My commodore once explained that good intelligence was like pornography—he didn't know exactly how to define it, but he knew it when he saw it.1 The naval intelligence community's standard for good afloat intelligence is, thankfully, less vague: we must provide intelligence that is timely, relevant, and predictive to allow commanders to make decisions. After the attacks of 9/11, the requirement grew to include the need for actionable intelligence that enables commanders not only to be aware of an adversary's course of action but also to direct action to counter the threat.2
Unfortunately, afloat intelligence teams are better suited to confront Cold War—era navies than to deal with today's stateless, unconventional fighters. The technology that supports our afloat Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs) and Aircraft Carrier Intelligence Centers (CVICs) was intended to help us battle an enemy that was relatively easy to find and difficult to kill (the Soviet Navy), not one that is difficult to find and easy to kill like today's terrorists, pirates, and smugglers.3 With no naval peer plying the sea and an ascendant asymmetrical foe that frustrates traditional operational intelligence (OPINTEL) methods, naval intelligence has lost its longtime benchmark for determining success and now needs to redefine how to judge itself.
Two barriers impede our ability to meet Fleet demand for afloat intelligence. The first is pre-deployment training that makes poor use of intelligence teams. The second is a lack of proficiency in OPINTEL analysis that is aggravated by our need to focus on an array of deployed missions that all have enormous intelligence requirements. Given these realities, one could be forgiven for suggesting that naval intelligence has not figured out how it can most effectively fight terrorism, and episodic questions about the relevance of our trade in today's Navy don't seem quite so malicious.
Underwhelmed Here, Overwhelmed Abroad
Strike groups prepare for deployments and surges under the 2003 Fleet Response Plan (FRP). With training overseen by Fleet Forces Command and administered by training commands such as Commander Strike Force Training, Tactical Training Group, and Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, strike group staffs are exposed to the range of naval operations they are likely to encounter on deployment.
Throughout the training cycle and during the concluding qualification phase, strike group and warfare commander staffs undergo demanding in-port and underway simulations that require them to demonstrate proficiency in executing pre-planned responses to a variety of simulated threats. These exercises are designed to encourage routinized responses. However, they are not helpful for intelligence teams because they don't promote adaptive thinking or predictive analysis.
Due to the scripted nature of simulations, strike group intelligence teams are forced into the role of glorified white cells—they receive intelligence reports from the exercise scripters and perform a minimum of analysis before passing the information to the relevant warfare commander, who initiates a desired pre-planned response. Meanwhile, little is done to ensure that intelligence teams are prepared to provide intelligence on the threats they will actually see on deployment. This dangerously squanders the opportunity to provide meaningful, real-world training for intelligence personnel.
Current training evaluates a strike group's ability to engage a fictional adversary in a culminating naval battle—a low-probability scenario—while neglecting most high-probability situations. Ship boardings in support of maritime intercept operations (MIO) are scattered throughout the simulations, along with a range of asymmetrical threats, but these scenarios do not test the temerity of intelligence teams.
The final simulation invariably pits strike groups against an armada of enemy ships, which are dispatched at the behest of the strike group commander and his warfare commanders. Chain of command, rules of engagement, and ship self-defense are tested, while afloat JICs and CVICs are relegated to the role of scorekeepers. Intelligence teams are not tested on their ability to provide the type of information that their commanders actually want—and need.
From Masters of One to Masters of None
The Cold War was a boon for naval intelligence for many reasons, including the fact that we were able to hone our OPINTEL skills for four decades against an adversary that was generally predictable. While the diminution of the Soviet naval threat has not eliminated the need for OPINTEL, the art has, arguably, suffered the same fate as that of antisubmarine warfare during the past ten years.4
The need to keep track of traditional naval forces has not changed, but the requirements of open-ocean OPINTEL have been eclipsed by the necessity of operating in the littorals and by the obligations of force protection and counterterrorism.5 Consequently, afloat JICs and CVICs today struggle to advance their OPINTEL skills and adapt to the intelligence requirements of the post—Cold War problem set, known collectively as maritime security operations (MSO).6
For example, during its 2005—06 deployment to Fifth Fleet, the USS Nassau (LHA-4) Expeditionary Strike Group spent approximately two months in the Arabian Gulf doing some open-ocean operations and some MSO. Most of the strike group spent the remainder of the deployment in the Indian Ocean as part of a task force combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. Strike group ships also assisted a distressed vessel in a complicated incident in which the crew initially appeared to have been held hostage. In another case, the task force oversaw the detention near Yemen of an individual suspected of having ties to terrorist organizations.
