Fear and Loathing in the Post-Naval Era
(See B. Tillman, pp. 16-21, June 2009 Proceedings)
Captain Thomas A. Davis, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I read Barrett Tillman's article and couldn't decide if I should laugh or cry. My first reaction was to wonder who Tillman was, then, having written 50 books, how on earth he could write an article on naval strategy and not mention Alfred Thayer Mahan even once; not even in the notes! Mahan and many others have exhaustively addressed the questions and issues that Tillman raises, such as the need for a peacetime and wartime Navy, in addition to associated political and economic issues. I find that anyone who believes that the only beneficial expenditure of national wealth on a navy is its use in combat is fundamentally confused as to the need and use of military forces of the United States. The concluding question, "Why do we still have such a big navy when we hardly ever use it?" is simplistic and uninformed and, like the author of the article, can be ignored as such.
Ted Williams—I believe the author completely misses the point in his critique of our Navy's current make-up and size. While he is correct in noting that we have not fought a fleet-on-fleet, blue-water engagement since World War II and are not likely to for the immediate future, our Navy has been almost continuously engaged in land strike, close air support from the sea and, from time to time, amphibious operations
all barely mentioned by the author. The intensity waxes (e.g., Korea and Vietnam) and wanes (e.g., Grenada and Libya), but these "feet dry" missions have been the bread-and-butter of our Fleet since World War II, and I do not see that changing with the advent of unmanned aerial vehicles or other technological shifts. If anything, such missions will be even more in demand as we engage dispersed "lesser adversaries" and the availability of overseas bases shrinks. As has been said so often before, "When it hits the fan, the first thing the President asks is, Where are the carriers?'"As for the rest of the Fleet, many of our likely adversaries have quite credible submarine capabilities, which dictate a significant number of attack submarines and ASW surface combatants to protect the carriers and amphibs. Likewise, there is the emerging threat of anti-fleet ballistic missiles, which, for the near future, only Aegis-equipped surface combatants will be able to counter. Add to the mix the necessary logistics ships, and the requirement looks pretty much like what we have today and, perhaps, even exceeds what we have. Post-Naval Era? Hardly.
Jonathan F. Keiler
Barrett Tillman errs after correctly noting that the Egyptian Navy inaugurated the missile age at sea by sinking the Israeli destroyer Eilat in 1967 by stating that "there have been no naval surface-to-surface missile engagements since." In fact, the first and only major missile engagements took place six years later during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Israel entered the war with a dramatically modernized naval force, having replaced its aged World War II era destroyers with modern missile boats built in both Israel and France and armed with Israel's indigenously produced Gabriel ship-to-ship missile. In October 1973, in a series of critical naval battles, Israeli missile boats sank at least six Egyptian and five Syrian missile boats. The Arab navies also lost several MTBs, minesweepers, and gunboats to Israeli missiles. While Israel's successes in the 1973 war do not necessarily affect Mr. Tillman's basic thesis, the fact is, a major missile battle at sea was fought decisively in 1973.
Jan Gabbert
We'll regret even thinking about a post-naval era. The fact that we have fought no major naval battle since World War II is proof of the effectiveness of a large and well-trained navy, just as not having to shoot down any enemy planes recently is proof of the effectiveness of air superiority, something else we should not give up.I offer a rough analogy: You live in a nice neighborhood where everything is quiet and peaceful and there is no crime. Coincidentally, everyone locks their doors, some have security systems, and many have guns in the house. Eventually, some of your neighbors forgo locks, security systems, or guns. It's a gradual process and no announcement is made. But the word gets out.
Soon, there are sporadic burglaries, then more. Burglars and thieves become common, property is destroyed, people are hurt, even killed.
It then becomes very expensive to "save" the neighborhood.
Will we ever learn? History is replete with examples of disarmament, cutbacks of military and naval forces, with uniformly bad results. Consider the preparedness level of the U.S. on the eve of World War II. We got badly bloodied for a year or so, until we rose to the occasion. But at what cost?
For my part, I should like to maintain very robust military and naval forces that never have to be used. Other people are watching.
Let's Resolve the Scorpion Mystery
(See J. I. Holwitt, p. 10, June 2009 Proceedings)
Bruce Rule
The author states in his fine article on the Scorpion (SSN-589): "The time has come to bring closure to the story of the Scorpion and eliminate these hurtful conspiracy theories."Toward that objective, I sent two detailed technical analyses, dated 14 March and 3 April 2009, to the Director, Submarine Warfare (OPNAV N87), COMSUBLANT, and the Naval History & Heritage Command. The contents of these reports are summarized here:
When the U.S. nuclear-powered submarine Scorpion was lost in the east central Atlantic on 22 May 1968, the event produced a series of acoustic signals detected by underwater sensors on both sides of the Atlantic. By comparing the detection times of these signals, their point of origin was determined. This position provided the basis for the search that identified the Scorpion wreckage.
