Building Partners Strengthens All
By Colonel Bryan Salas, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command
From the savannas of Africa to the jungles of South America, Marines serve as trainers and advisers to partner nations. This not only supports those governments, it also deters terrorism. Previously Marines formed ad hoc, provisional teams from various parts of the Corps, teaching everything from infantry tactics to the Law of Armed Conflict. The teams disbanded after the short-term mission was complete—and much of the hard-earned knowledge garnered through these experiences disappeared.
For this reason, a new organization was formed in late 2007 to provide continuity and cohesion for these important missions. The Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG) works either directly with host nation forces or Marine units that have partnered with them. The aim is to build capacity for civil and military operations.
MCTAG's function is to assist geographic combatant commanders, through component commanders, with security cooperation and Phase 0 operations (routine military actions to prevent and prepare for crises).
Why We Need MCTAG
Previously, teams were built from both operational forces and the supporting establishment. These groups accomplished the mission, but often at the expense of the units from which they came. Personnel were pulled from key billets in tactical formations to meet a growing demand for trainers and advisers. With no organization to coordinate efforts, teams lacked standardized training through a formal course of instruction. And their temporary nature prevented the ongoing, persistent engagement needed to maintain long-term relationships with partner-nation military personnel.
The MCTAG concept calls for extensively trained cohesive teams to deploy into the same partner nations repeatedly, developing trust and building relationships as they develop their partners' capabilities. The objective is to develop self-sustaining, building-block training programs that have a long-term effect on our partner nations and move their militaries beyond the basic skills. They can then better maintain peace and stability within their borders.
The Right Marines for the Job
MCTAG director Colonel Scott Cottrell, returning from duty as an adviser in Iraq, characterized the type of personality needed: "Not all Marines have the internal wiring necessary to effectively advise, train, and assist foreign partners," he said. "Only a Marine who knows his business, and possesses an open, engaging, and patient leadership style will succeed—and a sense of humor doesn't hurt either. There is great personal satisfaction in assisting a foreign military partner develop the skill sets necessary to stabilize and defend his nation—so we don't have to."
Study Other Languages
Language is a key tool of the foreign military trainer and adviser, Cottrell emphasized. MCTAG seeks Marines with cultural experience or the ethnicity of partner nations. Spanish-speaking Marines are needed for South America. Francophones are needed from the Caribbean to Africa.
But Marines with no second language should still apply—if they are willing to learn. Individual language instruction occurs throughout pre-deployment training, and the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning has installed a language lab in the MCTAG compound to teach and sustain proficiency.
Structuring the Organization
Based at the former Amphibious Reconnaissance School at Fort Story, Virginia, MCTAG is a subordinate unit to U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command. Built into the Corps' personnel-growth strategy called the 202K Build Plan, MCTAG will be staffed with 59 Marine officers and 111 enlisted Marines. The organization also includes a Navy medical capability.
The cornerstone elements of MCTAG are its Coordination, Liaison, and Assessment Teams of 11 personnel each. They support specific geographic combatant commanders' areas of responsibility through the component commands, such as the U.S. Southern Command or U.S. European Command.
Teams to conduct the train, advise, and assist mission will continue to be sourced from the operating forces, the supporting establishment, or the reserve forces. These teams will execute a standardized pre-deployment training program and then deploy in support of geographic combatant commanders. The teams have a cross-section of warfighting capabilities, and the military operations for which they train and advise range from infantry tactics to logistics and maintenance. The sections have habitual, near-continuous contact with their assigned host nations' militaries.
Getting Up and Running
The first train, advise, and assist team reported to MCTAG in June 2008 and has deployed to multiple countries in support of the U.S. Southern Command. Currently MCTAG is training the next team in support of U.S. Southern Command, and the first team in support of U.S. Africa Command. MCTAG is the lead in assisting U.S. European Command to prepare a Georgian Battalion for deployment in support of Marine Expeditionary Brigade Afghanistan and in training Marines to support the Liberia Security Sector Reform.
These initial deployments are consistent with the longstanding U.S. policy of support and military exchanges with partner nations. But this time, units have been specifically organized, trained, and equipped to assist our regional friends.
