An Unlikely Naval Aviation Pioneer
(See E. E. Christensen Jr., pp. 48-53, September 2008 Proceedings)
Commander James J. Coogan Jr., U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—Just a side note on Rear Admiral Ernest E. Christensen Jr.'s piece on the successful 1919 transatlantic flight of the NC-4. The aircraft was about 80 miles north of Cape Cod when it had to turn back due to one of the rear engines overheating. After taxiing at sea for 12 hours, the NC-4 was towed into the Chatham Naval Air Station. It was determined that the faulty rear engine could be rebuilt but the forward engine had to be totally replaced. Under the supervision of Chief Machinist's Mate Charles Devine, the work took four days. Another day was lost when one of the electric starter motors failed and a replacement had to be flown up from Rockaway Beach on Long Island. The NC-4 belatedly re-joined the other "Nancys" in Halifax, Nova Scotia. Despite all of the problems, the NC-4 was the only aircraft to successfully complete the flight to the continent.
After the historic flight, the NC-4 was crated and brought back to the United States where it was displayed in New York City's Central Park. Later the aircraft was flown around the East Coast as a recruiting tool for the Navy. Eventually, the aircraft went into storage and after some restoration went on display at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C. The NC-4 was so large (68 feet long with a 126-foot upper wingspan) that the Smithsonian decided to turn it over to the Naval Aviation Museum in Pensacola, Florida, where it is now viewed by thousands of people each year.
Fish or Cut Bait
(See J. Risner, pp. 38-42, September 2008 Proceedings)
Commander Gregory J. Erickson, U.S. Navy—Ensign Risner articulated a clear, cogent argument on the need for the U.S. Navy to provide helicopter support to special operations and offered a logical way that this could be accomplished. Hopefully his article will generate some discussion among the leadership.
I can tell from the author's youthful exuberance that he is hoping that we decide to "fish." Unfortunately leadership in three key areas has decided to "cut bait."
First, naval aviation, which has prided itself in its ability to project power from the decks of aircraft carriers, has not yet grasped that in the war on terrorism it may take a team of 12 SEALs to do the mission and not simply a 1,000-pound JDAM that can be strapped to an F-18. Helos just aren't sexy.
Second, Navy Reserve leadership disestablished HCS-5 in 2006, despite the increasing demand for special operations support and the ongoing Central Command Request for Forces. The short-sightedness of this decision cannot be understated. In fact, not even a full year had passed when it was recognized as a huge misstep and an OPNAV-sponsored working group was formed to investigate different courses of action for increasing Navy helicopter support to special operations.
Finally, Special Operations Command (SOCOM) continues with a message of "SOCOM does not require any Navy aviation support" while continuing to validate the Request for Forces regarding Navy helicopters in Iraq. I find it particularly ironic that SOCOM traces its establishment to the failed 1980 Iranian rescue attempt. This was primarily caused by a failure of Navy helicopters, yet SOCOM refuses to acknowledge that there will ever be a requirement to perform special operations missions with support from shipboard helicopters.
So, I tip my hat to HSC-84 for continuing to maintain a four-aircraft detachment in Iraq for more than three years now. I also ask the helicopter pilots out there to think about it for just a moment: one squadron supporting a four-aircraft detachment to the other side of the world for three years straight, night after night flying alongside the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment and the 20th and the 21st Special Operations Squadrons, all the logistics to get aircraft, parts, and people over there, all the planning and image study performed each night, and all the maintenance phases completed. It's enough to make a guy long for the "simplicities" of a three-aircraft, three-week detachment to Fallon.
Ensign Risner, you have a bright future in my opinion. I hope that you zealously continue to advocate and reflect on helicopter support for special operations.
New Flagships of the Fleet?
(See J. Vandenengel, pp. 62-64, September 2008 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander David Douglas Winters, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Ensign Vandenengel makes a fair case for potential expansion of the submarine as a promising and versatile weapons platform, but not as a flagship. Today, more than ever, the key capability demanded of a flagship is command and control, not weapons capacity. In this, the submarine, with all its advances, remains woefully deficient.
Stealth, still the greatest strength of the "silent service," is simply not compatible with the high-volume telecommunications and information processing requirements of 24/7 fleet command. Some day this may change, but the potential for that change certainly does not lie within the next couple of planning cycles. It will, for example, be a long time before the air warfare commander can operate in a practical manner from within a submerged hull.
But, on the other hand, young officers should dream. So I am happy to optimistically anticipate the day when such dreams can become reality.
The Bitter Cost of Business
(See K. S. J. Eyer, pp. 44-49, July 2008; J. T. Rooney, p. 6, August 2008; J. B. Barta, J. E. O'Neil Jr., M. Gussow, pp. 6-7, 84, September 2008 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Paul D. Speer Jr., U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—Captain Eyer's article startled me. I retired in 1973, a reserve officer on active duty for 20 years and, I thought, at the top of my game. I resolved at that time never to take a job—insurance or real estate were the usual outlets—where I had to use my Navy rolodex to make a living.
Now the DOD suffers force drawdowns and hires more civilians on contract. How can that be? Whom are we fooling with our budgetary cycles? We train our officers (and technical ratings) so that they can go off and be paid more than they did on active duty? The Navy was not meant to be a boot camp for consulting groups.
And what of our retiring officers? They acquired significant skills and information when they served on their country's figurative shilling. As civilians they are being paid not only for their expertise, but also for the contacts they made—their juniors and peers who remain on active duty and who can influence employment of contracting groups. But woe betide the retiree who cannot bring in the proverbial contract bacon.
