Twilight of the $UPERfluous Carrier
(See H. J. Hendrix and J. N. Williams, pp. 21–26, May 2011 Proceedings)
Richard Selman—Captain Hendrix’s and Lieutenant Colonel Williams’ assertion that the supercarriers are superfluous lies beyond my comprehension of the laws and prerogatives of the sea. In one sentence they state CVNs are extremely vulnerable and in another maintain that cost and signature are the primary concerns. The projected amphib function of the America class is curious at this point, since a major amphibious operation has not been made in decades. Also, given the fact that the light carrier cannot launch and recover fixed-wing aircraft simultaneously, these assault ships would not be able to fulfill many combat requirements. Hangar space would be restricted as well as ordnance storage. Why CVNs would be more vulnerable than amphibs was never shown.
Finally, giving the primary attack mission to submarine missiles and drones would assure many more off-target hits and civilian casualties. Ironically, the solution to funding supercarriers and F-35s would be to encourage more Alaska, California, and North Dakota oil production. Scrapping the only difference between the U.S. and Chinese navies puts a seal of approval on Chinese hegemony in Asian waters.
Remo Salta—After reading a photo caption in Captain Hendrix’s and Lieutenant Colonel Williams’ article proposing building 60 America-class amphibious assault ships, at first I thought it was a printing error. But after reading the rest of the article, one discovers that the authors were really serious.
As the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program has clearly demonstrated, simply building 50 escort ships has been a Herculean task that was fraught with mismanagement and gigantic cost overruns. And now we are to believe that the same thing would not happen in building 60 carriers, plus their air wings? The cost for this would be staggering. Put another way, if what the authors say is true and we can purchase three light carriers for every nuclear-powered supercarrier, that means we could buy 20 supercarriers for the price of 60 light carriers. Let’s say that this number is off by even as much as five. That would still be 15 new supercarriers for the same price as 60 light carriers. So tell me, how many admirals at the Pentagon would not want to have another 15 new nuclear-powered carriers rather than 60 smaller light carriers?
Simply having a lot of light carriers is not the solution, but they can play an important role in a high/low mix of sea-based air power every major navy needs. The new America class is basically the Wasp class but without the well-deck. Currently, we have only eight Wasp-class carriers. Since the Tarawa-class ships need to be replaced anyway, why not extend the production line of the Wasps and add a few more to the America class, bringing up the total number for both classes to about 20 ships? That would add flexibility to our high/low mix and would provide a generous number of short-takeoff/vertical-landing carriers to supplement our current inventory of nuclear-powered carriers.
We should also re-examine the LCS program. We could still end these two outrageously expensive and unproven warships and purchase something much more sensible, such as an enlarged version of the Danish Absalon class, which has already proven its worth on antipiracy missions off the coast of Somalia. A slightly larger and faster version of that ship could carry up to four helicopters (rather than the two now carried) plus some unmanned aerial vehicles. The Absalons are better armed than any amphibious-assault vessel, making them much more capable of defending themselves against a potential adversary. This class also has some amphibious-assault capabilities, which would make the vessels ideal for humanitarian-relief missions.
With a more reasonable high/low mix of Wasp, America, and nuclear-powered carriers plus an Absalon-like replacement for the LCS, we will probably achieve many of the same objectives that Captain Hendrix and Lieutenant Colonel Williams are searching for, but at a much more reasonable price. Especially in this new era of shrinking defense budgets.
Another View
(See E. Smith cartoon, p. 10, May 2011 Proceedings)
Admiral James G. Stavridis, U.S. Navy; Supreme Allied Commander, NATO—As the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and director of NATO Allied Operations, I was dismayed at the cartoon depicting a NATO puppet being directed by the United States in the Libyan operation. Nothing could be further from the truth.
The operation in Libya, conducted by the 28 nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is very much an international operation. Of the 40 flag and general officers involved, only 5 are from the United States. Of the 15–20 ships on station in the arms embargo on any given day, none of them is from the United States. Of the 80 strike aircraft conducting combat operations over Libya, none is from the United States. Ditto for the no-fly-zone operation.
The United States, as a key alliance member, continues to contribute essential refueling, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. U.S. Predators still operate on key missions. But, as President Barack Obama has said, the strike operations and the leadership of the Libyan operation remain principally vested within our European partners. This is appropriate and sensible, given the proximity of Libya to Europe.
Today, of the 150,000 NATO troops operating around the world in Afghanistan, Libya, the Balkans, counterpiracy, and other missions, more than 50,000 come from our European partners. They are doing a good job, and in Libya in particular, their efforts lead the way.