Even as elements of the strike group were conducting traditional MIO, other ships took part in the first capture of suspected pirates in recent memory.7 Meanwhile, another vessel spent three months in the northern Arabian Gulf overseeing oil platform security operations. Each of these missions required a significant investment of intelligence resources, and each required a different analytical approach.
Even as our OPINTEL skills decline and MSO requirements increase, evolving Navy roles, such as the 1,000-ship concept, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, and the new riverine force, will stretch us further. Yet we still struggle to master those missions that have persisted since before the current war.
The Navy didn't establish an MIO intelligence exploitation pilot program until mid-2005, even though we've been doing MIO in Arabian Gulf waters for 14 years.8 Even now, members of boarding teams at Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) school don't get formal training on what is arguably that mission's raison d'etre: intelligence collection.
And strike group intelligence centers still don't have timely access to an integrated database (one of which purportedly resides at the Office of Naval Intelligence) with a history of ships that have been approached or boarded, even though many of the same ships continue to operate year after year. Our lack of historical perspective in MIO not only hinders our ability to detect threats on the sea but also hurts our relations with mariners, who grow wary of our constant interruption of their normally legitimate use of the sea.9
To Be Effective in 4GW, We Need Help
There is no panacea for what ails naval intelligence. However, some course changes will help improve the situation. Strategically, we must acknowledge that the asymmetric threats we now face signify a new reality, known as Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW).10 Although conventional threats like those posed by China and Iran will remain a concern, they will likely be overshadowed by the destabilizing elements of asymmetric warfare. We must keep our OPINTEL skills sharp, even as we develop the skills and training required to be successful at 4GW.
On a tactical level, intelligence personnel need more time during pre-deployment training to focus on the missions they will support on deployment. Whenever possible, they should be spared from strike group training that does not enhance their ability to support operations. Rather than being evaluated on their ability to feed information to strike group watch teams during simulations, JICs and CVICs should be de-coupled from these simulations, leaving a small crew of seasoned analysts to support training objectives, and allowing most of the team to focus on developing analytical skills for 4GW along with OPINTEL.11
During the FRP, afloat teams also participate in up to three intelligence-specific simulations at the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center. These integrated team trainers (ITTs) focus on developing intelligence team cohesion and analytical skills. They provide JICs and CVICs the opportunity to do what they can't do in strike group-wide simulations: conduct detailed target analysis, improve information flow, and practice standard operating procedures.
Unfortunately, these ITTs are not part of the graded evaluations that make up a readiness assessment, the scenarios are not as up to date as they should be, and ITTs still are not integrated with the trainers that their cryptologic brethren use. Still, they are the closest that afloat intelligence teams get to training like they'll fight. These trainers should be made a central component of the FRP, and efforts should be made to improve them.
Realistic Training Is Crucial
Once intelligence teams are free to focus on more relevant preparation methods, the next step is to improve the realism of training. Army Soldiers preparing to deploy to Iraq undergo force-on-force training that simulates situations they are likely to face in-country—car bombs, suicide bombs, and roadside bombs—along with exposure to the full spectrum of operations they are likely to execute, from humanitarian assistance to close quarters combat.12
Afloat intelligence teams should similarly train for the eventualities they expect to face, such as countering sea-based terrorism, hijacking, piracy, slavery, and assistance to vessels in distress. Current shortcomings are borne of a lack of access to—not the existence of—realistic stateside training opportunities. Indeed, strike groups train with an array of opposing forces that can simulate everything from suicide speedboats to drug smugglers in a benign environment. More time should be spent training with opposing forces, focusing on intelligence collection and analysis—the type of work that's being done by deployed forces every day.
