The Coast Guard Could Be Better Used
By Peter von Bleichert
I have always been impressed with the sight of an F-14 Tomcat catapulting off a supercarrier, a pair of F/A-18 Hornets rolling in for the kill, or a Tomahawk volley from a destroyer offshore. But never have I been more
proud of our maritime forces than in August 2005 while watching U.S. Coast Guard helicopters pluck people from the floodwaters and rooftops of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. The rest of the federal government may have been missing in action, but the Coast Guard proved that no matter how many demands are placed upon it, the First Fleet is Semper Paratus.
This is because of the service's unique humanitarian abilities combined with a military structure and law-enforcement authority. The Coast Guard achieved its mission in 2005 despite having been shuffled from the Department of Transportation to the massive and freshly hatched Department of Homeland security. This has created problems for many organizational charts that have been restructured since 11 September 2001. Overlapping and redundant responsibilities now permeate bureaucratic and jurisdictional systems, wasting taxpayers' money and creating confusion amid crises.
When planning force structure and missions, we routinely question whether a given mission might be more effectively carried out elsewhere. For the Coast Guard, we need to keep and enhance some missions—and reassign others. Some logically belong elsewhere or strain aged equipment and limited resources. Another restructuring would mean that new submissions could be adopted and core competencies strengthened.
Designated Coast Guard responsibilities currently include maritime safety, mobility and security, national defense, and protection of natural resources. Maritime safety includes search and rescue, recreational boat safety, ice patrol, and port security. Mobility means aids to navigation, ice breaking, management of traffic and bridges, and rules of the road. security sub-missions include drug and alien migrant interdiction, marine resource protection, and law/treaty enforcement.1
Reassign Responsibilities
If we think of "Coast Guard" as a verb rather than a noun, the way in which duties should be assigned may be clarified. The first areas that need housecleaning are in administration and infrastructure. Just as the Federal Aviation Administration, not the U.S. Air Force, monitors private pilots, so responsibility for recreational boating safety should rest with the Department of Transportation Maritime Administration (MARAD). But maritime safety, as a sub-mission of port security, should fall under the Coast Guard's national defense mission.
Aid to navigation—a maritime mobility sub-mission clearly related to infrastructure—also belongs with MARAD. The Coast Guard could transfer aid-to-navigation vessels ranging in size from the 21-foot trailerable boat to 180-foot seagoing buoy tenders. For budgetary purposes, inter-agency hardware transfers would be done at fair market value.
Marine Traffic Control (MTC) would operate within MARAD and be facilitated by automation and GPS-based vessel transponders. MTC would pass data on suspect vessels to the Coast Guard and Navy networks for interception.
Responsibility for bridges would be reassigned to the Federal Highway and/or Federal Railroad Administrations, with security falling to local and state law enforcement and their small vessel flotillas.
International ice patrol, which we have had ever since the Titanic's infamous night, helps to reduce the need for and the cost of search and rescue—it has its rightful place within the Coast Guard structure. However, ice-breaking, specifically polar ice-breaking, is a strategic mission for keeping sea lanes of communication open and safe. Therefore, it belongs under the Navy umbrella.
Maritime security's sub-mission of drug and illegal immigrant interdiction logically belongs under a consolidated Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), with which the Drug Enforcement Agency would act on stemming the narcotics trade. At offshore holding areas, ICE would be responsible for boarding vessels for cargo, crew, and customs verification prior to transit of U.S. territorial waters and/or ports.
The Coast Guard would retain the ability to board for safety and pollution inspections, and would continue to enforce fishing law and international fishing agreements at sea, as well as protecting our Exclusive Economic Zone. But case prosecution should be handed to the Fish and Wildlife Service.
Education and prevention of marine pollution, now under the Coast Guard natural resource protection mission, may also fit better at Fish and Wildlife, in cooperation with the Environmental Protection Agency. The Coast Guard would respond to incidents of pollution and laws against it, with local FBI environmental crime task forces pursuing investigation and prosecution. Because environmental attacks (such as cracking open an oil tanker or exploding a gas or chemical carrier in port) are a potential threat, the Coast Guard needs to work at all levels with the Navy and MARAD to prevent them.
