A Thoroughbred Ship-Killer

Even with its striking design and blue camouflage paint scheme, the Chinese Houbei-class guided-missile fast-attack craft (Type 022) remains unknown to most defense analysts. While at first glance the ship appears to be relatively small (225 tons)-at least when compared to U.S. warships-the Houbei packs a lethal punch in the form of long-range, fourth-generation Chinese antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs).

One has only to imagine a Taiwan defense scenario, with U.S. strike groups closing on the region, to appreciate the potential Houbei threat: stealth and speed allow the positioning of a coordinated, dispersed attack group hundreds of miles off the Chinese coast, suddenly presenting American warships with a fusillade of supersonic ASCMs from multiple axes. Beijing's decision to build large numbers of the Houbei likely reflects the logic that small, cheap, single-mission combatants can be decisive weapon systems when used collectively.

Not an Anomaly

The Houbei's history is somewhat vague, but the ship's sudden emergence in large numbers suggests it is a high People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) priority. It was first seen in Qiuxin Shipyard, Shanghai, in 2004, reportedly based on a proven Australian twin-hull, wave-piercing catamaran design. The first hull measured 140 feet, with a very shallow five-foot draft. Maritime analysts view the rapid production of a large number of these radical new hulls at several different shipyards as a major event in PLAN shipbuilding.¹ China's construction of the Houbei class continues apace. More than 40 units have already entered service, according to GlobalSecurity.org; 20 more are projected by 2015, and some claim a total of up to 100 will be produced.²

While China has long maintained a large force of small fast-attack craft, the quantum leap Houbei-class improvements surprised many. The wave-piercing catamaran/water-jet propulsion technology, while borrowed, results in a very fast (some claim 45 knots), stable, and low-profile vessel.³ The catamaran hull is a small-waterplane-area-twin-hull (SWATH) design and has features similar to recent U.S. experimental high-speed vessels and the General Dynamics version of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). This design provides exceptional stability at high speeds, which is important when maintaining long-range command-and-control (C2) connectivity and firing ASCMs on the move. In fact, a 2008 Congressional Research Service report highlighted the Houbei as a highly advanced design of concern.⁴

An Element of a System

The Houbei's weapons make it a formidable platform alone, but PLAN leaders surely designed her to act as an element of a larger combat system. First, the likely frenetic underway tempo of activity of her small crew of 12 leaves little margin for organic target acquisition or situational awareness, even with increasingly automated weapon systems and sensors. While a 2007 Signal magazine article highlighted the vessel's passive electromagnetic and electro-optical sensors, these systems provide only line-of-sight targeting, though they do not reveal the ship's position.⁵

The article also discussed the Houbei's surprisingly extensive (considering it is such a small combatant) data link connectivity for long-range coordination with aircraft, submarines, and other PLAN warships. All this points toward a craft designed for over-the-horizon targeting (OTHT) within a larger combat network. The converse also holds true: on her own, the Houbei has only marginal ability to find ASCM targets. Because of its limited range, however, especially at higher speeds, coordinated Houbei group operations in blue water would presumably require at-sea refueling (a current Chinese capability gap).

The Houbei's offensive punch is centered on a new, long-range ASCM-this platform is all missile-shooter. Although it has some self-defense capability with its Type 630 six-barrel close-in weapon system and small FLS-1 short-range surface-to-air missile launcher on the bridge, its large ASCM launch housing occupies more than a third of the topside area. According to the latest Defense Department report to Congress, each boat can carry up to eight YJ-83 (C803) ASCMs, targeted by improved OTHT for long-range, coordinated ASCM strikes.⁶ Still, U.S. government assessments, among others, caveat such conclusions with statements that open-ocean OTHT is extremely challenging and only a potential future Chinese capability.

As the Houbei's main weapon, the C803 deserves further discussion. The missile is a follow-on to the highly successful (and proliferated) C802 ASCM, yet it brings next-generation capabilities. Its extended range (reportedly 135-plus nautical miles), higher speed (though likely not supersonic, as some claim), enhanced countermeasures, and reported ability to receive target information in-flight make this a formidable missile.⁷ Just a single C803 is a serious potential threat to a U.S. carrier or expeditionary strike group, but Chinese naval tacticians almost certainly do not envision single-missile strikes against adversary capital ships. Perhaps more important, the C803's lethality is made manifest when its range is combined with the maximum Houbei operating range (estimated at 300 nautical miles, as compared to similar Australian designs).⁸ Hence, seen as a larger combat system, a group of externally cued Houbeis become much more than defensive-oriented littoral craft.

