Everyone has an opinion about intelligence. Some warfighters develop them early in their careers simply based on the quality of their squadron intelligence officer, ship independent duty intelligence specialist, or cryptologic rider. Some communities such as the submarine force and Special Warfare collect and use intelligence daily and have an informed tactical-to-strategic view of its nature. To other warfare communities without large intelligence embeds, it is a largely unseen and undervalued activity until officers achieve sufficient seniority to gain routine interaction.
It is no surprise, then, that over time a wide range of views on intelligence develop. Given the focus on the new maritime strategy and the consequent need for quality intelligence to support our forward deployed and increasingly expeditionary fighting forces, it is more important than ever to take time to learn what intelligence is, what it does, what it can and cannot easily do, and areas where it needs improvement.
Myth 1: Intelligence is of marginal value unless it is actionable.
Operators and decision-makers need and deserve actionable intelligence, and they should continue to demand it from their N2s and J2s. Demanding it at the exclusion of foundational intelligence, however, is perilous for any commander. In almost all cases, one cannot unlink actionable from non-actionable intelligence. Calls to produce the immediately actionable overlook the reality that only through a broad and multi-layered intelligence effort can one acquire sufficient raw material to eventually produce a key insight. The iceberg analogy applies: how high the tip emerges from the water's surface is a function of the size of its submerged base. Even in the case where a single take becomes actionable, usually an enormous amount of time and effort has been made to orient collection assets and dedicate the best collection means to identify a precise operational direction. Telescoping intelligence methods, where the steady compilation and analysis of the seemingly unimportant allows one to home in on a vital discovery, are best exemplified in the means by which Saddam Hussein was captured and Abu Masab al-Zarqawi found, fixed, and finished.
Fixating on actionable intelligence and devaluing the rest also belies every decision-maker's need for baseline and contextual intelligence. At the very heart of maritime domain awareness (MDA), for example, is the synthesis of intelligence, environmental, and operational streams that define normality. We will never discern anomalies or suspicious actions that might provide early warning of illicit, illegal, or threatening behavior unless we comprehend routine activities of ships, crews, cargoes, agents, shipping companies, and ports. Building MDA on potential adversary navies demands the same approach. Snippets of non-actionable data may be meaningless by themselves, but in their synthesis they create a knowledge base of contextual intelligence that is a necessary precursor for effective action.
What is non-actionable today may be very actionable in the future. Scientific and technical intelligence work, for example, which includes foreign material acquisition and exploitation of missiles, torpedoes, jamming equipment, etc., is critical to maintaining the Navy's tactical advantage in future combat. In the meantime, contextual intelligence is used to maintain situational awareness, monitor discrete changes in areas of continuing interest, and deepen our overall understanding, so we are neither surprised nor unprepared to shift focus and act when required.
Non-actionable and actionable intelligence are intertwined; commanders need both.
Myth 2: Intelligence is basically secret information.
"Information" has become the vernacular umbrella term to describe almost all types of knowledge. So used, it is a source of great confusion. In fact, information is only the second tier on the popular Knowledge Pyramid, a hierarchy consisting of data, information, knowledge, and wisdom. Intelligence as an activity touches all four categories. Intelligence as a product results from an evaluative process that aims to deliver knowledge and foresight. Information, on the other hand, is simply processed data. It is still valuable, of course, because it connects parts and answers the "who, what, where, when" questions, but it is still a basic form of understanding. Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure (PMESII) studies—which outline the structure and features of a nation—are a good example of this category. PMESII is heavy on information and lighter on knowledge.
An intelligence product in its most mature form is a synthesis of information that strives to correctly answer the how and why questions. Here intelligence is more akin to knowledge in that it organizes relevant information—validates sources, collates, discerns patterns, and evaluates—to communicate meaning. Modern intelligence is not just defined by this process, however, but by its military and policymaker customers and the uses to which it is put.1
Intelligence does not end at acquiring, evaluating, and transmitting knowledge. Intelligence officers should not just be human valves remotely turning on spigots of sensor data, newsy information, or encyclopedic knowledge from the intelligence community. They should be edging toward the pyramid's tip, the zone of wisdom, using superior understanding to generate good value judgments for decision makers, including a vision for what might come next. This is the highest charge of an N2 or J2—to convey what they anticipate, not just what they know or don't know.
Intelligence is not just classified information. To consider it as such is to underestimate its power and potential, and lower expectations of the naval personnel performing those functions.
Myth 3: Intelligence is produced exclusively from classified sources.
