Deterrence vs. Defense
(See N. Friedman, pp. 90-91, April 2009 Proceedings)
Commander James M. Nugent, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—Dr. Friedman suggests that a prevailing argument against ballistic-missile defense (BMD) is that it presents an immoral response because it upsets the "balance of power." While this is possibly an argument that might incite a fair degree of indignation in many USNI readers, it's also not the strongest argument to be made against BMD.
The definitive argument against BMD is that it's technically impossible, and that it is a political anodyne equivalent to having National Guardsmen running around our nations' airports after 9/11, though far, far more expensive. The current BMD system was brought online without having to adhere to the Pentagon's weapon testing requirements, and tests of this system or any BMD system to date hardly would qualify any of them as capable of handling a ballistic missile with rudimentary defensive enhancements. Might we someday provide a sufficient system to counter all possible anti-BMD measures? Nearly 50 years of trying should provide small comfort to all but the most diehard of BMD fans, but Dr. Friedman suggests that this glimmer of a possibility is enough to give our potential enemies pause, and worth the continued ungodly expense.
The author also seems to be ill informed or otherwise overly prone to simplify the makeup of the Iranian government. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the current president of Iran, shares something in common with Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a pragmatic conservative and president of Iran from 1989 to 1997, and Mohammad Khatami, a moderate reformer and president of Iran from 1997 to 2005: none of these men ran the country and in fact they had little control over any significant governmental entity, especially the military. Dr. Friedman need not be concerned. Mr. Ahmadinejad could do nothing with a nuclear weapon, as he has no control over any that could or might exist. The man who has run the country since 1989 is the Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. He and the various councils that advise him wield all the power in the Iranian government. The face of Iran may well be Mr. Ahmadinejad, but the cogs of the government are more opaque and harder to gauge than many are comfortable to admit.
The Iranians are an extraordinarily proud people and will do things that from a Western perspective seem to be against their better interests; most observers would say that the Iranians draw the line at self-annihilation. In the spring of 2003 the Iranians made overtures to the George W. Bush administration that were primarily intended to help allay Iranian concern that Iran was next after Iraq and Afghanistan. The Iranians respect strength and are appropriately concerned when it threatens them.
There's no logical reason to think that the Iranians doubt American willingness to use a triad of nuclear weapons that the Iranians would be powerless to deflect were any of it targeted against their country. Iran's leaders are not irrational and hardly likely to be unappreciative of the repercussions for an act of nuclear terrorism, thus making them perfect candidates for deterrence, allowing the United States to focus resources on things more substantive than an iffy technological deus ex machina.
Buy Fords, Not Ferraris
(See H. J. Hendrix, pp. 52-57, April 2009 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Jay A. Stout, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—Where did the warriors go? Our Navy serves the nation in many roles, but ultimately it must be able to prevail in combat across the globe, in the littorals, and at sea. It absolutely astounds me that—among other absurdities—a U.S. Navy officer would write, "The Navy's force structure should be organized to maximize the potential of its assets during peacetime . . . while also providing a means for swift concentration of credible combat power to meet any emergent major combat operation."
What? This reads like business school twaddle. I can only hope that Commander Hendrix really meant, "The Navy should be organized, manned, and equipped to secure the nation's maritime interests, and to prevail in combat operations when, where, and how the commander-in-chief directs. The Navy's capacity to contribute to other operations should be used as circumstances permit, but never to an extent that compromises its ability to fight and win."
Heaven help us if the vision our naval officers strive for is the maximization of the Navy's peacetime potential with a goal of meeting "any emergent combat operation." What does this mean, anyway? Personally, I'd embrace the opportunity to fight an opponent who is organized to maximize his peacetime potential and plans only to meet—rather than crush—me.
Lieutenant Nicholas Woodworth, U.S. Navy—Commander Hendrix's proposal to reduce the vulnerability of carrier strike groups (CSGs) is interesting, but does not address two major issues. First, while the America-class LHA might be suited to launching Joint Strike Fighters (JSF), it is not capable of launching any of the other aircraft that would normally support a strike package, namely Hawkeyes, Prowler/Growler, and F/A-18 tankers. Without that support, an expeditionary strike group would be heavily dependent on inorganic airborne early warning, electronic-warfare aircraft, and air-to-air refueling (AAR) platforms that are not immediately or readily available in all areas. The CSG's inherent strength is that, except for inorganic P-3/EP-3 ASW/I&W support, it is a self-contained air force.
Any strike operations would have to be conducted under the control of an Aegis platform for even basic threat warning and control, severely limiting the striking range of the JSF. Should a problem arise during landing, the lack of an organic AAR aircraft would endanger both aircrew and aircraft.
