The Coast Guard Promotes Dynamic Leadership
By Captain Donna Cottrell, U.S. Coast Guard
Are your efforts at mentoring and professional development frequently overcome by a demanding operational tempo? Advancing careers and executing the mission at hand do not have to be mutually exclusive undertakings, if you adopt the Coast Guard principles of operations as part of your culture.1
Have Clear Objectives
Leadership should be purposeful, not haphazard: random acts of leadership result in random acts of professional development. For short-term goals such as qualifying a deck watch officer, engineer of the watch, or aircraft commander, it is essential to have a sustainable process in place so that personnel can progress in a timely manner. Proactive planning is also crucial for long-term career plans. Schedule regular meetings with those who report to you directly, to set and monitor medium- and long-term objectives. Written goals with realistic deadlines take leadership from theory into practice.
Be a Presence
Avoid e-leadership. There is no substitute for your physical, day-to-day presence. Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Thad Allen describes leadership as "the ability to reconcile opportunity and competency."2 Through interaction with your personnel, you develop and define your own competency as a leader while opportunities to use that expertise increase. You act as a broker for subordinates by identifying their abilities and challenging them to build on those skills whenever possible.
Promote Unity of Effort
Encourage everyone in your chain of command to share your commitment to professional development. Coaching need not be constrained to the training room or XO's office; inoculate a 24/7 dedication into the very mindset of your organization. Ensure that your everyday processes facilitate ongoing career building. Brown-bag lunches to discuss leadership, periodic counseling sessions, daily briefs, and regular drills can instill continual professional growth into the corporate culture.
Seize the Moment
"Assess each situation, seize the initiative, and take the action necessary."3 Every encounter with one of your crew, however mundane, is a chance for professional growth. Much of the best counsel I have received occurred when someone seized the moment to offer encouragement and advice when they were least expected but most needed. Take advantage of a captive audience whenever possible. Slow watches, routine flights, and even road trips are excellent occasions to get to know individuals and offer your support and guidance.
Be Flexible
Adapt to circumstances as they unfold. If we do not expect perfect conditions when carrying out a mission, why should we expect them in everyday life? Accept reality by adapting your methods and style to the situations and personnel at hand. Always using the same, one-size-fits-all style of management will not reliably produce the desired outcome. Instead of insisting that you simply are the way you are, look beyond your own personal sphere. It isn't all about you; it's about those you lead and how you can best help them to improve themselves. If you adopt this attitude, you will watch yourself grow as well.
Manage Risk
Risk is mitigated by ensuring that troops are trained and equipped for the mission and for greater responsibility.4 It is, of course, tempting to give the difficult jobs to top performers. But at times, taking a chance on those who are untested provides them with much-needed challenges. Deliberate delegation of tough assignments allows your charges to work outside their comfort zones. This can yield dramatic growth, both for the individuals and for the organization.
Show Restraint
When Alexander Hamilton wrote of restraint in his Letter of Instruction to Revenue Cutter officers, he was addressing specifically the issue of respect, which remains one of the service's core values.5 Honest, constructive feedback is the essence of esteem. Give your charges a tangible plan of action, coupled with confident expectation of success, and watch them improve.
The principles of Coast Guard operations create a "bias for action," a phrase popularized by then-Vice Admiral Allen in 2005. When he took charge of the response to Hurricane Katrina, he used the expression as a rallying cry to do something and stop the never-ending deliberations. This approach can be applied to all levels of leadership and career development. Rather than allowing a high operational tempo to be an obstacle, use it as a means to enhance your workforce and build the next generation of leaders.
1. The U.S. Coast Guard's Publication 1 (http://www.uscg.mil/top/about/pub1.asp) describes its history, missions, and unique characteristics. Principles of operations are covered in chapter 4.
2. Admiral Thad Allen quoted in Deven Bhatt, "MIT Sloan Interview with Adm. Thad Allen, Commandant," Fifteen: MIT Sloan School of Management, 17 May 2007, http://media.www.mitsloanfifteen.com/media/storage/paper766/news/2007/05/17/MitSloanNews/Mit-Sloan.Interview.With.Adm.Thad.Allen.Commandant-2905659.shtml.
