Helen of Troy may have had "the face that launched 1,000 ships" in the legendary war for Troy, but in Greek mythology it was Hephaestos (pronounced Hee-FES-tes)—the weapon-smith of the gods—who inspired their construction and taught the necessary skills.
Within the Department of the Navy, the Navy International Programs Office (NIPO) plays a role not unlike that of Hephaestos by facilitating our allies and coalition partners in their development of weapon systems and military organizations that are functionally interoperable with U.S. forces. It has done so for years by way of its development and oversight of foreign military sales (FMS); international cooperative agreements; excess defense article transfers (such as decommissioned ships and aircraft); technology transfer and licensing; personnel and data exchanges; and international military education and training—collectively known as Naval International Programs for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard team.
But it's no myth that a quiet revolution has occurred recently in naval international programs. This change revolves around a new strategic planning methodology for determining how best to plan and use most effectively the finite resources of the Department of the Navy in helping to equip and train foreign militaries or to build partner capacity among our treaty allies and operational partners in the war on terrorism. While not well known beyond the bulkheads of the Navy Department, this new method has attracted the attention of the Fleet and combatant commanders (COCOMs) and has helped build a renewed appreciation of the strategic value of international programs reflected in the new maritime strategy unveiled in 2007.
Relationships Are Key
The Departments of Defense and State have a long tradition of foreign security assistance. What's new about NIPO's strategy is that it strives to link the agencies' traditional joint FMS activities and other international program processes directly to the theater security cooperation objectives and plans of each of the regional COCOMs. The effort seeks to maximize the interoperability and cooperation identified in the 1,000-Ship Navy concept originated by Admiral Mike Mullen.
It has been said that the first two ships in the 1,000-Ship Navy are partnerships and relationships. This is key to NIPO's strategy. While foreign sales of weapon systems or technical support may benefit U.S. industry, and in some cases provide cost savings or cost elimination to the Department of the Navy, of even greater importance is the level of increasing interoperability and familiarity such sales or activities bring to combined operations. As Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter stated in his guidance to NIPO: "It's not about selling stuff . . . it's about relationships."
From that perspective, every international program should meet a COCOM priority, fill a partner nation's security requirement, and build, maintain, or renew an operational relationship. NIPO's new strategic planning methodology has established program opportunity planning partnerships between NIPO and the COCOMs (along with the Navy and Marine component commanders) to improve our ability to assist the COCOMs in fashioning operational partnerships with foreign militaries—particularly with non-traditional partners.
What are Naval International Programs?
Naval International Programs provide direct defense support to treaty allies and operational partners. The most visible programs are in the category of security assistance, such as support of foreign acquisition programs like the recent purchase of F/A-18 E/F aircraft by the Royal Australian Air Force. As this example shows, Navy Department cooperation in foreign military sales is not limited to foreign navies or marines.
Acquisition of advanced-technology U.S. weapon systems by other nations—for which Congress and the Secretary of Defense have mandated stringent, elaborate, and lengthy vetting and transfer procedures—requires an organization dedicated to balancing the security, regulatory, and logistical risks with the benefits of building partner capacity. In addition, NIPO must conduct the planning, negotiating, and industrial relations necessary to ensure success. A significant step in NIPO's new strategic planning methodology is identification and removal of barriers to the process.
NIPO was organized more than two decades ago from a number of related offices scattered throughout the Navy, bringing together a diverse portfolio:
- Foreign military sales (FMS)
- Foreign military financing (FMF)
- Excess defense article (EDA) transfers
- Cooperative acquisition and research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) agreements and data exchanges
- Establishing Navy Department policy on technology security and participating in the DOD technology transfer process
- Reviewing the licensing of direct commercial sales (DCS) of naval systems
- Defense personnel exchanges and foreign visits
- Training of foreign military personnel, including the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program
- Management of naval Section 1206 programs (named for Section 1206 of the Defense Authorization Act that provides for nations who lack funding for such capabilities like maritime domain awareness)
Foreign military sales are sales of U.S. systems to a foreign government with the acquisition managed by the U.S. government as if it were a U.S. domestic defense acquisition program. Foreign military financing is similar, except that the purchase is financed by U.S. dollars as foreign aid. Excess defense article transfers provide other nations with U.S. equipment in good condition that is being retired from inventory. This includes ships and aircraft to nations ranging from Nigeria to Turkmenistan.
