The Navy Is Giving History a Bad Name
(See B. Hanley, p. 10, March 2009 Proceedings)
Commander Tyrone G. Martin, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I think Lieutenant Colonel Hanley is being unduly harsh in his criticism of an organization that is still aborning. He is premature as well. Its organization chart, at last report, had yet to be issued. Rather, I think it is quite surprising and exciting that the Navy, after decades of largely ignoring its history, under the current CNO is intent on making it a part of everyday service. He wants each command to incorporate applicable historical information at every opportunity, and has cited "Old Ironsides" long history as something that may contain valuable lessons for everyone.
My last duty prior to retirement placed me in frequent contact with the Naval Historical Center, and I found many reasons to be critical. One was exactly what the author seems to be proposing: limit the command to being an archive. I found that the personnel were so deeply imbued with the "archive" mentality that it was almost impossible to get them out of the academic mode and into the real world. I am hoping that, whatever the shortcomings of the new organization at the outset, it will be aware enough to transform itself into the Navy's relevant, outreaching, and persistent historical presence that will enrich everyone's experience.
Norman Friedman—Lieutenant Colonel Hanley has missed the point of what the Naval History and Heritage Command is trying to do. Current decisions are often made without reference to past experience. No one can say definitely what (if anything) history "proves," but past experience can help us avoid some mistakes.
For example, about 1997 the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) compelled the Navy to change its long-standing practice of having a preliminary design organization in Naval Sea Systems Command produce sketch designs as a test of desired ship characteristics. Because the whole process was conducted in-house, it was easy for those setting ship requirements to change them to make the results more affordable (or more like what was wanted). This process, which also applied to aircraft, made naval procurement far more efficient than that of the other services. But the Navy could not resist OSD's one-size-fits-all approach, because it could not explain why its own process had been adopted, or that it had worked so well. Results included the lengthy and unhappy Zumwalt saga. Similarly, knowledge of past unhappy experience with very fast ships would have forced those advocating high speed for the current Littoral Combat Ship to think twice, at the least to spend more time explaining just what the high speed would buy.
Decision-makers generally are unfamiliar with the details of their service's experience. They need to tap those who understand the record well enough to make sense of it. Usually the relevant experience is far enough in the past that just using the record requires expertise. A letter from Captain X denounces the new policy of, say, forward-deploying carriers. Who was he
Did his opinion matter at the time Unless the historian producing the report really knows the Navy—not just the current Navy—his product is unlikely to be useful. History is the only laboratory we have in which people as well as abstractions are involved. Very often key decisions are made on the basis of abstract calculations. A talented historical analyst can see how human factors have affected broadly analogous situations in the past. Of course this is not a science. But it would be foolhardy to reject the idea of applying historical knowledge to current decision-making just because it cannot be perfect.This applied history (like applied science) has to be done by trusted analysts working inside the Navy, providing private advice to decision-makers because their advice will often run counter to what others in the decision-making process may want to do (otherwise, why bother asking them
). The analysts need the widest possible access to past experience, which is why the archives held by the Navy are so important—and why those who operate the archives are most likely to find what matters.In effect, the Heritage Command is going back to its roots. The naval staff created the Naval Historical Center in the first place as a repository of experience it could tap (other military staffs had similar interests in their history). It happens that the materials that help the naval staff are also very convenient for historians and the general public—the Navy has a strong interest in helping outsiders understand it. As a naval historian, I have benefitted from access to the materials collected by what is now the Naval History and Heritage Command. As an analyst, I have carried out the kinds of study described here, and I have come to value the historical record as a way of helping decision-makers.
Arctic Melt: Reopening a Naval Frontier
(See D. Gove, pp. 16-21, February 2009 Proceedings)
Captain Leonard A. LeSchack, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—Admiral Gove provides an excellent, timely, and comprehensive overview of the Arctic Ocean as a potential operating theater
and yet again one for potential conflict! It is a theater that is sure to grow for the Russians.I believe the Arctic will be an area in which former Russian President Vladimir Putin sees little competition, especially in resource development. And Russia, by its currently overwhelming superiority in polar operational capability, will attempt to stretch international boundaries in the Arctic as much as it can get away with. The most dramatic example of this was the planting of the Russian flag on the sea floor at the North Pole in August 2007.
Admiral Gove's article delivers a wake-up call, describing environmental changes that may open a new front or theater. He discusses the need for preserving sea lines of communication, sovereignty issues, access to resources, and national security challenges. But in fact, the Arctic is not a new front. Because of my Cold War experience there from the late 1950s on, I wrote a classified paper on the threat of the continuing buildup of Soviet ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) in the Arctic in the late 1970s. It led me to believe that Soviet ballistic missiles from essentially untouchable Soviet assets hiding in the Arctic Ocean were a greater threat to North America than the Cuban missiles in 1962 ever were. That piece was published in 1979 in Naval Intelligence Quarterly. Soviet SSBN buildup continued to the end of the Cold War in 1990. My continued concern led me to recommend the establishment of a new command to address this buildup, "COMNAVFORARCTIC" (Proceedings, September 1987).
It seems to me the time has come to seriously revisit that proposal for establishing COMANAVFORARCTIC (or some command like NORAD that is joint with the Canadians, our natural ally in this theater), a command that specifically focuses on Admiral Gove's very real concerns.
In "COMNAVFORARCTIC" I observed,
There is a glaring lack of a continuous, high-level focus on integrated plans, operations, and intelligence gathering for the Arctic theater. The Navy's traditional and existing commitments in support of long-standing national priorities are about all it can handle, given existing resources. This constraint, coupled with a lack of high-level advocates pressing for a standing capability for credible U.S. Navy force projection in the Arctic, has ensured that significant thought will only be given to the Arctic theater when some dramatic event occurs. We need a high-level advocate for Arctic theater operations.