3. USCG Publication 1, chapter 4, p. 52.
4. Ibid., p. 55.
5. Ibid., p. 58.
Developing an International Perspective
By Rear Admiral Mike LeFever, U.S. Navy; and Mark Neighbors
The Navy's mission is shifting toward irregular warfare, as has now been well established. Given the new imperatives to enhance relationships with international maritime forces, we anticipate greater involvement in theater engagement and outreach. To carry out this new work effectively, we must increase our competency in foreign languages, and we must develop regional expertise and culture.
What We Need
U.S. naval forces have long served as the nation's maritime ambassadors, and the service's influence overseas depends just as much on our ability to communicate as it does on firepower and technological superiority. Language, regional expertise, and cultural awareness (LREC) have been fundamental to success whether we have been negotiating the 19th-century opening of Japan, countering the Soviet Union during the Cold War, or mediating with Middle Eastern sheiks more recently. All three facets of LREC are essential to theater security cooperation, maritime domain awareness, and humanitarian missions. We need such international facility for intelligence collection, information warfare, expeditionary operations, and maritime interdiction.
Transforming Our Culture
In response to Fleet demands, in 2006 Chief of Naval Personnel Vice Admiral John C. Harvey Jr., in collaboration with Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy Vice Admiral John G. Morgan Jr., launched an overhaul of Navy LREC. The following results are envisioned:
- Sufficient abilities to meet Navy needs while also maintaining our surge capability. This includes a cadre of career professionals such as foreign area officers (FAOs), language-skilled Sailors who can interact with natives of other cultures, and a reserve capacity of language and cultural expertise for contingencies.
- Capabilities aligned with operational requirements to support joint and Navy missions using the total force—active, reserve, civilian and contractor—to shape the maritime environment.
- Agile, cost-effective policies that optimize results while managing risk.
- A development strategy that maximizes the existing educational infrastructure, embraces training opportunities, and leverages the Navy's ethnic diversity.
The process of realizing this vision has begun. The first step was to inventory which LREC capabilities already exist, analyze their relevance to missions, and align them functionally to avoid duplication.
This was followed by a series of initiatives stimulated by higher-level guidance such as that from Quadrennial Defense Reviews and the CNO. Efforts at the Naval War College, Naval Postgraduate School, and Naval Academy complemented all this to infuse regional and cultural understanding into our operational mindset. Core elements of the Navy's LREC transformation include:
- Reconstitution of the FAO program as a restricted line community (restricted line officers of the Navy and Reserve are not eligible for command at sea). FAOs will augment Navy component commands, forward-deployed task forces, and carrier and expeditionary strike group staffs. By 2015, 400 Navy FAOs will serve as our LREC vanguard.
- Realignment of the Personnel Exchange Program (PEP). Consistent with Navy component command theater engagement strategies, PEP billets with traditional allies will be redistributed to strengthen relationships with emerging partners. If theater security cooperation indeed is a core Navy mission, PEP must be recognized as an essential engagement-strategy ingredient.
- Navy-wide self-assessment and accession screening for foreign language skill. In March 2005, the service implemented screening for foreign language fluency among new recruits, officer candidates, and midshipmen. Results are contained in personnel databases, so that those skills can be tracked for operational purposes.
In July 2007, over 143,000 individual assessments of proficiency in more than 300 languages and dialects were identified. Approximately half of the aptitude was in Spanish, with large populations of French, German, and Tagalog. Exceptional competence in obscure languages from remote but important areas was also identified. This capability is woven into the fabric of the force.
- Foreign language proficiency bonus opportunities. Formerly restricted to cryptolinguists and others in language-coded billets, eligibility has been expanded to include Sailors with proficiency in critical languages, irrespective of billet. The award levels have risen to as high as $500 per month for top competence in a critical language, and as much as $1,000 per month for abilities in multiple languages. Eligibility is contingent on meeting Defense Language Proficiency Test requirements.
- The Center for Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture. Established under the auspices of the Center for Information Dominance, this originally was a clearinghouse for LREC-related training. It has now expanded to include development of individual country and regional studies tailored to Fleet needs. The Center collaborates with the Naval War College, Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Academy, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, and culture centers of the other services.
- The Naval Postgraduate School's Regional Security Education Program. Created shortly after the attack on the USS Cole (DDG-67), this program embarks Naval Postgraduate School faculty and regional experts in strike groups to deliver instruction in regional threats, history, culture, and religious awareness. The Navy's LREC transformation effort embraced the educational program in 2006 as part of the overall solution for achieving theater-engagement objectives. Since then, Fleet demand for it has sharply increased.