Intelligence-funded collection costs tens of billions of dollars in a national system that expends $43 billion a year on all aspects of intelligence.2 Our nation pays a high price for dedicated collection assets in all spatial dimensions, supporting processing capabilities and specialists skilled in each intelligence discipline, or "INT." These investments help analysts unravel mysteries and penetrate the designs of adversaries who aggressively try to keep their secrets. Total dependence on classified sources, though, would consistently reveal a partial picture of ground truth. Open sources are used to form the edges of the jigsaw puzzle, while classified techniques concentrate on finding and connecting the difficult inner pieces.
Though analysts have been historically challenged by the volume and veracity of open sources, they have steadily learned to swim in the sea of information available in the public domain. In fact, most are predisposed to use unclassified material. A great many analysts, particularly the more influential producers, come to the community with advanced degrees and specialties derived from academic work, and continue to access books, articles, and press reports in their respective areas of study. The intelligence community has invested in an Open Source Center that pools information from the "internet, databases, press, radio, television, video, geospatial data, photos, and commercial imagery."3 Additionally, intelligence agencies continue a longstanding tradition of contracting translations of "white" and "gray" literature on special high-interest targets.4
Even with greater access to information, the sober reality is that uncertainty and ambiguity will always complicate our ability to understand thorny targets. As one CIA analyst put it, "the game is akin to putting a puzzle together without all the pieces, or a box top to guide you, and with several parts of other puzzles thrown in."5 Difficulties notwithstanding, the intelligence community uses all sources, regardless of classification, to clarify the picture for military commanders and policymakers.
Myth 4: All I need from intelligence is a smart box; men-in-the-loop only impede and delay access to intelligence.
This philosophy reflects a tactical view that during operational execution all an aviator, surface warrior, or SEAL might need is a coordinate, infrared tipper, electronic intercept, or image. We must fully subscribe to all efforts designed to improve sensor-to-shooter technology to ensure rapid dissemination of vital data to warfighters, but a UAV snapshot, signal of interest, or radar contact is only unevaluated sensor data. This raw take becomes meaningful with proper intelligence preparation of the environment and people trained to give perspective on battlespace developments.
Engaging fleeting targets in today's environment is critical, but the ultimate solution is not just a smart box with artificial intelligence, bandwidth, and high processing capacity. In reality the demand for dedicated intelligence specialists forward has increased as warfighters face challenges of dynamically retasking sensors, making sense of the take, understanding cultural and political sensitivities, and gauging effects. Intelligence analysts offer context at all levels of war, evaluating the ever-shifting behavior of adversaries, calculating red's next moves, and helping operators adjust tactics. This is especially true in cases where remote support from the rear may not be assured. Intelligence specialists must continue to be forward deployed and embedded with Navy units because commanders rely on local intelligence analytical expertise to inform and guide their warfighting effort. This abiding advisory role does not come at the expense of sensor-to-shooter timeliness.
Myth 5: Intelligence experiences more failures than successes.
Documented shortfalls in the quantity and quality of intelligence exist, and intelligence failures splash newspaper headlines at the first hint of a global surprise of any magnitude. The American public pays a lot for strategic warning and they want their oracles to achieve good batting averages. Well-publicized intelligence community reforms are under way, but these efforts also mask a great corpus of quiet intelligence work that continues to successfully inform national security principals and promote effective military planning, operations, and procurement.
Properly calibrating expectations of what intelligence can provide is an essential job of intelligence officers at all echelons of command. Senior officers must know up front that we cannot reliably or consistently predict the future, and that we will rarely acquire unambiguous intelligence. Periodically we will be surprised around the world and we must be prepared to manage these risks, because history tells us the improbable, irrational, and unlikely occur with disturbing frequency. This reality is underscored by the sobering fact that key figures in foreign countries continue to be startled by events that they were in the best position to know about and in their best interest to get right. Consider Israel's Prime Minister Golda Meir before the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Iran's shah before the 1979 revolution, Kuwait's emir before the 1990 Iraq invasion, and Palestinian National Authority President Mahmoud Abbas before the 2006 Hamas election victory.
For every publicized U.S. intelligence failure, scores of successes exist. But like a submarine or a SEAL team returning from deployment, the intelligence community will rarely trumpet its accomplishments if it hopes to repeat them. Whether it is responsive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) on battlefields; new software in surface combatant electronic warfare systems; in-depth technical intelligence on ballistic missiles; new discoveries of foreign military operating patterns and wartime intentions; or analysis of political-military events to guide strategy and operational action, intelligence is making a difference. Let us not be deceived by headlines, nor take for granted the wide variety of standing baseline intelligence products or the steady flow of intelligence that remains tailored, timely, and accurate. Intelligence has its shortcomings, but its silent successes continue to outweigh the shrill failures.
