The window of opportunity for constructing the advanced DDG-1000 guided missile destroyer, formerly the DD(X), will remain open for a few more months. And, in addition to carrying out current missions and tasks, the ship could be the critical path to the most cost-effective development of the proposed next-generation ballistic missile defense ship, now designated CG(X).
The Navy awarded contracts for the first two ships of the DDG-1000 or Zumwalt class on 14 February 2008. The ships—to be completed in 2014—will be built by Northrop Grumman at Pascagoula, Mississippi, and by General Dynamics/Bath Iron Works in Maine. They will have a full-load displacement of almost 15,000 tons and an overall length of 600 feet—the dimensions of a cruiser by all reasonable standards. Armed with two 155-mm rapid-fire guns for shore bombardment; Standard, Tomahawk, and Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles; and a large manned- and unmanned-helicopter facility, the DDG-1000s will be highly capable, multi-purpose warships.
Still, the future of these ships is being questioned in some circles as critics—members of Congress among them—instead prefer to continue building destroyers of the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class. The last of 62 Burke-class ships, which were designed in 1979, are on the building ways. The DDG-1000 is superior to the Burke in most warfare areas while the financial considerations of resuming construction of those ships in place of the Zumwalts would undoubtedly mean eliminating one of the two yards now building surface combatant ships. Constructing one or two DDG-51s per year cannot support two shipyards.
Department of Defense officials have said that if DDG-51 production continues the ships' radars and several other features would have to be upgraded. John Young, the head of Pentagon acquisition, told Congress "Nothing's free. DDG-1000 has a lot of features and it does cost about twice as much as DDG-51, but it's got a lot more capability."1
Also highly significant, the DDG-1000 could and should serve as the prototype for the planned CG(X). With an existing growth margin of some 2,000 tons plus additional space and weight if the two 155-mm guns are deleted, the DDG-1000 design could accommodate a larger superstructure to fit the still-to-be-developed radars that may be needed for the ballistic missile defense role, and possibly for more vertical-launch missiles. (The DDG-1000 can carry 80 Standard/Tomahawk equivalent missiles.)
Thus, the Zumwalt design will provide a major surface combatant with features and capabilities superior to even an improved Flight III DDG-51 that some observers have touted. Indeed, with the increasing U.S. Navy emphasis on littoral operations, a DDG-1000-type ship can provide an area protective envelope to support the operation of the littoral combat ship (LCS) and other coastal, amphibious, and maritime prepositioning forces that lack effective antiair/antimissile defenses. Depending upon the LCS variants available, the DDG-1000 could be critical for countering hostile submarines and surface craft as well.
The current DDG-1000 program calls for seven ships. This number was announced in 2007 when, apparently for fiscal reasons alone, the Navy's leadership cut the program from 32 ships. (In fact, the 32-ship requirement remains on the books.) In fiscal year 2007 dollars the first two DDG-1000s will cost just over $3 billion each with follow-on ships pegged at $2.5 billion, plus research and development costs. Restarting the DDG-51 program will see ships with a unit cost of almost $2 billion each (compared to $1.2 billion for the last of the 62 ships in the current DDG-51 program).
While the DDG-51 is a capable ship, it pales in comparison with some features of the DDG-1000. In addition, as the basis for the CG(X), the DDG-1000 program will accrue the benefits of reductions in the costs of hull and machinery design, components, and crew training for the missile defense ship. In fact, the technologies and engineering development models inherent in the design and construction of the Zumwalts offer significant insight into future surface ship programs beyond the CG(X).
Some members of Congress have called for a nuclear-powered CG(X). However, their arguments do not hold up to realistic cost estimates or to logic. Navy and Coast Guard ships combined burn about 8 percent of the government's oil consumption, which is just 2 percent of the nation's total use of oil. Aircraft burn about 73 percent and ground vehicles 15 percent. Add in the costs to design a new CG(X)N hull and machinery; the higher costs to recruit, train, and retain nuclear personnel; increased maintenance costs for nuclear ships; the related political issues; and the end-of-service-life disposal costs, and a nuclear CG(X)N should have very little attraction.
Two DDG-1000s are on order and five are planned for fiscal years 2009 through 2013. If the Navy's leadership does not strongly support those ships a window will close next January when there is a new President and a new Congress, the latter most likely dominated by Democrats. Future shipbuilding budgets undoubtedly will be reduced in the next few years for several reasons, including strong competition from several other defense programs. If the Zumwalts are not pursued, the entire shipbuilding industry will be affected. More significant, as one senior officer told the author, "we must not lose sight that our ultimate objective is the right warfighting capability."
To date the Navy's leadership has been lackluster in support of the DDG-1000; some would say that the senior civilians and admirals have "damned it with faint praise."2 The DDG-1000 offers an important and flexible ship for the Navy's operations over a 30-plus-year period beginning in 2014. The alternatives—at this time—are not realistic.
1. John J. Young, Jr., Director, Defense Research and Engineering, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 3 June 2008.
2. Christopher P. Cavas, "The Navy Adrift," Navy Times (2 June 2008), pp. 12-13, and "Not making their case," Navy Times (9 June 2008), pp. 18-19.