Building a Small Surface Warship: Mission Impossible?
(See W. J. Holland Jr., pp. 14-19, February 2008; K. Lee, D. Criner, p. 6, March 2008 Proceedings)
Michael T. McNerney-I could not agree more with Rear Admiral Holland's statement that "emasculating the technical competence of the Naval Sea Systems Command" by placement of the responsibility for shipbuilding with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research Development and Acquisition was "an arrangement that put the administration of a highly technical process in the hands of officials who were schooled in accounting and budgeting and overseen by political appointees with short tenures and little experience."
During my tenure at Naval Sea Systems Command, I reported to the last three NAVSEA commanders (before I retired in September of 2003) and we recognized with much frustration the above view expressed by Rear Admiral Holland, but expressed it in a much simpler fashion: "If we all agree that painting by the numbers never produced quality art, why does the Navy continue to believe that building ships by the numbers will ever produce quality war ships?"
I was truly pleased with the views expressed by Rear Admiral Holland and that those views were printed in Proceedings. That is why I am a life member.
Vice Admiral James H. Doyle Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)-Admiral Holland's exposé on the institutional and organizational problems of Navy shipbuilding is right on target. I also agree that returning to an organization that resulted in a surface Navy of 84 multi-warfare Aegis cruisers and destroyers might be a good start to getting back on course.
An organization similar to the one that built the Ticonderoga and Arleigh Burke classes would stress accountability, system engineering, teamwork with the laboratories and industry, training, land-based sites, innovative Fleet introduction, and lifetime support. Such an organization should operate under professional technical/operational leadership in a centrally directed project that integrates development of the combat system, when appropriate, with construction of the warship. Also critical would be a similar organization of operational leadership in OPNAV participating as sponsor in all phases of the acquisition process.
This organization is needed now to press on with arming and modernizing the 84 Aegis cruisers and destroyers to defend against ballistic/cruise missiles and perform fundamental battleforce and seacontrol missions. These Aegis warships are the only force capable of protecting carrier and expeditionary strike groups, sea bases, joint forces, and allies from the ever increasing threat of missile attacks, particularly short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, as well as numerous cruise missiles.
The latest Navy shipbuilding plan indicates that Aegis cruisers and destroyers will be required until mid-century before replacement ballistic-missile defense and battleforce-capable ships will be available in numbers. Right now the Navy's attention, focus, and limited funds are on the littoral combat ship (LCS) and DDG-1000 in a management organization that is fragmented and therefore cannot be held accountable in either OPNAV or the material command.
Navy leadership must take charge of rearming the existing Aegis fleet and at the same time press on with evolutionary weapon system development capable of pacing and defeating evolving ballistic-and cruise-missile threats. It must also start planning to construct cruisers by about 2011 to replace the aging ships of the Ticonderoga class. There is enough blame to go around about why we are where we are in Navy shipbuilding. Leadership at the highest levels must set and enforce the priorities for the surface Navy, pinpoint accountability, simplify the process, and move on. It's time to get back to an organization we know works.
Commander Wayne J. Smith, U.S. Navy (Retired)-Rear Admiral Holland's article has much to recommend it. However, he may be unaware of how much study and "warfighter" input actually went into the LCS. Wargames were used to examine potential missions and problems inherent in the use of what became the LCS. Starting in 1999, a series of three dedicated games under the Concepts for the Navy after Next (CNAN) program examined a set of combatant concepts (platform, sensors, weapons) in different operational/mission scenarios. Players from the intelligence, operational, technical/laboratory, and analytical communities participated.
Selected concepts were also examined during at least three Global War games. These annual games had two parts to them; the "main game", and a set of concurrent but smaller "innovation" games. The Streetfighter concept was specifically examined in only one of the innovation games. In other main and innovation games, the platform technologies which contributed to the LCS were examined in a wider variety of missions (transport, amphibious operations, sea-basing, etc).
In 2002 a second effort was undertaken to generate a set of operational requirements. This focused on the operators and operational communities (ASW, MIW, AAW, etc). The thrust of the effort was to go to the operational/mission specialists and find out what was important to them for inclusion in a next generation combatant, similar to the approach the aviators use. Scenarios were used to generate discussion and focus on different capabilities and attributes. The results and commentary were recorded and collated. A steering committee consisting of representatives from the surface community, and other potential users (Coast Guard, Army) pulled the inputs together into a single set of mission requirements, which were then forwarded for review and approval.
