Professional Notes

We Need Shore-Based Aircraft in Iraq
By Major Scott A. Cooper, U.S. Marine Corps

Before the current war in Iraq, then-secretary of State Colin Powell laid out the problem: "You break it, you own it." Iraq's problems have indeed become America's. One way in which we can immeasurably improve the situation is by shore-basing naval aircraft.

Throughout the 1990s, there was frequent talk about the anti-access challenges that our military faced. The Navy and Marine Corps advocated the operational flexibility of sea-basing. From 1991 to 2003, carrier aviation was crucial to the enforcement of the southern Iraqi no-fly zone. The complications of host-nation basing, diplomatic clearances, and bilateral allied relationships were not issues that had to be addressed if we flew off a carrier in the Persian Gulf.

December 1998's Operation Desert Fox is a good example of this. After Saddam Hussein again kicked out the UN Special Commission inspectors, President Bill Clinton ordered a four-day air campaign against suspected facilities for weapons of mass destruction. American aircraft based in Incirlik, Turkey, had been enforcing the northern no-fly zone; they were not allowed to participate in the operation because of Turkish objections. Those based in Saudi Arabia participated only minimally, as no aircraft that took off from Saudi Arabia could drop ordnance on Iraq because of Saudi government restrictions. All the ordnance dropped was from either F-14B and F/A-18C off the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) or Air Force B-IB and B-52 aircraft launched from Diego Garcia and Bahrain. The operational flexibility of sea basing was indisputably validated.

Circumstances are different today. With air bases in Balad, Al Asad, al Taqaddum, Taji, AIi, Kirkuk, Basrah, Baghdad International Airport, just to name the primary ones, the American military no longer has to concern itself with basing agreements, diplomatic clearances, or bilateral allied relationships related to basing. But we have other challengesincluding force protection and logistics. We need to take a close, critical look at aviation's contribution to this conflict.

Sea Basing

Admiral Vern Clark, during his tenure as CNO, looked hard into future military operations and articulated a framework vision titled Sea Power 21, which seeks to align, organize, integrate, and transform the Navy. It has three broad pillars: Sea Strike, Sea Basing, and Sea Shield.

Rear Admiral Thomas J. Kilcline, Director of Air Warfare, summarized the second of these in The Hook magazine ("Naval Aviation and Sea Power 21," Summer 2005, p. 4): "Sea Basing represents the nation's ability to ... support protection of national interests without having to ask 'permission.' The aircraft carrier represents the core of all sea-basing concepts-providing a key node for the secure and persistent projection of tactical aviation around the world from U.S. sovereign territory."

But reality on the ground assumes an anti-access environment, which Admiral Clark's document does not address. In fact, the future he envisions is much like the one we see today in Iraq. In his Proceedings article "Sea Power 21: Projective Decisive Capabilities" (October 2002, p. 35), Admiral Clark says: "When we cannot achieve operational objectives from over the horizon, our Navy-Marine Corps team moves ashore. Supported by sea bases, we will exploit superior situational awareness and coordinated fires . . . Information superiority and networking will act as force multipliers . . . bringing expeditionary warfare to a new level of lethality."

Shore Basing

In Iraq, our forces must operate ashore, i And they desperately need speed and precision, especially in aviation. Iraqi Freedom is not a conventional war, but it is not Desert Fox either. We need to push ourselves to adapt, as the U.S. military has done throughout our history.

At the tactical level, rebuilding Iraq means that infantrymen on patrol interact with civilians, taking off their sunglasses and helmets and giving a lot of deference-ever watchful of snipers and ambushes. They build trust among the population, yet rapidly escalate force if they encounter fire or contact with insurgents or an improvised explosive device (IED). Meanwhile the war goes on, as infantrymen barge into people's houses looking for insurgents. They frighten the women and children and then try to regain trust by handing out candy or replacing a lock that they broke. It is a conflict of inefficient progress that breeds hostility.

IEDs are one of the greatest threats to U.S. forces. Often a convoy takes casualties and cannot determine a triggerman. As forces call in a medevac and secure the attack site, they also must pursue this triggerman. In an urban environment, with only the forces that were part of the convoy, such a pursuit may be impossible.

But an F/A-18 or AV-8B with a Litening II targeting pod can track the triggerman as he flees, whether he is on foot or in a vehicle. The aircraft can continue to track the triggerman and can also provide a quick reaction force with directions as they pursue him. Aviation has consistently contributed immeasurably.

We cannot predict when aviation assets will be required, and, with the number of forces deployed to the theater, we do not have the ability to keep strike or reconnaissance aircraft airborne 24 hours a day. Response time is what matters most. This is why proximity is relevance.

A comparison of the aircraft based at Al Asad with those based on a carrier in the Persian Gulf shows the importance of land-basing aircraft in the Iraqi conflict.

Carriers are limited to a 12-hour deck cycle, but an airfield operates 24 hours a day. The leadership in Iraq recognized this limitation, at least partly, when they ordered two of four EA-6B aircraft of Electronic Attack Squadron 141 (VAQ-141) off the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) in September 2005 and shore-based them at Al Asad.

