Since the dawn of aerial combat, militaries have attempted to reduce the risk of human casualties by taking the pilot out of the aircraft. Nikola Tesla was the first to hypothesize an unmanned aerial vehicle in 1898, five years before the Wright brothers successfully achieved powered flight. Tesla claimed that the U.S. military could use a fleet of tele-automated, pilotless aircraft to aid in armed combat. Elmer Sperry developed this concept from 1917 to 1919 into the Hewitt-Sperry automatic airplane.1 Although Sperry successfully demonstrated the utility of the UAV, his invention, and most others prior to the Vietnam War, could only be classified as either guided missiles or target drones.2
Despite the UAV concept's proven effectiveness and the relative safety of a UAV, unmanned aerial systems (UAS)-defined as both the vehicle and control systems that guide them-have not been fully integrated into current battlefield strategies. Three issues have hindered the development of fully autonomous aviation squadrons: pilots have not fully accepted them, technological breakthroughs have been slow, and there has been no clearly defined UAS command structure to aid in joint forces integration.
Top Gun vs. Ground Control
The popular impression of naval aviation, epitomized by the 1986 film Top Gun with its risk-taking pilots and high-performance aircraft, has tended to attract aspiring aviators and drive them away from UAS programs. Current Navy UAV operators/pilots sit either in a specially designed Humvee-based ground control station (GCS) or on board a ship in a GCS combat information center terminal.3 While this may be exciting technology for a surface warfare officer or a Marine ground selectee, Navy pilots make up the majority of the few who are qualified to handle the UAS. Rear Admiral Mark Guadagnini, the Chief of Naval Air Training said in a 4 November 2008 interview in Navy Times, "Pilots will continue to play a key role in UAV squadrons." Though there is a current demand for more than 1,100 UAV operators, only 163 Sailors are currently UAS-qualified, which includes technicians, payload operators, and a small officer contingent.
Along with manning deficiencies, the relatively slow progress of technological breakthroughs also has hindered UAS progress. Early programs, such as the Air Force's Compass Dwell in 1968 and Compass Cope in July 1971, relied heavily on the most basic sensor technology and wireless data transmissions from enormous, room-sized computers located at the GCS. The delay between data transmission to the UAV and sensor feedback crippled the operator's ability to make timely and accurate decisions in a fast-paced environment. Despite more than 20 years of technological advances, including the development of the microchip processor in the 1980s, advanced computing software, more accurate sensors, and faster computers and data transmission speeds, this delay resulted in many missed targets. However, in 1999 laser technology advances were tested as a means of decreasing delay time. When implemented, this new technology increased the UAS's effectiveness by decreasing the delay in the sensor-to-shoot kill chain, but it did not solve all the problems.
Better Technology, Greater Risk
As improved technology has gradually increased the effectiveness of the UAS, it also has increased the number of threats it faces. Cheaper and accessible computers and wireless technology have made it easy for the average person to hijack modern UAVs. Most naval UAVs are short range and require a link through either very-high-frequency (VHF) or ultra-high-frequency (UHF) ranges, both commonly used civilian frequencies. Even the proposed Tier-III UAS, which uses high-altitude, long-endurance UAVs such as Northrop Grumman's Global Hawk Maritime Demonstration unmanned aerial system, which relies on satellite operations, are vulnerable to electronic attacks.4 Although the Department of Defense's Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032 calls for "improved capability to prevent interception, interference, jamming and hijacking [of UAVs]," no specific course of action has been stated; the roadmap only requires this to be completed by 2032.
The U.S. Government Accountability Office's November 2008 report to the Armed Services Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces identifies the absence of a single DOD entity accountable for UAS integration as the main issue hindering the progress of the 2007-2032 roadmap.5 Current military programs, such as the Joint Strike Fighter, were designed with the input of each service, with implementation plans developed through joint effort. Although each military branch has expressed a need for UAS programs, without a specified governing body to coordinate joint planning, these programs lack direction. This is clear when viewing the different training methods for UAS operators and technicians that each branch has employed and the variety of UAS programs that have been developed.
Standardized Training
The current methods for UAS training differ greatly among military branches. The Air Force accepts only applicants who have had at least four to six years of time served, a postgraduate degree, and have undergone nine months of training.6 The Navy accepts both officers and enlisted to work as UAV operators and UAS sensor technicians respectively. UAS training for naval personnel has been limited to a brief certification course, but Guadagnini plans to create a UAS training school. A standardized joint forces training curriculum focused on a multirole UAS platform could facilitate planning and create a common background allowing for easier communication while conducting UAS missions.
Little progress has been made in developing such a curriculum, nevertheless, current UAS programs are aimed toward creating a joint forces multirole endurance UAV. In 2006 a test program, known as the Joint Unmanned Combat Air System, or X-45 J-UCAS, was transferred from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to the Air Force and Navy. The program is intended to create a UAV equivalent of the JSF through implementing a common operating system among variants and multirole capabilities.7 Concentrating on a single, multirole UAS, rather than developing many specialized versions, will greatly advance the capabilities of future UAVs.
Through the UAV's 111-year history many issues have hindered the full integration of remotely operated aircraft into battlefield planning. However, recent advances have helped to accelerate the development of UAS programs. The advent of the video-game generation has produced many potential future military personnel who are willing to accept jobs that require them to sit in front of a large screen for hours at a time. The invention of the microchip processor has advanced processing power and software development, quickening the virtual and physical development of the UAS. Finally, although only vague plans and roadmaps have been created to define the future of the UAS, both the DOD and Congress have recognized a need for the creation of a UAS governing entity.
As UAS programs become more sophisticated in an effort to take the "dull, dirty, and dangerous" out of aviation, the fact is that no sensor system will ever fully simulate the capabilities of the human pilot.8 No computer can fully reproduce the complex decisions a fighter pilot must make, or manage the high-pressure target-selection decisions an aerial assault pilot may encounter. Since there are no plans yet to completely remove the human being from the cockpit, the glamour of the naval aviator will remain intact.
1. Laurence R. Newcome, Unmanned Aviation: A Brief History of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Reston, VA: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2004).
2. Louis C. Gerken, UAV-Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Chula Vista, CA: American Scientific Corp, 1991).
3. John Pike, "Intelligence Collection Programs and Systems," 13 March 2009, http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect.
4. William Reynish, "UAVs Entering the NAS," Avionics, 2004. Accessed 12 March 2009 http://www.aviationtoday.com/av/categories/military/1139.html. Peter Pace, Linton Wells II, Kenneth Krieg, and Stephan A. Cambone, Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments: Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Roadmap, 2005-2030, n.d. 12 March 2009 http://www.scribd.com/doc/1509636/US-Air-Force-uav-roadmap2005.
5. United States Government Accountability Office, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Management and Integration of DOD Efforts to Support Warfighter Needs, 2008.
6. Lolita C. Baldor, "Air Force Creates New Pilot Programs for Drones," the Associated Press, 2008. 13 March 2009 http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/WireStory?id=6093348&page=1
7. Peter Pace, Linton Wells II, Kenneth Krieg, and Stephan A. Cambone, op. cit.
8. Ibid.