Concurrently, a set of technology initiatives was examined. A technology group was set up at NSWC Carderock that assembled much of the existing information and pointed to shortfalls in information or technology issues. Logistics was specifically highlighted by this group as an area for special attention in any LCS-related acquisition program. It also collected directly or pointed to other sources of technical information. The entire set of tests and data collected by the U.K. on its prototype trimarran, for example, were made available to the United States.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the Navy has at least two high-speed vessels that it has operated over a period of years, the Army at least two, and the Marine Corps one. The technical and acquisition community had all of this information available to it, and in fact collected much data from each. Additionally, an extensive cost and operational effectiveness analysis was performed after an acquisition office was established. Finally, it must be noted that the requirements document for the Vertical Launcher program was generated in about two days on a few pages, and was approved within OPNAV in about a month.
Hype, Hope, and Hard Facts: Getting a Fix on SSGN SOF Capabilities
(See M. Dobbs, pp. 28-32, February 2008 Proceedings)
Captain Kerry D. Ingalls, U.S. NavyI share Commander Dobbs' concern that we not over-hype SSGN for any mission capability, but his well-intentioned article suffers from inaccurate and outdated information.
While the Trident hull is larger and somewhat less maneuverable than our SSNs, her assigned operations take this fact into account. Further, she is equipped with advanced sensor and fire-control systems, providing the tools necessary to successfully manage the challenges of the littoral environment. Regardless, SSGN is not an SSN. Indeed, the concept capitalizes on the strike and special operations forces (SOF) delivery advantages inherent in her immense and reconfigurable volume.
Other modifications include addition of a forward hovering system that, coupled with her legacy hovering system, produces excellent depth-keeping characteristics. Both West Coast SSGNs have proven the ability to maintain periscope depth plus or minus one foot, for more than 24 consecutive hours, at less than 0.5 knots. They have also shown proficiency at periscope depth control with sternway. SSGN slow speed depth control is perfectly capable of supporting SOF delivery.
Our training and certification processes are more rigorous than Commander Dobbs implies. New trainers provide excellent acoustic, target motion, and geographic simulations. Attack Weapons System trainers employ systems identical to those found on the submarine, and more trainer improvements are planned. We tailor offcrew training to anticipated tasking and to specific crew needs as identified during the previous operational period. This training is designed and evaluated by the crew's commanding officer, senior Trident Training Facility leadership, and by my staff and me.
I lead evaluation of the final certification event. It is a robust five-day scenario, testing many aspects of specific mission area performance. Tactical watch Standers are evaluated both individually and as a team within their watch sections. It is not possible to stack the deck with the top team players. But most important, we certify SSGN crews the same way we do SSN crews, both for the SOF mission and for all other primary missions.
Finally, Commander Dobbs' assertion that Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) program success is fundamental to SSGN's utility as a SOF delivery platform is simply incorrect.
While there will no doubt be situations in which SSN is the host of choice for particular SOF missions, I can state with confidence that the Ohio's (SSGN726) maiden deployment, on which she has already sailed, will feature real world SEAL Delivery Vehicle operations. Commander Dobbs' pessimism in this regard is simply unfounded. And as for ASDS employment, we have every reason to believe SSGN will prove to be a viable host for this SOF delivery system as well.
We continue to work diligently to maximize the national security benefit derived from this exceptional platform and the Sailors who man her. The SSGN as a SOF delivery platform is not perfect, and neither are our training infrastructure and methods. All will benefit from continuous feedback and improvement as we gain operating experience with SSGN. But SSGN as a SOF delivery platform is neither hype nor hope-it is a deployed reality.
Editor's Note: The author commands Submarine Squadron 19 in Bangor, Washington, to which both West Coast SSGNs and four SSBNs are assigned.
From Warrior to Lifesaver
(See W. M. Glut, pp. 66-69, February 2008 Proceedings)
Captain Donald R. Fiske Sr., United States Merchant Marine (Retired)Commander Gluf is right on the money: Tarawa-class LHAs would make ideal TAHs for all of the reasons he described.
The Comfort (T-AH-20) and Mercy (TAH-19) conversions were the best options in their time. An LHA platform reconfigured as a T-AH offers an ideal option for the 21st century. In addition to war-related casualties and tsunami relief, having the five Tarawas available to carry the flag on goodwill voyages (a "great white fleet") will certainly help enhance our reputation worldwide.