Adapting training to the current realities in-theater should be simple. Fifth Fleet, for instance, already issues pre-deployment guidance on the operations that each strike group should expect. In order to allow maximum integration into the workup cycle, this guidance should be issued at least nine months prior to deployment, so Commander Strike Force Training and Tactical Training Groups have time to tailor their programs.
U.S. Marine Corps Expeditionary Units already do this as part of their pre-deployment training program. USMC regulations require the supported theater to issue guidance on unique theater requirements, and Marine Corps Expeditionary Units must integrate this guidance into their pre-deployment training programs.13 If our sister service can change its training focus when combat operations are at stake, surely we can implement a flexible plan to accommodate the more static requirements of MSO.
A Framework for Success
Given the assortment of potential missions and the limited amount of time and resources that can be allocated for pre-deployment training, a risk-based analytical model is needed—what the intelligence community refers to as Intelligence Preparation of the Environment. Such a model should be used by training commands that oversee strike group workups—like Commander Strike Force Training—in coordination with afloat staff intelligence officers (N2s) and their shipboard counterparts.
At the beginning of each FRP cycle, leadership should evaluate the possible missions that JICs and CVICs will see on deployment, using guidance provided by the theater commander, formal lessons learned from recently deployed strike groups, and an assessment of the geopolitical factors affecting the region of probable deployment. For example, an assessment today might note that strike groups operating in Fifth Fleet are involved with MIO and operations to counter human smuggling, while tensions with Iran have resulted in increased deployments by both Iranian Navy and naval forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Additionally, acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia have increased following the demise of the ruling Islamic Courts Union.
The next step is to apply risk management techniques to the model. Where the likelihood of employment is high (MIO, for example), training should be planned, as it should be where the potential threat to U.S. naval forces is high (i.e., Iranian naval activity). Where that likelihood is low and the intelligence requirements are low (humanitarian assistance operations, for instance), risk should be accepted.
This framework is similar to models for implementing Maritime Domain Awareness as directed by the President. In building an effective understanding of all threats in the maritime domain—an overwhelming task—strategists have called for a risk-based approach that provides a general awareness of lesser threats to gain greater awareness of high consequence threats.14 While strike groups must prepare for all aspects of MSO, a realistic appraisal of the current situation would allow JICs and CVICs to focus their efforts more effectively.
By using an analytical framework to set training priorities early in the FRP, afloat N2s and ship's intelligence officers can make informed assessments of the environment in which they will operate. They can then arrange additional training for intelligence personnel—such as tactical questioning, cultural immersion, and evidentiary collection and analysis—that is not provided during the FRP. Meanwhile, trainers can use the same framework to fine-tune the workup cycle for each strike group. There's no way to anticipate every mission, but a risk-based model would help prepare strike group intelligence teams for a wider array of missions. More important, such a flexible model would help restore faith in the FRP process itself.
Let's Lead the Way into the Fourth Generation
Naval intelligence is more relevant than ever; it just has not adapted well to evolving threats following the Cold War. Bringing back the focus on OPINTEL is not the best answer. Although we should revisit our approach to OPINTEL analysis, we must simultaneously position ourselves for success against 4GW threats. Adaptability remains key, as rigid intelligence approaches are doomed to fail. During the Cold War, we needed intelligence specialists (ISs) who could analyze the location of a Soviet Snoop Plate submarine radar and predict where the sub would be 12 hours later. Today we need ISs who can help a boarding team find the person of interest among a crew of wary mariners on board an old dhow.