Return to the American Way of War
(See S. F. Kime, pp. 40–43, May 2011 Proceedings)
John H. Schuyler—Captain Kime makes a thought-provoking case for a different approach to when and how we make war; unfortunately, he both clouds his point when he romanticizes the militia in U.S. history and ignores changes in historical circumstances. If we had relied on the unreliable militia in the Revolutionary War, we would still be a British dominion today. It was no accident that the veterans of the officer corps of the Continental Army were the proponents of a strong federal government that could support both adequate land and sea forces. Militia-based defense was already an anachronism in the late 18th century.
The citizen armed forces of World War II were not the equivalent of calling out the militia. They were the result of a monumental effort to quickly build a huge, highly capable professional force on the base of a very small professional standing military. Does that success make Captain Kime’s case? Perhaps, if one ignored that we have neither the same insulation effect of the two great oceans we had then, nor, in the modern world, the same luxury of time. We won’t have over two years (as we did September 1939 through December 1941) while others fight. Neither can we expect any war to remotely be the same.
Having said that, Captain Kime still raises many interesting points on how America should face the world.
Weldon C. Gray—At last, a career military officer stands up and speaks out! Every point Captain Kime made is true. We have abused our Constitution through the faceless military-industrial complex’s budget, taxing the citizens of this nation so admirals and generals, along with their congressional cheerleaders, could have their way.
Waste does not or cannot aptly describe our resources lost to this mythical concept of national defense, nor the misery and despair it has brought to nations we have bullied in the name of defense.
Our nation began in 1776 to create a government wherein the just powers derived from the consent of the governed. Our national strength lies in our founding principles, not in our vast arsenal of destructive devices. Thank you, Captain Kime. You deserve a 21-gun salute.
We Need to Square Away Navy Camouflage
(See T. Kiefer, p. 14, May 2011 Proceedings)
Chief Electronics Technician Vance “Bud” Holley Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Kiefer’s offering was embarrassingly accurate and right on target. Regarding the photo of young sailors in “aquaflage,” the only uniform that made sense was worn by the command master chief addressing them. During the last 50 years of my own active and retired Navy career, numerous uniform changes were tested, tweaked, and implemented, some of which triggered a “head scratch” once the novelty abated.
In contrast to the current Navy working uniform (NWU), the early enlisted dungarees were neither flashy nor appropriate for off-base travel and were completely incapable of hiding stains. They were, however, perfectly suited for most ship/shore work stations, maintainable, comfortable, and cost-effective. Today’s concept of a common work uniform for E-1 through O-10 makes perfect sense, setting aside a dated tradition, closing ranks. But the NWU must be designed with functionality, suitability, and supportability in mind. We live and operate within a professional Navy culture where stealth is a key component of every survivability equation. Shouldn’t our uniforms reflect that same thinking? Let’s not ask our sailors to dress for a parade. Our posters and our people should leave no doubt that we are “military grade.”
Cold Front on a Warming Arctic
Russia Opens Its Maritime Arctic
(See B. S. Zellen, pp. 44–49; and L. W. Brigham, pp. 50–54, May 2011 Proceedings)
Captain Dwight Gertz, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—I agree with comments that warming of the Arctic Ocean probably will create an opportunity for great-power rivalry. One effect of that rivalry will be an increase in the importance of the small number of pieces of solid land in the far North. One potential flashpoint could be the Svalbard Archipelago. Reaching past 80 degrees north, Svalbard was placed under “full and absolute” Norwegian sovereignty by a 1920 treaty.
The same treaty, however, grants access for commercial purposes such as fishing, hunting, and mineral exploitation to other countries, most significantly Russia. Although the interior of the islands still looks quite frosty, a warmer area along the western coast could provide space for significant infrastructure. The islands are theoretically demilitarized, but Norway’s coast guard, which is a part of the Royal Norwegian Navy, is very much present, and the Russian helicopter base at Cape Heerodden looks much too large for its stated purpose. There already have been disputes over fisheries regulation, and it is not hard to imagine more problems over the exact meaning of the right to exploit minerals.
Creeping Jurisdiction Must Stop
(See C. Antrim and G. Galdorisi, pp. 66–71, April 2011 Proceedings)
Thomas S. Wyman—With reference to Ms. Antrim’s and Captain Galdorisi’s article, it is incumbent on China to recognize that unilateral annexation of waters beyond internationally endorsed territorial limits cannot succeed. A recent Associated Press news release reported that the Chinese ocean monitoring agency, China Marine Surveillance, is adding 1,000 officers this year and will augment its 300-vessel fleet by acquiring 36 new vessels over the next five years. This is further evidence that China intends to resist with force the challenges by other littoral states to offshore areas it unilaterally claims.
