The Death of NATO
(See R. L. Bateman III, pp. 48–53, December 2010 Proceedings)
Admiral James G. Stavridis, Supreme Allied Commander, NATO—Pretty surprising that a Supreme Allied Commander Europe—standing as I do in the footsteps of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, just 65 years after the end of World War II and after 60 years of the founding of the alliance—would feel the need to write about why the North Atlantic Treaty Organization matters to the United States.
NATO has continued its positive and important contribution to European, North American, and global security. At the recent summit, the 28 NATO nations agreed to work together on key threats going forward. We are working toward a strong strategic partnership with Russia.
Today, NATO employs more than 130,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines on three continents in a wide variety of vital missions: the Balkans, counterpiracy, counterterrorism, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This is all in addition to performing the traditional NATO missions, ranging from patrolling the skies over Baltic allies to complex multinational exercises with our 28 member states and 33 partners in the Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue, and the Istanbul Cooperative Initiative.
NATO has the best pool of partners we will have in the world for the foreseeable future. Look at the other Cold War alliances and what happened to them. Remember CENTO? How about SEATO? The RIO Pact? All have folded their tents and faded away. Before we decide we can do without NATO, we should think about where our other partners will come from—the bench isn’t deep.
If we are looking for capable military partners with real resources, the ability to deploy and operate with us, and well-trained troops, Europe provides the lion’s share in the world today. With a collective gross domestic product of more than $30 trillion (twice that of the United States), and 6 million-plus men and women in uniform (almost all of whom are volunteers, as in the U.S. military), our European allies are vital in terms of real military capability and credibility.
From a philosophical perspective, these are many of the nations that most fundamentally share our values. Europe is the source of the Enlightenment and the ideals of democracy and liberty that we cherish: individual and human rights, freedom of speech and religion, and the rule of law. While individual countries around the world certainly share those values, no other region in the world so deeply shares them and is prepared to act with us to defend them.
Nearly 70 percent of the U.S. population traces its heritage and roots to Europe. This lineage creates linguistic, cultural, historical, and economic bonds. Granted, the economies of Asia and the Pacific Rim are rising over time, as are the democracies of Latin America. Yet for the immediate future, the linkages with Europe remain the strongest overall set of connections that we have in the world.
We have 98,000 troops in Afghanistan, and our allies (almost all of whom are from NATO) have 45,000. We’ve taken 1,300 killed in action—and our allies have taken almost 900. I’d say they are very much “in the fight” with us. In the Balkans, we have only 900 troops, and the allies have almost 10,000. Globally, allies—again, many NATO nations—are more than ten times greater than the U.S. presence in overall peacekeeping missions. NATO specifically and Europe in general still, even after 60-plus years of alliance, look to me like pretty good partners.
In the Wake of a Sunken Soviet Submarine
(See N. Polmar, pp. 60–64, December 2010 Proceedings)
Norman Polmar—The illustration of the Project Azorian lift concept to raise the sunken Soviet missile submarine K-129 accompanying my article showed one of several notions of how the lift was accomplished. Like all such illustrations in the popular press until the recent publication of the new book Project Azorian: The CIA and the Raising of the K-129 (Naval Institute Press, 2010), the picture shown was merely one of several artist concepts of how the operation was envisioned and was a fanciful concept, not an accurate depiction.
Project Azorian, which I coauthored with film producer Michael White, shows precisely how the salvage attempt was performed, and contains numerous detailed drawings showing the various components of the lift system, plus photographs of the K-129 wreckage on the ocean floor, details of the lift ship Hughes Glomar Explorer, and more.
The Mission Is Warfighting, Not Relief
(See R. J. Carr, p. 10, December 2010 Proceedings)
Captain John McCandless, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—Mr. Carr has forgotten a few things about the humanitarian missions often carried out by the U.S. Navy.