Training and advisory teams have become critical in fighting the irregular threats of the 21st century. In his assessment report "The Long War: Send in the Marines" (January 2008), Commandant of the Marine Corps General James T. Conway includes the MCTAG. Envisioning a "Marine Corps operational employment concept to meet an uncertain security environment," Conway states: "This war will place demands on our Marines that differ significantly from those of the recent past. Paramount among these demands will be the requirement for Marines to train and mentor the security forces of partner nations in a manner that empowers their governments to secure their own countries." His paper supports the Joint Campaign's phases, specifically Phase 0 operational requirements.
To deter terrorists from gaining a foothold in poorly governed or ungoverned regions, the United States works to solidify relationships with friends and allies. We accomplished this in Phase 0 by developing host-nation military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, improving information exchange and sharing, and ensuring U.S. forces' peacetime and contingency access.
United We All Stand
MCTAG also supports the Commandant's concept of the Security Cooperation Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SC MAGTF). Introduced in "The Long War," the SC MAGTF expands tactical flexibility from combat power to civil-military operations such as humanitarian assistance and infrastructure improvements. Building partner capacity involves enhancing the security of partner-nation forces and alleviating underlying conditions that contribute to instability. It is inherently a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational process.
Both MCTAG and the SC MAGTF bolster the Navy's Global Fleet Station program, joined in dynamic support of the geographic combatant commander's Phase 0 operations. The Global Fleet Station works to increase U.S. presence in regions of interest to build partner capacity in maritime security. To date, it has conducted missions with a Marine component in Africa and South America and will soon do the same in the Black Sea area.
Training and advising partners is not new for Marines. Recent successes in transition teams from Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the utility of strong partners with shared concerns. The MCTAG element in the Commandant's concept provides the focus, continuity, and institutional capacity required to defeat contemporary irregular threats. The organization represents a new chapter in Marine Corps history: forward-deployed Marines strengthening partner nations through ongoing presence and long-term relationships. At the same time, it builds future leaders through sound training and personal examples.
'Helmet-Up' the Harriers, Now!
By Colonel Jim Sandberg, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)
By 2012—in less than three years—the Marine Corps will have completed sufficient individual and organizational training and received enough aircraft to declare an initial operating capability with its first operational squadron of F-35Bs, the unique short-takeoff/vertical landing variant of the long-awaited Joint Strike Fighter.
The first cadre of Marines to help staff the joint F-35 Lightning II training unit at Eglin Air Force Base has been selected, and most are probably already en route. The F-35 training they'll receive has gone through careful and detailed development during the past eight years of the System Development and Demonstration program. No doubt that training will be polished and thorough, fully sufficient to bring them to the level of proficiency required for the initial operating capability. But I wonder if that is enough.
The Harrier pilots and organizations that will soon transition to the F-35B, with its helmet-mounted display (HMD) as the primary reference for both flight and combat, will bring almost zero individual, organizational, or cultural HMD experience with them. Why must this critical learning curve be so steep?
New Technology Is Exciting—and Challenging
The Lightning II is full of marvelous new systems that bring a new level of warfighting capability to Marine tactical air, as well as to the tactical air forces of our Navy and Air Force, the armed services of allied nations that are partners in the program, and several other nations that have expressed interest in procuring the jets themselves. Some of these systems have never been employed before, and some are being used in ways never even contemplated. One of the latter is the F-35's HMD.
HMDs have been around for decades. The Navy experimented with visual target acquisition systems in the late 1970s, and the revolutionary Apache helicopter incorporated the integrated helmet and display sighting system in the early 1980s. Technology such as this was primarily focused on targeting and weapon-aiming solutions, but it evolved over time into advanced systems that today can provide the aircrew with a host of information, depending on the task at hand.
From targeting to weapon employment, threat data, navigation displays, situational awareness cues, and in some cases even basic instrument flight information, these devices have reached such a level of sophistication that today in the F-35, the HMD is intended to be the pilot's primary flight and combat reference. Of course, the aircraft has ancillary and backup flight reference displays on the heads-down cockpit screens, but the entire pilot-vehicle interface system is built around the concept of an HMD as the primary reference.
The idea was to develop an HMD system so capable and robust that the "tradition" of a heads-up display (HUD) on the glare shield could be abandoned. It has never been a part of the F-35 production design. Now the HUD information is right in front of the pilot's eyes. This has never been done before in a production aircraft. Getting it right continues to be a major technical challenge.
