As the need to form a unified front to address the challenges faced by both the military and the Foreign Service grows, the Departments of State and Defense continue to reach out to one another in the interest of collaboration. The Department of State’s Foreign Policy Advisor (POLAD) program is a response to the increasing demand for the interagency cooperation necessary to successfully pursue the missions of both departments, with what Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called “more cross-fertilization, more interchange.”1 To date, however, the POLAD program’s reach into the Navy remains limited to the upper echelons. A recent push to broaden the POLAD program has sought to again expand the relationship with the Navy, and connect carrier strike groups with invaluable foreign-policy advisors. The question is, will it work?
Not So Different
The Departments of State and Defense have more in common than one may expect. Besides consular support, State is concerned with maintaining peace and security, providing humanitarian assistance, and developing international relationships. The declared mission of the Department of State is to:
Advance freedom for the benefit of the American people and the international community by helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world composed of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international system.2
The mission of the DOD, meanwhile, “is to provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of our country.”3 While the methods may be vastly different, peace and security are fundamental to the core missions of both State and DOD.
Naval command missions range from maritime-security issues (both nationally and internationally) to providing humanitarian assistance and responses to a range of international crises. Within the DOD framework, the Department of the Navy strives “to maintain, train and equip combat-ready Naval forces capable of winning wars, deterring aggression and maintaining freedom of the seas,” but the Navy also takes on a variety of missions beyond the traditional “military” objectives.4 For instance, the naval component for U.S. Central Command, 5th Fleet, defines its mission as “ensuring stability in the region, countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ensuring access to strategic natural resources.”5 This has grown to include “civil affairs missions, maritime interception operations, humanitarian aid,” and “combined exercises,” as well as engaging regional allies through special programs for security assistance.6
Bridging the Gap
The Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs is a bridge connecting State and Defense in support of shared objectives. The overlap in missions is best illustrated by the “Three Ds”: defense, diplomacy, and development.7 Operating along what Dr. John Finney, a former advisor to the chief of the National Guard Bureau, called the “seam between foreign policy and national security policy,” is the POLAD—a highly experienced Foreign Service Officer (FSO), whose purpose is to provide support to military commands by working in tandem with commanders themselves.8 By evaluating the political implications of military actions, and keeping the commander in the loop with international events as they unfold, a POLAD brings a new dimension of diplomacy into the military command. As military leaders find themselves dealing more frequently with civilians abroad, a POLAD boosts the command’s diplomatic and political capabilities by bringing in Foreign Service experience and providing a link back to the Department of State.
A military command armed with the “soft power” of diplomacy is better equipped to win the hearts and minds of the people, an objective that has been defined as crucial to many of our military missions abroad. The addition of diplomatic capabilities to the diverse arsenal of a carrier strike group—one of the United States’ most impressive and visible projections of military power—would expand the reach of our soft power and continue to strengthen relationships with foreign states.9 Positive experiences working with POLADs can encourage military commanders to reach out more often to diplomats as well. Interpersonal ties between players in both State and DOD can lead to an increased level of interagency cooperation and coordination, and bringing everyone to the table will lead to a more unified response to national-security issues.
Views from the Fleet
A deployed carrier strike group often deals with the overlap between State and DOD. Rear Admiral Terry B. Kraft, currently the commander of CSG 12, remarked that humanitarian assistance, noncombatant-evacuation operations, and direct contact with foreign vessels and foreign governments are typical experiences for a deployed strike group. A POLAD would help coordinate between the strike-group commander and other agencies, or non-governmental organizations, as well as keep the commander dialed in to situations in the many states with which the strike group would interact. Additionally, as State’s diplomatic missions in Iraq and Afghanistan expand, a POLAD linking the mission on the ground to the Navy commanders in the area would be invaluable.10
A second strike-group commander does not believe that POLAD support would be particularly effective during regular operations but remarked that during “a major multinational exercise or operation,” a POLAD would be of great worth. The knowledge and experience a POLAD brings to the table can be very useful, based on the commander’s experiences with advisors at other commands. In particular, a POLAD can provide a commander with a crucial regional context, keeping the commander up to date on current events, as well as providing background on the history and culture of a particular region or country. A POLAD can contribute to the diplomatic, economic, political, economic, and social assessments of countries, making it possible for strike-group commanders to “optimize engagement opportunities.”11