The Navy provides immediate aid because our ships are frequently forward-deployed. Pawn off this mission on another government agency? It’s not practical, as transportation as well as dedicated physical assets are needed. I get a kick out of the current U.S. Air Force commercial that touts the providing of humanitarian relief as a normal course of action. Yet a search of the Air Force’s Web site shows no hits for that term. Sure, the Air Force flies doctors, nurses, and Airmen to aid at scenes of natural disasters, but the Navy’s there first, and with considerably more assets.
Flying into remote locations, putting Sailors or Marines ashore, and medevacing seriously injured to medical facilities afloat are undertakings that not only provide humanitarian relief, but training as well. When the SeaBees rebuild a school or health-care facility that’s been wiped out by a tsunami, that’s not only training, but a generator of good will that pays years of dividends. When a battle group steams to provide relief in Indonesia, planning and executing emergency-op plans, the exigencies of the situation offer plenty of training as well.
Much of the Navy’s humanitarian relief is provided by forward-deployed units, but some missions are in our own backyard. The recent aid provided after Haiti’s devastating earthquake was extensive, expensive, and joint. Some of the first units on the scene were naval assets from Guantanamo. The relief efforts went on for months. Did the Navy pick up the tab for the ships and personnel it provided? Perhaps, but it really doesn’t matter. The folks at Naval Sea Systems Command didn’t throw up their arms and say, “Oh no, this means another delay for DDG-1000.” It simply doesn’t work that way.
Our mission is warfighting, and relief operations prepare our Sailors to do their warfighting job.
Lieutenant Commander Peter Pressman, Medical Corps, U.S. Navy—Mr. Carr has all but asserted that humanitarian initiatives and warfighting are mutually exclusive. Many of us actively involved in ongoing joint humanitarian operations could not disagree more with this position. The Department of Defense has mandated that “stability operations [which provide the local populace with essential, sustainable services and humanitarian needs] shall be given priority comparable to combat operations.” Inadequate food, water, and basic medical care are widely recognized as causes as well as results of armed conflict.
Moreover, the claim that other agencies are better suited than the military for provision of humanitarian assistance ignores the fact that the military as an intrinsically operationally oriented culture is, in fact, the most effective and efficient means of executing any action. I would argue that, especially in the current strategic environment, the Navy’s core mission is not warfighting per se, but peacekeeping, and protecting U.S. interests and those of our allies.
In 1962 John F. Kennedy predicted a war “new in its intensity, ancient in its origins,” waged by those “seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him.” We have confronted this prophetic truth by developing irregular-warfare doctrine that includes such concepts as stability operations, joint operations, and creating alternatives through business and educational opportunities. An impressive logistical and humanitarian initiative has occurred in Iraq, Haiti, and Afghanistan, where the community outreach inherent in expeditionary medicine serves as an important part of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts.
In contrast to the position advanced by those who contend that the mission is warfighting, not relief, I would suggest that we already have demonstrated that relief itself can serve as a potent weapon that the Department of Defense in general, and the Navy in particular, with their resources and culture, are uniquely positioned to employ.
What’s in a Name?
(See J. M. Caiella, p. 10, November 2010 Proceedings)
Captain James E. Wise Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)—Congratulations on a fine article by Mr. Caiella. Someone had to bring the subject to the attention of the Navy. To continue to name ships after politicians and government personnel is most inappropriate. I spent two years as a part of ship’s company on the USS America (CVA-66), and I remember how proud we all were to call the ship our home. Our skipper at the time was Don Engen, and the fit was just perfect. I often recall the refrains of our ship’s theme song, “America, the Beautiful,” during evening hours while in a foreign port. Yes, she was a beautiful ship and a most respected home for all who lived on board her.
Douglas Pauly—Mr. Caiella nails it. The Navy’s scheme for naming ships, especially capital ships like carriers and subs, has become a joke. The pandering for political consideration is what’s behind the present methodology for providing names. A good place to start for correcting the situation is to eliminate the naming of capital ships for living individuals. The only exception I would make for that is if the person was (or is) a uniformed member of the armed forces, and that they performed in a truly heroic capacity, or they provided undeniable leadership that contributed to victory. Other than that, no exceptions.