HMDs for Everyone
The official HMD program of record for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine tactical air forces is the joint helmet-mounted cueing system (JHMCS), currently employed in F-16s, F-15Es, and F/A-18s at home, and in conflicts around the world. But not all Falcons, Strike Eagles, Hornets, and Super Hornets are equipped with JHMCSs. The system has only been in service for about a decade, there are significant aircraft modifications required to install it, and there are always competing requirements for the scarce budget resources that equip our warfighters.
But for those that do have JHMCS installed, generally operating in concert with the aircraft's targeting systems (LITENING, SNIPER, ATFLIR, etc.), experienced warfighters report that the HMD brings a quantum improvement to the combat efficiency and safety of conducting combat close air support. Comments like "20 percent quicker" (shorter kill chain) or "80 percent safer" (less aircraft exposure, better target situational awareness, increased accuracy, decreased possibility of collateral damage) are not uncommon. The numbers might change, but the orders of magnitude are similar.
Even crews without JHMCS usually prefer to work with a wingman or airborne forward air controller who has one, if they can; it's that much better. Similar advantages of having an HMD have been reported across TACAIR missions, from air-to-air combat to road reconnaissance and almost everything in between. Some pilots have even considered checking their JHMCS symbology during approach and landing in the event of a HUD failure.
But some of these F-16s, -15s, -18s, and other aircraft may never have JHMCS installed. Some are too far down the budget line, some are facing "sundown" plans, and some have older ejection-seat systems with which JHMCS is incompatible for safe ejections throughout the aircraft's envelope. The Marine Corps' AV-8B Harrier II seems to have fit all three of these categories in the past, but the gears of the budget and acquisition processes are finally beginning to turn.
Today, Marines in Harriers are engaging enemies in combat every day using many of the same weapons and targeting pods as their Marine Hornet counterparts, with many of the same tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) but without any HMDs and the attendant improvements in combat effectiveness, safety, and tactical relevance. Even many of those older F/A-18 Hornets in the Corps do not yet have HMDs. How many more years of combat will they have to sustain without the capability to send our very best?
Time Needed to Improve Capabilities
Last year, a Harrier squadron flying combat missions submitted a Deliberate Universal Need Statement. The Marine Corps Combat Development Command validated it. In response, the Harrier program office in NAVAIR (PMA-257), working with the Aircrew Systems Office (PMA-202) and their resource sponsors in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters Marine Corps, have been pursuing a priority Capability Improvement Issue to provide Fiscal Year 2012 funding for development or procurement of a suitable HMD for their Harriers. Today, they plan to begin flight testing in FY 15 and have the technology in the field by FY 16. But I wonder if that is enough.
Whether on land, in the air, or on the sea, significant advances in warfighting capabilities, usually through some new equipment or weapon, require time and experience. Individuals, organizations, and cultures must learn how best to use these new capabilities, and develop the necessary TTPs. With all due respect to developers and trainers (I have been both), we can barely begin to imagine the TTPs that will evolve from actual use of these improved capabilities.
As a newly minted major, I was part of the Corps' transition to F-18s in the early 1980s. I remember the magic that many of us attributed to the HUD. In addition to being a wizard gunsight, it was also the Hornet's primary flight instrument. This was nothing like the depressed reticules or the AJB-3 attitude indicators with which we had all grown up in our Phantoms and Skyhawks. This was entirely different. It was a quantum leap in capability.
But no matter how many classroom lectures, simulator rides, or exams we had, it still took time and experience for each individual, organization, and culture to develop what in many instances were significantly different TTPs to safely and effectively execute our missions. It wasn't easy, and it was not free.
Three years later, when the (HUD-equipped) Navy A-7 Corsair II squadrons began transitioning into the Hornet, I imagine pilots said things like, "Hey, neat HUD. I wonder if I can do [fill in the blank] with it?" They didn't have to learn from scratch what a HUD was or how to use it. They already had the individual, organizational, and cultural experience with another HUD that allowed them to take full advantage of this new technology quicker, more efficiently, and perhaps even more safely.