Interestingly, U.S. law prohibits the Navy from either making a profit or incurring a loss as part of this process. Money received from the sale of a ship, for example, goes directly into the U.S. Treasury and not the Navy. These sales do yield ample economic benefit, however, as programs spread overhead over a broader base, development costs are shared, and weapon system suppliers enjoy economies of scale. In the case of Harpoon missile production, the Navy is able to produce the new, improved Block III missile at an active facility that has been kept open exclusively by foreign sales for more than ten years, thereby saving the Navy the considerable cost of restarting a cold production line.
Cooperative agreements include negotiated multinational acquisition programs for such systems as the NATO Sea Sparrow missile and the Joint Strike Fighter. Additional agreements involve collaborative research, development, and testing for future programs. They, like FMS, FMF, and EDA, are guided by a strict Defense and State Department technology transfer and licensing procedure, for which NIPO is the Department of the Navy's executive agent. NIPO also facilitates Navy Department approval of many scientific, acquisition, and training personnel exchanges. Likewise, the international program office plays a significant role in international training, with the portfolio managed by the Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity in Pensacola.
The latest series of programs managed by NIPO is aimed at providing other nations—particularly non-traditional partners—assistance in the war on terrorism. Known collectively as "1206 programs," these are COCOM-initiated programs funded from the U.S. defense budget to help nations that do not have the funds for such programs.
Naval international programs, however, constitute only a portion of the Navy Department's overall security cooperation efforts, with additional operational tools like combined training, port visits, and military-to-military talks belonging to the COCOMs, Fleet commanders, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), or Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC). NIPO's new strategic planning method was designed to strengthen international efforts across all lines by tying international programs to the COCOM Theater Security Cooperation Plans, along with Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard guidance. It is indeed a quiet revolution.
Sources of the Revolution
In 2005, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (International Programs) Rear Admiral Mark Milliken saw the need for a mechanism for change focused on the value of international programs for U.S. operational commanders. NIPO was widely perceived by naval leadership as being reactive, rather than proactive; it sought to fulfill foreign nations' requests without a formal method in place for examining interoperability with U.S. forces or for furthering combined military planning.
Admiral Milliken decided to initiate development of an objective, transparent, iterative, and replicable strategic planning methodology as a decision-making tool for determining which international program opportunities best supported COCOM theater security cooperation planning. This effort went into overdrive with the establishment of a new directorate within NIPO, the Strategic Planning and Business Development Directorate (NIPO-03) in September 2005.
Complementing Admiral Milliken's previous outreach to operational forces, the extensive acquisition experience of his successor, now-Vice Admiral Jeffrey Wieringa, allowed him to reiterate the importance of international programs—and the critical link to COCOM requirements—to the naval acquisition community. In October 2006, Navy Secretary Winter indicated his support for the methodology and then-Rear Admiral Wieringa's overall efforts, thereby making it a Department of the Navy planning method.
Because it is an iterative method and adaptable to the changes in COCOM planning, we continue to make improvements to ensure it addresses requirements from all elements of the Navy Department. Current Deputy Assistant Secretary Rear Admiral Nevin Carr has initiated efforts toward greater harmonization of international requirements among COCOMs, Fleets, OPNAV, HQMC, and partner nations, focused on implementing the new maritime strategy.
Method of the Method
Analytically, the strategic planning method itself is straightforward. The primary step is the analysis of all applicable security cooperation guidance from DOD and Navy leadership, with the dominant source being the regional COCOMs' Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP). Using content analysis techniques, the TSCPs are—on a regional basis—turned into numerical matrices representing countries (potential partners) and desired naval capabilities (naval warfare areas). Level of priority is indicated on a 5 (highest), 3 (middle), 1 (low), and 0 (none) scale. The point is to accurately define the COCOM's priorities on a country by country and on a warfare area by warfare comparison. This capabilities-based analysis is sent back to the COCOM (and naval component commander, as appropriate) for approval.
NIPO then examines the inventory of naval and joint acquisition programs that currently exist or are projected in the future, as well as anticipated EDA or commercial offerings, to determine which program could best fill the COCOM's particular capability requirement for that country. There may be multiple options, including training programs. Once the optimal program is identified to support the capability requirements, NIPO works with system commands, program offices, and industry to assess the probability of success for the program.
