The Bear Comes Out of Hibernation
By Commander T. J. McKearney, U.S. Navy (Retired)
The Russian overflight of U.S. forces operating near Guam last August brings flashbacks to those of us who grew up in the Cold War Navy. A routine part of our deployments then was to anticipate similar events by the Soviet naval air forces. From the first indication that a Soviet Bear D (Delta) reconnaissance aircraft had launched in search of our carrier battle or amphibious ready group, to the highly photogenic overflight of the lumbering, turboprop-driven behemoth with its escort of our F-14s, we were ready. The surveillance, intercept, and engagement resources of the U.S. battle group and supporting forces ashore were all boresighted on catching the Soviets outside the launch envelope of their antiship missile-equipped Badger and Backfire bombers.
This was serious stuff. Our ability to project power around the globe and to the very edge of the Soviet empire was dependent on winning this game of counting coup. I'm sure the recent Guam incident and subsequent pronouncement by Sovi— oops! I mean Russian military officials that their sortie was a sign of things to come have led to brow-furrowing by those who remember the bad old days. These initial reactions are likely to be reflexive: "See, here they go again; we really can't trust them!"
Knee-jerk tendencies and larger issues of contemporary Russian strategy aside, how should we see this? Are the Russians really as bad we thought back then? Are they a mere shadow of what they once were? Just as important, have we lost the ability to respond to a threat that we spent the better part of half a century learning to counter?
The Looming Past?
It's been about 15 years since our disengagement from the Soviet threat at sea. Both the U.S. and Russian navies have changed a great deal in that time. The new Russian federation made it clear in the early 1990s that the cost of global naval operations was one they were unwilling to bear.
Consequently, this recent attempt to threaten us with their long-range aviation will be a struggle. The aviation forces flying out to meet us now are substantially the same as during the Cold War, but the threat the Soviets presented in their heyday was the product of their employment in an integrated, coordinated force that cannot be reconstructed anytime soon.
The ex-Soviet surface navy has become a largely coastal force. It has abandoned sea-based tactical aviation and relies on surface combatants for at-sea strikes. The evolution of the Russian submarine capability has been slow, and the Kursk tragedy of 2000 raises legitimate questions as to the proficiency of the once-proud Soviet submarine force. Finally, the Soviets' ability to fight at sea was dependent on a now-dismantled surveillance network, the SOSS (Soviet Ocean Surveillance System), to locate U.S. naval forces and coordinate an overwhelming saturation attack.
For our part, the U.S. Navy has made steady gains in the evolution of some of our area air-defense capabilities, but a couple of asterisks are in order. On the plus side, the current-generation Aegis, SM-2, and soon-to-be-deployed SM-3 provide an umbrella over a force that is far more responsive and integrated than it was the last time we strained our eyes looking for the Bear D to appear on our scopes.
However, the combination of the F-14 Tomcat and the Phoenix missile system made it possible for us to engage air-to-air the Soviet Badger and Backfire regiments at a range of 500 miles. We can't do this today. And our smaller carrier air wings, built around the F/A-18 Hornet and Super Hornet, lack the airframes to maintain the antiair "grid" and simultaneously conduct long-range strikes.
This brief assessment does not suggest we've regressed to a point where a shooting match against the Russian Navy would be a near thing. We're still the big guys now, and those Russian pilots flying out to our operating areas should keep smiling and looking friendly. But it's clearly time to pull out the greensheets and TACNOTES of 20 years ago—the tactics on which we relied in the face of the Soviet air threat—and see how they stack up today.
The Bear or the Dragon?
The mildly upsetting sensation that the Russians may be giving us with their reborn naval aviation adds to a more recent distress that the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has caused. The PLAN is building new systems (or buying them from other people—like the Russians!), conducting out-of-area deployments, and confronting our naval forces at sea in a manner not unlike the Soviets of old.
Concern is in order, whether this is part of the perennial conflict over our Taiwan policy or a wider challenge to our regional naval power projection in the western Pacific and Indian Oceans. Clearly the PLAN is committed to developing a tactical capability unseen by the U.S. Navy since the height of our Cold War confrontation with the Soviets. The Chinese are a long way from presenting the sort of global naval threat that the Soviets did, and it's debatable whether they will; global hegemony may not be their style.
However, the aggressiveness with which the PLAN is expanding its overall capabilities is impressive and should shock us out of our post-Soviet complacency in regard to warfighting at sea. In truth, we're straining to reestablish blue-water capabilities, such as antisubmarine warfare, that we have not exercised since the ex-Soviets tied themselves to the piers and put the Bears in mothballs in the early 1990s.
For several years following that development, the United States gradually shifted naval power toward the Pacific. But clearly the race is now on again. As the Chinese work to get their sea legs and the Russians dust off their flight manuals, we need to be mindful that naval power is on the rise globally—among nations of all sizes and all intentions. Stay tuned. Soon we'll see a news report about a Russian aircraft flying over a Chinese PLAN exercise.
The Russian Bear excursion highlights the fact that the western Pacific is a crowded place. The Russians have decided to nudge their way back in, which should remind us that we need to maintain a broad naval capability that is equally viable in the small wars of the littorals and against other navies intent on sharing the blue waters of the open oceans.
