Iraq and the Challenge of Counterinsurgency
Thomas R. Mockaitis. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008. Illus. Notes. Bib. Index. $39.95.
In Iraq the author sees the U.S. military facing the most complex counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign in its history. He judges the post-invasion phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) as badly planned, "horribly mismanaged," and initially a prime example of "how not to conduct" a COIN campaign.
Mockaitis, a professor of History at DePaul University who also teaches at the Center for Civil Military Relations, argues that the demands of World War II overwhelmed previous experience in the Philippines and Latin America and fostered large conventional forces. Thereafter, the long Vietnam War led ultimately to a reconsideration of the conventional approach and rejection of counterinsurgency.
From the planning phase through initial occupation, he analyzes the invasion of Iraq, judging that we deployed enough troops to defeat Saddam's forces, "but not nearly enough to pacify Iraq." Once U.S. leaders recognized a growing insurgency, they failed to develop an effective COIN strategy.
In "Getting It Right" Mockaitis explains how U.S. troops "rediscovered and/or developed" effective COIN methods. The book's conclusion points out lessons to be learned but adds that we have a "fairly limited range of options." In Iraq the author believes there is plenty of blame to go around; behind the mistakes, however, are longer term structural deficiencies "for which no individual bears responsibility."
While Mockaitis hammers the Republicans and several general officers for OIF failures, the Democrats take a few hits as well. This brings to mind the age-old observation that in democracies, those not responsible for government action will comprise the first rank of vociferous critics. Nonetheless, his recommendations regarding the absolute need for our Services to greatly strengthen COIN training and organization make good sense.
Historic Photos of the United States Naval Academy
James W. Cheevers. Nashville, TN: Turner Publishing Co., 2008. 216 pp. Illus. Notes. Bib. $39.95.
This impressive collection of nearly 200 black-and-white photographs illustrates the origins and early years of the U.S. Naval Academy until the present. James Cheevers, the associate director and senior curator of the Naval Academy Museum, has managed extensive collections of naval art and artifacts for more than 35 years.
Cheevers emphasizes the important role photography has played in portraying the immense changes that have taken place at the Academy since it was established in 1845. He also points out the occasional obscure fact, such as, "the first known motion picture film shot in Maryland showed the arrival of Spanish prisoners of war at the Naval Academy on July 15, 1898."
The chapter titled "The Post-Civil War Period (1866-1894)," chronicles Rear Admiral David Porter's dramatic and innovative transformation of the Academy and its grounds. Among a number of other intriguing photos, one notable shot of the baseball team shows William F. Halsey, class of 1873. This is the Halsey who sired "Bull" Halsey, class of 1904, the naval leader who rose to the five-star rank of fleet admiral for his distinguished service in World War II.
"The New Naval Academy (1895-1947)" explains how Navy successes during the Spanish-American War led to vastly increased congressional support of the Academy. This chapter's striking photos include Midshipman (and later Fleet Admiral) Chester Nimitz and Bandmaster Charles Zimmerman, composer of "Anchors Aweigh," as well as assorted aerial views of the Academy grounds.
Cheevers has done a skillful job that is sure to be appreciated by admirers of a fine institution—and especially by Naval Academy grads.
Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas
Alexander Cooley. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008. Illus. Refs. Index. $29.
According to a 2004 DoD report, the United States that year maintained 860 overseas military installations and another 115 on non-continental U.S. territories. In the past 15 years, we moved from larger to smaller and more numerous bases around the world. This fact has often provoked debate in our own military services and caused serious contention in many of the host countries.
In his preface, the author writes, "Given the hundreds of U.S. military installations scattered across more than a hundred overseas countries and territories, the dearth of comparative political analysis on the issue is puzzling." Cooley's purpose is to make sense of "base politics" and to explain major trends spanning different countries and eras.
He traces, for example, the evolution of U.S. basing in the Philippines and Spain, where many attribute the political longevity of Ferdinand Marcos and Francisco Franco to U.S. military presence and political support. Although military cooperation between those two countries and the United States ebbed in the 1980s and 1990s, domestic and foreign policy imperatives—some stemming from rising international terrorism—have improved relations.
Cooley also assesses whether Japan and Italy's dependence on the "U.S.-led security system" is an exception to his argument that changes in domestic institutions are critically important to "politicization and depoliticization" of the U.S. presence. This is an especially interesting review and policy update on two of the countries we occupied following World War II.
While it presents no startling revelations, Base Politics offers feasible pros and cons for both sides of the debate on U.S. basing in allied nations.
Strategic Challenges: America's Global Security Agenda
Edited by Stephen J. Flanagan and James A. Schear. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Inc., 2008. 415 pp. Illus. Notes. Index. $28 (paperback).
The United States has seen turbulent times since 9/11: wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, looming confrontations with known or suspected proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and episodes of mass violence in unstable regions. This book posits that the strategic environment of the next decade will experience "continued, possibly heightened, instability."
The book first focuses on geostrategic, military-technical, and regional trends that can be "drastically altered" by WMD proliferation, sustained terrorist campaigns, regional crises that tax the United States' capabilities, and asymmetric threats to our advantages in information management and space. The authors note the difficult role the U.S. plays as the "lone, comprehensive superpower."
Later chapters range from countering global terrorism to defusing conflicts in unstable regions and securing America's future. "Protecting the American Homeland" is especially interesting. Its authors envision future attacks as "a virtual certainty" and underscore that Osama bin Laden sees chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons as "war winners."
The last chapter proposes that a more successful counterterrorism strategy requires "synergy between actions designed to eradiate jihadist terrorists and their structures, and those designed to isolate jihadists from the wider Muslim population." It also strongly urges development of more effective U.S. cooperation with China, Russia, and India. The editors, both distinguished scholars, have put together an extensive and fairly complex analysis of U.S. strategy and proposes ways ahead. While there are no final answers, students of our executive and legislative branches should consider this book's arguments.