In 2003, after four years as the 32nd Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Jones was appointed Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, the first Leatherneck ever to hold the post. He retired from that assignment at the end of 2006, concluding a distinguished military career spanning 40 years. Last summer, the Senate asked him to lead an important commission examining the state of Iraqi security forces. The report was issued after Labor Day. What follows is an exclusive interview with the general, conducted by Proceedings columnist Harlan Ullman, that reflects on the work of that commission, its findings, as well his views on other topics, including Afghanistan. Since the interview, General Jones has been named by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice as her special envoy for Middle East security, a role in which he is to help design a Palestinian security force, among other tasks.
Proceedings: General, nearly half a year has gone by since you issued your report on the state of Iraq's security forces. Given what you see happening in Iraq today, what do you now consider the most significant findings and recommendations of your commission?
General Jones: On the positive side, the capability of the Iraqi Army and the Ministry of Defense are better than people here realize. There is evidence that the Iraqi army is fighting well. The Iraqi part of the surge has gone better than expected. Support, training, technical support, schools, and support centers are now functioning pretty well. There is sufficient manpower given high unemployment to man the increases planned for the army.
The sectarian and ethnic balances have been well struck in most units. The population has taken a stand against al Qaeda not so much due to the surge but to al Qaeda's brutality. Three more army divisions are expected by 2008.
The negative side is that the Ministry of Interior is highly sectarian, very corrupt, and that has prevented the police force from becoming effective. Everything the Ministry of Defense is, the Ministry of Interior is not. The National Police force (about 25,000 strong) is dysfunctional and must be completely reorganized. In many ways, it is akin to Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard by another name, Shia in composition, and until that is changed, it will operate as a rogue agency.
For the rest of the police, training is improving. However, much has to be accomplished before the police can play an effective role countrywide in providing security and preventing criminal activities. This means that while the army is doing better, it must pick up policing functions until the police are able to shoulder fully their responsibilities. One consequence has been a diversion of the army from its traditional border protection role that has permitted men and material freer access into Iraq, whether in support of insurgent elements or for smuggling and other criminal activities.
Second, the influence of Iran in southern Iraq, especially with the reduction in UK forces and presence, is very troubling. Much of the south is turning or has turned into Islamic-like republics very much influenced by the Shia clergy and the militias in turn that have close links with Iran. This is a situation that must be closely watched, bearing in mind that the government in Baghdad has decreasing leverage on parts of the south.
Finally, success ultimately depends on the civil side and how far political reconciliation can repair the splits between and among the various ethnic groups as well as within them. This the United States and the Coalition cannot accomplish. It is up to the Iraqis.
Proceedings: What about al Qaeda, and is the transformation of al Anbar Province in which Sunnis have turned against insurgents a model for the rest of the country?
General Jones: My sense was that al Qaeda accounted for a fairly small proportion of the violence, perhaps 15 percent. However, by striking certain targets such as the Golden Mosque in Samarra in February 2006, al Qaeda was able to intensify the Sunni-Shia split to its advantage.
But in Anbar province, the phenomenon was largely ethnic and more applicable to rural areas where, unlike Baghdad, Sunnis were a substantial majority. Sunnis began turning against al Qaeda well before the surge started last year. Baghdad is a more complicated situation because different ethnic and tribal groups are commingled within that city.
Proceedings: What should the United States be doing that we are not?
General Jones: The strategic consequences of extremist views on our side, whether to push for immediate withdrawal or to escalate military action are, in my opinion, recipes for failure. As the surge winds down, I would propose:
•We should focus on the Iraqi army in training and building up its capacity to shoulder the security load with minimal U.S. support.
•As Prime Minister [Nouri al-] Maliki knows, the Iraqi police must be made functional as a highest priority.
•As the Iraqi army and police become more capable, the U.S. should reposition to where our forces can do the most good, both supporting the Iraqi army and protecting the border. While Iraq's borders are long, geography has reduced the infiltration routes to a manageable level given our mobility and technological advantages.
Finally, we need to adjust our footprint to one designed to be expeditionary and not for an occupying force. We must not advertise our presence beyond a certain point, as the Iraqi people will tire of having so many U.S. forces so visible in their country.
Proceedings: What about Iran?
General Jones: Last summer, there was overwhelming evidence of massive Iranian support (to insurgents and other radical factions), from high-tech weaponry such as IEDs and EFPs [explosively formed penetrators], to advisers. That appears to have lessened although the Ministry of Interior is heavily influenced by Iran and penetrated by Iranian agents. So we need both a regional strategy and an understanding by the Maliki government that neither the tip of a gun nor the tip of a pen can force a military solution. Only internal reconciliation can.
The regional strategy must involve both Iraq's neighbors and our friends and allies in Europe and elsewhere who understand that a failed Iraq and a defeat for the United States are only in the interests of insurgents, al Qaeda, and others out to do mischief. A way to start is to propose a conference that looks at the overarching problems and issues at the proverbial 35,000-foot level before moving to specific actions, at least to get people talking.
Proceedings: What about Afghanistan, a country for which you had the military responsibility as NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe?
General Jones: Afghanistan is a classic case of what happens when international organizations are failing in helping stabilize and reconstruct a country. We, of course, need more NATO forces—perhaps four more maneuver battalions as well as more helicopters and air lifters. But until we can make progress in the war on drugs and countering corruption and crime, Afghanistan risks becoming a narco-state. That means reform of the justice system and building up of the police as well as establishing real job alternatives, tasks that must be urgently undertaken.
The appointment of a high commissioner is a step in the right direction. But if neither the U.N. nor the European Union is prepared to accept these responsibilities, then NATO has no choice except to fill that gap. If NATO does not, more than Afghanistan is at stake. The future viability of NATO is at risk.