The Navy is unique in that its weapon systems and platforms have the longest lead time between the thought of mission, the design of the ship, its construction, and commissioning. As a consequence, in today's world with the face of warfare changing and the costs of armaments compounding, the Navy is caught in a time warp. Leaders have always favored waging wars with the weapon systems that brought them success when they were afloat. The threats we face are changing faster than we can bring new forces to bear. Our erstwhile opponent Russia is now trying to design/build/commission new warships on a three-year cycle, shortened from prior schedules that ran as long as five.
Our contracting process is a shambles. The big firms long ago learned to win the bid and make the money on the ship alterations. We no longer have the ability to design our own ships and model them. That is a false economy. Where are our Navy constructors who can put into drawings the demands of the operators for mission-configured ships?
There is plenty of work to do in the Navy. We must determine the appropriate missions demanded by national security policy and the accompanying strategy. We also need to develop the naval strategy and tactics necessary to defeat both blue-water enemies and those state and non-state actors intending to engage in asymmetric warfare against us. We must design and build better ships that meet these requirements and institute training regimens to enable our ships and men to perform in the highest traditions of the naval service.
This is work that needs to be done within the Navy by the dedicated officers whose knowledge and current experience we have bought and paid for, not by retirees with loyalties split between the Navy and their current employers. The Navy and the Coast Guard are living with the consequences of that.
Captains, your service is required . . . and appreciated.
War on (Buzz)Words
(See K. Bateman, pp. 20-23, August 2008; W. B. Young, E. Shimberg, P. J. Madden, p. 6, September 2008 Proceedings)
Commander Earl J. Higgins, U.S. Navy (Retired)—At this point in time I find it incumbent upon myself to respond to and comment on Ms. Bateman's excellent article castigating and criticizing those DOD members who fail to prioritize good, concise, and clear writing. At the professional-layman communication interface, it is both significant and important to achieve clarity, cohesion, and understanding without the employment of unnecessary, repetitious, and superfluous argot comprehended by few of those who are tasked with reading the communication. Eschewing sesquipedalian constructions and fustian diction will ameliorate connotative apperception and obviate misapprehensions of the parameters involved.
Besides, Ms. Bateman's essay is, like, really cool, if you know what I mean.
Joseph G. Dimmick—Buzzword is itself a bit of jargon that has found its way into respectable usage. Some jargon is useful in the long run. It makes fast communication reliable. Examples are AirLant, RECON, CPA, UNREP, and XO.
Egregiously obfuscating words are encouraged by seniors.??The current lexicon is constantly changing, depending on which senior is involved, and how long it has been since he was exposed to the latest in management training.
Long ago, I worked at the Navy lab across the river from the U.S. Naval Academy. Working-level engineers were expected to find their own sources of funds for projects. The dank, dark confines of Crystal City held individuals with budgets for various technical areas. The buzzword for them was sponsors.
If a particular sponsor was unknown to me, I usually scouted him before starting to write a proposal. Once, I attended a meeting run by a prospective sponsor. RECON was my objective. He spoke almost entirely in unfamiliar buzzwords.
I wrote down every buzzword I heard, and ticked each one as he used it again. My intention was to become fluent in his favorite buzzwords, and to use them repeatedly in every communication with him. It was probably the worst piece of writing I ever produced, but when I handed him my half-page proposal, he said, "This is the clearest proposal I have ever seen!"
Those buzzwords of yore quickly became obsolete, but not before I could wow him again by using them liberally in the report (he called it a deliverable) I took to him about a year later.
My temporary lapse into buzzwords was useful in the end. Parts of that report were actually used in the design and specifications for the gas turbine ships that were not then even built.
Seniors who lead by example are vulnerable to juniors who learn their favorite buzzwords. On the Internet, there are lists of current buzzwords to be banned.
The CNO or maybe even SECDEF could improve communication and reduce vulnerabilities by banning certain buzzwords, and then updating the lists periodically. To lead by example, those senior leaders would first have to wash their own mouths out with soap.
Supporting the Services
(See J. F. Kelly Jr., p. 8, August 2008; T. A. Davis, pp. 84-85, September 2008 Proceedings)
Reverend Frank Morgret—Captain Kelly has written a powerful, persuasive, and succinct argument for the use of civilian contractors to support our nation's all-volunteer force. However, in so doing, he has raised a pivotal question.
The United States no longer fights an amorphous, ill-defined "war on terrorism." With the release of the new National Defense Strategy, the DOD declares its aim to win "the long war against violent extremist elements" (page 7), a much more limited and precise goal.
Is the all-volunteer force, supported by its retinue of civilian contractors, the weapon of choice in this new war? Or would another paradigm result in greater support on the home front?
Last year, a photo by John Moore, taken for Getty Images, appeared in the 19 February Kansas City Star. It still circulates widely on the Internet. The photo shows a white board upon which is scrawled, "America does not go to war. The Marines go to war. America goes to the mall." (Apparently, the whiteboard was on a Marine Corps installation, so no slight was meant to the Army, the Navy, the Coast Guard, or the Air Force.)
To many, the contractor-supported, all-volunteer force gives the impression that "they," not "we," are at war. In the climate of increased sacrifice the long war against violent elements worldwide will demand, is this a healthy attitude for the United States to foster? Will those at the mall be willing to pay the extra cost in personnel and wealth such a war will demand? Would universal national service-yes, a draft-increase the immediacy of this war for those at the mall?
Fighting a foe that chooses asymmetrical warfare saps the will of a nation more quickly than does fighting a conventional foe. Ho Chi Minh has proven that unequivocally. Does having a contractor-supported, all-volunteer force strengthen or diminish the will of the United States in such a war?
I have answers to none of these questions. However, they must be asked, and this is the forum in which to ask them.