The other major issue is that the LHA would have to share its fuel load not only with its normal helicopter contingent but with gas-hungry jets as well, which would reduce the amount of time between replenishments and put both the LHA and supply ships at greater risk in the littoral. A 12-plane JSF squadron with each plane flying twice a day would consume approximately 370,000 gallons of JP-5 per week, and that is assuming only one tank of fuel per sortie, because of a lack of AAR.
Rather than conceding the littoral to less capable units, CSGs will be able to operate within range of hostile diesel-powered submarines by embracing the revitalized antisubmarine warfare capabilities of the P-8, which will begin service around the same time as the first of the America class is ready. Using a three-tiered forward presence system of Influence Squadron, ESG, and then CSG will delay the Navy's response to emergent crises, especially if the CSGs are not forward deployed and instead are plying U.S. waters, waiting to be called up. This removes the value of having our opponents know that in a matter of days, not weeks as in the commander's proposal, a CSG can be in position off their coastline flying combat strike missions, fully supported by organic specialty platforms. Those weeks might be long enough for the Chinese to consolidate a stranglehold of Taiwan, or Iran to heavily mine the Strait of Hormuz.
A CSG might provide more stick than needed, but an Influence Squadron may realize that when their carrot is not enough, they do not have a large enough stick to respond, or to use Commander Hendrix's analogy; while it is true that one does not always need the performance of a Ferrari, the problem with choosing a Ford is that you might be hoping for a Mustang and get a Pinto instead.
Paul J. Madden—The suggested Influence Squadron isn't a Ford, it's a skateboard. If large-deck carriers are obsolete, why do so many world navies—Brazil, China, France, India, Russia, the U.K., and the United States—want them now? Some people with this-war-itis forget that the main purpose of a navy is to counter other navies, and not just in the littorals. We shouldn't bring a knife to a gunfight.
Carriers are also used to project power over land. Many years from now, technology may allow Influence Squadrons to do that half as well as large carriers can. Ironically, by then, nuclear propulsion might be the only way to get around at sea.
Borgnine's Navy'
(See E. Borgnine, pp. 12-13, April 2009 Proceedings)
Commander Peter M. Stroux, U.S. Navy (Retired)—The photo of Gunner's Mate First Class Ernest Borgnine as a young Sailor appears to have been reversed, possibly in the original negative. Prior to 1947, the deck rates/ratings (i.e. Boatswain's Mates, Gunner's Mates, Torpedomen, Fire Control Men, Turret Captains, Mine Men) wore their insignia on the right arm with the eagle facing toward the heart. All other rates/ratings wore the insignia on the left arm. Service stripes (commonly called hash marks) were on the left arm in all cases. In 1947 all rates/ratings were relegated to the left arm where they remain to this day. Nevertheless, Gunner's Mate Borgnine's article was inspiring and informative. "McHale" deserves his honorary CPO rating as the true patriot he is.
We Need More Icebreakers!
(See N. Venzke, p. 8, March 2009 Proceedings)
Commander David L. Teska, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve—I deeply respect Rear Admiral Norm Venzke's experience and in-depth knowledge of the Coast Guard's icebreaker fleet and mission, and thus understand his point of view. I, however, respectfully disagree with his overall position that the icebreaker mission is one the Coast Guard should have. When I came out of officer candidate school in May 1990 I was full of enthusiasm for going to sea on an icebreaker, then represented by the USCGC Polar Star (WAGB-10) and Polar Sea (WAGB-11) based in Seattle, Washington. That assignment wasn't to be and my career went down another path. In the years since, the Coast Guard has continued the polar mission of supporting the National Science Foundation on research trips. Yet the Coast Guard is an extremely small and, some would say, overly committed service that can ill afford such an exotic and specialized mission as a three-cutter icebreaker fleet.
Lieutenant (junior grade) Charles M. West, in his award-winning article, "The Three Rs: A New Course for an Old Coast Guard" (Proceedings, August 2006), presented a sound argument for the service shedding the icebreaker mission and transferring operation of those cutters to the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). This is a more logical agency to crew and operate the three ocean-going icebreakers Rear Admiral Venzke mentions that are used exclusively to ferry scientific research teams to Arctic and Antarctic regions. One exception is USCGC Mackinaw (WLBB-30), which the admiral didn't mention. That icebreaker assists in keeping channels and harbors open to navigation on the Great Lakes, where the Coast Guard is required by law to maintain an icebreaker, which would preclude the service from transferring it. With an active-duty force of under 50,000 and a reserve force of just over 8,000, the Coast Guard needs to re-think the missions it has on its plate and as Lieutenant (junior grade) West pointed out, reduce its missions to those that support its core competencies. Among them is the icebreaking mission it currently performs.