- Naval War College integration of regional content in professional military education. The college began enhancing the regional content of its core curricula in 2005, offering a set of five regional concentration areas in its elective program. Each of these has an approved additional qualification designator. The primary professional military education curriculum has been updated with a comprehensive regional and cultural foundation for Navy leaders. These modules are available through Navy Knowledge Online.
- Language study and cultural awareness at the U.S. Naval Academy. The curriculum now includes Arabic and Chinese, in addition to French, German, Japanese, Russian, and Spanish. The Academy enhanced its language study abroad program, increasing the number of participants, adding a new program in Chile, and coordinating new opportunities in China and Japan. The recently established International Programs Office and the Center for Middle East and Islamic Studies provide additional LREC study prospects at Annapolis.
- Navy Reserve Officers Training Corps programs. Greater attention is being given to regional and cultural understanding. For example, in 2005 Commander, Naval Education and Training Command replaced a mandatory course in computer basics with a course in regional and cultural studies. NROTC midshipmen participate in foreign exchange and summer overseas total-immersion events.
In 2007, U.S. Fleet Forces Command and Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet developed Navy Tactical Task 4.8.5, "Maintain Cultural Awareness." This commits the Fleet to gradual but important enhancement of our cultural awareness. It institutionalizes much of the pre-port visit, pre-overseas movement orientation that has routinely been carried out for decades. It tracks training through the Defense Readiness Reporting System-Navy, and it allows senior commanders to better see how well a unit is prepared for foreign interactions. Finally, it promotes documentation of LREC-related lessons learned to facilitate the program's development.
How Much Is Enough?
This clearly is the question most open to debate. Some continue to believe that technology is our most important asset; others that strategies used during the Cold War still suffice. They and others insist that LREC is not needed, that it would only be nice to have, and that it is a luxury competing for resources. As one of the authors of this article was told: "The only language we need in the Navy is ones and zeros [referring to computer languages—nothing else matters." Some LREC proponents outside of the Navy believe that our primary mission should be shuttling polyglots and cultural anthropologists between global hotspots.
The answer, obviously, lies somewhere between all these views. Certainly LREC competes for resources. It is expensive, takes time to develop, and is perishable. But experience has shown that LREC, even in small doses, pays important—if admittedly intangible—dividends. It is basic to the maritime strategy and to the Navy's global engagement and security cooperation objectives.
During a visit to overseas Fleet and component commands by one of the authors, two numbered Fleet commanders were emphatic: LREC increasingly was key to their theater engagement plans. Both made strong cases for increased investment in the program's training, particularly for officers assigned to foreign liaison and country engagement roles.
Discerning the right level of capability is an ambiguous task. The expeditionary nature of the Navy's missions complicates the challenge to define requirements for cultural awareness and language proficiencies. Nevertheless, LREC must be examined, thoughtfully planned, and painstakingly balanced against other warfighting requirements. It is not a strategic end; it is an operational means. It is an enabling capability used to achieve intended effects that are consistent with the strategic vision.
Moving Ahead
The above initiatives embarked the Navy on a course toward achieving a more robust LREC capability. Each is linked to the maritime strategy, the CNO's guidance, and the Navy's strategic plan. Each corresponds to specific tasks described in the DOD publication Defense Language Transformation Roadmap (January 2005, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050330roadmap.pdf). LREC will continue to refine, align, and shape itself to our evolving global missions. With each move forward, the Navy will add value to this important operational capability.
Will the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle Replace the Humvee?
By Colonel Bill Siuru, U.S. Air Force (Retired)
The high-mobility multi-wheeled vehicle (HMMWV, or Humvee) has been on duty with the U.S. Army and Marine Corps for more than two decades. Developed during the Cold War, the Humvee proved vulnerable to improvised explosive devices when it was deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq. Humvees were "up-armored," but a better solution was needed and came with the mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle.
Well before the MRAP, the Army and Marine Corps had begun developing the joint light tactical vehicle (JLTV) together, to become the Humvee's eventual replacement. The JLTV family of vehicles currently consists of 17 variants of the JLTV and associated trailers. The variants are planned to meet both Army and Marine missions ranging from light reconnaissance and troop transport to weapons deployment and command and control. Because missions are so diverse, we need a modular approach and a flexible design to meet the armor and crew-protection requirements. This way, the Army and Marines will have the capability of modifying it as required to maximize its performance, payload, and transportation features for specific missions.
