More than 60 years after it was formed, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has become a global player with a military presence on three continents: Europe, Asia, and Africa. Since 2003 its forces have fought in Afghanistan to support nation-building in the war-torn region of the Hindu Kush. In the Balkans, NATO has been present for 15 years and went to war in 1999 to end the human rights violations of the regime of Slobodan Miloševic, former president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The organization airlifts food and equipment to African crisis regions, and ships flying the NATO flag cruise the coast of Somalia battling piracy and securing the sea lines of trade. Even in the United States, in 2005 the NATO Response Force provided disaster relief for the regions hit by Hurricane Katrina.
The Evolution of an Alliance
The Alliance's founders never anticipated such a broad portfolio of functions. On the contrary, the 12 nations that signed the 1949 NATO treaty in Washington, D.C., known as the Washington Treaty, had in mind a more informal institution, created to counter the Soviet threat but not intended to entangle the superpower interests of the United States.
NATO's evolution from a small, single-purpose club of 12 to the most successful security organization in modern history with 28 members occurred in several phases. During each "moulting," NATO adapted to the new requirements by changing its tasks and missions.
Each time, it required a major global incident for the Alliance to alter its course. The fall of the Berlin Wall 20 years ago terminated NATO's first incarnation as a purely defensive organization and transformed it into an instrument that could help Europe shape its political future. During this second phase, the organization filled the power vacuum left by the disestablished Warsaw Pact and supported the stabilization and democratization of eastern and southeastern Europe. By creating partnerships with former foes, incorporating new members, and undertaking the military action in the Balkans, NATO became a guarantor of political order in Europe.
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 marked the beginning of NATO's third and present phase. Today it is a global player and has expanded its influence far beyond its members' territories.
Currently, the Alliance is developing a new Strategic Concept that will determine its direction for the next decade. There is a trend toward projecting NATO's global role and even expanding it. In the context of this debate, a number of new tasks have been discussed. Energy security is one possible role that has been raised. Hardly any of its proponents clarify what NATO actually can and should do to secure the energy supply of its member states. Should it store oil and gas reserves to assist those who are cut off from their energy supplies, or should the Alliance contemplate military action against those who interrupt the flow of gas and oil aggressively
"Climate change" is another catchphrase, also leaving open the role NATO could play to cope with the consequences of global warming. A further mission some want the Alliance to fulfill is that of subcontractor to the United Nations to help alleviate humanitarian tragedies in Africa and elsewhere. They argue that only the Alliance has the necessary technical means and organizational skills to act rapidly and decisively in case of need.
Leaving Afghanistan
Regardless of the attractiveness of the idea of having NATO fight for justice and democracy on a global scale, this should not be its future business model. It is much more likely to reorient itself to its core purpose and as an institution for the defense of the security interests of its members. Indeed, with its withdrawal from Afghanistan beginning in 2011, NATO will enter its fourth evolutionary phase.
The gradual removal of military forces from the Hindu Kush, whether it is completed in two, four, or more years, will likely initiate NATO's return to its roots as a classic security alliance. Admittedly, even such a traditional institution will have to look beyond its territorial boundaries, because globalization is also relevant for the security realm, and the organization cannot be focused solely on the territory of its member states. Still, after Afghanistan it should resemble more the defense alliance of Phase I than the global player of its present phase.
Let there be no misunderstanding: NATO's military engagement in Afghanistan was appropriate and inevitable. There was no alternative to ousting the Taliban regime, which provided save havens for the al Qaeda network. That is why the consensus among the Allies is not to withdraw until the government in Kabul has enough security forces at its disposal to cope with the re-emergence of the terrorist threat. But NATO's mission in Afghanistan will remain traumatic for the Alliance, not only because of the price paid in blood and treasure.
Disillusionment will spread even further among those engaged in Afghanistan, simply because any nation-building effort in such a poor and war-torn country can accomplish only modest achievements, far below initial expectations. Even if the international community manages to foster stability and economic growth there over the next decade, Afghanistan is unlikely to outstrip the economic power of an African state such as Chad, and it will always depend on external aid. Such a sobering outcome can hardly be attributed to a lack of international engagement. It is arguably the best situation that can be achieved in countries that are among the least developed in the world.
Scaling Back
As a result, in the near future there should be few illusions about the prospects of nation-building in deprived regions. The willingness to engage militarily in troubled areas will shrink dramatically, despite atrocities in such countries as Congo and Sudan. Instead, NATO's path will be determined by its members' understanding of their own limitations. In many respects, NATO after Afghanistan will be a different and less ambitious alliance.