Misnaming Navy Ships (Again)
(See N. Polmar, p. 89, February 2009 Proceedings)
Commander Donald R. Bouchoux, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I read Mr. Polmar's article with a sense of both amusement and irony. In March 2000, Proceedings published a similar article I had written ("The Name Game") in which I made many of the same arguments. Following its publication, I received a hand-written congratulatory note from then-Senator John Warner (R-VA), agreeing with my points and promising action to keep the planned CVN-77 from being named after a person, which clearly did not come to pass. Nine years later, former-Senator Warner has personally realized the benefits of fish not voting. I still cherish the note from the senator who contributed so much to the Navy and nation, but have become resigned to a future in which naval combatants are named for political expediency rather than tradition or logic.
Aussie Frigates Reborn
(See L. Cordner, pp. 48-53, March 2009 Proceedings)
Jose Luis Alonso—Since the beginning of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program a question has been crawling through my thoughts.
The U.S. Navy has 22 Oliver Hazard Perryclass frigates with neither surface-to-air (SAM) nor surface-to-surface (SSM) missiles. And now it is spending too much money building the new LCS ships, also with neither SAM (rolling airframe missiles are only for self-defense) nor SSM (Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System missiles have only a 40 km range, not enough against true SSM-armed ships). But Australia has upgraded its Adelaide-class frigates (of the Perry design) with SM-2—while retaining their Harpoon capability from their MK13 launchers—and an 8-cell MK 41 Vertical Launch System with 32 Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles. Why can't or won't the U.S. Navy do the same? The Perrys can be upgraded spending less money in less time, becoming very interesting ships. Why don't they do it?
Re-Education for the 21st-Century Warrior
(See J. Shuford, pp. 14-19, April 2009 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander David R. Lyon, Supply Corps, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—Admiral Shuford's article emphasizing the need for leaders with education in humanistic studies is, in my opinion, right on point. I came into the Navy in 1966 with a degree in sociology. My training served me very well in Vietnam where I served as officer in charge of Naval Support Activity Detachment Hue. After leaving the active Navy, I earned a master of arts in healthcare administration and served as a hospital administrator until my retirement. One of my sons wanted to also serve as a Navy officer. He graduated from high school as a National Merit Scholar, attended Carleton College (one of the top five liberal arts colleges in the United States) where he learned fluent German and some Russian, and graduated with a degree in history. When he applied to join the Navy and attend OCS, he was turned down as he did not have a technical degree. He is now serving as a first lieutenant in the 1st Cavalry Division in Iraq. He probably will now make a career of the Army. What a loss to the Navy.
Lieutenant Commander G. Bruce Greer Jr., U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—The Admiral has written an excellent article. Some context is in order to understand the depth of the issue for implementation of any changes. I was a NROTC midshipman and junior officer with the current generation of senior captains and flag officers. At the time, nuclear power was pushed hard for midshipmen, and those academically qualified were being drafted for some years (I escaped with the help of my F-14 CO). All midshipmen had to be qualified to go into nuclear power, but were not mandated to be engineers. On graduation, the academic code, which drove qualifications for graduate school, was determined by overall, math, and physics grades. Technical majors were strongly encouraged and graduate school options were overwhelmingly engineering focused. Time spent getting a long-term graduate degree was a blank on your record, and blanks were not good, especially in a non-Navy school.
I chose to get my graduate degree at Kellogg School of Management, and discovered when I joined the reserves that they did not care about graduate degrees in your reserve profile. I have now worked all over the world in executive positions in several industries and cannot say enough good things about my Navy experiences and training. But the context of the people who would implement Admiral Shuford's suggestions will make it difficult for his ideas to take hold. Still, I hope they do.
Arctic Melt: Reopening a Naval Frontier?
(See D. Gove, pp. 16-21, February 2009; L. A. LeSchack, pp. 7, 86, April 2009 Proceedings)
Commander Robert C. Whitten, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—The authors argue that melting Arctic sea ice is a long-term national security problem. While such concern appears reasonable, it is much more likely that by the time this nation has adjusted its policies to deal with the absence of ice, it will have returned. Indeed, recent observations of sea ice indicate that an ice-free Arctic may already be ending.
The presence of ice in the Arctic Ocean is dependent on thermal properties of ocean currents as well as atmospheric temperature. Contrary to conventional wisdom, mean atmospheric temperature was constant from 1998 to about 2006 and has been decreasing since the latter year. However, such a temperature decrease requires a long time to influence sea ice, perhaps a decade. The reasons are the large mass and heat capacity of the oceans as well as natural oscillations. As a result, planners should be wary. In words of poet Robert Burns, "The best laid schemes o' mice n men, gang aft aglay."