U.S. Navy: Carrier Aviation: Dollars and Sense

'. . . V/STOL aircraft will increase aviation mission performance by our air-capable ships and will enormously increase the flexibility of aircraft carrier design.'

-Admiral James L. Holloway III, USN

Chief of Naval Operations¹

The U.S. Navy's nuclear-propelled supercarriers (CVNs) are the world's largest, most powerful, and most versatile warships. They are also the world's most expensive.

Their cost severely limits the number of supercarriers that the nation will afford. Today the Navy has 11 aircraft carriers. That number will decline to ten ships in about 2013 when the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) is decommissioned. The plan is to return to a force of 11 CVNs with the completion of the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), now scheduled for 2015-2016.

In the opinion of many observers, ten aircraft carriers-or even 11-are too few to support U.S. political-military interests around the world. Even when the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are eventually concluded, the United States will have continuing interests in the Middle East. Similarly, sub-Sahara Africa, with some areas already in turmoil, is expected to become more contentious in the near-term, as evidenced by the establishment of Africa Command as a new U.S. combatant command. At the same time, President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela is planning a major buildup of his country's armed forces with the purchase of Russian aircraft and submarines. Add in the continuing U.S. concerns in the Western Pacific with respect to China and North Korea, and U.S. naval forces will be required in probably larger numbers than are now available. Carriers probably will be in high demand because of their "presence" and ability to operate tactical aircraft, especially when land bases are not physically or politically available.

While the Navy has a 313-ship plan, it is unlikely that the number will increase significantly beyond the current Fleet of about 280 ships. The shipbuilding programs of the past dozen years have averaged about $10 billion (in 2008 dollars). But the Navy's 2008 report to Congress calls for an average of $15 billion over the next five years (Fiscal Years 2009-2013).2

The additional money-an increase of some 50 percent per year over the recent shipbuilding budgets-will be hard to find. The Army and Marine Corps are being increased by 92,000 men and women over the next few years, all Army and Marine tactical vehicles except for M1 tanks will require replacement after the Iraq conflict ends, and several highly expensive military aircraft programs are under way-the MV-22 Osprey, F-22 Raptor, F-35 Lightning II, CH-53K helicopter, and a new Air Force bomber. Department of Defense health care costs are skyrocketing while annual defense spending will undoubtedly decline in the future.

The most expensive ship is the nuclear carrier. Rear Admiral David Architzel has written that the USS George H. W. Bush (CVN-77) was procured for $6 billion compared to $7 billion "reported by Mr. Polmar."3 My number-"about $7 billion"-includes fitting out and post-shakedown availability costs, all incurred before the ship is ready for service. Does his number include those very real costs? (Also, the Navy's number exceeded the congressional cost cap on the CVN-77 by about $1 billion.)4

More significant is my estimate that the Gerald R. Ford will cost some $12 billion. The Navy's number is $8 billion. Recent Navy cost estimates and planning for new ships should give us pause.

First, the new San Antonio (LPD-17) is a non-high-tech ship. She has no major missile system, no advanced fire-control system, no AN/SPY-type radars, and she has conventional (diesel) propulsion. In other words, she is an improved but still basic amphibious ship, similar to LSD/LPD-type ships constructed by the Navy for the past 65 years. The San Antonio has now cost twice the original Navy estimate and the ship, commissioned in January 2006, is nowhere near ready for deployment as this column was written.

Second, the new-concept littoral combat ships (LCS) do introduce many new concepts and features to warship design and construction. The cost of these ships has also doubled over the past few years, with none yet completed. Indeed, the LCS-3 has been cancelled, with Rear Admiral Charles H. Goddard, the Navy's program executive officer for ships, citing Lockheed's best offer as "unaffordable."

Now look at the Gerald R. Ford: new nuclear propulsion plant, new electrical system, new radars, completely new type of catapults, and other advanced features. Can anyone realistically believe that this ship will not incur massive cost increases over the next eight years? Non-Navy analyses place her probable end cost at $12 billion or more.