On a trip to the Beaufort, North Carolina, area in the spring of 2007, I noted the Peleliu (LHA-5) tied up at a berth in Morehead City. She was, according to local knowledge, in a state of decommissioning. Now is the time to reuse/recycle these vessels.
At a time when we're stopping construction of the Arleigh Burke-class in favor of the untried DDG-1000 (costing $1.4 billion), we should be looking at ways to reasonably reuse some of our valuable assets.
A Triumph in Strategic Thinking
(See B. E. Trainor, pp. 40-42, February 2008 Proceedings)
Colonel Mark A. Olinger, U.S. ArmyThe author has provided strategic joint and service planners an example of what right looks like when it comes to strategic thought. But where do we go from here? What are the missions that the U.S. military will be called on to carry out in the future? The answer to these questions should be used to determine the size, capabilities, and force structure of our land, sea, and air forces.
Defining missions is one part of creating a rational and effective framework to stimulate strategic thought. A three-step process is applicable. First, national security objectives must be clearly identified; second, the security environment in which these objectives will be pursued must be evaluated for potential shortfalls and associated risk to be identified; and third, the missions that the U.S. armed forces will be expected to execute to achieve these objectives must be identified.
The process described is not easy; it requires thoughtful and coordinated analysis by practitioners of public policy, strategists, defense analysts, and planners involved in the defense decision-making process. To avoid friction, changing priorities, goals, and any other shifts in guidance requires a leap of faith combined with candid discussion. To advance strategic thought, an initiative must be seized that embraces offensive operations in the best traditions of the services.
U.S. leaders continue to change the national security strategy in response to the demands of the war on terrorism. Urgent needs exist for a strategy that focuses on offensive operations. A strategy that exhibits the thought behind the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s allows the nation to take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and in most cases confront threats before they attack us. This type of strategy should appeal to leaders within the military services, the American people, Congress, and the executive branch, because it follows in the tradition of fighting wars abroad rather than on the homeland.
When Principle Is Involved
(See H. Ullman, p. 8, February 2008; D. Derkits, p. 84, March 2008 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Peter A. Trump, U.S. Navy (Retired)-We should not abandon our principles when the going gets tough. Does the fact that our war on terrorism is constitutionally undeclared somehow excuse us from the rules of war and the Geneva Conventions concerning the treatment of POWs? In another context, Booker T. Washington observed that to keep a man in the gutter, it is necessary to get down there with him. I believe that is the way to look at this debate; we should conduct ourselves in compliance with the rules we helped draft and that we have agreed to by treaty. We should not be making up new rules with the game in progress, no matter what the aggravation.
Stop Blaming the Press
(See D. J. Danelo., pp. 52-55, January 2008; J. A. Stout, S. Williams, R. Duenow, pp. 84-85, February 2008 Proceedings)
Christopher Heg-Though I am not a veteran, I feel it is my duty to respond to the letter from Major Duenow published in the February issue. Perhaps he would feel more at ease under outgoing Russian president Vladimir Putin, who does not have to worry about political opposition, a free press, or the rule of law. I wonder what exactly "protect and defend the Constitution" would mean in that context?
Training for the Wrong Fight
(See R. Berke, pp. 56-60, January 2008 Proceedings)
Commander Dale C. Rielage, U.S. Navy-Lieutenant Commander Berke does an excellent job outlining the many challenges facing naval intelligence today. His proposal for a risk-based approach to naval intelligence training, however, begs the question of what exactly constitutes the core competencies of naval intelligence professionals.
Naval intelligence today represents a small cadre, arguably undersized for the Navy's growing intelligence needs. PostCold War shifts in the Navy's intelligence structure have cost us the ability to satisfy organically our own intelligence requirements. Intelligence support now is unavoidably joint, and the key to success for any command is the ability to use this joint and national federation in support of its mission. The Navy's considerable investment in joint billets-indeed, almost half of all naval intelligence officer billets are joint-is a valuable tool for leveraging this support. Naval intelligence professionals in joint billets facilitate Fleet access to the wider intelligence system, and they return to the Fleet with a joint savvy that helps the Navy continue to leverage the nation's investment in intelligence capability.
Within the joint intelligence construct, the single unique analytical capability naval intelligence offers is maritime operational intelligence (OPINTEL). Whether done ashore or afloat, in joint or Navy commands, if naval intelligence does not drive maritime OPINTEL it will simply not be done. And while Lieutenant Commander Berke is correct that there is "no naval peer plying the seas" today, a glance to Asia makes it clear that we will face a near-peer competitor at sea in the coming decade. Finding, describing, and predicting the actions of naval forces is our fundamental warfighting requirement.
