The U.S. Navy is suffering a crisis in leadership, both civilian and military. This situation is being manifested in several ways. Probably the most important are the rate of firings of commanding officers, the handling of Sailors’ interests, and the chaos in Navy ship procurement.
Commanding officers. During the past decade the commanding officers of Navy ships, air squadrons, and shore facilities have been relieved of duty at the rate of more than one per month. This past year, a total of 17 COs were relieved—the highest number since 2003, when 26 were relieved.
The causes for the relief of those COs—ten captains, six commanders, and one lieutenant commander—ranged from “inappropriate conduct” to solicitation of prostitution to ships colliding with a buoy and with a pier (see table). During the past decade just over one-third of dismissed COs were charged with “personal misconduct.” The next most common causes, in order, were “significant mishap,” “command climate,” and “command performance.”
The bottom line is that Navy leadership has failed. The questions that immediately come to mind are: (1) Were regulations and expected standards not properly articulated by the Navy’s leadership? (2) Were less serious infractions tolerated at earlier stages in the officers’ careers, leading to a belief that, being “chosen,” they were subject to a different set of standards? (3) Are the regulations and standards promulgated by the Navy’s leadership too tough for these times? Or (4) a combination of the above?
These issues are compounded by the rise of women to the senior ranks, along with modern communications. When women initially went to sea, they were junior officers and enlisted; their commanding and executive officers rarely dealt with them on a one-on-one basis, and in the first decade of women at sea they were in relatively few ships. Today, women are clearly visible at every rank, and COs and XOs—female as well as male—are professionally involved with them on a day-to-day basis. That, obviously, leads to familiarity and potential complications during six-month or longer deployments away from home ports—and families. Day-to-day contact on board and on liberty, and jointly solving problems can easily lead to increased familiarity and hence potentially inappropriate personal relationships.
Second, the instantaneous worldwide communications that the Internet provides to everyone ashore and at sea further complicates the issues, as rumors and innuendo are rapidly spread. One can easily contact an old shipmate to “get the skinny” on someone or to pass on a tidbit about an officer.
Regardless of which of those issues apply, the morale of the Navy’s officers is suffering as is the public image of the service. The Navy’s leadership must take appropriate action to correct this situation. This action must be direct and personal—not by establishing another board or committee, nor by promulgating lengthy guidelines to the Fleet. And the action must be taken now.
Enlisted men and women. At almost every change-of-command or awards ceremony, the senior officers and civilian officials tout the importance of the enlisted personnel of the command. But many of the “troops” are truly unhappy with the Navy’s leadership. In their letters in Navy Times, in private conversations, and in e-mails with the author, they indicate that the leadership is failing them.
This appraisal is based on a long list of frustrations. These include:
• Bringing back cutlasses for chief petty officers. This means another piece of gear to be carried and maintained, a manual of arms to be learned, and something else to be packed away and then found when needed. The question I have invariably been asked is “Why?” A CPO has a distinctive uniform and insignia—and attitude. Carrying a cutlass a couple of times a year will neither help identify him or her, nor enhance the chief’s status or ego.
• Taking away a Sailor’s sense of individuality and sense of belonging to an elite group by the continued merging of ratings. In the old days—a couple of decades ago—a Sailor took great pride in being a sonarman, radioman, journalist, or engineman. Today, the journalist and photographer—both honored professions—are “mass communication specialists.” It is an awful term—and takes away a person’s individual specialty. The list of combined ratings is very, very long, and getting longer.
• Uniform issues bug most enlisted personnel. Every Sailor with whom I have had exchanges in the past year or more has raised this subject. The issues include regulations about when and where baseball caps can be worn (we are a baseball-cap society!), the problems and constant changes in athletic garb, and, most especially, the new Navy working uniform (NWU), with its digital blue pattern. It is neither attractive, practical, nor naval. James Hulme’s commentary on page 10 of the October 2009 issue of Proceedings captures the essence of the problem:
Our armed forces should have distinctive uniforms that foster esprit de corps without sacrificing common sense. When in combat, they should be the best possible camouflage for the situation. When working behind a desk, they should have something practical and economical.
The latest NWU does not fit the bill. Its primary benefit may be the jokes that it has elicited: “The Navy’s camis are great—no enemy can spot us on the deck of a warship.” And: “When I fall overboard, since they won’t be able to see me the CO can save time and fuel by just steaming on.” And: “Can we please have ‘U.S. Navy’ in larger, brighter letters—everyone who sees me in the NWU thinks I’m a [fill in the blank].”
The list of clothing issues continues.