The first reanalysis of these acoustic signals in 40 years has provided the following new information:
- Four independent lines of evidence confirm the initiating events that caused the loss of the Scorpion were two small explosions that occurred one-half second apart at 18:20:44Z on 22 May 1968. These events were contained within the submarine's pressure hull. The source of these explosive events cannot be determined from analysis of the acoustic data.
- Because of these explosive events, the crew was unable to maintain depth-control. The Scorpion sank to 1,530 feet where the pressure hull collapsed in one-tenth of a second at 18:42:34Z.
- The energy yield of that collapse event was equal to the explosion of 13,200 lbs of TNT at 1,530 feet. The source of this energy, which exceeded the yield of all torpedoes carried by the Scorpion, was the nearly instantaneous (less than 0.01-seconds) conversion of potential energy in the form of 680 psi of sea pressure to kinetic energy, the motion of the intruding water-ram which entered the pressure hull at supersonic velocity.
- Other than the two small internal explosive events, more than 15 Scorpion-associated acoustic signals were produced, first by the collapse of the pressure hull, and then, over the following three minutes at increasing depth by the collapse of small, more pressure-resistant structures such as spherical tanks within the wreckage.
- There were no explosions from a torpedo or any other source external to the Scorpion pressure hull. The Scorpion was lost because of an onboard problem the crew could not overcome.
Mr. Rule, for 42 years the lead acoustic analyst at the Office of Naval Intelligence, wrote the position paper that remains the Navy's official assessment of the dynamic and acoustic characteristics of submarine bulkhead and pressure hull collapse events.
Lieutenant Commander Anthony T. Dunn, U.S. Navy (Retired)
In the case of the USS Scorpion, we know her location, but not the event, or events, that led to her loss. We know from the site survey that she exceeded crush depth and imploded. Naval architect Captain Harry Jackson commented that her hull failure was textbook, i.e., it failed where a submarine exceeding crush depth should fail.I doubt the author's suggestion that another trip to the site would provide additional clues. The implosion of the control room comprehensively destroyed that space and the ensuing failure of the bulkhead between that room and torpedo room would make access to the torpedo tubes iffy at best.
The worst of this has been the effect on the families. They do not know what led to the loss of their loved ones, yet there are those who would hold out hope that a reason could be found. As is the way of the sea, she is loathe to give up her secrets. Unfortunately I don't think we will ever know the answer to this.
Old Ship, New Mission
(See D. Axe, pp. 34-35, June 2009 Proceedings)
James F. Campbell
The photograph showing training under way contains the image, off to the side, of a member of the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary's Interpreter Corps. Helping the U.S. Navy, no less! There are about 260 members of the Auxiliary in its Interpreter Corps who stand by waiting for the call to lend a "voice."Chasing the Pirates
(See N. Friedman, pp. 90-91, June 2009 Proceedings)
Commander Al Beltrami, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)
Norman Friedman indicates that "the problem has not yet assumed proportions" for a Western government to aggressively handle the ragtag pirates of Somalia. One wonders what the proportion has to be before the problem is resolved. Perhaps the United Nations could contract with the Malacca states to solve the problem in their fashion. They apparently did not use their attorneys or Marquess of Queensberry rules to terminate the Malaccan piracy issue—nor if memory serves, did Stephen Decatur with the Barbary pirates and the British with Henry Morgan.On the Verge of a Game-Changer
(See A. S. Erickson and D. D. Yang, pp. 26-32, May 2009 Proceedings)
Alex V. Mandel
The antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) certainly is a new challenge. Still there are some aspects worthy of special mention for a proper estimation of the degree of the threat.Let's guess for a start (although still a big if) that China will really deploy a tested and proven ASBM capability. Such an ASBM can be used with either a nuclear or conventional warhead.
If nuclear, an attack against a U.S. carrier group would certainly result in a nuclear retaliation, i.e., an escalation to nuclear war as the most probable consequence. It seems highly unlikely that China will consider this an option.
For a conventional ASBM, the response is known and already exists: ships with ballistic-missile defense (BMD) capability. The results of this capability's testing are encouraging, the program is underway, and the number of Aegis ships with the capability steadily grows.
This perspective can thus be viewed with reasonable optimism.
In a qualitative aspect, the current ASBM threat doesn't seem to be a greater menace for carrier groups than, for example, the Soviet long-range heavy supersonic cruise missiles were when they appeared. They certainly were a challenge, but effective answers were found and the value and powerful potential of the U.S. carriers remained.
Quantitatively, the numbers will work for the United States rather than China. The ASBMs, with their required complex supportive infrastructure, must be expensive. And probably more expensive than a U.S. response of increasing the number of much smaller anti-missile missiles on board the BMD-capable Aegis ships.
The MK 41 VLS is a standard modular unit and quite compact system in production. If the ASBM threat becomes real, it should not be a great problem to increase both the number of modules and interceptors. There may even be room on board the carriers if the necessity is acute. State-of-the-art data-exchange technologies and the network-centric capabilities of the U.S. Fleet should allow carrier launched missiles to be guided by other ships of the group.