Expanding China's Reach

The goal to extend Chinese offensive naval capability into blue waters beyond Taiwan is now well documented. The 2009 DOD report to Congress (and other recent assessments) discussed the new doctrinal emphasis on "far sea defense," beyond the traditional 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone.⁹ The Houbei class fits into this operational design, but with an added twist: semi-stealth, speed, and volume ASCM fires provide a potentially lethal element within a stratagem of offensive surprise. While surprise is not a new element of Chinese doctrine (i.e., "assassin's mace"), naval theorists have traditionally viewed Chinese littoral naval capabilities amidst an anti-access and area denial paradigm-i.e., defensive in nature. Alongside other long-range ASCM platforms, the Houbei class provides a distinctly offensive capability within an "active defense" strategy.¹⁰

Recent assessments support this assertion. In 2005 testimony to Congress, analyst Richard Fisher asserted that China could deploy the Houbei along with larger surface ships and submarines in an effective blockade around Taiwan and have the capability to conduct coordinated, mass ASCM attacks against U.S. naval forces by 2010.¹¹ In 2007 congressional testimony, Naval War College Professor Andrew Erickson assessed that China's emerging naval capabilities provided power projection beyond the littorals, into the South China Sea, and to a limited degree, the Western Pacific.¹² Defense Secretary Robert Gates in an April 2009 speech stated:

We know other nations are working on ways to thwart the reach and striking power of the U.S. battle fleet-whether by producing stealthy submarines in quantity or developing anti-ship missiles with increasing range and accuracy. We ignore these developments at our peril.¹³

Blue-Water Capability

Contemporary Chinese literature also discusses targeting U.S. Navy strike groups at increasing ranges from the mainland. A recent Naval Postgraduate School analysis relates that numerous Chinese articles describe how Beijing aims to locate U.S. aircraft carriers with OTHT and strike them with long-range weapons while they are still more than 1,000 nautical miles from Taiwan. The assessment concluded that if Beijing realized this capability, the United States would have an extremely complicated task in repelling an invasion of Taiwan.¹⁴

A 2007 RAND assessment also stressed that Chinese writings clearly indicate pre-emptive attacks on key U.S. power-projection capabilities-including aircraft carriers-prior to or quickly following formal declaration of hostilities to disrupt deployment of forces to the region, place America in a passive position, and deliver a psychological shock to the United States and its allies.¹⁵ It states further that an aircraft carrier with escort, if surprised, would be particularly vulnerable to a mass missile attack.

It seems clear that China's growing fleet of Houbeis fit into Beijing's potentially offensive operational design. Numerous networked, fast, low-profile, and lethal ASCM attack craft support more than just anti-access and area denial paradigms. Beyond sea-denial missions in Taiwanese waters and littoral anti-access focused on the U.S. fleet, the offensive capability of the Houbei collective complements other long-range ASCM platforms cued by Chinese intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The sudden onset of high-volume, precision ASCMs from Houbeis, larger warships, aircraft, and submarines represents a serious potential carrier strike group threat.

Images of the Houbei platform strike even casual observers with the fact that it is essentially an ASCM platform. Everything else on board simply supports that mission. This craft is a purebred ship-killer, perhaps even a carrier-killer. Alone, however, the Houbei is not particularly survivable, and may in fact be quite expendable. Speed is its greatest defense.

Is the U.S. Navy Prepared?

With ASCM threat-range rings extending farther and farther from the Chinese mainland, U.S. tactics and operational schema will have to adjust. Beyond shifting strike group operating areas farther to sea in blue water (thereby limiting the efficacy and relevance of the carrier air wing), the Navy will have to address the potential Houbei-class threat.¹⁶ The Houbeis' size and partial stealth, however, mean that the U.S. Navy may never locate the firing platform with long-range sensors prior to or after a C803 ASCM launch, making prosecution by way of U.S. surface-launched Harpoon missiles difficult at best.

