The nine-year war with Islamic extremists has driven al Qaeda and its associates into a largely disaggregated operational posture with diminished capabilities and even lower stature. With the al Qaeda threat lessened, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq targeted for wind-down by the Obama administration (and the Bush administration before it), the nation inevitably will turn to a debate about military-force posture appropriate to its long-term strategic goals.
That debate has to some extent already begun, though divorced from any overarching strategic context. In a Foreign Affairs article in early 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote, “As much as the U.S. Navy has shrunk since the end of the Cold War, for example, in terms of tonnage, its battle fleet is still larger than the next 13 navies combined—and 11 of those 13 navies are U.S. allies or partners.”1 So it would appear that Secretary Gates is setting the stage for dramatic cuts in Navy force structure, a postwar pattern repeated several times in the United States since the end of World War II.
This is not the time for history to repeat itself. Many of the challenges facing our nation are abidingly maritime in nature: Rising powers are building navies to contest U.S. mastery of the seas, and the world economy remains utterly dependent on the free flow of goods across the maritime commons, the freedom of which is guaranteed by American sea power.
These fundamental realities cannot be taken for granted. Simply put, America cannot remain a global power without a global navy, and that global navy is under siege as policymakers seek to reduce each discretionary part of the federal budget to fund America’s growing appetite for entitlements and to service its increasing debt.
The Search for a Grand Strategy
The war on terrorism never constituted a true “grand strategy,” nor was it ever put forward as one. It was an exigency forced on the United States by Islamic jihadists bent on spreading a version of a “New Caliphate.” As that war continues into its tenth year and the present administration openly talks of a drawdown, many observers are beginning to resurrect the dialogue of grand strategy begun in the early days of the George W. Bush administration. Then (as in the 1990s), America was faced with what some have called the “unipolar” moment: that is, when the United States reigned supreme (and without serious challengers) in diplomatic, military, and economic might. Forced to shelve serious discussions of a grand strategy appropriate to a unipolar world, the United States instead spent most of the past decade pursuing two land wars in Asia against largely irregular and insurgent forces. These wars have arguably made the United States a safer place by denying al Qaeda safe haven and by removing from the international scene a regime in Iraq that was a threat to its neighbors and its own citizens, that openly flouted the will of the international community, and that was thought by many reputable intelligence services to possess weapons of mass destruction.
This pursuit has come at a cost, however, as the United States has spent nearly $1 trillion ($700 billion on Iraq and $300 billion on Afghanistan) on those campaigns, even as a serious economic crisis at home hobbled the economy. The world’s most powerful nation has expended considerable blood and treasure fighting shadowy, irregular forces in conflicts whose outcomes are still in doubt. All the while, a rising international competitor focused inwardly on generating 10 percent annual growth even as it modernized and enlarged its armed forces, especially its navy.
Although China has emerged as the United States’ most stressing strategic competitor, there is little evidence that a grand strategy appropriate to facing the challenge of extending and sustaining America’s position of global leadership is under consideration. The administration’s national security strategy continues to focus on terrorist threats, particularly those wielding weapons of mass destruction, while giving little consideration to the ways the United States will pursue its interests. If the nation truly does depend on freedom in the global commons, partnerships, and counter-proliferation as described in the strategy, then the ways America will exercise leadership should be defined. Sea power is a key element of each of those objectives. It is more suited to those missions than ground or air forces, whose permanence and impermanence respectively make them poor choices to secure free and legitimate movement without infringing on others’ freedom and sovereignty.
Strategic Considerations
The coming strategic dialogue will take place amid the backdrop of three potentially irreconcilable considerations. The first will be a natural, increased hesitance toward land war after a costly decade or more in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many Americans eventually will ask what was gained by the expenditure of more than 5,500 lives and more than a trillion dollars. The second will be the growing appetite for domestic infrastructure investment and entitlement spending even as the nation confronts mounting debt. The final consideration will be the desire of the American public to play the leading role in a world increasingly marked by the rise of Asia and the emergence of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the so-called BRIC nations) as counterweights to U.S. and European influence.2
The support of the American people for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has been remarkably durable, but it would be unwise to think such support would extend to another land war of choice in the near term, a sentiment echoed by Secretary Gates, who wrote that “the United States is unlikely to repeat another Iraq or Afghanistan—that is, forced regime change followed by nation building under fire—anytime soon.”3 While there are other feasible reasons the United States might wish to employ massive land force, Afghanistan and Iraq appear emblematic of the chaos and untidiness many observers feel will mark the future strategic landscape. This landscape will grow ever more dangerous as sophisticated weapons continue to proliferate into the hands of insurgents and terrorists. If these types of conflicts are unlikely to summon similar U.S. resolve, there is a question of continuing to sustain the capabilities and capacities necessary to address such conflict at the same levels. Might the nation be better off working to preclude these situations before they erupt, rather than reacting at such great cost?
