Irregular Sea Control for Counter-Piracy
st Century Seapower first cited maritime security as an expanded core capability. But to be truly effective, counter-piracy and other low-end missions must be considered unified, combined, and joint. Minimally and efficiently manned and equipped, persistent sea bases could provide cost-effective solutions for one of our oldest and most enduring core capabilities: sea control.High-End Responses
Somali pirates, using small skiffs and operating with hijacked fishing vessels as mother ships, present a highly diffuse and distributed threat to commercial maritime shipping. The international community has responded by sending largely high-end warships that operate collectively with U.S. Navy units in Commander, Fifth Fleet's Task Force 150 and 151, the European Union's EUNAVFOR under Operation Atalanta, NATO's Allied Mission Protector, or else independently, as is the case with China, Russia, India, Malaysia, and others.
All units cooperate at the tactical level, but they have had limited success. High-end ships are unable to provide adequate coverage to build real awareness of their environment, or to respond quickly to piracy. There are just too few of them, and the area is too large, measuring over a million square miles (twice the state of Texas). Within this vast area are thousands of small boats.
They are fishermen, traders, smugglers, and pirates. Some swap between all of these occupations on any given day. Making sense of this myriad of small-boat traffic requires a force that can get among them to gain awareness and begin shaping the environment. Large capital warships are too far removed and, despite their range and endurance, cannot as efficiently monitor or query boats or interact to deter potential pirates. Even though many carry their own embarked helicopters and small boats for surveillance and rapid response, there are too few of these assets for the size of the area that requires coverage.
Enter the Low End
In the past, special operations forces (SOF) have been quicker to translate their activities ashore to the maritime environment. Accustomed to mixing soft and hard power to gain awareness of the operating environment, build indigent capacity, and influence the local population, they have operated from small sea bases. Examples include the barges Hercules and Winbrown 7 in the northern Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq Tanker War in the 1980s, and the USNS Stockham (T-AK 3017) in Operation Enduring Freedom, Philippines.
Because of the large areas involved and the high demand for SOF, conventional forces must adapt their operating concepts and become more SOF-like to conduct counter-piracy and maritime-security operations off the coast of Somalia. Conventional naval forces have succeeded in low-end missions such as Operation Market Time off Vietnam. The nature of such threats minimizes the requirement for highly trained SOF assets, and most conventional expeditionary units could easily carry out counter-piracy.
New Approaches with Old Platforms
A number of options with minimal effort could quickly provide low-cost and highly efficient platforms to host persistent irregular sea-control forces. This would free high-end warships for their ocean sea-control and forward-presence missions. Operating in a relatively low-threat environment, persistent sea bases could support a "free form" international and interagency force that would share the burden of containing piracy and other threats. (The CNO Strategic Studies Group introduced the free-form force concept in July 2005.)
A low-end mix of barges, converted commercial platforms, prepositioning assets, and amphibious and auxiliary ships could form a chain of these bases, interspersed along the coast. They would support small frigates, corvettes, and coastal patrol craft, as well as smaller boats and helicopters. Small vessels could be special boat units of highly capable MK-V patrol craft and 11-meter rigid-hull inflatable boats, and special-operations craft riverine, less in demand in the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) is ideally suited as force provider for such missions, with its riverine squadrons, maritime expeditionary security squadrons (formerly naval coastal warfare units), maritime civil-affairs squadrons, and explosive ordnance disposal. Additional capabilities could include helicopters, Scan Eagle and other unmanned aerial vehicles, psychological operations, Coast Guard law-enforcement detachments, FBI and a host of other joint, interagency, or combined assets. Currently available containerized mission-support modules could provide easily reconfigurable hospital, messing, repair, and berthing facilities to barges and commercial ships. Expeditionary units could have a standing capability for command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence.
The Navy has already recognized the value of low-end platforms in maritime-security missions by its use of Ocean 6, an oil-services barge that since 2006 has served as a persistent sea base and command-and-control platform in the North Persian Gulf mission to protect the critical Iraqi Khawr al Amaya and al Basrah oil terminals.
Forming a Protective Chain
This chain of persistent sea bases would be most effective close to shore, within Somali territorial waters, at intervals of 20 miles. This would maintain an adequate surface-surveillance picture with supporting small craft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and helicopters. In such a relatively low-threat environment, aerostats may provide additional surveillance coverage.
