began with “experiencing minor problem.” When I interviewed the first commanding officer of the Thresher in the summer of 1963, then-Captain Dean L. Axene stated that at test depth the only “problem” he would describe as “minor” would have been a reactor scram. Axene added that seawater flooding, even through a ½-inch pipe, would never be described as a minor problem. Several other submarine officers with whom I spoke while writing the book Death of the Thresher (1964) fully agreed with Axene.
Shortly after the loss of the Thresher, then–Vice Admiral H. G. Rickover held a meeting in Washington of his staff and submarine commanding officers for the purpose of revising and reducing the time for reactor-scram restarts.
Finally, the reactor-scram casualty theory is fully agreed to by Bruce Rule, in 1963 the analysis officer at the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) evaluation center at Norfolk and subsequently the lead acoustic analyst in the Office of Naval Intelligence for 42 years. On 3 July 2012, Rule wrote to the Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion:
There is not now—nor was there in 1963—any evidence in the specific case of THRESHER to support the [court of inquiry] conclusion that the rupture of a silver-brazed, sea-connected pipe caused a reactor scram. THRESHER’s 0913 transmission to the [surface ship] SKYLARK—which made no mention of flooding—and analysis of the SOSUS acoustic data are consistent with failure of the non-vital electric bus which resulted in a reactor scram at test depth . . . Unable to deballast because of a subsequently confirmed ice-formation condition in the high-pressure air lines, THRESHER sank to collapse at extreme depth without any prior flooding. Both the pressure hull and all sea-connected systems survived well beyond design specifications.
Admiral John C. Harvey Jr., U.S. Navy; Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command—After reading Mr. Polmar’s column, I felt compelled to correct a number of errors of fact and misperceptions contained in the piece, if only to minimize the confusion for the readers regarding authorities and responsibilities within our submarine force.
Although I disagree with many of the opinions Mr. Polmar espoused, I will limit my comments to matters of command-and-control. I discussed this topic extensively in my article “Course Corrections in Command and Control” in the March 2012 issue of Proceedings. While it would not be productive to repeat everything in that article, let me address a few major points about the leadership of the submarine force.
Mr. Polmar takes aim at the purportedly “convoluted command structure” in the submarine force. His discussion is simply inaccurate and without merit. Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet and I endeavored over the past three years to clarify lines of command-and-control for all forces, taking action to provide clear channels of authority and accountability from fleet commanders to individual units. As a result, the administrative-control relationships of Commander, Submarine Force Atlantic and Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet are very clear. Further, the role of Commander, Submarine Forces as a force commander is also clear, and the submarine force is executing these responsibilities very effectively.
As is the case with each of our warfare communities, the Chief of Naval Operations has a Director of Undersea Warfare (N97) who serves as the Navy’s resource sponsor (responsible for programming resources across the Future Years Defense Program) for our undersea-warfare programs. This is neither new nor unique to the submarine force, as N96 is the Director for Surface Warfare and N98 is the Director for Naval Aviation, with the same responsibilities within their respective warfare areas.
It appears, however, that Mr. Polmar’s primary criticism is reserved for the Director of Naval Reactors. Here again, his criticism is inaccurate. My responsibilities as Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces for the safe and effective operation and maintenance of the nuclear-powered warships assigned to my command are clear and unambiguous. I am accountable directly to the Chief of Naval Operations for every aspect of the performance of my fleet. However, because of the truly unique nature of nuclear propulsion and the very high standards for safety and operational effectiveness required, day in and day out, the Director of Naval Reactors has been afforded broad oversight responsibility for the details of research, design, construction, testing, operation, maintenance, and disposal of all Navy nuclear-propulsion plants since the inception of the program in 1948.
Currently, our Navy has 104 operational reactors (including submarines and aircraft carriers), and this year we will surpass 150 million miles safely steamed on nuclear power. Our success is due in large part to the director’s strong oversight and commitment to the highest standards of operations and safety. The Naval Reactors organization has been consistently recognized not only for its record of excellence, but also for its operational model, by business, academia, and government experts—both in the United States and abroad. I strongly disagree with Mr. Polmar’s criticisms of this organization that has achieved such a record of excellence, and continues to do so, and I believe his fundamental assertion of ambiguous authorities is factually incorrect.
The Farming of the Sea
(See D. Walsh, p. 86, July 2012 Proceedings)
Captain Ward R. Anderson, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—Without question, fish farming is growing. But rather than the one-sided, all-is-well view presented by Dr. Walsh, a week reading the newspapers in Nova Scotia will challenge nearly every assertion in his column.
Dr. Walsh says fishermen like this expansion of fish-farming, and I can understand their desire for work. Lobstermen, too, are fishermen who are hunters, and lobstermen as well as wild-fish fishermen are not happy with the expansion of aquaculture for many reasons. Escaped fish degrade the wild-fish genetics, and the pollution from fish waste, antibiotics, pesticides, and vitamins adversely affects the wild fish and lobster population. Politicians have backpedaled on old promises to limit aquaculture to the dismay of editorial writers and conservation groups, and aggressive expansion is under way.
Wealthy mainland Chinese consumers import high-quality Canadian fish products because they do not trust local Chinese fish sources. Canadian aquaculture is causing concern to Canadian fish exporters. Meanwhile, in the United States, we import these Chinese fish products in incredible and growing amounts.