It must be recognized, however, that the exploration and development of deepwater offshore resources is only practical where an internationally agreed regime prevails. Sovereign states bordering areas where China unilaterally claims jurisdiction would see such high-handed actions as an unacceptable taking of their respective maritime heritages. In spite of its aggressive maritime surveillance program, China cannot expect to explore and develop the deep-water resources of disputed areas with impunity. A successful long-term program of offshore exploration, development, and production relies on decades of stable operation without political strife.
Any oil man will tell you that there are plenty of challenges in deep-water drilling and production, and that the additional threat of political strife cannot be tolerated. Long-term offshore oilfield exploration and production operations simply cannot be sustained in a politically unstable environment of claims and counterclaims, where there is a possibility of military challenges involving those operations. It takes little imagination to appreciate what havoc a drone, missile, or torpedo attack would have on offshore oil drilling and production facilities.
To the extent that China insists on asserting dominion over offshore areas to which it has no legitimate claim, those areas cannot be safely developed. The threat of hostile actions by neighboring nations as well as by others is unacceptable. No prudent offshore operator would consider exposing his personnel and equipment to the risks associated with operations in politically contested waters.
The Chinese are acting as the regional bully in asserting unilateral jurisdiction over maritime areas where other nations have perfectly legitimate claims. This is nothing more or less than the tactics of a powerful regime attempting to override the interests of weaker nations. A confrontational and unilateral “sea grab” to annex and control offshore areas to which other nations have a claim would prove both costly and counterproductive. It would frustrate the very objectives that China hopes to achieve. The only practical way forward is for the community of nations involved to reach a mutually acceptable agreement on all disputed areas. Otherwise, any effort to develop the resources in such areas is untenable.
Tonkin: Setting the Record Straight
(See L. R. Vasey, pp. 66–71, August 2010; and R. R. McDonald, D. M. Showers, and C. E. McDowell, pp. 81–82, January 2011; L. R. Vasey, p. 85, February 2011; T. Hayward, p. 87, March 2011; and J. Treanor, pp. 84–86, April 2011 Proceedings)
Robert J. Hanyok—I am writing to set straight for the record Admiral Vasey’s misquotes from my article, “Skunks Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish,” which I wrote as senior historian for the National Security Agency’s Center for Cryptologic History. Having only read Admiral Vasey’s article in April 2011, I am coming in late to the discussion. However, it was the nature of Admiral Vasey’s quotes he attributes to me that caused me to reply even at this late date.
At issue are two quotes he claims come from my article; both appear on page 71 of his Proceedings article. After noting that I present “convincing arguments” from a signals-intelligence (SIGINT) perspective “that there was no evidence of North Vietnamese torpedo boat attacks on 4 August,” he proceeds to reference my article as follows:
[Hanyok] also comments, “It seems that the NSA position (presented to President Johnson) was a fairly straightforward one: the second attack occurred [emphasis added].” Then he [Hanyok] implies a political motive behind the NSA position: “This allowed President Johnson to shift the blame for the final decision (to order an air attack against North Vietnam) from himself to the ‘experts’ who has assured him of the strength of the evidence from the SIGINT.” But Hanyok offers no proof to support this allegation.
Admiral Vasey attempts two things with these quotes. In the first part, he tries to make it appear that the NSA presented a consistent and unified version of events that night––that the attack occurred. In the second part, he attributes to me an effort to paint a dark “political” motive behind the NSA position. Neither attribution is true. But to understand better what I wrote, let the paragraph he uses be quoted in its entirety:
As for the doubts about the second attack among the analysts at NSA, it appears that none of them were ever publicized during the briefings with officials at the Defense Department. Or, if they were mentioned, they were downplayed. In fact, it seems that the NSA position was a fairly straightforward one: that the second attack occurred. So firm was NSA’s position, that one previous NSA historian has suggested that this allowed President Johnson to shift the blame for the final decision from himself to the “experts” who had assured him of the strength of the evidence from the SIGINT.157.
Two points are obvious. At no time did the NSA include the doubts its analysts held regarding the second attack when it reported intelligence about the attack to the national leadership. The “straightforward” position scrubbed out any doubts regarding the attack—which was a disservice to the President. Admiral Vasey failed to provide the context within which I made the statement about the NSA position. Second, the idea that President Johnson shifted the blame from himself to the “experts” was made by another NSA historian, whom I am quoting. Admiral Vasey also fails to mention this contextual fact. The Gulf of Tonkin incidents remain a contentious issue; but to misquote does no good for anyone.