This may seem impractical, considering Somalia's 1,600 miles of coastline, but the problem is more manageable if the sea bases are positioned in the vicinity of coastal towns and villages where pirates are known to originate, such as Mogadishu, Eyl, Berbera, Kismayu, Merca, and Bosasso.
Helicopters would be quick-reaction forces, while small craft would patrol among indigenous vessels, conducting queries and slowly building an intelligence picture and awareness of the various players on the water. Through daily conversations, exchange of small gifts, information, advisories, and psychological-operations materials, Coalition forces could begin to shape and influence these lawless spaces.
These forces could also operate locally procured dhows and fishing vessels to provide more covert surveillance, and possibly serve as Q-ships (codenamed for types of ships that operated out of World War I Queensland, Ireland) or decoys to lure pirates seeking ships to hijack. Corvettes and frigates with helicopters could patrol farther offshore, where their greater endurance and sea-keeping would allow them to watch for "leakers," pirates who have avoided irregular sea-control forces.
Evolving Missions
As most experts agree, maritime power can contain piracy, but ultimate solutions are found only ashore. If irregular sea control begins to succeed, and if piracy and maritime crime is contained at sea, the international community could consider expanding the role of these sea bases to support occasional humanitarian and shaping operations ashore.
The capacity and capability of the sea bases could be modified to support the staging of construction and humanitarian supplies, potentially hosting civil-affairs groups, naval mobile construction battalions, medical units, and nongovernmental organizations. The bases could provide security to these forces and allow forays ashore to be adjusted as conditions on the ground allow.
Additionally, irregular sea-control forces operating from sea bases could begin the crucial work of building Somalia's capacity to enforce law and order in their own territorial waters. U.S. organizations such as NECC's Expeditionary Training Command or Coast Guard mobile training teams could team with other U.S. and international partners to train Somalia's nascent coast guard. Again, the sea bases could provide security and sanctuary, so that Coalition forces could avoid threats ashore while focusing on delivering quality training afloat.
Undoubtedly, when considering the great distances involved, a chain of irregular sea bases off Somalia would present logistic challenges. These are already well known to the Naval Forces Central Command/Fifth Fleet logistic commander, Commander Task Force-53, supporting Coalition naval forces in CTF-150 and CTF-151. Support facilities and capabilities in the region, such as the ports of Djibouti and Mombasa, would have to be expanded through agreements with the host nations; additional ports would have to be surveyed for expanded use, for example Salalah and al Duqm in Oman.
However, Central Command and the Fifth Fleet have to consider expanded logistics in the North Persian Sea regardless of counter-piracy actions, due to the threat posed by a hostile Iran. This could make the Gulf untenable for Coalition naval forces in the event of an armed conflict. Many of the platforms that would make ideal sea bases could also hold considerable quantities of stores and fuel to support their assigned assets and would likely require less resupply missions than warships.
We have learned in Iraq and Afghanistan that to succeed in an irregular fight, irregular thinking is needed. It's time for new approaches to counter-piracy.
Piracy Can and Must Be Suppressed
As philosopher George Santayana once said: Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. Historians may scoff at the simplistic implications, yet the adage often rings true. The parallels between modern piracy and that of the late 18th and early 19th centuries are staggering. Two hundred years ago, prolonged negotiation and unwillingness to act led to hundreds of Western prisoners being enslaved. Nearly one-sixth of the U.S. federal budget was devoted to tribute payments.1
It was not until decades later that the Barbary Corsairs were put down for good. In the 21st century, the global community is allowing itself to enter the same stalemate. On our current course there is no end in sight.
Looking Back
The impetus for the U.S. Navy was a loosely aligned group of privateers on the North African coast. For almost 20 years, they attacked and imprisoned American seaman without penalty. It started in 1784, with the capture of the U.S. merchantman Betsey. More than 16 years passed before any significant resistance to such piracy began. Legendary stories about Lieutenant Stephen Decatur and William Eaton tell of fierce, decisive battles that slowly eroded Barbary strength at the beginning of the 19th century. In 1815, Decatur finally quelled the threat. From 1784 until then, vast sums of money were paid in fruitless tribute, dozens of U.S. ships were taken, hundreds of Americans were imprisoned, and many were put to death.