Maximize Deepwater 21 for Homeland Defense
Coast Guard search and rescue will be improved under the Integrated Deepwater System Program (Deepwater 21 will make asset capability improvements across aircraft, cutters, C4ISR, and logistics) and should be expanded.2 To keep Coast Guard helicopter crews from hovering near trees, power lines, and other dangers, the Federal Emergency Management Agency should buy and strategically preposition airboats and small vessels or organize local boat-owner volunteer auxiliaries for flood disaster response. Regardless, the service may also wish to purchase no-tailrotor airframes for dedicated urban flood search and rescue.
Tasked with general coastal defense, homeland security, and port and waterway security under its national defense duties, the Coast Guard has great potential to enhance our national defense. Port and waterway security should be extended to include protection of Navy assets and U.S.-flagged merchantmen in foreign ports. All port security tactics and hardware would then be aligned to counter the lone-boat attack à la USS Cole (DDG-67), the feared small-boat swarm attack, and defense against scuba divers and submersibles. An expanded waterway security/riverine capability could incorporate Navy and Marine Corps lessons and special operations training methodology.
A territorial ASW sub-mission should be added to the Coast Guard's portfolio, under maritime security. This would relieve some strain on the Navy and help it concentrate on subsurface protection of its amphibious and carrier strike groups. A Coast Guard ASW capability could be as basic as dip sonar and magnetic anomaly detectors on aircraft, with improved sonar on cutters.
One wonders where all those S-3 Viking sub-hunters the Navy ditched have gone. They would make great land-based Coast Guard platforms. The Navy is also currently retiring P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft as new Boeing 737-based P-8 multi-mission maritime aircraft become available. The P-3s are being offered to India and Pakistan as refurbished maritime aircraft, but instead the Navy could pass them to the Coast Guard.3
Finally, the vertical takeoff and landing unmanned aerial vehicle will be a force multiplier across Coast Guard missions and, luckily, has its place and support in Deepwater 21. The technology offers exciting capabilities.
Use the Coast Guard to Go Sub-Surface
Of course there is no more potent subkiller than another submarine. The Navy is reluctantly realizing that its nuclear-only policy for submarine forces is based in the Cold War era of Admiral Hyman G. Rickover. Emerging ultra-quiet threats from new regional powers and potential adversaries are out there-especially in the form of new, air-independent propulsion diesel-electric attack submarines.
The Navy is also re-learning the elusiveness and value of these modern boats to littoral and blue-water warfare. Having rented a Swedish diesel-electric boat and her crew in 2006, the Navy used the submarine as an aggressor during Fleet anti-submarine warfare training off San Diego.4
The path of least resistance for a reborn American diesel-electric attack submarine force is the U.S. Coast Guard. Operation close to U.S. shore bases would negate the oft-cited limitation of diesel-electric's slow transit times to their patrol areas. A small number of German and/or Swedish boats could be purchased and offset by U.S.-based assembly privileges, until indigenous designs emerge from Electric Boat and Newport News.
This would help keep these strategic yards busy and assist Coast Guard orientation with new systems and training. Cross-training between the Navy and Coast Guard would provide initial USCG crews for the boats. They would also have onboard liaisons with the manufacturer, Navy, and German or Swedish navies during ramp-up to operational status.
Not only would the Coast Guard then have a greatly expanded national-defense capability and weatherproof search-and-rescue platform, it could also provide aggressor training to other services. This reintroduction of American Sailors and submariners to an old friend may even nudge the Navy into wanting their own diesel boats.
And when they were needed in foreign or international waters, diesel-electric submarines could keep up with roll-on/ roll-off and merchantmen surface vessels, thereby supplementing our convoy and foreign-port defense capability.
New Structures for New Conditions
The Coast Guard Auxiliary, a mostly volunteer force, contributes to the safety and security of our citizens, ports, waterways, and coastal regions. Sub-missions are public education, operations, vessel safety checks, and Project AIM, which seeks to introduce high school students and graduates to the Coast Guard Academy and the service.5 Thousands of Americans use our waters every day for work and play. They can be our first line of defense and response, a living sensor that can alert the service or ICE to trouble. Educating pleasure boaters and fishermen on identification and reaction to security threats, suspicious vessels, or illegal fishing will greatly enhance homeland security.
