The carrier controversy is heating up. The latest developments include: (1) the pending reduction of the U.S. carrier force to ten ships, (2) Secretary of Defense Robert Gates probably delaying construction of the next carrier, the CVN-79, and (3) the catapult system for the carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78)—the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS)—may be having problems. If the last is correct, the carrier could be delayed years with a major increase in costs.
Some defenders of the current CVN program have made good arguments for these ships, and some have done very poorly. One of the clearest and most articulate arguments for them was written by Rear Admiral Terry Kraft in a recent issue of Proceedings.1 But most such articles and so-called "studies"—even that by Kraft—tend not to address three factors vital to the controversy: cost, capabilities, and concept of operations.
Cost: The Gerald R. Ford is expected to cost about $12 billion dollars, according to memos circulating in the Pentagon. A higher number—$14 billion—has also been mentioned, but it is not clear if that reflects the cost of changing the catapult system from EMALS to steam. At the moment the Navy is not discussing the EMALS situation with respect to possible delays or replacement. The latter would involve major redesign and delays if the ship's advanced propulsion plant can generate enough steam for conventional steam catapults. (If the plant has to be modified to provide steam for the catapults, there will be more delays and further cost increases.)
While a follow-on ship could be "cheaper" if the EMALS situation is favorably resolved, the current and near-term shipbuilding budgets remain on the order of $12 billion per year. And, with the current U.S. economic situation, there is a significant possibility—some would say probability—that the amount of money available for shipbuilding will be reduced in the near future.
Should the Navy spend a quarter of its shipbuilding budget on carriers every four years? Or one-fifth every five years? Future shipbuilding budgets will include large-scale procurement of the higher-than-expected-cost littoral combat ships, a new ballistic-missile submarine, a new surface combatant (and possibly two), and for a while at least, two nuclear-propelled attack submarines per year.
Thus, cost considerations must be included in discussions of future carrier programs.
Capability: Current carrier air wings are in many respects less capable than their predecessors of the Cold War era. The F/A-18 Hornet strike-fighters are effective aircraft, but lack the legs for long-range strike in comparison with the now-discarded medium and heavy attack aircraft. And the recent retirement of S-3B Vikings from the tanker role means that aerial refueling must be done with buddy stores on F/A-18s, taking aircraft away from the strike and fighter roles.
Similarly, the limited range/endurance of F/A-18s restricts their ability to perform effective combat air patrol. Their predecessor F-14 Tomcats, supported by KA-6D Intruder and S-3B tankers, were far more capable in that role.
Hornets carrying so-called shared reconnaissance pods provide tactical reconnaissance for air wings. These pods have far less relative capabilities than were available with the dedicated reconnaissance aircraft of the Cold War, such as the RA-5C Vigilante, RF-4B Phantom, and even the RF-8 Crusader. Those aircraft were flown by dedicated mission pilots while the pod-carrying F/A-18s are flown by strike-fighter pilots who have limited specialized training (and, I am told, would rather be flying other missions).
Antisubmarine warfare (ASW) is another carrier shortfall. During the Cold War the carriers had both fixed- and rotary-wing ASW squadrons. The fixed-wing aircraft are long gone, and while 19 MH-60R/S aircraft are being assigned to carrier task groups, their ASW capability is severely limited. The MH-60S aircraft have no ASW capability; the MH-60R hel-icopters are largely distributed to surface combatants. The few on the carrier are regularly employed in VIP transfers, cargo carrying, surface surveillance and attack, and other roles. This is in contrast to the earlier, dedicated ASW helicopters.
Finally, during the Cold War specialized electronic reconnaissance aircraft were on board carriers-the big EA-3B Skywarriors and, briefly, the ES-3A Shadow. Land-based aircraft now carry out this role when they can reach the carrier operating areas.
Concept of Operations: Also avoided in most discussions are specifically how and where the carriers will be employed. If not today, then in the near future the Taiwan Strait area will be too difficult for carrier operations because of Chinese antiship ballistic missiles, submarines, and land-based aircraft. Similarly, the Persian Gulf could be too hot when within range of Iranian aircraft, missiles, and possibly submarines.
The proliferation of such weapons will make other areas within range of enemy territory/bases difficult if not impossible for carrier operations. Rather, the carrier will continue to be invaluable and largely invulnerable for operations in more remote areas, where bases are not available to U.S. forces. Chinese and, to a more limited extent, Russian activities in Africa and South America, as well as local crises and conflicts in those area, will probably be the most important venues for U.S. carrier operations.
Course of Action: This is a too brief discussion of factors that should be addressed in the current carrier controversy. Other factors should also be considered, such as the current and potential impact on carrier operations of long-range strike missiles fired from surface combatants and submarines; unmanned aerial vehicles—for reconnaissance, air combat, strike, early warning, and even ASW; satellite reconnaissance and targeting; and the F-35 Lightning/Joint Strike Fighter, which could operate from smaller (not small) aircraft carriers.2
Perhaps an objective, blue-ribbon panel should be empowered to address these factors and to make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. Some action is needed—and now—to help develop a realistic, long-range carrier plan.
1. RADM Terry B. Kraft, USN, "It Takes a Carrier: Naval Aviation and the Hybrid Fight," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (September 2009), pp. 20-24.
2. Smaller aircraft carriers could be variants of the LHA/LHD amphibious assault ships; at more than 40,000 tons full load, these ships are larger than the World War II-era Essex-class (CV-9) carriers, which could embark about 110 contemporary aircraft.
But what is the relevance of those facts? The "Big E" was one of seven U.S. aircraft carriers in commission on 7 December 1941. Six fought in the Pacific in 1942. (The Ranger [CV-4] saw action only in the Atlantic theater.) Of those, four—66 2/3 percent—were sunk in action that year. Only the Enterprise and Saratoga (CV-3) survived. At times, the "Big E" was the only one of the six that was operational—and in one of those periods with one of her elevators out of service because of enemy damage. The Enterprise spent many months out of action in shipyards during the war and the Saratoga was sent to the yard on several occasions for repairs to torpedo and kamikaze damage. Their damage could be considered mission kills—the ships were not sunk, but were not able to fight.
Today's carriers are relatively survivable. But they can be found and they can be sunk. Look at the public statements of U.S. Navy officials about the Chinese DF-21 antiship ballistic missile, not just the press reports. Look at the record of the Swedish non-nuclear submarine Gotland recently operating against U.S. carriers in the Pacific. Look at the antiship cruise missiles and advanced torpedoes that are fitted in the submarines of several foreign navies.
Could the U.S. Navy accept the loss of two-thirds of its carrier force in combat? For what accomplishment? Will Aegis ships normally assigned to protect carriers be increasingly assigned to ballistic missile defense in "box" areas away from the carriers? Will the next generation surface combatant—now the CG(X)/CG(X)N—be capable of supporting carriers? There are many unanswered questions.
-Norman Polmar
It Takes a Carrier," pp. 20-24, September 2009 Proceedings.)