The presumption permeating Lieutenant Commander Berke's analysis-and much discussion in the intelligence community-is that our basic OPINTEL skills remain strong. In fact, in the face of competing requirements and limited Navy billets, the community faces a slow erosion of these fundamental skills.
Naval intelligence must support all the Navy's missions with the flexibility that the community has always shown. But it must do so from a foundation of rigorous analytical techniques grounded in our unique mission.
The Commanders Respond
(See pp. 28-43, March 2008 Proceedings)
Admiral Melo Gomes, Chief of Staff, Portuguese Navy-Portugal's history and national sentiment are intrinsically connected to the sea. Portugal secured its sovereignty and wealth through the sea. The Navy has been paramount to this effort, which is still recognized by the nation. The Portuguese Navy's control of sea trade began in the 16th century, and by the early 19th century a well-established network of port authorities was in place.
Geography is vital to a country with more than 1,300 miles of coastline and an Exclusive Economic Zone some 18 times the size of its territory. The strategic position of the Azores and Madeira archipelagos requires a secure oceanic bridge to the mainland. Further, the historic relationship with Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa and Brazil direct our vision to the South Atlantic.
Today, national strategic interest has a variable geometry and is more complex as the boundary between internal and external security blurs. Defense is viewed within the context of alliances, with NATO and the European Union (EU) having a dominant role, but also through bi- and multi-lateral cooperation. This requires an effective contribution of naval assets. Ships and marines have to be ready to defend national interests, support the international community's effort toward peace wherever needed, and provide continuous support to friends and allies to share both dividends and responsibilities.
The need to control and ensure the safety and security of vast ocean spaces is evident in today's world marked as it is by the unpredictability of the risks and threats in the maritime domain. Overexploitation of natural resources, abuse of the marine ecosystem, illegal immigration, drug trafficking, transnational crime, and terrorism are on every navy's agenda. Moreover, in our case, any major disruption to sea lanes of communication becomes an unprecedented danger, as 53 percent of all EU trade flows through Portuguese jurisdictional waters.
To respond, Portugal needs naval capabilities able to promote safety, security, and law enforcement in surrounding waters as well as the classic naval needs intended for military defense and foreign policy support. The most effective and efficient way to achieve this goal is through a force that integrates the Navy's typical functions with those of the coast guard. We call this the "dual-role Navy."
With this, we effectively run multi-role missions at sea in cooperation with the various state departments, working through the National Maritime Coordination Centre. This provides everyday visibility for the Navy-for better or worse-on how successfully missions are accomplished and understood by our fellow citizens and political leadership.
We have organized the state's authority at sea in the most efficient and synergistic manner to effectively control a vast ocean area and provide a service that is recognized by fellow citizens as cost-effective and within the limits of the country's economic resources. The dual-role Navy fulfills a wide range of missions both internally and abroad, in cooperation with our state departments and with friends and allies, with the firm objective of safeguarding the "Portuguese Sea," contributing to stability, and ensuring the free flow of essential goods and commodities.
Commodore Clifford Scavella, Commander of the Royal Bahamas Defence Force-Militaries around the world have for years had the task of justifying their existence to their governments. Over the years, the budgets of the Royal Bahamas Defence Force have increased steadily to meet its demands. The burden for our force is policing more than 80,000 square miles of sea with more than 700 islands and cays, which came along with sovereignty in 1973.
With the demands of 21st-century asymmetric operations by irregular forces, the need for a maritime corps to police the maritime expanses of our island state is urgent. Illegal immigrants, poachers, drug and arms smugglers have traversed the waters of the archipelagic regime virtually unchecked.
While justifying budgets is always a challenge, the realities of world terrorism and other imminent threats caught the attention of the Bahamas on 9/11, resulting in the implementation of stringent measures at our borders and ports-of-entry. As worldwide threats increase, technology to combat them evolves as well. Demands for these tools to fight a real enemy drive the operating costs of that defense ever higher.
In a small quiet Christian nation such as the Bahamas, the question of why there is a need for a Navy/Defence Force often comes up. Society does not always understand the importance and the necessity of such a force. We have to impress on them that militaries do not just protect borders, they also deter threats. As we move toward the future, making a positive impact in our society, this relatively young Navy/Defence Force will continue to make great strides in responding to natural and conventional crises that pose a threat to our territorial shorelines.