The greatest threat to realignment of bureaucracies is resistance to change and turf wars over traditional missions. Such arguments are more emotional than practical. We should embrace only creative streamlining. When it comes to trimming the federal fat and finding the best ways to protect our country and people, we should demand nothing less. Reassessing the Coast Guard's role in the Department of Homeland security is a good start.
1. U.S. Coast Guard, http://www.uscg.mil/defaultasp.
2. Integrated Coast Guard Systems, http://www.icgsdeepwatencom/.
3. "P-3s to India/Pakistan," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 24 April 2006, p. 62.
4. Norman Polmar, "Back to the Future," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (March 2006), p. 20.
5. U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, Mission Statement, http://nws.cgaux.org/statements/mission_statement.html.
Mr. von Bleichert is a political science instructor and writer. He holds a graduate degree in International Relations and is now pursuing a Ph.D. in Public Policy and Administration, specializing in Homeland Security. Mr. von Bleichert interned as a staff writer with the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, Whitehall, London.
We Are Still Ignoring the Sources of Terrorism
By Lieutenant Commander James Dillon, U.S. Navy
In the wake of the 24 March 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, two harbor seals received significant attention. Volunteers celebrated their cleaning. The press documented their recovery. Crowds were on hand and cheered the seals' release into the water . . . until a nearby killer whale attacked and ate them moments later (see John Spryut, "The Last Word: Eyrie in a Tower for Legal Eagles," Lloyd's List, 26 May 1992). Similar dangers face regions in which Coalition forces seek a sort of instant gratification, in that they fail to gain the true engagement and buy-in of populations among which reconstruction projects are introduced. And yet it is this type of gratification, which treats symptoms at the expense of causes, that has become the focus of Coalition policy in recent years. Our national military strategy needs an adjustment.
Study the Symptoms
Summaries of easily observable symptoms such as IED attacks and troop levels fill news articles and broadcasts. Third World citizens, reported to be angry about the lack of hope or international standing in their areas, attack Western civilization in an attempt to bring parity through destruction. We react as parents would, with a mixture of incentives and punishments. We need to look more deeply into the context.
A lack of context has led to problematic analyses. Proponents of Alvin and Heidi Toffler's book War and Anti-War (New York: Little Brown, 1993), for example, assert that insurgent conflict arises from the current shift from an industrial to the information age. Throughout history, we are told, societies increase competition to dominate new sources of wealth. Today, information technology is this new source, and it is blamed for causing consternation in extremist circles.
Similarly, adherents of Fourth Generation Warfare see a methodological shift. For example, in The Sling and the Stone (Zenith Press, 2006), Colonel Thomas X. Hammes asserts that extremists use information technologies to influence Western opinion, purposefully dragging out the conflict until we simply grow weary and leave.
Both of these superficial analyses lead to the same superficial solution: nationbuilding, with an emphasis on public relations. SeaBees descend on a village, build a school, write a news release, and declare victory-comforted by assuring themselves that thanks to American construction prowess, villagers know they were spared from conditions that foster extremism.
But two harbor seals could attest that such quick fixes do not solve all problems. The Sadr City turnaround was widely considered a success in 2004, after American forces helped give hundreds of thousands of Iraqis access to water, electricity, and sewage services. One of the most dangerous places in the country became one of the safest. But the area was "transitioned" before Iraqis had taken mental as well as physical possession-and it quickly reverted to violence.
Another quick fix was applied to the quick fix: the current strategy, continuous engagement. Meanwhile the enemy is moving anywhere it can find refuge, and "strategic overwatch" forces are stretched ever-thinner across the globe (including in South Korea, Germany, and elsewhere), as they continue to dwell on symptoms and watch more projects go the way of the harbor seals.
Isolate the Causes
Beneath the variety of surface symptoms lies a universal cause. Regardless of cultures and histories throughout the world, people prefer not to be impoverished and will do what they must to subsist. When legal options exist, people remain productive members of society. Otherwise, they do what is available to them-including joining street gangs and terrorist groups.