FPD Thailand Shows the Way
By Scott M. Bernat
The U.S. military remains dependent on host nation support to ensure the safety and security of its forward-deployed forces in many countries throughout the world. An effective Force Protection Program is equally dependent on the timely receipt of accurate threat information and on a thorough understanding of a country's security capabilities, limitations, and intentions. Force Protection Detachment (FPD) Thailand's comprehensive approach to FP support includes continuous interaction and teamwork with Royal Thai law enforcement and military security personnel, effectively leveraging host nation physical security and intelligence support before, during, and after U.S. military deployments.
Sovereign country legal restrictions often prohibit American security personnel from disembarking weapons or other designated equipment such as handcuffs, batons, and even bulletproof vests. Therefore, for our deployed ships, aircraft, vehicles, and personnel to remain secure, we need host nation security support. We are always dependent on their capabilities and limitations. The relationships that we form with host nation security forces inevitably dictate the quality and level of support we receive.
Relationships Evolve from Communication
FPD Thailand ensured a high level of host nation security response and support through seminars, exchanges between experts on subjects of mutual importance, and lecture programs.
Established during September 2004 in partnership with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) Greater Southeast Asia Field Office and the NCIS Security Training, Assistance, and Assessment Team Pacific, the program capitalizes on an exchange of information during each session.
Direct participation is often required through question and answer periods, practical exercises, and scenarios designed to showcase the equipment, procedures, response, and effectiveness of each host nation agency in attendance.
American standards of conduct and security-support requirements are explained in both English and Thai, while demonstrations by Thai security forces show the FPD the country's capabilities, limitations, and intentions. Reporting this critical information remains essential to the development of appropriate force protection plans and the establishment of a meaningful security posture.
Teamwork Gets Results
Since the program's inception, FPD Thailand has relied on the expertise of many qualified individuals and associated agencies, including the U.S. Department of State Diplomatic Security Service, Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, National Guard and Reserves, federal, state, and local law-enforcement agencies, as well as private contractors, all with verified law-enforcement and/or security experience. S-3 Services Inc., a U.S.-Thai-owned company that the U.S. Army Special Forces, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Department of Energy routinely use, provides critical interpreter/translator and administrative support.
In presentations, exchanges, and lectures on the security needs of deployed forces, the numerous topics covered include port and airfield security, physical security, convoy security, terrorism and terrorist methodologies, introduction to explosives and improvised explosive devices (IED), bomb threat and IED response, weapons of mass destruction, checkpoint security procedures, vulnerability surveys, route analysis, surveillance detection, maritime law enforcement, police officer safety and survival, and police officer first responder. Law enforcement and security scenario-based English language sessions are also included to help the Royal Thai Police interact with visiting U.S. military personnel.
More than 2,000 host nation personnel have participated in the program—Royal Thai government officials, police, and all branches of the military. In addition, to further enhance the country's mitigation and response capabilities, FPD Thailand has deployed metal detectors, search mirrors, flashlights, and bomb suppression blankets with the various Royal Thai law enforcement and military security forces that provide direct support to U.S. deployments. This heightens local security, both for U.S. forces and for the Thai and international communities.
Shared Information Improves International Rapport
As FPD productivity has increased, relationships with Thai law enforcement and military security personnel have improved, which demonstrates the program's success. Requests for threat information and security support routinely receive positive responses from program attendees, who often participate in the planning, preparation, and execution of U.S. military security-related activities.
FPD Thailand has set the standard for excellence, effectively leveraging host nation FP intelligence and physical security support through the use of available resources, liaison, and the demonstration of force protection requirements.
This program model has been implemented around the world in various forms, based on assessed needs of the host nation's security services. FPDs located in Australia, Chile, Columbia, El Salvador, Guatemala, the Philippines, and Singapore have already presented seminars and expert exchanges in direct support of U.S. military deployments. The continuation and expansion of this program will enhance host nation security force engagement and understanding, leading to an effective FP posture for visiting forces.
Beating the Fast Attack Craft Threat
By Steven Noonen
On 6 January 2008, five Iranian speedboats were reported to have made "provocative actions" against three U.S. warships in the Strait of Hormuz. "I'm coming at you and you will blow up in a couple of minutes," was the threat thought to have been heard via radio. But Iran denied the incident, and subsequent reporting confirmed that alternative explanations may include normal radio noise and chatter. Nevertheless, this is an example of the growing challenge of protecting U.S. ships and our allies against threats on the high seas.
These types of actions occur globally—pirates attack off Somalia, Tamil rebels fight Sri Lankan naval ships—and ships' commanding officers have to take threats seriously and make crucial decisions with the information available on the scene. Small fast-boat tactics pose a number of technical and tactical challenges that U.S. Navy Research and Development and Experimentation processes are addressing today.
Truth Is Strangest
The would-be showdown on 6 January very closely duplicated an exercise that was conducted in summer 2007 off Virginia Beach. During the previous 14 months, the Program Executive Office Integrated Warfare Systems 6 had been working on a sea trial experiment with Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Program Executive Office Integrated Warfare Systems 3, and Naval Network Warfare Command. This was a critical first step in expanding sensor fusion capability to include tracking surface contacts.