Shipbuilding. Every year the Navy proposes a shipbuilding program and, as required by Congress, submits a 30-year shipbuilding plan. It’s a “shambolic” charade, as all admit it’s a fantasy. First, the cost estimates of these efforts are unreal, as continually stated in the frequent reports of the Congressional Budget Office and Congressional Research Service, and in statements by highly qualified individuals. The Navy’s shipbuilding budgets are unlikely to increase in the foreseeable future and more likely will be reduced. The higher-than-planned (or feared) costs of the littoral combat ship (LCS) and the carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) will further reduce available funds in the near term.
In the current U.S. economic environment, the Congress will demand more accurate ship-costing efforts. True, such estimates can rarely if ever be completely accurate because a ship takes several years to construct. Still, the Navy’s leadership has done very poorly on the now-building LCS and CVN-78, as well as other recently constructed ships, most notably the floating disaster known as the San Antonio (LPD-17)—which introduced no major new technologies, took twice as long to build and cost more than twice as much as planned, and suffered major problems while on her initial deployment. (Those problems were experienced in the next several San Antonio–class amphibs acquired, and only in the most recent hulls have they been largely, but not completely, fixed.)
Today the Navy’s image and efficacy—within the service and in Congress—are being questioned because of two major shipbuilding decisions. First, successive Chiefs of Naval Operations, Admirals Vern Clark and Mike Mullen (now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), repeatedly said that the Navy had enough (62) destroyers of the Arleigh Burke class, and that a new follow-on surface combatant was needed, the Zumwalt (DDG-1000). But shortly after becoming CNO, Admiral Gary Roughead directed a restart of the existing Burke class—a design that is now more than 30 years old—and truncated the Zumwalt program with three ships. While both actions may have been justified, no substantial rationale has been given for those decisions.
And, more recently, the Navy has (again) changed course on the LCS program. The program began a decade ago when the Navy awarded contracts to two industry teams to develop and build competitive LCS designs “at the speed of light,” as successive CNOs and surface-warfare flag officers attested. Each team was to build up to two ships. After competitive evaluation the Navy would select one design to fulfill the requirement for a total LCS force of about 55 ships (within a planned fleet of 313 ships).
Into 2010 the Navy continued to praise this approach to the LCS program, even though both designs have been late and far over planned costs. The design selection also was delayed, with the penultimate declaration by the Navy’s leadership being that the winning design would be chosen in November 2010. Then, without warning, in November the Navy announced a “split decision”—the leadership now wants to buy ten additional ships from each builder. The claim is made that the existing competition had driven down costs for both designs.
That is a questionable claim in view of the more than doubling of the costs of prototypes of both designs, major problems in developing and producing their mission modules, and the increased costs of supporting a large number of both LCS configurations in the Fleet. The two LCS designs have different sensors, computers, software, tactical displays, propulsion systems, etc. Those will cause increased maintenance and support costs, increased personnel training costs, and restrict flexibility in personnel assignment.
The Navy’s leadership must better understand the current issues related to discipline within the officer corps, the issues related to enlisted men and women, and reality in shipbuilding plans and decisions if it is to have the credibility, respect, and loyalty that the Navy must have. The situation is further exacerbated by the public—and possibly congressional—perception that the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and the anti-terrorism efforts are “non-naval” operations and hence, with the national economic situation and the austerity years ahead, the Navy can be significantly reduced from its current status. Such action would be against the best interests of the United States. The Navy has an important role in the political, economic, and military well-being of the country, and the leadership must bring credibility to the service
Reasons for Firing Commanding Officers in 2010*
• Failing to adequately discipline a junior officer accused of inappropriate conduct.
• Problems with “temperament and demeanor.”
• Charge of solicitation of prostitution.
• Fraternization with junior Navy personnel.
• An inappropriate relationship with a female officer in his command.
• “Inappropriate conduct.”
• Drunkenness and conduct unbecoming an officer.
• “Derelict in the performance of his duties.” (Ship struck a buoy in the Persian Gulf.)
• Loss of confidence in ability to command. (Ship hit a pier in Batumi, Georgia.)
• Loss of confidence in ability to command.
• “Charged with sexual harassment, maltreatment of a subordinate, simple assault, conduct unbecoming an officer, drunk and disorderly conduct and use of indecent language.”
• “A result of an investigation into allegations that he acted in an unprofessional manner toward several crew members that was inappropriate, improper and unduly familiar.”
• “A preliminary investigation into allegations that she had been involved in inappropriate relationships with other Navy personnel.”
• “Inappropriate personal behavior.”
• “Improper personal behavior.”
• An alleged cheating ring involving shipboard training exams.
• An “unduly familiar relationship” with each other (both the CO and executive officer were fired).