For those in devastated areas, the future becomes a daily set of questions. How can I get what I need to support my family? If I help the Americans, will my family be safer or at risk? Should I provide a tip about activities in my neighborhood, or look the other way?
Answers are based on competing pressures that have been labeled a battle for hearts and minds. But it is principally a contest of promises.
On one side, extremists promise a host of attractive outcomes. Let a terrorist stay in your home and receive quick cash. Here's how you can become famous. We will give you power. And even: Die for the cause and live forever in heaven.
These incentives can appeal to otherwise peaceful people with few skills and fewer prospects for work, similarly to the way crime appeals to many otherwise peaceful poor people in this country. On the other side, Western civilization thus far offers only the intangible promise of promise itself-in the form of distant infrastructure projects.
Acknowledge Cultural Differences
Many countries now have documents certifying support of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The Declaration of Independence began as a manifesto declaring the primacy of individual rights. Yet over time, its principles have come to define who we are as a people.
The American military has become expert at protecting lives and bringing liberty. Helping others pursue happiness has been a quandary, though. Our strengths have yielded great economic capacity that often overshadows our ability to plan. Since the successes of World War II industrial production, the U.S. military in particular has focused on the ability to build. This explains why so many in uniform address symptoms of conflict through operations labeled "rebuilding" or "reconstruction."
We need to take a closer look at how various cultures fundamentally pursue happiness, because people concerned with getting food each day have difficulty embracing our intangible promises. The instinct of survival is immediate and powerful.
People are also inclined to want a better life. Working with a shovel rather than a gun may pay less, but the threat of death associated with the latter makes the former more attractive. And the pride that comes with providing for a family is immeasurable, especially the ability to sustain it (pursuit of happiness).
To prove to others that our promises are not empty, we must change the way we focus on the short term as well as the long term. If we do not, our rush to build will lead to extended conflict or ultimate failure.
How to Treat the Causes
We all believe we understand the inalienable truths of the U.S. Constitution. We learn them in civics class, take them as given, and move on to other subjects. Instead, we need to move from theory to application through deliberation and careful planning, carrying out the following steps. This way we will be addressing the causes, not the symptoms, of terrorist activity throughout the world.
* Remember FDR's social success: President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal funded projects similar to those of today's conflict. Dams and power grids eventually made good FDR's intangible promise of restoring "old standards of living and of thought" (Democratic National Convention, 2 July 1932). But the projects were both means and ends. FDR set aside best business practices in order to employ millions of partly or untrained Americans who were beginning their personal pursuit of happiness. The same must be done today. Until local citizens, inefficient as they may be, are handed shovels to begin their own pursuits, they will probably keep holding their guns.
* Understand the reasons for local hostility: We can see the implications of not using local labor in Djibouti. To rejuvenate a local economy, Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa engaged a third-country company to rebuild a pier. seeking to maximize efficiency, that company subsequently imported labor to perform the bulk of the work. Meanwhile, unemployed local citizens looked on with increasing disgust, finding the promise of future opportunities hard (if not impossible) to believe. JTF-HOA began the project to gain friends. In practice, such undertakings in Djibouti, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere are doing the opposite.
* Use local labor: Local labor is a force multiplier. Particularly on less complex projects, service members should supervise rather than perform work to increase the scope of projects. Rather than 20 SeaBees building a school, individuals should supervise the locals who build those schools themselves.
* Change our force structure: If Sun Tzu receives accolades millennia after positing that battles should be won before they are ever fought, America should recognize society development as a form of warfare and treat it as such. The number of civil engineering and related units should be increased and integrated into every major command. The scope of change may not match the transition from horse to motor cavalry, but it should be large enough to permit New Deal or Marshall Plan-level impacts for targeted locales.
* Let people see the reasons for changes: Innovation invites resistance and requires impetus. In a technique called lightning strategy, businesses implement a series of small changes to build momentum toward larger innovation.
The same must apply to construction processes. Local citizens may hear of the benefits of a new dam. They may acknowledge the advantage of a new power plant. We need to ensure they are fully engaged in innovation. For any large project to succeed, citizens need to see and experience tangible elements of it. For example, while they build a nearby sewage plant, citizens should lay drainage pipes in ditches they dig along their own streets.