Thus, while the ASBM is a new challenge, it is not a game changer making U.S. carriers obsolete or unable to perform their missions. The actual danger is, rather, that the ASBM
unreasonably overestimated by some too mesmorized by the formula that a ballistic missile can hit a carrier may lead to the unfair proclamation of a twilight of the big carriers with no good reason. That would certainly be a step in wrong direction and an undeserved victory for a pretty problematic weapon not yet used, and, in a sense, a more dangerous threat to the future of the U.S. global naval power than the hypothetical ASBM itself.U.S. Navy in Review
(See S. C. Truver and M. Robinsky, pp. 68-74, May 2009 Proceedings)
Robert J. Carr
Talk about damned with faint praise. This article paints a picture of a Navy whose two biggest needs are lawyers to deal with the courts, pirates, and Congress (assuming there's a difference) and a combination hospital/cargo ship for humanitarian expeditions. Only a few sentences of the entire article dealt with actual warfighting, the Navy's core mission. I hope the lack of focus on warfighting was by the author's choice rather than a lack of actual examples. When the highlights of the year are court cases, the demise of a ship that's too expensive and has limited capability, and distributing food around the world, you've got a Navy that's lost its focus.Lieutenant Scott McKee, U.S. Navy—In May, the first International Maritime Security Conference was held in conjunction with the 7th International Maritime Defense Exposition hosted by the Royal Singapore Navy and S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University. Its goal was to promote global maritime security and safety and update maritime practitioners on the latest cooperative efforts, policy and legal frameworks, and technological developments in these arenas.
One common point made by presenters of all backgrounds was the need for the United States to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Border disputes may take years to resolve, but smaller working arrangements can contribute to regional security and protect global commerce. It is within these meetings that a solution to piracy lies, as one of the components for global maritime security.
In contrast, Proceedings highlighted piracy from a U.S.-centric point of view to include the creation of CTF 151, as well as academic and legal commentary. The discussion, however, neglects critical topics of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower such as advances in information sharing technology, regional maritime security partnerships, and maritime domain awareness. Perhaps next year's "U.S. Navy in Review" will include updates on regional relationships beyond the operational formation of a combined task force in an effort to continue building regional stability with our allies.
Books in Brief
(See G. W. Keiser, pp. 158-159, May 2009 Proceedings)
Gerald N. Sandvick
In reviewing Bill Yenne's Aces High, Colonel Keiser has Major Richard I. (Dick) Bong as "a corn fed Kansas lad." I do not know how much corn Major Bong ever ate but I do know that he was born and raised in Poplar, Wisconsin, educated and married in the nearby city of Superior, and only left northern Wisconsin for his military service. America's "Ace of Aces" really ought to have his home turf properly identified.We Need More Icebreakers!
(See N. Venzke, p. 8, March 2009; D. L. Teska, p. 160, May 2009 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Norman C. Venzke, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)
The sole purpose of my article in the March 2009 Proceedings was to address an extremely serious deficiency in the polar icebreaker fleet to wit: "The United States simply does not possess an icebreaker fleet commensurate with its national needs." I mentioned the Coast Guard only because it "owns" the fleet and, therefore, has the responsibility for maintaining its adequacy. Whether or not the Coast Guard should retain the icebreaking mission or have it transferred elsewhere was beyond the scope of my article. However, I fail to see any advantage of a transfer since the operations and performance under the Coast Guard have been quite satisfactory except that charters have been needed to fill the gap. Also, I am not privy to the merits of transferring the mission to NOAA. Regardless of which agency might have the mission, the deficiency will remain a deficiency until there is an infusion of new and substantial funding for construction and repair. A drastic reduction in icebreaking missions would be virtually impossible. This is a difficult problem that must be resolved by the Coast Guard, the National Science Foundation, possibly the Department of Homeland Security, and certainly Congress.Captain Robert G. Moore, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)
Commander Teska appears to have overlooked the distinction between platform and mission. Unfortunately he is not the first to do so, and I suspect he won't be the last."Heavy Icebreaking" should be viewed as shorthand for "The capability to conduct surface operations in the maritime areas of the polar regions in support of the national interest." Those interests enjoy different priorities at different times and places, ranging from defense to stewardship including everything between. A look at polar missions since the late 19th century demonstrates the wide diversity.
The receding of Arctic ice is changing those priorities yet again, promising an increase in commercial and public marine operations throughout the region. Federal responsibilities in law enforcement, marine safety, pollution prevention/response, and security are among the missions which will require the conduct of surface operations, and it should be unnecessary to point out that those are missions falling within the statutory responsibilities of the Coast Guard.
Polar experience is also needed across a broader span than that needed simply to "drive" an icebreaker. An understanding of polar operations is required to adequately represent U.S. interest in development of international standards and regulations governing commercial vessel operation in both the Arctic and Antarctic, evolution of the Antarctic Treaty and the like. Involvement in such deliberations has extended to the Coast Guard in the past, and the experience gained aboard icebreakers has served the country well.
Heavy icebreaking platforms should remain with the Coast Guard for these and a number of other reasons.