Grand-strategy discussions also will reflect fallout from the diminished state of the U.S. economy as a result of the recent recession and financial crisis. Many economists are wary of growing levels of institutional debt in the United States, and austerity measures are likely to be considered. These almost certainly will include aggressive efforts to cut the defense budget, as automatic-entitlement costs grow as a proportion of the federal budget.
Pressure to cut the defense budget is likely to result in equal or nearly equal shares being assigned each of the armed services, as such joint burden-sharing is the norm in a Pentagon bereft of inter-service rivalry in the post–Goldwater-Nichols era. While the defense budget is not the cause of the nation’s economic problems, policymakers will be sorely tempted to include it in the solution, rather than curbing dramatically rising entitlement spending. A final strategic consideration likely to color discussions will be the almost certain desire of Americans to continue to be the acknowledged global leader—diplomatically, militarily, and economically—even as the resources available to continue to exercise such leadership are in jeopardy. American political leaders will pay a heavy price at the ballot box if seen by voters to be supporting or forcing a decline in U.S. power and influence.
Why Sea Power?
American sea power is the most flexible of the various instruments of military power, and the one most able to accommodate the foregoing strategic considerations. Even more, it is an essential element of an effective grand strategy, along with a strong economy and useful alliances. As policymakers begin to think seriously about an appropriate grand strategy for the post–war-on-terrorism world, American sea power should occupy a central position. Several obvious national-security imperatives are made possible by preponderant American sea power:
Sea power facilitates the homeland-defense “away game.” Naval forces operate for extended periods far from U.S. shores without the permission of any sovereign government; this translates into the extension of America’s homeland “defensive perimeter.” The ability to gather information, perform surveillance of seaborne and airborne threats, interdict suspected WMD carriers, and disrupt terrorist networks without a large footprint ashore is critical in a world of denied access and decreasing acceptance of American troops stationed abroad. Dealing with these threats as far from our shores as possible gains decision space and engagement opportunities.
Sea power bolsters critical security balances. Preponderant American sea power underwrites East Asian security by demonstrating to friends and allies American resolve to maintain regional stability. Additionally, the overwhelming advantage enjoyed by U.S. forces in sea control and striking power is, in and of itself, an inducement to maintaining security. Absent such preponderance, a nascent Asian naval arms race has the potential to intensify. In the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, sustained U.S. naval combat power serves to assure allies of the nation’s resolve to maintain stability in the face of an unpredictable regime in Iran.
Sea power provides an effective conventional deterrent. The visible presence of American sea power operating freely in the maritime commons provides an effective conventional deterrent to those who would seek to threaten regional security and stability. First, the capabilities and capacities of preponderant naval power are arrayed in a manner that causes an adversary to question the effectiveness of a preemptive attack (deterrence by denial). Such capabilities include sea-based ballistic-missile defense and the striking power of carrier-based air power armed with precision-guided munitions. Second, the likelihood of a prompt and painful counterattack from the sea raises the stakes associated with military adventurism.
In either case, recent scholarship in the study of conventional deterrence indicates that overall U.S. conventional superiority is less likely to provide an effective deterrence than is the local regional balance of power.4 This suggests that to deter effectively, the United States must have that local presence—and no form of military power can be as consistently present in as many critical places at once as sea power. Presence should be re-evaluated to more prominently include a paradigm of “forward stationing,” or what the Navy refers to as forward-deployed naval forces.
Sea power fosters diplomacy, development, and defense. American sea power is the global guarantor of freedom of commerce on the world’s oceans, thereby promoting American economic stability and growth. This role has been played before in history by the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the British, but never before has it been played by a nation without imperial or colonial aspirations. American guarantees to the global commons do not come with a colonial “tax” on other nations. The overwhelming majority of world trade (by weight and by value) travels across the world’s oceans, to the benefit of all trading nations. Additionally, America’s diplomatic power is increasingly supported by its sea power, a symbiotic relationship reminiscent of U.S. foreign policy conduct throughout much of its pre–World War II history.
Sea power provides for modulated military response. The world is an increasingly disordered and untidy place, with regional instability a constant feature of the strategic landscape. Should deterrence fail (as it sometimes does), already present combat-ready naval forces are prepared to conduct prompt and sustained operations. These operations range from shows of force, raids and demonstrations, strikes, and special operations, all the way to the forcible entry of land power from the sea. This menu of choices is a primary feature of American sea power, and it provides the President with unmatched flexibility to respond, escalate, and de-escalate without having to deploy additional forces into theater. Should the nation find it necessary to transition to a punishing land war, American sea power provides the means for assuring the entry of follow-on forces, as well as providing considerable combat power in support of ongoing land operations.