The effort culminated in the Trident Warrior '07 Netted Surface Tracking Experiment (12—13 June), in the Virginia Capes operating area just off the beach from Combat Directive System Activity (CDSA) Dam Neck. Similar to the incident in the Strait of Hormuz, five small speedboats simulated attacks against two U.S. warships. But these two combatants had been specially modified. For the first time at sea, the track information from the close-in weapon system (CIWS) was provided to the Aegis weapon system for target tracking and engagement via the cooperative engagement capability (CEC). The significant breakthrough here is that CEC was originally designed to pull together target data from ships and aircraft to create a comprehensive air picture of the surrounding battle space. In this experiment, CEC fused radar information from multiple ships on surface targets. Thus, the exercise demonstrates a technical capability that will fulfill a critical gap.
These small boat threats, known as fast attack craft or fast inshore attack craft, have been a concern to the U.S. Navy for a number of years. They can move at amazingly high speeds, are extremely maneuverable, and are made of fiberglass, so they can evade normal radar detection. The more effective integration of existing capabilities onboard Navy ships provides a first step to defend against such threats.
Technical Limitations—and Possibilities
Most shipboard radar systems do not have the accuracy or update rate to adequately track fast attack craft/fast inshore attack craft. CIWS has an extremely accurate search radar with a high update rate; but, as its name implies, it has only a close-in or limited-range engagement envelope.
And CIWS operates autonomously from the rest of the ship's combat system. The CEC fuses sensor measurements from radars integrated into the network to develop a composite track shared by all CEC-equipped ships. This sensor fusion maximizes radar diversities and geography to build a significantly improved composite track that all networked radars contribute toward maintaining.
CEC composite tracks are integrated into the Aegis combat system and the ship self-defense system (SSDS) for weapons engagement. But CEC was developed to defend ships in the air warfare domain, not the surface warfare domain.
For the summer 2007 experiment, minor modifications were needed on both CEC and CIWS processors, to integrate the CIWS search radar into the CEC processor and to initiate and maintain surface tracks on the CEC network. No modifications were made to the CEC data distribution system, Aegis or SSDS Combat Systems, or to the CIWS radar for the experiment.
The initial at-sea execution worked far better than had been anticipated. CIWS initiated surface tracks out to the maximum range expected and maintained track continuity, even during close-weaving formations or near the other combatants.
Once initiated, these surface tracks were maintained and updated by all the sensors integrated into CEC, on the ships, and at CDSA Dam Neck. The CIWS-initiated surface tracks were displayed in the Aegis combat system, making them eligible for engagement with the ships' longer-range weapons.
The CEC system at CDSA Dam Neck had not been modified to include the CIWS integration, as had been done on the Aegis ships. But Dam Neck's CEC equipment received and processed the surface track data into the SSDS combat system, and then the roof-mounted radars at Dam Neck contributed to maintaining the composite surface track. In addition to the surface tracks, the CIWS search radar data contributed to the composite air tracks in the CEC network.
Looking Ahead
The summer experiment went beyond just the technical integration of systems to combat fast attack craft/fast inshore attack crafts. Surface Warfare Development Group at Little Creek was also involved to test and assess their emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) against small-boat threats. They and Operational Test and Evaluation Force ensured that scenarios accurately represented the current fast attack craft/fast inshore attack craft profiles. The tactics demonstrated in the summer experiment were almost identical to those reported in the Hormuz incident. Surface Warfare Development Group was able to validate their TTPs during the free play period, leveraging the assets already committed to the experiment.
In keeping with the Sea Power 21 Vision, the CNO directed that Naval Network Warfare Command would identify "candidate [technologies] with the greatest potential to provide dramatic increases in warfighting capability. Embracing spiral development, these technologies and concepts will then be matured through targeted investment and guided through a process of rapid prototyping and fleet experimentation."
The June 2007 experiment was a prototype demonstration. Within the context of Program Executive Office Integrated Warfare Systems, it has provided the thread to warfighting improvements, through coordination of emerging TTPs and system capabilities. This effort will directly lead to improved ship self-defense for our Fleet against air and surface targets, and it will change the focus of platform sensor integration into network-centric operations.
All the testing was done under the CNO Sea Trial Experimentation program, designed to explore technologies that may fill mission capability gaps. Once the experiments are completed, Naval Network Warfare Command makes its recommendation to the CNO on the viability of the technology.
In September 2007, the Netted Surface Tracking Effort was endorsed as the number-one initiative in the 2007 Sea Trial Experiment process. But there's been no time or opportunity to use these modifications in the Fleet ships that could take advantage of them. The acquisition community (the Program Office and OPNAV) has to determine the overall cost to implement this capability into operational assets, and the best method to fund the improvements. They have the arduous duty, in a constrained economy, of balancing technological and operational benefits against cost.
The incident on 6 January 2008 was resolved without firing weapons. But if political and military tensions continue to rise, casualties may result. Hopefully before that occurs, some of the new technologies and tactics being developed today will be in place to provide our Sailors, ships, and allies with the best protection we can offer.