Myth 6: ONI is more focused on national rather than Fleet interests.
The National Maritime Intelligence Center, of which Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) is the largest component, is officially designated one of the nation's Maritime Domain Awareness Enterprise hubs. Also, four out of every five ONI dollars come from national intelligence accounts. These realities, plus warfighters' sense of disconnection from ONI have given rise to a view that the command is focused on so-called national activities at the expense of the Fleet. The reality is national maritime interests and Fleet interests coincide and both customers are shared beneficiaries of all maritime intelligence.
Every activity ONI performs directly or indirectly contributes to Fleet awareness, naval defense, or planning against adversary navies. Its contributions range from special support for submarine missions to science and technology discoveries of advanced naval weapons' characteristics to providing experienced imagery analysts to ride big decks. While it is true efforts such as Global Maritime Intelligence Integration are fundamentally national, because they are driven by the President, the Fleet will unquestionably profit from increased circulation of maritime-related information.
The real problem is that the interfaces between the office and the Fleet remain inadequate. Many ONI analysts remain largely insulated from the true needs of deployed units, and although improvements have been made in pushing tailored intelligence forward, pulling for answers from the office's Web site or connecting with real experts remains unsatisfactory. Moreover, insufficient products of continuing importance to the Fleet are maintained as living works and many sterling products tailored to one customer are not shared with other naval customers who might benefit. In recognition of this longstanding Fleet frustration in accessing its expertise, in February 2009 the office established the Nimitz Operational Intelligence Center: the entry point for the Fleet and the prime node designed to support Maritime Operations Centers. In the final analysis, connecting rich, available, tailorable intelligence with demanding customers is ONI's greatest challenge. The notion that its problems are somehow rooted in a pre-occupation with producing national maritime intelligence, however, is a red herring.
Myth 7: Successful operations-intelligence integration primarily involves intelligence getting in tune with warfighters.
Weaknesses in operations-intelligence (ops-intel) integration are commonly viewed as intelligence challenges. To many naval officers, better integration involves improving intelligence responsiveness to legitimate warfighter requirements, increasing ISR persistence, reducing sensor-data latency, or lashing more intelligence capability (personnel, sensors, connectivity) to individual units or operator decision centers. Better integration is all that, but best integration is much more. Those engaged in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan will attest that genuine ops-intel integration is a two-way street where warriors and intelligence specialists feed one another to produce genuine synergy and sharpened effects.
The essential characteristic of ops-intel integration is symbiosis, where no planning or operational action starts or ends without key players in the circle of trust. While this sounds self-evident, a tendency still exists for military planners and especially high-level policymakers to selectively consult intelligence experts, or to do so late in the game after specific objectives, assumptions, and courses of action have attained significant inertia.
Successful ops-intel integration extends beyond staff work inclusiveness or mission planning. It is just as important for operations-derived information streams to flow north as it is for intelligence waterfalls to cascade south. Habits of mission reporting and debriefing, like those perfected by strike aviation, must be more widely adopted by all naval forces, particularly expeditionary units at the edge and ships distributed to global Fleet stations where situational awareness may be spotty. That every Sailor is a sensor will become a reality under the new Maritime Strategy and we must ensure insights are captured and integrated regardless of source. The same holds true for systems that inherently support the employment of weapons, but may also enjoy non-traditional ISR attributes.
In combat areas, the operations and intelligence communities of all services have been driven together in mutually reinforcing ways and are seeing great success, whether near Haditha Dam in the case of riverine forces or eastern Afghanistan in the case of special forces. The larger Navy must take and apply these lessons broadly, particularly if it hopes to be ready for another major contingency operation or contain local disruptions in far-flung regions. Achieving true integration is not easy, and both operators and intelligence officers must do their part to perfect it.
All seven myths contain a kernel of truth, otherwise they would not have survived so long, but each deserves deep scrutiny because they are misleading. It is in our collective best interests to understand the complex business of intelligence: what it is, what it is not, and how it really works for our service and our nation. It is even more important to get rid of the folklore if we intend to spend any of our finite energy seeking improvements in this field.
1. Joint Publication 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 June 2007.
2. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. "DNI Releases Budget Figure for National Intelligence Program." Press release, 30 October 2007.
3. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. "ODNI Announces Establishment of Open Source Center." Press release, 8 November 2005.
4. "White" literature is available open-source information. "Gray" literature includes unclassified or For Official Use Only
equivalent documents certain nations restrict to domestic or government-only readers.5. Martin Peterson, a senior CIA analyst, in National Security Studies Quarterly, Spring 1999.