Sea power provides America’s survivable nuclear deterrent. The Navy’s fleet of 14 ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs)—each equipped with multiple independent re-entry vehicle–armed Trident intercontinental ballistic missiles—is its most survivable method of providing strategic nuclear deterrence. With Russia remaining a powerful nuclear state and China upgrading its own nuclear stockpile—in addition to the nuclear mischief of North Korea and Iran—the United States must continue to upgrade its SSBN force even as it considers new and novel ways to employ it.
Sea power shows the best face of America. The purpose of American military power is to protect the United States by fighting and winning wars, and American sea power is no exception. That said, the staggering cost of military power demands a premium be placed on those forces with peacetime missions that also advance the national security of the United States. No nation on earth is as quick to provide humanitarian assistance in the wake of natural disasters as is the United States, and no element of U.S. strength is as critical to prompt and sustained recovery efforts as American sea power. Whether it is the direct provision of food, water, and shelter, emergency medical care, or security in a chaotic environment, American sea power answers the nation’s call when its considerable sympathy moves it to act.5
Threats to American Sea Power
There are two primary threats to the future of American sea power. The first is a series of technologically advanced, networked weapons and sensors designed to deny U.S. naval forces the freedom of maneuver from which all other benefits of sea power derive. America’s uncontested dominance of the seas for the past two decades is increasingly threatened, as other nations—principally China—have fixed on strategies of denying U.S. naval forces freedom of maneuver and action. While the United States invested heavily in its ability to project striking power ashore after the Cold War, it failed to invest sufficiently in its ability to gain and maintain sea control.
The second threat is domestic in nature, and it is the tendency of the United States to dramatically reduce the Fleet in postwar drawdowns. Much of the thinking in this article stems from an assumption that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are likely to be drawn down in the near term. This, plus the previously mentioned downward pressure on defense budgets as a result of increased entitlement spending and U.S. debt load, creates a perfect storm for a dramatic decrease in naval power.
Recent postwar drawdowns (Korea, Vietnam, the Cold War) have resulted in a historical average of a 33 percent decline in Department of the Navy resources. Each of those wars, however, was accompanied by a nearly equally dramatic increase in resources to buy ships and manpower. What will be different in a near-term drawdown is that even as the Navy supported the wars of the last decade, its battle force shrank by 18 percent and its total manpower decreased by nearly the same. Put another way, any postwar cut administered on today’s Navy will affect a force that has grown dramatically smaller, older, and worn-out while fighting two wars.
Preponderant American sea power, the likes of which produces the seemingly disproportionate statistics cited earlier by the Secretary of Defense, is both the result of American investment and the influence that investment has in causing other nations not to invest. Put another way, building U.S. naval strength causes other nations not to build theirs, especially those who side with the United States. This is often known as the “free rider” effect, but in terms of naval arms buildups, it is a particularly stable situation.
While it is clear that some nations (China and India among them) are building their navies, were the United States to follow Secretary Gates’ logic and begin to whittle away at its naval preponderance, subtle messages of detachment would be sent to friends and allies who heretofore have looked to the United States to stand up in the role of global naval hegemon. Japan, Australia, Singapore, and others are closely watching for signs of U.S. disengagement in East Asia, and any move to decrease naval preponderance there would increase pressure for those nations to respond with their own building programs. While they may be able to modestly increase their shipbuilding, none can create a fleet capable of replacing U.S. naval presence.
Without U.S. naval preponderance, such buildups are likely to prove counterproductive. The world has seen before the dramatic costs of naval arms races, and the stability resulting from the overwhelming U.S. advantage in sea power must be seen as a strategic advantage not to be thrown away lightly in a reflexive round of budget-cutting.
The Opportunity
Republicans scored a decisive victory in the 2010 congressional elections, returning to a majority in the House of Representatives for the first time since 2006. Their victory was in no small part fueled by the rise of the Tea Party, a small-government, restrained-spending movement that, at least in this election, voted Republican. A number of new Representatives believe they were sent to Washington to cut spending, but they will find rough sledding when they arrive in the Capitol, in the form of a determined bloc of votes in the House (and a majority in the Senate) from members of the Democratic Party determined not to let their legislative achievements be superseded. Spending cuts eventually will come, but they will come as the result of consensus and compromise; and to that end, the defense budget will be on the chopping block.
Republicans traditionally have been able to cut defense spending without looking weak, and to get cuts in domestic and entitlement spending, the newly energized House majority will have to offer something—and what they will offer will be substantial cuts in the defense budget. The stage is set for another round of strategically inept budget cuts, with Congress sending signals to the administration and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, telling each of the services what its share is, resulting in a smaller pie being equally divided. It does not have to be that way.
