It is said that no good deed goes unpunished. During President George W. Bush's first term and under the leadership of CNO Vern Clark and Navy Secretary Gordon England, the Navy moved to save billions of dollars through innovative management improvements, including personnel reductions.
The intent was to use these savings to purchase ships, aircraft, and other vital capabilities that otherwise were unaffordable. Unfortunately, the wars in Afghanistan and then Iraq intervened. Those billions saved went to other uses. In this case, the Navy in doing good did not do well.
As I argued last month, the Pentagon is headed for a budget-driven tsunami. The shortfall between needs and actual funding could be in the hundreds of billions of dollars.
Here is a suggestion for deflecting this pending crisis:
Former CNO, now Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen and CNO Admiral Gary Roughead have forcibly and convincingly argued that maritime forces have a crucial role in shaping environments and preventing incidents from becoming crises, and crises from becoming catastrophes.
Whether in the Pacific or off the coast of West Africa, that vision is playing out. When he was Commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Roughead favored a video presentation of a hospital ship that demonstrated the impact a non-combat vessel could have on improving the lives of less fortunate people and in fostering favorable perceptions of the United States.
Of course, no Navy can rely solely on humanitarian contributions for its existence. And others are concerned about China's growing naval strength and a resurgent Russian Navy. While those fears are probably greatly exaggerated, national security is about planning for what could or might happen.
Given these realities, what should the Navy consider as its next good deed? First, I would argue that for the immediate future, America faces no significant adversary at sea. If the goal of the Navy remains 313 ships, the only way to get there short of spending a great deal more money is to keep ships in service longer. To do that, the Navy would be well advised to consider putting a certain part of the force in reserve or standby and what was called "cadre" status in the late 1960s, meaning greatly reduced crews and just enough steaming time to keep the ships—both surface vessels and submarines—at a minimum degree of readiness.
In other words, the Navy might have 150 or 200 of its 300 ships fully operational. The remainder would require perhaps 6-12 months to return to Fleet standards. However, the absence of a maritime threat would safely permit this type of a regime to work, allowing time to get the reserve forces back into service if needed.
Regarding people, the Navy should look toward a revolution in education. Crews in cadre status should be given opportunities to use their downtime for increasing knowledge and learning on both professional and personal levels. With simulators and other shore-based systems, professional warfighting skills can be kept sharp. And with distance learning and other techniques, educational opportunities can be brought in a more significant way to the Fleet.
Missions still must run the gamut from major combat operations to winning hearts and minds. And returning to the notion of hospital and non-combatant ships that can carry out humanitarian duties, why not engage the public in general and philanthropies in particular to fund these missions?
If the nation is serious about dealing with humanitarian and related crises, what better way to address them than with hospital ships that can bring extraordinary capabilities to the vast majority of the world's inhabitants who live within 50 miles of a coastline?
The Navy would oversee these capabilities and provide some resources. But the bulk of the money would come from the private sector, reminding the public that defeating these harmful forces is more than a military task. A Red Cross will never replace a battle ensign. But, in this case, doing good might actually lead the Navy to do well.