Potential programs are then ranked by the simple formula of COCOM priority multiplied by the probability of success. Then a detailed assessment of the regulatory and political barriers is made. This decision-aid tool allows the COCOMs and Navy and Marine component commanders to effectively determine where NIPO can best apply its finite resources to develop new security cooperation opportunities.
Acquisition Program Value
Although primarily concerned with developing partnerships, NIPO is actually in the acquisition chain of command. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (International Programs), dual-hatted as the Director of NIPO, reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition), as well as to OPNAV and HQMC for policy matters. He also acts as the Coast Guard's agent for security assistance programs based on a memorandum of understanding.
Being in the acquisition chain makes us conscious of our potential contributions to providing economies of scale to ongoing Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard programs by way of international sales. It also keeps us mindful that "it's about relationships." In fact, the dollar value of the potential programs is deliberately not a planning factor. This ensures that low dollar-value programs with non-traditional partners receive the same attention as higher value programs, based on COCOM requirements. However, wherever it is appropriate, NIPO strives for cost savings on programs like the F/A-18E/F, AEGIS, Harpoon, and, potentially, the Littoral Combat Ship.
Negotiated cooperative programs can also provide direct financial benefits by offsetting costs to the Navy Department budget and filling capability gaps that might otherwise require a larger U.S. investment. In addition, cooperative programs can offer other critical benefits such as risk sharing and technology infusion (bright ideas from our partners).
Real-World Results
It's great (and mandatory) to have a plan. But as we all know, plans don't win wars. Engagements win wars. In shaping the global strategic environment, our direct interaction with allies, partners, and potential partners is what will win the war. International programs are a highly visible contribution to that effort.
When other nations fly F/A-18s as their main land-based air-defense weapon (or the F-16 or other U.S. aircraft), participate in a cooperative program like the NATO Sea Sparrow, or purchase a frigate or littoral combat ship built around an AEGIS combat system, it identifies a commonality of strategic purpose—a partnership. This is the greatest facilitator of bilateral and multilateral interoperability.
In regions suffering from instability, international programs—most likely security assistance under the foreign military financing or 1206 programs or international military education and training—can contribute significantly to the joint multilateral coalition. NIPO works to ensure that even non-traditional partners have access to the tools by which they can defend themselves, consistent with COCOM requirements.
This includes nations that have previously sought security cooperation elsewhere. Immediately after President Bush's call for a strategic partnership with India, NIPO opened communications with the Indian Navy and Air Force concerning ways we could cooperate—all in close coordination with then-CNO Mullen, Admiral William Fallon, then-Commander, Pacific Command, and Admiral Gary Roughead, then-Commander, Pacific Fleet. While a number of potential Indian programs are in development, the major success thus far has been the refurbishment and transfer of the ex-USS Trenton (LPD-14) to the India Navy as INS Jalashwa.
In Africa, Section 1206 programs like the Gulf of Guinea Regional Maritime Awareness Capability initiative were strongly supported by Admiral Henry G. Ulrich III, then-Commander, Naval Forces Europe, and have created a dialog with nations whose ungoverned waters might become transit lanes for terrorists. Fulfilling these countries' long-standing desire to monitor and control their own waters provides additional assets for the coalition.
Among traditional allies, the sales of combat systems such as AEGIS—integrated into Spanish, Japanese, Norwegian, and Korean ships—and missiles like SM-2 and Harpoon, along with cooperative development programs, allow for a level of commonality and interoperability that will pay dividends over time. Since the best interoperability occurs when we all use the same systems, both foreign military sales and cooperative programs provide the high end/net-centric keel for those 1,000 ships.
Where Do We Go from Here?
While the existence and benefit of a DOD revolution in military affairs has been hotly debated, it is fair to describe today's ongoing transformation in naval international program planning as starting a quiet revolution in international programs. This provides a model other services may wish to consider. In addition to linking Navy Department programs directly to COCOM requirements, a major strength of the strategic planning methodology is its objectivity, transparency, and iterative nature. It may not be as beautiful as Helen of Troy, but it is an integral part of the new maritime strategy.
There may never have been a real (mortal) Hephaestos. But if he were real, Hephaestos would be serving in NIPO today—building maritime security relationships and forging cooperative partnerships for 21st-century sea power, air power, and land power.