Performance at sea will continue to be the benchmark by which our community is judged. To answer our critics' charges of irrelevance and to excel afloat, we must produce timely, relevant, predictive—and actionable—intelligence on the range of missions that our deployed strike groups take on every day. If the purveyors of 4GW ideology have it right, then our shipboard ISs and cryptologic technicians, along with their leaders who wear khaki, will ultimately determine success or failure in the war on terrorism. It is our responsibility to provide the most realistic, challenging, and adaptive training possible.
1. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart famously invoked the "I know it when I see it" argument, when attempting to define pornography in his concurring opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio. See U.S. Supreme Court, Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (concurring), (Washington, DC: 1964), http://laws.findlaw.com/us/378/184.html.
2. RADM Richard Porterfield, "Naval Intelligence: Transforming to Meet the Threat," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 131, no. 9 (2005): par. 1, 4, http://www.military.com/Content/MoreContent1?file_NI_0905_Naval-P1.
3. For simplification, the terms JIC and CVIC in this article refer to all intelligence and cryptologic work centers aboard Navy CV/Ns and LHA/Ds. Supplemental Plot (SUPPLOT), Expeditionary Plot (EXPLOT), Ship's Signals Exploitation Spaces (SSES), and associated functional support centers are considered parts of the JIC and CVIC.
4. Reversing a decade of decline, U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander ADM Gary Roughead in 2006 finally made ASW his Fleet's top maritime priority, directing all strike groups deploying from the West Coast to take part in several days of ASW training in the waters off Hawaii. See William Cole, "Submarine ?Hunts' Navy Ships," Honolulu Advertiser, 24 February 2006, http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2006/Feb/24/ln/FP602240340.html.
5. CDR Jason Hines argues for the rehabilitation of OPINTEL as a core skill of naval intelligence personnel in his article "Restore the Foundation of Naval intelligence," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 131, no. 2 (2005): 36-40.
6. MSOs include efforts to counter sea-based terrorism and other illegal activities such as hijacking, piracy, and human trafficking, as well as assisting vessels in distress. They help set the conditions for security and stability in the maritime environment and complement the security efforts of regional nations. See U.S. Navy, "Maritime Security Operations," http://www.navy.com/about/navylife/onduty/navyglobalinvolvement/maritime/.
7. For an excellent review of this piracy case, written by then—Staff Judge Advocate for the Nassau Strike Group, see Michael Bahar, "Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and Strategic Theory for Naval Anti-Piracy Operations," Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 40 (2007): 1-85, http://ssrn.com/abstract=982679.
8. R. O'Rourke, "Navy Role in Global War on Terrorism (GWOT): Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (Washington, DC: CRS, 2007), 2.
9. Former NAVCENT N2, CAPT Paul Becker, voiced his discomfort with the lack of historical information in 2006. See "Intel Officers Emphasize Research, Key Jobs, Cultural Understanding," Inside the Navy 19, no. 2 (2006): par. 4.
10. The concept of 4GW involves the return to a decentralized form of warfare, where non-state actors use asymmetric means—absent the goal of military defeat—to force the adversary to question his will to prevail. Along with other 4GW theorists, T. X. Hammes doubts the U.S. military's current ability to confront 4GW, given our focus on high technology instead of on the human factor. See T. X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004).
11. The recent establishment of flag-led staffs (Commander Strike Force Training) to oversee strike group workups is a step forward for strike group training in general, thanks to the improved access to resources that they bring, along with the ability to influence the program. The extent to which intelligence training will benefit remains to be seen. In any case, afloat intelligence teams need a more relevant training process at the ship level, too, not only at the strike group level that CSFTs oversee.
12. Gordon Lubold, "How U.S. Army Trains for a Different Kind of War," Christian Science Monitor, 30 June 2007, 1.
13. Commandant of the Marine Corps, Marine Corps Order 3502.3: Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) Pre-deployment Training Program, 7 July 1995.
14. F. R. (Joe) Call III, "Taking a Risk-Based Approach to Maritime Domain Awareness," Proceedings of the Marine Safety and Security Council (the Coast Guard Journal of Safety and Security at Sea) 63, no. 3 (2006): 55-57.