Accelerating and Unifying Operations
With the introduction of the F-35B, the Corps continues to merge its TACAIR capabilities and cultures from the Harrier, Prowler, and Hornet communities into a more cohesive supporting force for Marines and joint and coalition forces. AV-8B pilots and their Harrier squadrons, with their short-takeoff/vertical landing expertise and Marine attack squadron culture and TTPs, will be joined by EA-6B and F/A-18 pilots and their own Marine tactical electronic warfare squadron and Marine fighter/attack squadron experiences.
I wonder if the Harrier and Prowler warfighters will marvel at the magic of the Lightning II's HMD as their primary flight and combat display. I wonder if the HMD-experienced Hornet drivers will say something like, "Hey, neat helmet! I wonder if I can do [fill in the blank] with it."
Marine Colonel Art Tomassetti, Vice Commander of the 33rd Fighter Wing, Eglin Air Force Base, sums up the situation:
All F-35 students walk to the airplane for the first time by themselves, without an instructor in their plane. We should strive to reduce the number of times that a pilot says "this is the first time I've done this or used this" with actual flight hardware to the max extent possible. Side stick, HMD, touchscreens, Distributed Aperture System, voice activation, Fly-By-Wire, and so on, some of these we can do well in the simulators and some we can't. The only other thing these pilots bring is their aviation experience. If that experience includes some of these F-35 capabilities, great. If not, well . . .
We Need the Navy Port Engineer Profession
By Captain Ralph E. Staples, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)
Most Navy commanding officers cannot envision conducting ship maintenance without the advice of their port engineers. Some in the Navy maintenance community have questioned whether the requirements to qualify as a port engineer are too extensive, but these qualifications are central to the program's blueprint for success.
Preferred requirements have not changed since the introduction of the program. Port engineers need a bachelor's degree in engineering, a U.S. Coast Guard license of 3rd assistant engineer or higher, experience in operating a commercial ship, and six or more years at sea in an operational licensed engineering position. For obvious reasons, the merchant marine culture has influenced much of the U.S. Navy port engineers' performance and competence.
The qualifications are—of necessity—hefty. Navy port engineers today have strong credentials. Many hold chief engineer licenses; master's degrees in business or engineering; certification as a Project Management Professional, American Bureau of Shipping Surveyor, or from the National Association of Corrosion Engineers; or other relevant professional recognition.
How They Developed
The need for port engineers arose in 1979, when the U.S. Atlantic Fleet determined that an additional fast combat stores ship (AFS1 class) could be needed to meet deployment requirements. An AFS that was in the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard for regular overhaul (ROH) was at the time delayed for an extensive period due to changes in work scope that had not been identified in the original ROH work package. Subsequently, the USS San Diego (AFS-6) was delayed three months in returning from its Mediterranean deployment with the Sixth Fleet.
Responding to a congressional mandate from these events and a GAO report on the high cost of Navy ship depot maintenance, the Navy introduced the Phased Maintenance Program to emulate the way merchant marine ships were maintained, repaired, and overhauled. This program's key elements include short-duration maintenance periods of 60-90 days versus year-long overhauls; cost-type contracts for several years on multiple ships of the same class, which included work scope definition plus work package development and execution; and the assignment of a port engineer to one or two ships, depending on ship size and complexity.
Before the introduction of port engineers, Navy maintenance planning activities made repair and alteration recommendations to the type desk officer of the ship's administrative command. Port engineers take a different approach, one that is based on conditions noted. This is called condition-based maintenance, which is different from system or equipment rebuilding or repair to the original manufacturer's specifications, and from maintenance mandated by an arbitrary ship-class planning document (which does not account for the actual condition of equipment). It is also different from a Navy ship-class planning-activity recommendation made with no physical inspection, underway testing, or operational observation of equipment performance.
The port engineer's recommendations for repairs include a blend of design knowledge, engineering savvy, and operational judgment. Port engineers have a good understanding of system and equipment interactions, rather than focusing only on the equipment.
The Navy received the new program in 1980 with mixed reaction. Some saw the engineers as a threat to their jobs, others as having too much authority. The first two, one a government employee and the other a contractor port engineer, had to prove themselves to a host of naysayers anxious to see them fail.
Fortunately, both turned out to be excellent choices. With their extensive seagoing and port-engineer experience, degrees in marine engineering, and Coast Guard merchant marine engineering licenses, their credibility was instant with the crew of any ship. This, combined with their ability to interact comfortably with their ships' commanding officers, proved crucial to their success.