The Navy used to have a rational, commonsense policy for ship names. Aircraft carriers were named after famous battles, battleships for states, cruisers for cities, destroyers and transports for people, submarines for marine life, and ballistic-missile subs for heroic people and leaders. Oh, how all that has changed! Now there are subs and amphibs named for cities and states. We’ve named some carriers and subs for people who absolutely did not rate such an honor.
I say that last line with no animus toward those who have capital vessels named for them, it’s just that their service, though admirable and honorable for this country, did not measure up to what should rate a capital ship’s name, especially one like a nuclear-powered carrier or sub. Franklin D. Roosevelt certainly rates as a wartime President who succeeded in leading his nation to victory. The same can be said for Ronald Reagan for his undeniable role in ending the Cold War. These two leaders deserve having capital ships named for them. Presidents Bush and Carter did indeed attain the position of President, but does that in itself rate capital ships being named for them? I think not.
George H. W. Bush’s service in World War II is beyond question, but if his service rates a carrier being named for him, then we really should have dozens more carriers so those who rate such an honor even more than he does can be accommodated. Jimmy Carter was a nuclear officer who did not make the Navy a career. He didn’t even serve on subs, and yet he has a Seawolf-class boat named for him.
History should be given a chance to determine if an individual citizen’s contributions to our nation deserve the honor of a ship-naming. Time is the best arbiter for determining how honorable the service of any given public servant truly was. The mention of the naming of the San Antonio–class amphib USS John Murtha hammers that point home. The Navy should get back to the established doctrine of years past when considering names for its ships.
James Martin—I wholeheartedly agree with Mr. Caiella that naming ships after politicians does not send the right message about our priorities as a nation, nor does it stir the populace to patriotism like a ship named America. I find it puzzling, however, that Mr. Caiella picks the recent naming of a ship the USS John Murtha to illustrate his point.
While Murtha was indeed a congressman, he also was a decorated Marine officer whose nearly four decades in the Corps included service in Vietnam, where he earned the Bronze Star for valor and two Purple Hearts. His military service was left out of the piece, and I believe it reflects strongly on why the Navy chooses to name a ship that carries Marines into battle after “a politician.” The Navy also recently announced the naming of a Virginia-class submarine after former Virginia Senator John Warner, “a politician” who similarly served in the Marine Corps and later as Secretary of the Navy before being elected to the U.S. Senate.
Indeed, to Mr. Caiella’s point, the naming of both the Murtha and the Warner do more than memorialize the valor and patriotism of those who served, they provide inspiration by giving our current Sailors and Marines an example of those who have succeeded, indeed thrived, after their service in the military. Especially in light of recent problems with those exiting the services to diminishing opportunities, the example of retired Colonel Murtha (a man who enlisted in the Marine Corps, used the G.I. Bill to send himself through college, and spent the remainder of his life in public service) will be both inspirational and educational to the many young men and women who are honored to serve on his namesake.
James W. Hulme—Mr. Caiella argues persuasively against politically expedient naming and for consideration of the connection between a ship’s name and the American and foreign publics. This may be accomplished by returning to the traditional grounds for naming U.S. naval vessels.
There is a long tradition in the naming of U.S. warships that predates the modern fashion to “bulletproof” the appropriations for a capital ship based on its proposed name. The Sailors who serve on a ship should feel that connection Mr. Caiella describes, both to the ship and, where applicable, to the legacy of her name. Each class of naval vessel, from carrier to support ship, had a particular naming convention, some of which were tied to American geographical place names. This tradition tied Sailors to their ships and ships to their namesake communities. When a ship is named after an American city or state, for example, there is an immediate connection between the citizenry and those who serve. The port visit of the USS New York (LPD-21) for her commissioning forged lasting bonds between New Yorkers and their namesake ship. Such connections should be encouraged and, where possible, facilitated by Fleet assignments.
There is a lot in a name. And the traditional grounds for naming ships reflected that reality.