The time is right for a real strategic debate, one that recognizes our strengths and applies valuable resources to those elements of national power best suited to sustaining and extending our position of global leadership. This debate will not start in the Pentagon, but it will certainly end there. Congress must work with the administration to fundamentally re-evaluate our nation’s defense posture and question faded paradigms. It is time to decide: Do we change the path we are on, or do we simply manage our decline through uninspired thinking?
How to Sustain U.S. Sea Power
In order to provide the United States with maximum strategic flexibility, Congress should take the following actions to ensure that the nation remains an overwhelming naval power:
• Require that the Navy provide a resource-unconstrained Fleet composition appropriate to meeting the requirements of the Navy’s 2007 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st-Century Seapower and an analysis of what capabilities and missions called for in that strategy are at risk given current/planned Fleet size and resources. This study should include options for additional forward-stationing of U.S. Navy vessels and proposals for new classes of ships designed specifically for low-end naval presence missions.6
• To relieve additional pressure from an already strained Navy shipbuilding budget, design and construction costs of the Navy’s new replacement ballistic-missile submarine should be added from outside Navy budget controls. This would represent recognition of the truly national, strategic mission carried out by these submarines. Without added resources, the defense industrial base and the nation’s conventional advantage at sea will be sacrificed to recapitalize the strategic force.
• To increase confidence in Navy shipbuilding budget estimates, Congress should mandate a set of consistent costing methods for use by Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Navy, and the Congressional Budget Office to alleviate wide variance in cost estimates based on divergent methods of calculation. Additionally, Congress should mandate that the Secretary of the Navy certify the wholeness of design of any new ship class before authorization of the first hull.
• The Navy should seek, and Congress should approve, the appointment of a four-star admiral to the position of Chief of Navy Shipbuilding. This position would be appointed for a term of eight years (analogous to the existing Director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion) and would oversee design, acquisition, construction, and life-cycle management of all surface ships, aircraft carriers, and submarines. Current program executive officers for ships, submarines, and aircraft carriers would report to this new executive who would report in turn to both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy.
• To maintain U.S. freedom of action (and thus influence) in the face of adversaries wielding anti-access capabilities, Congress should require the Navy to report on its AirSea Battle Concept initiative with the Air Force, and it should consider funding relevant acquisition initiatives designed to overcome (predominantly Chinese) anti-access threats.
• Congress should hold hearings into the status of the Goldwater-Nichols Act after nearly a quarter-century of existence. Specifically, it should investigate whether the rise of jointness as a combat and acquisition construct has created an atmosphere within the Department of Defense in which the services cannot effectively advocate for their unique capabilities, even if doing so is arguably in the nation’s strategic interest. Military group-think in the face of a fluid strategic environment is tantamount to an abdication of moral responsibility by our military leaders.
The Best-Suited Element
The United States is faced with complex strategic choices, the resolution of which may define the nation’s ability to remain the world’s leading power. It is difficult to consider any likely alternative future in which the United States continues to exercise global leadership and influence without relying heavily on sea power. A reflexive impulse to cut the Navy’s force structure as the United States draws down from ongoing combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is consistent with America’s 20th-century postwar practice. Such consistency, however, would ignore both the extent to which the Navy already has been reduced and the critical flexibility sea power gives to policymakers as they consider an appropriate post–war-on-terrorism grand strategy.
At a time in which many politicians are considering dramatic reductions in military spending to fund domestic priorities and retire debt, thinking deeply about spending more on one facet of military power is out of fashion. But such thinking must be encouraged, as the benefits of shifting to a maritime-influenced grand strategy will be realized in the sustainment and advancement of U.S. global leadership—while failing to do so sets the conditions for the military to do little more than manage U.S. decline relative to other rising powers.
As a maritime nation, the United States should apply its comparative advantage—sea power—to the pursuit of its global interests even as it conserves its precious resources. Costly Eurasian land wars do little to extend U.S. power and influence in the world, and continuing to plan for them in the future creates a considerable drain on those resources. American sea power is the element of military power best suited to advance U.S. strength and influence, and it should be resourced accordingly.
1. Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs (January/Februay 2009), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63717/robert-m-gates/a-balanced-strategy.
2. Robert M. Gates, address to Navy Sea, Air, and Space Exposition, National Harbor, MD, 3 May 2010.
3. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy.”
4. Michael Gerson and Daniel Whiteneck, “Deterrence and Influence: The Navy’s Role in Preventing War,” Center for Naval Analyses, CRM D0019315 (March 2009), pp. 45–46.
5. The Secretary of the Navy stressed this “face of America” theme during a recent speech to the Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College (Ray Mabus, address to U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 9 June 2010, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/secnav/Mabus/Speech/CurrentStrategyForum610.pdf, 4 July 2010).
6. U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st-Century Seapower (October 2007), http://www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf, 2 July 2010.