Even if located after launch, the Houbei's speed could quickly put it outside the Harpoon engagement envelope. Air-launched Harpoons and/or aerial cueing may be a solution, but that would mean operating aircraft or unmanned aerial systems within range of Chinese fourth-generation land-based and naval surface-to-air missiles.¹⁷ Hellfire-armed MH-60R helicopters would be similarly vulnerable. Another option might be prosecution via nuclear-powered attack submarines, but questions about whether an SSN can effectively track or direct MK48 heavyweight torpedoes against a Houbei remain. The most desirable tactic is probably a Houbei-class mission-kill with pre-emptive mining or in-port destruction. But short of a general war, this is hard to imagine.

Another option is to rethink the "Streetfighter" ship class design.¹⁸ While some might argue that the LCS is the solution to countering the Houbei class, the ship's future remains cloudy. It is not optimized for surface warfare, is over ten times larger in displacement than a Houbei, and is arguably too valuable to mix it up in high-threat waters. The original Streetfighter architects envisioned a vessel of not more than 500 tons-small, fast, networked, and modular.¹⁹ Naturally, operational challenges come with deploying smaller craft far afield, but the U.S. Navy has mastered them before.

While simplistic, the old adage of "fighting fire with fire" suggests that a moderate number of smaller, fast, stealthy, single-mission U.S. Navy combatants may be the answer to threats like the Houbei class. Indeed, the Houbei class itself serves as a splendid example of a large run of small, single-mission ships. Such vessels are inherently cheaper, simpler, lighter, and rapidly manufactured.

Yet the LCS class arguably violated all of these dictums as never-ending multi-mission requirements expanded its displacement, cost, timeline, and complexity. The LCS is no Streetfighter, and the Navy probably will not acquire them in the numbers to perform Streetfighter duties, regardless.

More Analysis Needed

Finally, a few qualifications are necessary when evaluating emerging Chinese military capabilities. First, Beijing claims Washington exaggerates the threat of new naval capabilities for effect; analysts must avoid bias and hyperbole and evaluate Chinese capabilities objectively. Others similarly argue that framing China as the next peer competitor serves only to justify large U.S. defense budgets. Second, credible theorists assert that China is fielding new platforms without the doctrine, logistics, training, or tactics to employ them effectively in combat. Beijing's current capability to coordinate complex, wide-area naval operations and OTHT is indeed suspect. Third, since current PLAN warships and crews remain untested, the lack of operational evidence complicates outside assessment of the progress of China's military transformation. Washington needs similar qualitative assessments of "new" Chinese capabilities before it makes significant U.S. force-structure changes.

The Houbei herself remains unproven. Indeed, some of her "stealth" features suggest they are more for visual effect than signature reduction. The final hull count of the Houbei (perhaps alongside a follow-on improved class) and operational deployments should help answer remaining questions about this mysterious new warship.

Still, an evaluation of the potential collective employment of the Houbei class offers considerations for U.S. Navy and maritime industry leaders.

• The Navy may well require high-risk, close-in, friendly maritime littoral presence capabilities to locate, identify, and target the Houbei.
• Small, agile targets like the Houbei amidst a cluttered littoral environment will demand next-generation precision terminal guidance for friendly maritime standoff weapons.
• Houbei-class vulnerabilities may include methods to obviate collective use, such as eliminating friendly target location data or preventing sortie from port.
• Increasing adversary standoff ASCM surface-launch ranges suggests that the Navy needs a longer-range surface-launched ASCM.²⁰
• Carrier air wings should again be prepared to address the long-range fleet air defense mission versus high-volume, multi-axes ASCM threats.²¹
• Adhering to a simple, single-mission class design is an efficient and rapid way to deploy large numbers of small combatants.
• Numerous smaller, single-mission surface-warfare craft may be a viable alternative to the current LCS design to address potential threats like the Houbei.

Individually, the Houbei is a respectable single-mission surface fast-attack craft. In the final analysis, however, the class may represent the successful fielding of a collective capability that directly counters traditional U.S. naval strengths and goes well beyond individual ship missions such as coastal patrol/defense. Navy leaders should view the 40-odd Houbei ships as a potentially integrated element of a larger subsurface, air, and maritime antiship force centered on fourth-generation ASCMs. While long-range, multi-axis, saturation ASCM attack is not a new tactic, the Navy has not had to deal with this potential threat since the heady Cold War days.²² If worst-case assessments of new systems like the Houbei prove true, U.S. maritime defense of a besieged Taiwan may be the first of several long-held strategic concepts to be overcome by events.