Results of the Pilot Program
All scheduled operational commitments were met. Depot and intermediate-level maintenance time was reduced by 2 percent. Operational availability increased by 5 percent, and unplanned maintenance was reduced from 11 percent to 1 percent of its related cost. All ships completed their maintenance availabilities early. Additionally, the three COs of the AFS pilot ships were unanimous in their support for the program, and it was determined that another AFS-class ship was not necessary after all.
This success led to expansion of the program to all of the combat support ship force. The auxiliaries, as many referred to them, included the AFS, refueling ships or oilers (AO, AOR, AOE), destroyer tenders (AD), and ammunition ships (AE). Expanding Phased Maintenance was a movement led from both headquarters and the deck-plates, with much of the impetus coming from the Fleet: ship COs, squadron commanders, and group commanders. They saw the added benefits of increased operating time, improved crew proficiency and morale that had often been lost during lengthy ship overhauls. Amphibious force ships were added and later combatant ships (cruisers, destroyers, frigates), until, as today, all surface force ships have port engineers assigned.
The engineers brought a new dimension to ship maintenance during the mid- to late 1980s. They frequently went under way with their ships to observe normal operations, engineering casualty control drills, Board of Inspection and Survey inspections, and operational propulsion plant engineering exams by the Propulsion Examining Board. Many integrated themselves so well that they became de facto members of the wardroom.
Cultural Differences
Most port engineers come from the merchant marine, which has its own culture different from that of the Navy. In the Navy's hierarchical structure, the commanding officer is several layers above the ship's chief engineer. But in the merchant marine, the chief engineer is the captain's primary technical expert and has a nearly equivalent status. But the captain has ultimate responsibility for the ship, by both position and law.
The engineering department is much smaller in the merchant marine, with a few licensed officers and unlicensed crew of 12-14. Crew size plays an important role in the culture as well. For example, a typical liquefied natural gas tanker has a total of 27 officers and crew. These ships are about the size of a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier. The small crew necessitates that officers and crew be trained to work, think, and act independently.
The vast majority of port engineers are graduates from the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (King's Point) or one of the six state maritime academies—California, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, or Texas. The academies' highly disciplined and rigorous education and training provides a mix of theoretical, design, and hands-on operational experience that makes the engineers very comfortable with their knowledge level on board ship. The academy rigor typically instills a strong work ethic, tremendous commitment to shipmates, and clear understanding of the importance of each person's role in ship operation and safety.
The Coast Guard engineering license examinations test knowledge in the theory, design, technical aspects and management of shipboard engineering systems and equipment. Propulsion, auxiliary systems, mechanical, and electrical systems operation are covered. This comprehensive examination ensures that licensed officers can professionally and safely operate their ships at sea.
How It Is Working
With today's short-duration ship-maintenance availabilities, continuous maintenance, and the Fleet Response Plan, Navy port engineers are vital and cost-effective. New maintenance practices outlined by the Current Ship Maintenance Project are designed to identify work requirements from initiation to job close. Core maintenance teams provide "one-stop shopping" for validating, screening, and assigning repair work.
With the use of the 2-kilo (OPNAV Form 4790/2K) work order form and automated work-brokering tools, the port engineer can screen requests and send them to the regional maintenance center (RMC) for assessment and evaluation. The RMC determines job placement, whether to the local multi-ship, multi-option contractor or the RMC production shop. Maintenance teams comprise the ship's port engineer, representatives from the RMC and the ship, and the ship repair site (private or naval shipyard). Work screenings have improved from two weeks to 48-72 hours.
Since the start of the pilot program in the 1980s, the engineers have been making substantial contributions to Navy ship maintenance and operational readiness. With their strong qualifications and merchant marine shipboard background, they have both cost-conscientiousness and business savvy. Their knowledge of ships and ship classes, overall maintenance knowledge, and project-management skills allow the officers and crew to focus on warfighting.
The Chief of Naval Operations has issued a mandate to improve current readiness while reducing cycle time, improving reliability, and reducing cost. The port engineer's role as the professional maintenance decision-maker becomes even more critical as the Navy transforms itself for the dangerous decades ahead.