Its role will shift back from that of an almost global peacekeeper to an organization that provides security for its members in a narrower sense. In exceptional cases NATO may be required to provide military action beyond its territory
not least so that it can remain relevant to the United States. Nevertheless, its role as worldwide crisis manager in lieu of the United Nations is obsolete. Energy security, climate change, and competition for natural resources such as water will be peripheral to its mission portfolio. Instead, the mutual security commitment enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty will continue to remain essential. The future NATO will be primarily an alliance in defense of the population, territory, and vital interests of its member nations.It's the Economy . . .
NATO future course will be affected by five chief concerns: the international economy, its relations with Russia, the alliance's expansion, global nuclear developments, and finally, potential threats.
The global economy will influence NATO's future direction most dramatically. The consequences of the international financial crisis will burden the budgets of NATO members for many years to come. Military expenditures will suffer disproportionally. All members are democracies in which it is politically easier to cut military procurement than social programs. Even the United States, currently the biggest defense spender, will have to cut its budgets considerably.
The result will be twofold. First, the share of military expenditures in the overall budgets of the NATO states will be further reduced. Already, only five of NATO's 28 members fulfill its self-commitment of spending at least two percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. The organization's average is less than 1.7 percent, and even this figure is adjusted by the disproportionate military expenditures of the United States (about 4.3 percent). Some members spend less than 1 percent on defense while spending 30 percent or more on social programs.
Second, the fact that economies and thereby GDPs are shrinking almost everywhere renders the comparisons in terms of percentages less meaningful. The amount of money available for the military will generally decline.
Given that some NATO members spend more than two-thirds of their defense budgets on personnel, the prospects for further military investments become obvious. Despite the fact that "transformation" is the mantra in NATO military circles, few funds will be available for increased expeditionary forces that can be rapidly deployed and sustained over great distances. Major projects for strategic air transport, modern military communication, and other military priorities will be stretched, reduced, or postponed; the future of long-range power projection will be significantly compromised. The vast majority of NATO members will have to cope with those capabilities currently available and once procured for territorial defense missions. As a result, many Alliance members will avoid costly military missions abroad for financial reasons. Indeed, some countries are about to reduce their personnel in Afghanistan, as they feel unable to bear the cost for the current level of demand.
Concerns over Russia
NATO is also leaning toward a narrower interpretation of its defensive mission because of its relationship with Russia. For historical reasons, its Eastern European members in particular still regard Russia as a threat and one of the chief reasons they applied for NATO membership in the first place. For many of them, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which codifies mutual solidarity in case of military attack, is primarily directed against Russia. Moscow's partiality for harsh rhetoric and military exercises close to the Baltic borders do not help to alleviate such concerns.
These gestures are unlikely to let up. As a result, subliminal concerns among NATO's eastern nations will persist as well. The respective countries will continue to regard territorial defense as the organization's core mission, and they need to be assured that the Alliance is willing and able to fulfil this mission. Paying lip service to security commitments will not be enough. Member nations with security concerns regarding Russia want evidence of NATO's military readiness and political resolve. Particularly after the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, Polish and Baltic voices raised the question of whether the Alliance could defend its members if most of its deployable forces are engaged elsewhere, in Afghanistan or the Balkans. What would have happened, some observers asked, if Russia had decided to act militarily against one of the Baltic countries to "protect" Russian citizens in the region
Thus, these countries call for concrete contingency plans, for military exercises to demonstrate NATO's preparedness and for the deployment of its forces or infrastructure on their soil as symbols of reassurance and solidarity.This does not exclude cooperation with Russia in clearly defined areas of common concern. However, true cooperation or even the oft-quoted "strategic partnership" will be possible only if all NATO countries feel safe and secure. Thus, the Alliance's core mission of providing security for its members will become increasingly relevant.
Increasing Membership
A third area in which NATO will return to its traditional security role is in terms of its expansion. After three enlargement rounds since the end of the Cold War, the organization has grown from 12 countries to 28 and has thereby contributed significantly to the political transformation of Eastern Europe. At the same time, the enlargement process required a tremendous integration effort, particularly since for political reasons some of the shortcomings of applicant countries have been benevolently overlooked. The integration process is not yet complete and still requires considerable effort on all sides. Decision-making processes must be simplified, and the distribution of functions must be negotiated.
All these elements diminish the enthusiasm to accept additional countries into NATO. The popular notion of swiftly creating a "Europe whole and free" through a rapid enlargement policy has lost steam. Ukraine and Georgia have a pledge for membership, but without a specific timeframe. Both countries still have a long way to go to be ready for accession and vice versa. In military terms, the Alliance would hardly be able to provide credible security assurances today for Ukraine, the second-largest country in Europe after Russia. Moreover, the new government in Kiev is much less enthusiastic about NATO, and its future policy with respect to the Alliance is not clear.