A third strike-group commander, who also had previously worked with a POLAD, agreed that it was not only political expertise, but the FSO’s knowledge of local culture and customs that were valuable assets to a strike group.12 Admiral Kraft commented that he could have used a POLAD as the political uprisings associated with the Arab Spring turned the Arab world on its head—with CSG 12 in the thick of it. Having a seasoned FSO on board would have given the commander a better understanding of political events as they unfolded, and bridged the gap in the security world between the sphere of politics and diplomacy, and that of military force.13
Selecting an advisor-candidate for placement with a carrier strike group must be a deliberate process. Rather than finding a “warm body” to fill an assignment, a POLAD must fit well with the command.14 An assignment to a strike group would come with unique demands, so the ideal candidate would need a very specific set of skills and traits. Admiral Kraft suggested that a POLAD would have to come aboard with an open mind, with some experience with or understanding of the Navy—including an ability to “speak Navy.” Some knowledge of naval operations would be necessary, as well as the flexibility to adapt to life on a ship.15 Views regarding the importance of selecting the right person for the job were emphatic, and one commander stated that “[u]ltimately…it depends on the personality of the POLAD and how well he or she can work with the commander and the staff,” and his or her ability to not only understand and appreciate the culture of the Navy, but also to integrate into the command and be accepted as “a vital member of the team.”16
While a POLAD tour with a deployed carrier strike group could play out in a number of ways, depending on the mission objectives, a period of training and harmonization prior to deployment would be vital to a successful tour. A part of any POLAD pre-deployment training program ideally would include participation in the strike group’s workups and certifications, a point on which several strike-group commanders agreed. This would give the POLAD a crucial introduction to the inner workings of the strike group, and allow the advisor, the commander, and senior staff to develop working relationships essential to the success of any POLAD assignment. As former POLAD David T. Jones pointed out, “The key to POLAD effectiveness . . . is trust.”17 Both Admiral Kraft and Jones suggested that once the strike group deployed, the advisor would not necessarily be on board all the time, but likely be sent into those states being supported by the strike group to help track unfolding events or coordinate between the command and the diplomatic mission, or move between ships as necessary.
State Perspectives—and Reticence
In 2009 Jones wrote The Future of Foreign Policy Advisors (POLADS) in the 21st Century, discussing a survey sent to active-duty and former POLADs, as well as State-DOD exchange officers, and State faculty and students at DOD schools. In a recent interview, he further discussed one topic touched on in his survey: the potential for a POLAD assignment on an aircraft carrier. He thought it sounded innovative. In the survey, however, he was surprised by an overwhelmingly negative response among POLADs to the suggestion, specifically citing one respondent who equated such an assignment with “being assigned to an Antarctic base—or even a punishment tour,” an apparently widely held view.18
Recommendations regarding the way forward with the expansion of the POLAD program are necessarily nuanced—the best answer to whether strike groups should be able to request POLAD support being, it depends. As long as the opportunity remains on the table, the Department of State should take advantage of DOD’s willingness to promote diplomacy as a crucial aspect of military affairs. Well-qualified advisors whose training, experience, and personality match the needs of a carrier strike group should be assigned to those commands that feel they would benefit from the support of a POLAD. However, as the selection and assignment of POLADs is a collaborative process between State and the gaining military command, both sides must continue to take great care in selection, bearing in mind the nature of such an assignment.
A tour embarked with a carrier strike group would present a number of unique challenges for any POLAD. The stark contrast between an FSO’s typical lifestyle and life on board a Navy ship, as well as the almost alien culture of the Navy from the FSO’s perspective, would demand not only the willingness, but the ability to adapt quickly. Experiences working with the Navy would be crucial in preparing a POLAD for placement with a strike group. Prior service in the Navy, or educational experience at the Naval War College—resident or nonresident—would be preferable. A POLAD should come into a Navy assignment with an understanding of not only how the Navy operates, but also a sense of its culture.
So the greatest obstacle to the assignment of POLADs to carrier strike groups likely will come from within the Department of State, from prospective advisors themselves. The prevailing view that an assignment on board a ship equates to “punishment” could threaten to keep well-qualified candidates away from these assignments. Because shipboard living can be a difficult adjustment to make, there must be clear value in such duty. Follow-on assignments should make use of the POLAD’s newfound understanding of the military and draw on this interagency experience to continue strengthening ties with DOD.
Getting to Know the Navy
It is important to keep in mind that the POLAD program is, as Admiral Kraft called it, a “two-way street.” Throughout the POLAD’s tour, a deeper appreciation of Navy culture would of course be developed, and these valuable new perspectives taken back into the Department of State later on. As interagency cooperation becomes more and more important to national security, having experienced FSOs with an understanding of the Navy’s operations and ties to Navy leadership will further contribute to State capabilities—as long as there are programs capable of tapping into these new talents.