Winning the Battle, Losing the War
(See S. Cohen, pp. 50–54, June 2012; and J. J. O’Neill, August 2012 Proceedings)
Christopher L. Kolakowski—Bravo Zulu to Mr. Cohen for this thoughtful article regarding the Navy’s strategic-communications and recruiting efforts. He raises a lot of important points that deserve careful consideration by the Navy leadership. In today’s media environment, being able to quickly and clearly articulate your story is critical, both for strategic support and recruiting.
A look at the Army’s recruiting experience is instructive here. It is no accident that of the five most famous ad campaigns of the past millennium, two (James Montgomery Flagg’s Uncle Sam poster from 1917 and “Be All You Can Be” from 1981 to 2001) were U.S. Army productions. “Be All You Can Be” in particular is instructive for the Navy, as it offers a possible way forward. The brainchild of then–Major General Max Thurman, who commanded U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) from 1979 to 1981, “Be All You Can Be” appeared during the “hollow Army” period of the late 1970s when budgets were slashed and the Army faced a similar situation to what the Navy finds itself in today.
Thurman understood that it was not an “all-volunteer Army, but an all-recruited Army.” This simple yet very profound distinction turned USAREC’s focus away from passive messaging to more active communication and selling. His ads focused on an external audience (as opposed to the internal Navy-based focus groups that produced “A Global Force For Good”), and resulted in USAREC going from mission failure by 47 percent in the poor 1979 economy to making mission virtually every year between 1981 and 2000. An excellent explanation of how General Thurman made this work is in the book America’s Army by Beth Bailey.
Today’s Army recruiting and messaging structure is vested in the Army G1, headed by a three-star civilian equivalent who directs the Army Marketing and Research Group based at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and the Pentagon. USAREC (a two-star command also at Fort Knox) is operationally controlled by G1, which ensures coordinated messaging and communication on the recruiting/accessions front. Of course, these efforts also pay off in terms of strategic communication about the Army. The widespread success of “Army Strong” (2006 to present) shows how an effective communications and recruiting effort can also help define the service’s identity.
Lastly, I would like to point out a sub-theme in Cohen’s article, one that has been discussed in several pieces in the pages of this magazine: the lack of holistic, humanities-focused education for naval leaders. The Navy is of necessity very good at technical education, but the naval Max Thurman (whoever he or she may be) needs an education that develops a broader understanding of the Navy and its role in society that an effective strategic-communications program requires.
India’s New Missile
(See N. Friedman, pp. 90–91, June 2012 Proceedings)
Admiral Arun Prakash, Indian Navy (Retired)—I was rather surprised to note that an expert such as Dr. Friedman had allowed some significant errors to creep into his otherwise perceptive commentary. May I provide a few clarifications to set the record straight?
The range claimed for the Agni V ballistic missile by Indian scientists is 5,000 kilometers (3,100 nautical miles) and not 10,000 kilometers. It was the ambiguous Chinese reaction that first accused India of concealing its “actual range of 10,000 km”—that would bring the United States and Europe within its ambit—and then dismissed it as “not a threat.”
The Agni V will not benefit India’s satellite-launch capability. The country has been in that business since 1980 when the Indian-built SLV-3 rocket first placed a satellite into orbit. Since then, giant indigenous launchers have placed about 50 satellites into polar and geo-stationary orbits. It was a U.S.-imposed technology “firewall” between the civil and military rocketry programs that has delayed the development of the Agni V ICBM.
While some of Dr. Friedman’s criticism of India’s Defence Research and Development Organization may be valid, his skepticism about India’s first nuclear submarine is not. The vessel’s launch on 26 July 2009 was widely publicized by international media. This 6,000-ton SSBN will form the third leg of India’s nuclear triad. She is currently undergoing a series of comprehensive system trials, including the firing up of the reactor, before she goes to sea and is then commissioned as the INS Arihant in 2013.
The Arihant will carry a battery of nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, currently of 750–1,000 km range. These will be replaced by SLBMs of intercontinental range at a later stage. A leased Russian Akula II SSN was commissioned by India as the INS Chakra in April 2012. This boat has no connection with the strategic program other than providing some hands-on nuclear experience to personnel and maintainers.
Lastly, an observation about Dr. Friedman’s comment on “Pakistan’s much subtler proposition” of supporting Muslim militancy, and enlisting Saudi Arabian support as a means of countering India. Without the slightest trace of schadenfreude I would like to point out that Pakistan’s Faustian bargain with violent religious fanaticism, rooted in Saudi Arabian Wahabi theology, may have served its (and the CIA’s) short-term aims of defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan and later, tormenting India, but is now ripping this unfortunate nation apart, and pushing it back, socially, culturally, and economically, to the 8th century.
I end by strongly endorsing Dr. Friedman’s proposition that the United States is letting slip essential leverage by not offering high-tech military technology to India, a country with which it signed the unprecedented civil nuclear deal in 2007. Let me illustrate: While the USSR/Russia has, so far, entrusted India with two nuclear subs on lease, and will soon be transferring a modernized 45,000-ton aircraft-carrier with fourth-generation fighters, the only piece of U.S. hardware in the Indian Navy today is the 44-year-old USS Trenton, now serving as the INS Jalashwa.