It seems to me that the planting of the Russian flag by a Russian submersible beneath the pack ice of the North Pole and claiming that the Lomonosov Ridge is an extension of Russian territory is such a dramatic event.
The Commanders Respond
(See pp. 14-33, March 2009 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Il Ibrahim, Chief of the Nigerian Naval Staff—The significant maritime security challenges facing Nigeria are piracy and sea robbery, particularly against shipping in the Niger Delta area of our country. To effectively deal with this menace, the Nigerian Navy has been collaborating with other maritime security agencies and stakeholders, such as the Marine Police, Nigeria Customs Service, and Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency.
The Nigerian Navy has intensified its presence at sea with all available resources, while there is an ongoing effort to make more platforms available. Recently the navy established a Special Boat Service (SBS) with enhanced capability to effectively patrol the anchorages and the coastal waters of the delta and Lagos areas. The SBS collaborates with other joint task forces to prevent hijacking, hostage taking, seizure of strategic installations, and activities of pirates and sea robbers in the two areas. Further, the navy recently acquired four Manta-class fast boats, two 38-meter Manta patrol craft, and helicopters, which have enhanced its capability to deal with the prevailing threats.
It is worthy to note that other measures aimed at addressing the menace include increased maritime domain awareness initiatives in partnership with the United States for the development of a Regional Maritime Domain Awareness Capability System to monitor shipping operations within ports and approaches to Nigerian waters. The establishment of the Gulf of Guinea Energy Security System and the proposed Gulf of Guinea Guard Force would also largely enhance the Nigerian Navy's capability. These efforts are expected to effectively contain the illegal sea-borne activities within the country's maritime domain.
Admiral Metin Atac, Commander of the Turkish Naval Forces—While Turkey and Norway were considered the most important NATO flank states during the Cold War era, Turkey has become a central state in today's global domain. In respect to its position, which is in the middle of an area dominated by regional instabilities such as in the Balkans, Caucasus, and Middle East, it has a privileged situation in the influence and interest area of all states and constitutions that are in the Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture. In this era in which globalization has accelerated, world security necessitates a search for a common answer to national and regional security problems. Achievement of maritime security is thus of the utmost importance to solving global security issues.
Maritime security is required to facilitate freedom of navigation and commerce, advance prosperity and freedom, and protect the resources of the seas. It can best be achieved by effective coordination of nations' maritime security activities on a global scale.
Today, this security fosters diversity because of the emergence of asymmetric threats as principal security issues in addition to conventional threats, which must be eliminated by international endeavor when necessary. In this context, terrorism, weapons and drug smuggling, illegal migration, and piracy have emerged as some of the significant security problems that naval forces face. Nowadays, piracy ranks first as a threat to maritime security because of its global dimension. It has a remarkably negative effect on national economies simply because of its existence in the international sea lines used by merchant vessels.
To overcome the new threats, navies attach great importance to new concepts such as maritime security and interdiction operations, and situational awareness in addition to traditional concepts of defense and sea control.
In contributing to maritime situational awareness in our surrounding seas, Turkish naval forces:
- Aim to own infrastructure of command and control, communication, reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence systems
- Lead maritime security architecture studies in coordination with national/international maritime organizations
- Improve information sharing by actively participating in multinational initiatives.
Additionally, Turkish naval forces have participated in and pioneered a series of initiatives to increase maritime security on a regional level. Within this context, our naval forces:
- Led the BLACKSEAFOR initiative in 2001
- Launched Operation Black Sea Harmony in 2004
- Launched Operation Mediterranean Shield in 2006.
In addition to regional initiatives, our navy contributes and promotes global stability by:
- Permanently assigning naval units in NATO-led Operation Active Endeavour
- Participating in the UN Interim Forces In Lebanon Maritime Task Force
- Participating in NATO-led anti-piracy Operation Allied Provider off Somalia
- Contributing to Coalition forces CTF-151, initiated by the United States to fight piracy in Somalia region.
In sum, Turkish naval forces, while performing their duties in terms of defense, monitor all regional and global maritime security developments closely, structure their modernization projects and training activities in this manner, assume a leading role on regional basis, and actively contribute to maritime security in national and international seas. Its existence in this arena will increase in the future.
The Missing Element: Strategic Communication
(See M. K. Eder, pp. 28-33, February 2009; H. Liske, p. 6, March 2009 Proceedings)
Captain Lawrence K. Zelvin, U.S. Navy—A few years ago, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England told a large audience meeting at the Nation Defense University on strategic communications that "I don't know what this strategic communications stuff is, but I know I want more of it." The biggest problems facing strategic communications is not the lack of a definition, a strategic goal, more/senior bureaucracy, or even countering American pop culture abroad. The biggest problem is that practitioners have not adequately explained the operational and tactical applications (the what and how) of the concept in the advancement of U.S. policy. This may be why the Defense Department's Strategic Communications Integration Group continues to fade in and out of relevancy; why Congress cut the DOD's request for $3 million for strategic communications initiatives; and why the former Deputy Secretary of Defense told a large audience that he still didn't know "what this strategic communications stuff is."
So where do we go from here
First, stop the desire to endlessly refine strategic communications' strategic goals and policies. Second, find and learn from strategic communications successes in the private sector (the 1982 Tylenol poison communications strategy) and within the DOD (military response to humanitarian crises such as the Asian tsunami and the Pakistan earthquake) to see what works and what doesn't. Last, apply these lessons in areas where strategic communications can positively advance U.S. policy objectives through detailed, executable, and measurable operational and tactical plans that can be understood, approved, and funded by senior leaders.