Variants and Features
Category A JLTVs, capable of carrying 3,500 pounds, are for general-purpose mobility. Category B versions, with 4,000-4,500-pound capacity, will be infantry carriers for small fire teams, mobile command and control, and reconnaissance; or they can carry heavy guns and close-combat weapons; or serve as utility vehicles or ambulances. The Category C JLTV, capable of carrying a minimum 5,100-pound payload, will serves as shelter carriers, prime movers or tow vehicles, or high-capacity ambulances.
The JLTV will not replace the majority of the 160,000 Humvees now in service; they will remain on duty for many years to come. AM General still produces 3,000-5,000 Humvees annually. And the JLTV will not replace the MRAP, which does not have either the payload or the versatility of the JLTV. Then there is the logistics problem that comes with having different contractor MRAP designs in the inventory. When the JLTV program started in late 2006, there was no requirement for rapidly acquiring nearly 16,000 MRAPs. Procuring MRAPs meant less money for JLTVs, the longer-term solution.
The Army and Marine Corps will probably relegate most of their MRAPs to war reserves and preposition locations. MRAPs gave us a near-term, urgent joint service solution for enhanced crew protection for the Army and Marines. But the services' long-term solution is the JLTVs. Even so, questions remain about affordability and the need to maintain both JLTVs and MRAPs, given their overlapping missions. Of course, large numbers of Humvees will still serve where crew protection is not critical.
Pricetag
The JLTV will not be cheap, at an estimated cost of $418,000 per copy. This is 70 percent more than the initial target cost of $250,000 per vehicle that would have allowed the Army to replace most of its Humvees with JLTVs. The current plan is to acquire only 1,385 JTLVs and 755 trailers by the year 2015, with the first one entering service in 2013, at a total cost of $1.3 billion.
The unit cost could be reduced somewhat with international involvement in the JLTV program. Australia, Britain, Canada and some non-NATO countries have shown an interest. There is also a Plan B ECV2 (the expanded-capacity vehicles 2), really an improved Humvee, that is less costly and less capable than the more desirable JLTV. Don't expect to see JLTVs in the motor pool soon. The original plan was to issue a request for proposal for the technology development phase as early as October 2007.
However, concerns about funding adequacy, technical maturity, and shifting requirements delayed the request until February 2008, while the Army and Marines went back to the drawing board to answer these concerns. Finally, in late October 2008 three contractors were selected from a half-dozen contenders.
Plans and Designs
The winners are General Tactical Vehicle, a joint venture between General Dynamics Land Systems and Humvee-builder AM General; Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems; and Navistar International and BAE Systems. During the 27-month-long technology development phase, contractors will build four test configurations for the first 15 months, followed by 12 months of testing. A design selection for the system development and demonstration phase could be made in the middle of fiscal year 2011, with a contract for the final production design to be issued in FY 2013. Of course this schedule could be delayed, and probably will be, because of more pressing government priorities.
Crew protection is a key requirement, and designs have benefited from lessons learned in the MRAP program. For example, state-of-the-art lightweight, advanced armor and a V-shaped hull design are now standard. Requirements include the ability to keep operating even after small arms attacks on fuel tanks, coolant tanks, or an engine oil reservoir. Jam-resistant doors provide easy escape after attack or damage. An automatic fire-extinguishing system will be used, and an extra spall liner to minimize perforation due to a small-arms attack. Injuries result from spall, or flakes of metal that break off when armor is hit by a projectile or explosive.
Two armor configurations, Category A and the enhanced level B, provide protection against mines, artillery, and RPG (rocket propelled grendade) warheads. Trailers are capable of carrying the same payload as the vehicle without comprising speed or reliability. Each JLTV will have to carry two cans of M16, one can of M203, four cans of M249, and six cans of either MK19, M2, or M60/M240 ammunition. All variants have to be transportable by CH-47 and CH-53 helicopters as well as C-130 aircraft.
While the U.S. Army has invested heavily in hybrid electric vehicle (HEV) technology, the three winning designs still use conventional diesel engines. Apparently, HEV drive trains are not yet ready for prime time, especially on the battlefield. The main problem is that batteries still do not have the energy density for compact and lightweight designs, and they are still expensive. The logistics of handling batteries on the battlefield is also a concern. However, because HEVs are able to easily supply large amounts of portable electricity needed by modern armies, they could be used in later-generation JLTVs. An important JLTV requirement is a modular design that allows seamless integration of future technologies.