Marines Need to Be More Spartan with Energy Use
(See R. J. Charette Jr., p. 8, November 2010 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Reuben A. Padilla, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—Colonel Charette’s article is right on target; he has framed the argument extremely well. What is fundamentally perplexing is that the largest consumer of energy/fuel is not the infantry battalion but rather the rest of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. Why the Corps has burdened the infantry battalion with this proof of concept makes little sense and may set the Marines up for failure.
Today, we can provide the force service support groups, Marine wing support groups, Marine wing control groups, Marine aviation logistic squadrons, naval construction battalions, and others with proven mobile renewable-energy solutions that do not put our direct-contact units at risk. The Corps can immediately reduce its demand for fossil fuel, save millions of dollars, and reduce its noise footprint.
In an October 2009 speeech at the Naval Energy Forum, Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus said:
It turns out that when you factor in the cost of transportation to a coastal facility in Pakistan—or airlifting it to Kandahar—and then you add the cost of putting it in a truck, guarding it, delivering it to the battlefield, and then transferring that one gallon into a piece of equipment that needs it—in extreme cases that gallon of gasoline could cost up to $400.
Colonel Charette’s article quoted fuel consumption at 200,000 gallons per day. Using the Secretary of the Navy’s price per gallon, in extreme cases the Corps is spending $80,000,000 a day on fuel. That said, the delivered contract fuel price per gallon may be as little as $6.50, which provides a more reasonable fuel cost of $1,300,000 a day.
Fuel consumption for typical 25-kilowatt fossil-fuel generators is 1.66 gallons per hour at full load. At half-load, fuel consumption is .85 gallons per hour, and those generators can be heard for miles on a cold desert evening. Each generator running 24/7 costs $258.96 per day or $94,520.40 per year at full load.
In either case, the Marine Corps is bleeding cash, and as Congress looks to reduce the national debt, it only makes sound business sense to immediately replace, wherever practical across all services, every fossil-fuel electrical generator with a mobile renewable-energy generator.
Tonkin: Setting the Record Straight
(See L. R. Vasey, pp. 66–71, August 2010 Proceedings)
Captain Richard R. McDonald, U.S. Navy (Retired)—The contention of Admiral Vasey that a North Vietnamese PT-boat attack was mounted against the U.S. destroyers Maddox (DD-731) and Turner Joy (DD-951) in the Gulf of Tonkin on the night of 4 August 1964, following the incontrovertible daylight attack on the Maddox on 2 August, was indeed the U.S. Navy’s official position for a number of years. Strongly reinforcing this position were intercepted North Vietnamese Navy radio transmissions that were interpreted as indicating that an attack had occurred. Still, doubts persisted about the validity of the 4 August attack based on the confused and contradictory visual, radar, and sonar reporting from the two U.S. ships.
Foremost among the skeptics was Captain John J. Herrick, the on-scene commander embarked in the Maddox, and arguably the most qualified observer of events that night by virtue of his broad professional experience and especially because he had had a front-row seat for the attack on the Maddox two days before. On 5 August he decided he “could not be certain what had or had not happened the previous night.” He was later to conclude “it was unlikely any torpedoes were fired” on the night of 4 August.
In new developments, a number of NVN personnel were captured in 1966 and 1967, some of whom had either participated in the 2 August 1964 attack or, in one case, was in the chain of command of the PT flotilla staff ashore and wrote the after-action report of that event; those captured North Vietnamese with knowledge of August 1964 naval activity uniformly denied that there had been an attack on the 4th.
As time went by, the intercepted North Vietnamese radio communications interpreted as supporting the case for the 4 August attack came under close scrutiny. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara’s exaggerated characterization of those intercepts as “highly classified and unimpeachable” was an unfortunate distraction in the search for truth. The National Security Agency conducted a comprehensive investigation concluding that the totality of the intercept reporting did not provide evidence of an attack on 4 August.