Same As It Ever Was
Now compare that history to today's statistics. In 2008, according to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), "the number of reported piracy attacks off East Africa rose astronomically."2 There were 145 piracy attacks in 2008 alone, resulting in more than 600 mariners kidnapped and held for ransom. The IMO has responded to this threat with plans to "improve communications between States" and "improve States' maritime situational awareness."3
The similarities between the IMO's efforts and those of a young United States are readily apparent. The current method of dealing with piracy involves diplomacy and a reactionary posture. The Maersk Alabama incident, while a victory for the United States, did little to deter the alarming trend. Even the IMO admits that "in the case of the situation off Somalia, developments ashore are probably the only way to resolve this problem in the long term."4
In the 18th century, the United States along with European nations found it easier to work with, rather than wage war against, the Barbary Corsairs. Morocco, Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis existed as semiautonomous regions. They shared many similarities to 21st-century Somalia. Today the global community approaches Somalia in the same manner as our forefathers approached northern Africa.
History has shown that a state with little centralized government cannot control its semiautonomous regions. It certainly cannot stop loose bands of marauders. Pirates today operate with impunity. They recognize the risk associated with their trade while on the high seas, but take shelter on land. They exploit the fact that they face no consequences after a foray is complete. The rewards for these impoverished pirates are well worth the risk of possible (but unlikely) capture.
The Current Soft Response
The international shipping community has taken measures to reduce the risk. Ships divert from normal routes and travel farther offshore, at higher speeds. They stand additional watches in pirate-infested waters. They run drills to counter attempted boardings, and carry insurance to help pay ransoms. All of these countermeasures have two things in common. More often than not they don't work, and they cost money.
There is an immense international fiscal impact from these tactics and techniques. We are not paying directly to pirates as we did in the 18th century, but we are certainly still paying tribute to them in many other ways.
Decisive military engagement solved the problem before, and it was not limited to battles on the sea. The USS Enterprise landed Marines in the summer of 1802 and engaged pirates on the "shores of Tripoli." In 1815, Decatur engaged and destroyed pirates at sea, then sailed his squadron of ten ships straight into the Harbor of Algiers, threatening the city's walls with his guns.5 There was no offer of tribute, and no possibility for compromise.
Decades of failed appeasement had taught our young nation a hard lesson. The United States demanded freedom, safety, and security on the high seas. It was a decisive and hard-fought battle that brought these demands to fruition.
Changing to a Harder Course
Once again pirates are threatening our freedom. Mariners from all nations are fearful of operating on the high seas. We are repeatedly reminded that no course to sail offers full protection from their misdeeds. They are cunning and capable of thwarting our most heartfelt efforts at avoiding conflict. Despite genuine attempts to implement best practices to make shipping safer, "developments ashore" are indeed the only likely solution, as the IMO concluded.
This is not a call to war. Rather, it is a reminder that the United States has faced this threat before and paid a heavy price for attempts to deal passively with a violent force. We must deal with pirates, and there must be no safe haven where they can hide. International naval activity on the high seas is a good start, but the global community must take the fight further. And if the global community is unwilling, then the United States must go it alone.
1. Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and The Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 11.
2. International Maritime Organization. Piracy in Waters of the Coast of Somalia, http://www.imo.org/home.asp
topic_id=1178.3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Boot, Savage Wars, 28.
Build the Army LSV Fleet
For the most effective deployment of Soldiers and equipment to remote corners of the world, options assets include sea basing, strategic sealift, joint high-speed vessels, and prepositioned fleets. All of those maritime assets assume the existence of a functioning, appropriate port. What if such a port does not exist or is not available
The requirement for an offload port is the weak link as well as the most critical component for mission success. A port establishes the final linkup from sea to land.Conventional ships must have ports to load and offload. Both the joint high-speed vessel (JHSV) and the large medium speed roll-on roll-off (LMSR) ship require the services of a functioning port. Without an operating facility, with its piers, docks, and wharves, these vessels cannot load or discharge cargo. A JHSV, LMSR, or commercial-contract ship sitting offshore unable to discharge is of no use regardless of how fast it traveled from its port of departure.