As stated in two previous columns, the U.S. Navy now has other, proven means of land attack than an Alpha strike from a carrier.5 While a Tomahawk is not as flexible as an F/A-18, the missile does not risk a pilot, has greater range, is less vulnerable to interception, and in some circumstances has more accuracy. Similarly, carrier ASW has been severely reduced. Unmanned aerial vehicles, satellites, long-range U-2s, and other systems can provide intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance capabilities superior to pods carried by F/A-18 Hornets. The list continues. While carriers are superior in a number of scenarios, there are alternative systems for many carrier roles.

At the same time, the F-35B short takeoff/vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft will be able to operate from large-deck amphibious ships (LHA/LHD). The value of the earlier Sea Harrier/Harrier STOVL aircraft was demonstrated in the Falklands conflict (1982), the Gulf War (1991), and the assault on Iraq (2003). In future scenarios an LHA/LHD with a dozen F-35s may be able to sufficiently influence the situation. There are 11 of these ships now in service.

With the drawdown in CVNs the United States should consider the value of employing some LHA/LHDs as partial or full STOVL carriers. If a new carrier costs $12 billion-or even $8 billion-what are the alternatives? For example, the soon-to-be completed Makin Island (LHD-8) costs about $2.5 billion. Would a combatant commander rather have another CVN or another three to five STOVL-equipped LHDs? Space limitations prevent a full discussion of all options.

Today's Navy cost estimates for ships are highly questionable-at best. The Navy's 30-year plan calls for constructing a new CVN every four or five years. What would be the impact on the Fleet and the shipbuilding industry of skipping a carrier and building three to five LHDs in its place? And, how will the larger number of "aviation ships" help the carrier with its missions in diverse locations in a troubled world? If ten carriers are acceptable for a few years, could that number be acceptable for several more years, especially if alternative "carriers" and other systems are available?

The subject certainly warrants further discussion.

The Admiral's Arguments

The comments by Vice Admiral Robert Dunn in the July 2007 issue of Proceedings (p. 7) demonstrate the increasing controversy over the carrier issue. Unfortunately, the admiral often misquotes me.

For example, he writes, "Mr. Polmar then levies the charge that there has been little or no change in carrier design from the abortive United States (CVA-58) until now." In fact, I wrote: "The CVN-78 continues the basic design concepts-with significant improvements" since the United States. Quite different statements, mine based in part on Norman Friedman's definitive U.S. Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History (Naval Institute Press, 1983), pp. 239-250.

Next, Admiral Dunn cites the operation of F/A-18 Hornets over Afghanistan launched from carriers in the Indian Ocean. What he does not address is the tanker requirements for those aircraft, especially in the early phases of the operation when land-based Air Force tankers were not available. How many S-3B Viking missions (that plane is being phased out) and F/A-18 tanker missions (taking them away from strike-fighter missions) were required to support those strike missions?

Admiral Dunn also takes on the Harrier, citing its early high accident rate. Those problems were-in time-solved by changes in training and maintenance, and aircraft modifications. The aircraft subsequently proved to be highly successful. After the Gulf War (1991), General Norman Schwarzkopf cited three aircraft in his list of weapons that made a significant contribution to a quick and decisive victory: The F-117 Nighthawk stealth "fighter," AH-64 Apache helicopter, and AV-8B Harrier-good company by any criteria.

And, the British experience in the Falklands (1982) demonstrated that operating from small ships in the South Atlantic during winter, Harrier-type aircraft were a key factor in the British victory. The official British record states: "These aircraft were a major success, showing themselves to be flexible, robust, reliable and effective . . . . There was 95% availability at the beginning of each day and 99% of all planned missions were flown."

The F-35B Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) will be an effective successor to the Sea Harrier/Harrier aircraft.

Admiral Dunn should not allow-in his words-"personal bias" to prevent objective discussion.