Beyond question, NATO's door to new members will remain open, as the option of inviting other European countries to join is explicitly codified in the Washington Treaty. However, its role as in instrument for political transformation in Eastern and southeastern Europe is likely to decrease in the absence of an alliance that will focus more on security and defense.
Nuclear Developments
Fourth, the Alliance will revert to its more traditional role with respect to nuclear deterrence. Current popular notions of a nuclear weapons-free world (such as Global Zero) do not mitigate the fact that such weapons will remain a factor in international relations for the immediate future. The number of countries having nuclear capabilities is likely to increase. North Korea has proven its nuclear status already with a test explosion of an atomic device in October 2006 and claimed another successful nuclear test in May 2009. Iran pursues its military nuclear program despite international threats and sanctions and is apparently closer to success than even pessimistic observers expected not long ago. As soon as Teheran has achieved nuclear status, other countries in the region could follow. Currently, 12 Middle Eastern states pursue civil nuclear-energy programs, which could be upgraded to weapons projects. The same holds true for East Asia. Countries such as South Korea or Japan are already "virtual" nuclear powers in the sense that they are technically capable of producing nuclear weapons. They might seriously consider such an option depending on how the situation in North Korea evolves.
Such a trend has two consequences. First, the concept of nuclear deterrence, which some had already written off after the end of the Cold War, is likely to undergo a renaissance. The lessons of Cold-War deterrence must be revisited and adapted to fit the new requirements. Second, the notion of nuclear commitments, also born during NATO's first phase, will regain relevance. Already in the past the United States extended its nuclear umbrella over NATO allies and South Korea and Japan through an idea called "extended deterrence." According to this view, any attack on one of these allies would incur the risk of American nuclear retaliation against the aggressor. The outcome was twofold. On one hand, this meant nuclear protection for non-nuclear allies, and on the other it was a means of non-proliferation, as it prevented the nuclear have-nots from pursuing their own nuclear capabilities. A nuclear Iran would particularly stress the non-proliferation aspect, as it would require the extension of the American umbrella (or that of other nuclear powers such as France or the United Kingdom) to countries that might otherwise try to acquire their own nuclear-deterrence capabilities.
State-on-State Conflict
Fifth and finally, NATO's range of risks and threats is likely to be supplemented by a further danger that will lead the Alliance back to its roots. So far, its threat analyses focus on dangers posed by international terrorism, non-state actors, failed states, regional instabilities, or the spread of weapons of mass destruction. A fundamental future risk is mostly factored out: the danger of major interstate war. There are not only regional actors or failed regimes that could refer to the use of military force. Major functioning states outside Europe also could attack one another. This would not pose a direct threat to NATO but to international stability, which the alliance cannot ignore.
Such a scenario is a realistic one, given the mutual amplification of three international predicaments. Should the predictions of climate experts become full reality, rising sea levels will threaten coastal areas, and desertification of entire regions will sharply reduce habitable areas. Many of the affected countries are poor and politically unstable but militarily well-equipped; some even have weapons of mass destruction. Their governments could use military force either in their struggle for land and resources or to channel the discontent of their own people.
Moreover, according to the forecasts on international energy demands, economic growth in Asia and elsewhere will lead to unprecedented competition for affordable energy. China already behaves aggressively to secure its oil and gas supplies, countering international attempts to promote good governance in Africa and elsewhere. Finally, weapons proliferation and the spread of missile technology will allow an increasing number of countries to project devastating power, even nuclear destructive power, over vast distances. Any detonation of a nuclear weapon, however, even if it occurs far beyond NATO's territory, would alter the international security landscape even more profoundly than the attacks of 9/11 did.
Given these three risks, it is difficult to imagine that future rivalries and interstate tensions can be solved by diplomatic means. Thus, the contingency of major nations being at war with each other will make it back to the international stage. The perception of NATO as a classic security alliance will gain importance.
NATO in its next incarnation, Phase IV, must have a different set of priorities. After it withdraws from Afghanistan, it must focus more on protecting its members' immediate security interests. It is worth noting that most of these immediate interests are Western interests. The West
referring not to a geographical but political category encompassing the community of democratic and pluralist market economies is a reality in international relations. NATO already differentiates between countries such as Uzbekistan and Armenia on one hand and Australia, Sweden, and Japan on the other.Article 10 of the Washington Treaty limits NATO membership to European countries and North America. This is not about a global alliance that chooses its members on a worldwide basis. Instead, it is about a close partnership among nations whose values and security interests coincide. Partnerships with these countries provide orientation, legitimacy, and a capacity to act in a globalized security environment. Thus, NATO's Phase IV is not only about focusing on its core business but also about the renaissance of the West.