Relevant regional experience without exposure to the Navy could impede interest in such an assignment, or cause unnecessary friction between a POLAD and the command. More encouragement from within the Department of State to pursue earlier opportunities to gain exposure to Navy operations would better prepare FSOs for future interagency assignments. A culture shift within State may be necessary to recognize the value of educational opportunities with the Naval War College. Participation in Naval War College offerings should be encouraged, including those outside the traditional graduate-degree program.
A potential revitalization of the currently dysfunctional POLAD Reserve—designed to pool candidates for participation in military exercises and contingencies—would open another avenue of interagency cooperation to give future POLADs crucial experience working with the military, particularly the U.S. Navy, given its humanitarian-relief capabilities.19
Opportunities for FSOs to engage in war games or other exercises with the Navy as role-players or subject-matter experts will help build the experience and understanding necessary for a POLAD to later support a Navy command.
In turn, the Navy should continue to pursue interagency involvement by cooperating with the Department of State. Feedback from interested commands is necessary to clearly define the role of the POLAD and ensure that candidates will meet the needs of the command. Existing programs that allow FSOs to work with the Navy are crucial to building the skills of future POLADs, and exchanges that bring Navy officers to the Department of State similarly will provide the interaction necessary to sustain interagency cooperation.
Coming Aboard
On one hand, Navy commanders are ready and willing to work with POLADs. They see them as valuable assets, with the command benefiting from the addition of State perspectives to the decision-making process. This stance is heavily nuanced, however, with emphasis on making sure that above all, the POLAD is carefully selected to best fit the command and the mission. While a number of missions could benefit from the support of a POLAD, others would be less appropriate allocations of the limited staff available for Foreign Service positions. Jones notes that a number of responses to his survey observed “that commanders who want POLADs now have POLADs—if they want them, there are discretionary funds to hire civilians on an ad hoc basis.”20
On the other hand, the potential for an assignment with a command at the level of a carrier strike group brought mostly negative views from respondents in Jones’ survey. Concerns were raised that FSOs are already spread thin, and further expansion into the Department of Defense would be difficult. Beyond this, the lower-level FSOs who would fill strike-group positions would be inherently less experienced, with less value added to the command. Some former POLADs did note that commands involved with stability, governance, reconstruction, and development, or commands that work more frequently with civilians would best use a POLAD.21
Efforts by the Departments of State and Defense to expand the POLAD program to strike groups have great potential. And effort is what it will take to professionally and mentally prepare FSOs for the demands of an assignment to a strike group. Navy commanders must also take a proactive role and step up communication not only with the Department of State, but also with Navy leadership, to make clear the needs of the commands and the willingness to request POLAD support. Increased mission capabilities and a stronger relationship are clear objectives for both State and DOD. Linking the political and diplomatic assets offered by POLADs with the Navy’s carrier strike groups—some of our nation’s greatest projections of power—would be a significant step toward effective interagency cooperation and united security efforts.
1. David T. Jones, The Politico-Military Function and the Department of State: The Future of Foreign Policy Advisors (POLADs) in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2009), 15.
2. Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2007–2012 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, 2007), www.state.gov/documents/organization/86291.pdf.
3. “About the Department of Defense (DOD),” U.S. Department of Defense, 2011, www.defense.gov/about/.
4. “Navy Organization,” Navy.mil, www.navy.mil/navydata/organization/org-top.asp.
5. Robert Schneller, Anchor of Resolve: A History of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command/Fifth Fleet, (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 2007), 43.
6. Ibid., 100.
7. David Arulanantham and Ted Gehr, “PACOM 3Ds Forward Initiative: How One COCOM Is Addressing Program Needs and Evaluation” (presentation, Strategic Advancements in Diplomacy and Defense: 2011 POLAD Conference, Washington, DC, 24 May 2011).
8. “State Department Veteran Blazes POLAD Trail for Guard,” US Fed News Service, 10 September 2010.
9. Adam Scher, “Political Advisors: Harnessing the Soft Power of Brigade Commanders,” Military Review, January–February 2010, 73.
10. RADM Terry B. Kraft (Commander, Carrier Strike Group 12), email to author, June 2011.
11. Undisclosed (commander, carrier strike group), email to author, June 2011.
12. Undisclosed (commander, carrier strike group), email to author, June 2011.
13. Kraft email.
14. Jones, The Politico-Military Function, 35.
15. Kraft email.
16. Undisclosed commander email.
17. Jones, The Politico-Military Function, 36.
18. Ibid, 14.
19. Jerry E. Sullivan (Deputy Director of the POLAD Office), interview with the author, June 2011.
20. Jones, The Politico-Military Function, 72.
21. Ibid.