* Think of ourselves too: Finally (and perhaps most important to many Americans), if we do not refocus our efforts to provide tangible means, even when inefficient, of setting local populations on their own pursuit of happiness, ours will be adversely affected. As our reconstruction efforts ultimately fail, we will need to spend more money on guns, leaving less for our butter. And inflation indices tell us that the price of butter is increasing.
Lieutenant Commander Dillon is a speechwriter and adjunct professor at George Washington University’s Graduate School of Political Management. He holds master's degrees in business administration and political management and has been deployed to impoverished regions in 13 countries across the globe Most recently he visited JTF-HOA, where he spoke with those involved in reconstruction projects.
Marine F/A-18 Composite Squadrons: Worth the Stretch?
By Major Gregory M. Beisbier, U.S. Marine Corps
The Marine Corps decommissioned one F/A-18D squadron last fiscal year and an F/A-18C squadron this fiscal year. In two years the Department of the Navy will be short by 41 F/A-18D aircraft, which will tremendously affect the Corps' ability to continue to fill its remaining five F/A-18D squadrons.
By 2009, this translates into a three-and-half squadron shortfall that will continue until 2014. And that's assuming the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) timeline doesn't get delayed again. Next year is the tipping point for the F/A-18D inventory, because this is when the three main factors driving future F/A-18D availability come to a head. The first is the phasing out of the two-seat F/A-18B. Also, because of usage rates, most of the Fleet Replacement Squadron's stock of F/A-18Ds will need to be replaced. Finally, all 52 lot 17 and below F/A-18Ds now assigned to VMFA(AW) squadrons will have to undergo the following mandatory modifications: Engineering Change Proposal-904, Airframes Change-316, and Center Barrel Replacement Plus (CBR+).
This is why a three-and-a-half-squadron gap will exist for five years between the Marines Corps' current F/A-18D inventory and its replacement, the JSF. But there is a fix.
If the Corps created F/A-18 composite squadrons of single-seat F/A-18Cs and two-seat 18Ds, we could bridge the gap between the projected 18D inventory shortfall and JSF induction. If properly implemented, this course of action could not only maintain current operational capabilities, but actually expand them across 83 percent of the F/A-18 community.
No Pain, No Gain
Proper implementation would not be painless or easy. But it is the only course available that could reduce all F/A-18Ds' average wing root fatigue life expended (WRFLE) to below .075 per 1,000 flight hours—without sacrificing one ounce of operational capability.
This is significant. IfVMFA(AW) F/A-18D WRFLE usage rates are not reduced to that level by next year, the Corps will lose 30 percent of its F/A-18 tactical aviation assets. The loss will severely degrade our combined arms operational capabilities. We are already operating at an intense tempo, so this could have catastrophic consequences for our ability to support the ground combat element.
Changes Needed in Training Manuals
The F/A-18 Training and Readiness Manual shows that composite squadrons consisting of six F/A-18A+/Cs and six F/A-18Ds are the best mix to fill VMFA(AW) defined missions. But to reduce F/A-18D WRFLE rates, we will have to implement critical changes in required usage. Proponents of the composite squadron concept contend that it would reduce WRFLE rates simply by scheduling the F/A-18Ds for air-to-ground missions that produce lower fatigue rates, and the F/A-18A+/Cs for high WRFLE missions like air-to-air.
But a critical review of the manual reveals that this is not possible as long as F/A-18Ds are needed for high WRFLE training sorties. Simply forming composite squadrons does not reduce those WRFLE rates. For composite squadrons to retain operational capability while simultaneously reducing F/A-18D usage to below .075 WRFLE per 1,000 flight hours, the VMFA(AW) portion of the manual must be modified to reflect the needs of a composite squadron.
Maintaining Lot-Different Composite Squadrons
In 2006, MAG-11 inadvertently set up the ideal case study on F/A-18 lot-different maintenance in a remote combat environment flying at a high operational tempo. ("Different lot" means different F/A-18 versions are put together.) Here's how it happened: In spring 2007, VMFA(AW)-242 finished its second Operation Iraqi Freedom II deployment. For its first deployment, OIF II.2, the squadron had deployed to al Asad, Iraq, with 12 lot 14F/A-18Ds.