The article by NSA historian Robert Hanyok, declassified in 2005, and to which Admiral Vasey takes exception, was a detailed report covering all of the intercepts in question. Mr. Hanyok concludes that all of the intercepts thought to indicate NVN combat activity on 4 August in reality related to the attack on the 2nd or to an ongoing salvage-and-rescue operation on the two PT that were damaged on the 2nd. Significantly absent on 4 August were any intercepts of naval command-and-control communications or target-radar emissions earmarking a PT attack. Such a profile was clearly exhibited during the 2 August attack.
Over the years, a number of historians have published books based on exhaustive research, including re-interviews of U.S. Navy officers and Sailors who had been on the scene on 4 August 1964. By far the best, most comprehensive of those books is Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (University of North Carolina Press, 1996), by Edwin E. Moise, professor of history at Clemson University. Moise concluded “the weight of evidence is overwhelming: No attack occurred.”
The U.S. Navy position on the matter now reads as follows:
On the night of 4 August, the warships reported making contact and then being attacked by several fast craft far out to sea. Officers in the naval chain of command and U.S. leaders in Washington were persuaded by interpretation of special intelligence and reports from the ships that North Vietnamese naval forces had attacked the two destroyers. More recent analysis of that data and additional information gathered on the 4 August episode now make it clear that North Vietnamese naval forces did not attack Maddox and Turner Joy that night in the summer of 1964. (See http:www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq120-120-1.htm.)
Editor’s note: Captain McDonald was a member of the team that interrogated North Vietnamese Navy POWs captured in 1966.
Rear Admiral D. M. Showers, U.S. Navy (Retired), former chief of staff, Defense Intelligence Agency, former special assistant to the director of Central Intelligence—In August 1964 I was the staff intelligence officer for the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Thomas Moorer. Having been alerted to anticipated congressional passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution as reaction to the suspected 4 August attack on U.S. destroyers, Admiral Moorer called his senior staff to general quarters during the evening of 4 August (Hawaii time). While impatiently awaiting confirmation of this action, the admiral repeatedly opined that the simple fact of the 2 August attack constituted sufficient provocation to justify such a resolution and that the congressional action should have been taken on that basis and at that time.
Although the Fleet needed to react to the resolution, there were doubts in many places as to the validity of the alleged second attack because of confusion at the scene and the lack of concrete evidence. It soon developed that, in addition to conflicting reports from the destroyer crews, there had been no sightings of enemy activity by the close-support aircraft flown by, among others, Commanders James Stockdale, Wesley McDonald, and Don Hegrat. Their testimony, augmented later by prisoner interrogations, have given credence to the contention that no attack occurred on 4 August. Also, the late Dr. Lou Tordella, deputy director of the NSA, personally discussed with me his research into the communications intercepts on 2 and 4 August as was subsequently detailed in the report by NSA historian Robert Hanyok. This research further substantiates the “no attack” finding. It’s time to consider this “case closed.”
Rear Admiral Charles E. McDowell, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, U.S. Navy (Retired), former judge advocate general of the Navy—I was the Seventh Fleet legal officer from 1966 to 1968. As such, I provided legal support to the exploitation team interrogating North Vietnamese PT-boat POWs in Vietnam, including oversight of team compliance with the Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Since that time, I have closely followed the Tonkin Gulf issue in a private capacity and as a member of the Navy Historical Foundation.
As a footnote to the Gulf of Tonkin affair, in 1995 former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara visited Hanoi as part of the Council on Foreign Relations and met with former North Vietnamese Defense Minister General Vo Nguyen Giap, then age 85. McNamara asked Giap, “Did what we thought was an attack on August 4, 1964—the so-called second attack—did it occur?” Giap replied, “On the 4th of August, there was absolutely nothing.” (Giap had nothing to lose by telling the truth—after all, he had won the war. See http://vi.uh.edu/pages/buzzmat/world198_4.html.)
Few events of the Vietnam War seem to stir the passions of both veterans and historians so much as the proven non-event of the so-called second Tonkin Gulf attack. I agree with those who say that it is time to declare, “Case closed.”