Sea basing brings Soldiers and equipment close to, but not onto, a distant shore. Marine Corps air cushion landing craft vessels (LCACs) can put ashore a Marine expeditionary force, but this is a short-term tactical event. It does not solve the problem of continued or sustained strategic support.
Strategic planning normally assumes the presence of port infrastructures, but in much of the world, especially areas of Africa, port capabilities are limited. What is the backup plan
To rapidly, effectively and dependably put Soldiers and their equipment ashore anywhere in the world on short notice, we should use U.S. Army logistic support vessels (LSVs).
LSVs Don't Need Ports
LSV-7 and LSV-8 deployed in June 2008 to Alaska and Puerto Rico respectively, where they discharged and loaded vehicles and equipment from unprepared beaches and piers. These vessels are the only ships in the U.S. military's fleet that can self-deploy and conduct landing-craft operations. An LSV can sail 5,000 miles without refueling, while carrying 2,000 tons of cargo. This is the equivalent of 28 Abrams M1A tanks (an LCAC can carry at most two Abrams tanks; a JHSV can carry 500 tons of cargo, the equivalent of seven Abrams tanks. Both LCACs and JHSVs have much less range than an LSV).
The LSV can self-load cargo using bow or stern ramps, sail across any ocean nonstop, and immediately upon arriving regardless of port infrastructure unload onto a pier, dock, wharf, or beach. It has been criticized as being slow (with a cruising speed of 12 knots), but a range of 5,000 miles makes it an effective transoceanic logistics platform. However, a class design upgrade would increase the LSV's cruising speed.
The JHSV, while promoted as fast (with speeds up to 50 knots), has a cruising range just over 1,000 miles, which prevents transoceanic passages. Moreover, its actual loaded operational speed is closer to 25 than 50 knots, only 10 knots faster than a conventional LSV.1
Military experience from past conflicts, in particular World War II Army and Marine Corps amphibious operations in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Pacific campaigns, demonstrate that success in putting Soldiers and equipment on foreign lands requires a flexible, rapid, and mobile force. If an adversary knows a port is required for offloading, then tactical options, and the ability to gain initiative, is compromised before forces have even landed.
The Army should consider increasing its capability to land on unimproved shores anywhere in the world. Piers, docks, wharves, and ports can be shut down, destroyed, or made unusable far too easily and quickly, but LSVs are designed to land on any beach and operate when high and dry.
The Army Should Retool
Joint logistics over-the-shore, though designed to provide beach-landing capability, is a cumbersome, time-consuming, and weather-vulnerable process. As was experienced on the beaches of France soon after 6 June 1944, the effects of even mild ocean storms can halt complicated, infrastructure-dependant amphibious operations.
Weather is a less-limiting operational factor for an LSV. Without having to depend on port services, it can modify its discharge location to adjust for weather, wave, and surf conditions. It can run up a beach, drop its ramp, immediately discharge troops and cargo, and depart in a matter of hours. This defines a successful amphibious operation: placing Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen firmly ashore, establishing momentum, and moving inland.
LSVs can transport containers as well as wheeled and tracked vehicles or personnel. This allows tactical flexibility, a key component for the success of joint operations.2 Just as Navy carriers are an excellent but often overlooked platform for supporting Army aviation assets, the Army's LSV fleet can be used to meet the varied needs of rapid and flexible amphibious-force deployment.
The Army should regain its roots in amphibious operations, reinstating in its maritime-training curriculum the many valuable lessons and skills learned during World War II, Korea, and Vietnam relating to oceanography, waves, beaches, tides, and currents. Increased training should be provided for worldwide amphibious operations, with a focus on Africa and the Middle East.
Successful amphibious operations require coordinated land, sea, and air assets. We certainly need the capabilities of the JHSV, LMSRs, and prepositioned vessels, but most of all we need the capability to put Soldiers and resources ashore anywhere, anytime. We cannot depend on world ports to determine when, where, or how we discharge. The proven concepts and capabilities of a landing craft are unsurpassed.
1. CDR Robert K. Morrison III, U.S. Navy, "Widen the Lens for JHSV," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2008, p. 56.
2. BG Robin P. Swan, U.S. Army, "Opportunity at Hand: New Roles for Carriers," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2008, p. 61.