Between deployments VMFA(AW)242's aircraft mix was changed to 4 lot 14s, 4 lot 20s, and 4 lot 21 F/A-18Ds. The squadron groomed Marine Aviation Logistic Squadron (MALS) supply and identified 25 specific parts from lots 14, 20, and 21 that MALS would need to stock.
During its second deployment, VMFA(AW)-242 reported above-average rates for non-mission-capable-for-supply, partial-mission-capable-for-supply, and overall mission-capable. This supports the squadron's assessment, especially in comparison with the averages of all other same-lot maintenance F/A-18 squadrons operating under the exact, same conditions.
Supporting the Carrier Air Wing
Equally as important as lot-different maintenance is the composite squadron's ability to support carrier air wing (CVW) operations. Although the F/A-18D inventory has a long catapult-and-arrested-landings (CAT TRAP) service life, it also has two issues that must be resolved before a Marine composite squadron can support a CVW deployment.
The F/A-18D carries 700 pounds less fuel than does an F/A-18A+/C. But this could be mitigated by carefully managing their position in the carrier's launch and recover window (deck cycle).
The other issue is reduced bring-back, or the amount of fuel and ordnance with which an aircraft can land on a carrier. This could be adjusted by increasing the aircraft's maximum arrested weight. Currently the limit is 34,000 pounds, but a 35,000-lb maximum would significantly increase the F/A-ISO's ability to conduct carrier operations. This would not come without a price: it would likely also decrease the current 1,500 CAT TRAP limit.
In summary, to deploy Marine F/A-18 composite squadrons with CVWs, we would trade CAT TRAPs for reduced WRFLE and flight hours, while supporting tactical aviation integration with forward air controller airborne and reconnaissance capabilities.
Doing the Math
NAVAIR Structures currently assesses that 10 percent of F/A-18D training flights result in 40 percent of the observed WRFLE rate. Based on this calculation, the remaining sorties accrue substantially less WRFLE than air combat maneuvering (ACM) and low altitude tactics (LAT) sorties. The significance of this can be seen in NAVAIR's recommendation that F/A-18D ACM and LAT training be conducted only when required.
Thus, NAVAIR judges that an F/A-18 composite squadron using a modified VMFA(AW) Training and Readiness Manual could reduce its F/A-18D average WRFLE rate by as much as 40 percent (from .1 to .060) while retaining the command and control capabilities of a current VMFA(AW) squadron.
Of course, a full 40 percent reduction in WRFLE would be possible only if a composite squadron never used an F/A-18D as backup for an ACM or LAT sortie.
To factor in this operational reality, a more solid estimate would be 70 percent of that 40 percent. In other words, a 28 percent WRFLE reduction would result from removing the requirement to use F/A-18Ds for ACM and LAT sorties.
This reduction in WRFLE usage would result in a 3.8-year extension for all VMFA(AW) assigned F/A-18Ds service life, before the CBR+ modification. Another 2.5 years would be gained after that modification.
So the relatively small .025 WRFLE per 1,000 flight hours reduction in total WRFLE would mean a 6 ½-year service life increase for all 60 F/A-18Ds VMFA(AW) assigned, if we implemented composite squadrons. This would not only bridge the JSF gap, it would actually expand our current operational capabilities and flexibility. And the Marine Corps would have substantial breathing room if the JSF activation were to slide again.
If the JSF does not meet its estimated delivery date and production rates, the Marine Corps will have little choice but to decommission four more F/A-18D squadrons-unless we take action in the next six months. If we modify the VMFA(AW) portion of the F/A-18 Training and Readiness Manual to support the training needs of the composite squadron model, we can form ten composite squadrons from the remaining five F/A-18D and five of the F/A-18C squadrons.
Major Belsbier is the VMFA-112 aviation maintenance officer. He Is a former operations officer of VMFA-122, and director of standardization and safety of VMFA(AW)-533, with which he deployed in support of OIF 05-07.1. This article is a brief reworked version of his USMC Command and Staff College master's thesis. For a copy of it (with references), please e-mail [email protected].