The civil war in Libya—ongoing as this is written—already has lessons for the United States on a number of levels: political, strategic, operational—and naval.
The initial establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya was begun with ship-launched Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles. These long-range and accurate weapons appear to have been used against Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi’s missile and radar sites. The opening barrage, according to reports available so far, was launched from two U.S. guided-missile destroyers, a U.S. cruise-missile submarine, and a British torpedo-attack submarine.
In the opening hours of the U.S.-NATO assault, the two destroyers, the USS Barry (DDG-52) and Stout (DDG-55), and the submarine Florida (SSGN-728) launched 199 Tomahawks, while the British submarine Triumph fired another seven missiles. (Two U.S. torpedo-attack submarines were in the Mediterranean—the Providence [SSN-719] and Scranton [SSN-756]—but based on available information, they did not fire Tomahawks in the opening salvo.)
With Gadhafi’s air defenses degraded, U.S.-NATO aircraft ranged over northern Libya with relative impunity. These aircraft flew from airfields in southern Italy and on Cyprus, and apparently from other locations as well. At sea, French carrier-based aircraft flew from the nuclear-propelled Charles de Gaulle, and helicopters, MV-22 Ospreys, and AV-8B Harriers flew from the U.S. assault ship Kearsarge (LHD-3).
Significantly, no U.S. aircraft carrier participated in Operation Odyssey Dawn, as the assault on Gadhafi’s forces was labeled. On the eve of the operation, two U.S. carrier strike groups were in the Arabian Sea–Gulf of Aden area with the Enterprise (CVN-65) and Carl Vinson (CVN-70).
By early April the only known victim of Libyan air defenses was one of its own MiG-23 fighters shot down. Allied air losses were a U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle that crashed because of “mechanical problems.” The two-man crew parachuted into friendly territory and was recovered by a gaggle of helicopters, MV-22 Ospreys, and AV-8B Harriers from the Kearsarge.
The land-based aircraft participating in Odyssey Dawn in the initial stages were primarily U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy. The former included:
F-15E Strike Eagle strike
F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter
E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control
RC-135 Rivet Joint electronic reconnaissance
AC-130 Hercules gunship
EC-130H Compass Call and EC-130E
Commando Solo electronic warfare
A-10 Thunderbolt ground-attack aircraft
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).
Navy land-based aviation included the combat debut of the EA-18 Growler electronic-attack, P-3C Orion maritime-patrol, and EP-3E Orion electronic-surveillance aircraft. These naval aircraft as well as the Air Force EC-130s undoubtedly also participated in offensive electronic operations against Gadhafi’s command-and-communications structure.
In an interesting joint effort at the tactical level, an Air Force A-10 and a Navy P-3C teamed up to attack several Libyan patrol craft. The A-10 engaged two of the small craft with its 30-mm Gatling gun, sinking one and causing the crew to abandon the other. The P-3C from Patrol Squadron 5 launched two Maverick missiles against the patrol craft, disabling one and forcing the craft to be beached.
From a naval-air perspective, it is significant that the assault on Libya was begun without a U.S. carrier in the Mediterranean. Neither carrier in the northwest Indian Ocean area was ordered through the Suez Canal and into the “Med.” In sharp contrast, in 1986 when President Ronald Reagan ordered air attacks on Libya in retribution for attacks against Americans, aircraft carriers were the principal means of striking Libya—with three carriers in March 1986 and two carriers in April 1986. (U.S. Air Force F-111 strike aircraft flying from England participated in the second raid, with massive aerial-tanking requirements and at great political cost.)
Today the “shaping of the battlefield”—to borrow an Army term—can best be done in most scenarios with Tomahawk missiles. Then, close to shore, Aegis cruisers and destroyers can provide an air-missile defense umbrella for allied operations. Thus, as demonstrated in Libya, non-carrier forces can have a major role in gaining control of the air.
Beyond Tomahawks and UAVs, aircraft are unquestionably required for almost any participation in a crisis or conflict. In Libya, beyond the helicopters, MV-22 Ospreys, and AV-8B Harriers launched from the Kearsarge, land-based aircraft are vital for intelligence and surveillance, electronic warfare, aerial tanking. and other support missions. Among these are combat search-and-rescue, with the Kearsarge having launched a force to recover the crew of the crashed Air Force F-15E.
With respect to other U.S. naval forces, three issues should be addressed. First, British special forces were inserted into Libya at an early stage of the civil war as well as, reportedly, U.S. CIA operatives. U.S. Navy SEALs could have a significant influence on such operations—collecting intelligence, destroying specific targets, guiding air strikes, and helping to train/advise friendly forces. SEALs could easily be inserted by rubber craft from submarines, helicopter, or parachute.
The second U.S. naval contribution is command-and-control facilities. Operation Odyssey Dawn was initially led by the United States, with Admiral Samuel Locklear in tactical command of the allied military forces. (Admiral Locklear is “triple-hatted” as Commander U.S. Naval Forces Europe, U.S. Naval Forces Africa, and Allied Joint Force Command.) He directed operations from the command ship Mount Whitney (LCC-20) in the Mediterranean. The location of the joint-force commander in the battle area provides many benefits, but demands relatively complex command-and-control facilities, which some naval ships can provide.
While Locklear and his staff are certainly well versed in NATO command-and-control issues, in Odyssey Dawn they were also working with non-NATO countries, including several Arab states. There were several instances of allied military aircraft firing on rebel forces—a major problem when dealing with non-professional troops on a very fluid battlefield. In addition, the situation in Libya demanded careful integration with humanitarian efforts.
Third, future operations of this type would also require Tomahawk strikes. Those weapons, costing more than $1 million each, are now in relatively short supply. While new stand-off, air-launched missiles are being developed, there is no replacement for the ship/submarine-launched Tomahawk. In the future, however, destroyers of the Zumwalt class could stand offshore and strike targets at ranges of up to 75 miles with highly accurate (and much cheaper) 155-mm guided projectiles.
While President Barack Obama has pledged that U.S. ground troops will not be introduced into the Libyan civil war, by mid-April it was obvious that other nations’ troops probably would be needed, if only to help arm and supply the rebels. Such activities could again involve U.S. naval forces, possibly in escorting allied shipping, or helping in the unloading of such ships even if U.S. vessels are not directly involved. And in the worst-case scenario, U.S. Navy ships could be required to evacuate rebels should it appear that Gadhafi’s forces would prevail.
Thus, U.S. naval forces have been involved from the start of Operation Odyssey Dawn and, most likely, will be involved up to the end of the military operations. Similarly, U.S. naval forces—Navy and Marines—must continue thinking of possible involvement in other crises and conflicts as the Arab world (or Muslim world if Iran is included) enters a period of revolution and evolution.