The Shadowhawks were deployed ashore because for the Prowler mission in support of ground forces, there was a need for more rapid response time, longer on-station time, and greater sortie generation than aircraft flying off the carrier could sustain. Those Prowlers remained in Al Asad until the Theodore Roosevelt departed for home. From Al Asad, the Shadowhawks generated a daily average of 43 percent more sorties than did their predecessors, VAQ-135, flying off the USS Nimitz (CVN-68), during each squadron's 110-day period of operations in Iraq.

Unquestionably, the challenges that VAQ-141 faced were significant. Carrier squadrons are neither equipped nor trained to operate ashore. The Shadowhawks were hosted by the Banshees of Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 1 (VMAQ-1), a Marine Prowler squadron based at Al Asad. Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 26 provided some intermediate maintenance normally conducted aboard ship. The Al Asad Marines also supplied chow, billeting, work spaces, vehicles, computer connectivity, and communications. Despite these challenges, the Shadowhawks' shore-based experience was a resounding success. Moreover, EA-6B Prowlers have had a shore-based presence continuously since September 2005.

Why, then, were there not Navy Hornets and Tomcats flying out of an air base in Iraq? Perhaps it was not logistically feasible or just too costly. Maybe some were concerned that pushing aircraft off the carrier would threaten the future of carrier aviation, fearful that Congress and defense-policy wonks would see such action as the fundamental case for future American wars and claim that the United States no longer needed aircraft carriers. Whatever the reasons, it cannot be denied that proximity to the fight is what made the difference in this particular conflict.

Both Carrier and Shore-Based Aviation Are Critical

By shore-basing some EA-6Bs, the warfighting leadership in Iraq put mission accomplishment ahead of service parochialism. This was a sensible and courageous act. The last four years in Iraq should not invalidate the importance of carrier aviation: the maneuver space that the sea proffers U.S. forces will be vital in future conflicts.

As we adapt to the battle before us, we should investigate the logistical and fiscal feasibility of shore-basing naval aircraft. America's naval forces-all of them-must always be expeditionary in mindset and in execution. If we shorebase a carrier air wing, there is no doubt that a company commander or forward air controller in Baghdad or Fallujah will find those assets more responsive as he walks the streets, conducts cordon and knock operations, and suddenly finds himself in need of an aircraft overhead.

Major Cooper is assigned to the staff of II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) based In Camp Fallujah, Iraq. A Marine aviator, he has served as an Electronic Countermeasures Officer in the EA-6B since 1996.

 

Anchor Up, Chiefs! Reset the Mess
By Captain Mike Lambert, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Move over naval officers, deck plate leadership is the chief petty officers' domain. CPOs celebrated the 114th anniversary of their official designation on 1 April 2007.

Now it's time to retake ownership: CPOs, become the intrusive leaders that Sailors need. Reassert your proper and traditional role.1

When did the CPO Mess begin to decline and lose some of its effectiveness and credibility? That question is for another writer to research. Right now we just need to heed the words of Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy Joe Campa: "Chief petty officers are first and foremost deck plate leaders charged with developing Sailors and enforcing standards."2 Campa started his assignment as our 11th MCPON (July 2006) with a wakeup call, saying it was time to "reset the Mess."3

You heard him, Chiefs: in other words, anchor up. Cattle-ranch hands "cowboy up" when they put on their spurs, cinch up their saddles, and get the toughest jobs done; CPOs need to anchor up to get the CPO Mess back on the right track and provide the deck plate leadership that our Navy needs so sorely today.

The CNO pointed to a direct relationship between strength of the CPO Mess and command success: "When a Chiefs' Mess is hitting on all cylinders, there is no better command, and when a Chiefs' Mess is not working well, there is nothing worse."4

Anchor Up

This means get out from behind your computer, get out of the CPO Mess, and plant yourself firmly on the deck plates leading our Sailors. No one else can do it, not even that stellar first class who's been doing a bang-up job as your leading petty officer. A great first class petty officer should never be considered a suitable substitute for a CPO. When the job calls for a CPO, anchor up, Chief, and get the job done. Take that stellar first class petty officer with you, while you're at it, and show her or him how it's done.

Some argue that a CPO Academy would be more useful than CPO initiation (Season of Pride/transition) in developing chiefs. But, based on personal experience, I think a better case can be made for chiefs simply reasserting the role of their mess.

More than 30 years ago, I began my life as a Sailor being raised by Navy chiefs. By most accounts, they did a good job. I would not have progressed from seaman recruit to captain without strong CPO leadership at every level-from my division chiefs to my command master chiefs. I needed course corrections at every paygrade. Fortunately, there was always a strong CPO to provide the necessary guidance. I have 100 percent confidence that today's CPOs are even better equipped to provide this guidance to our Sailors and junior officers.

Otherwise, the effectiveness and viability of the Mess will be even further eroded. There can be no compromises when fulfilling the MCPON's mandate that "Chief petty officers take on the role of standard bearers, to enforce those standards amongst ourselves as well as up and down the chain of command."5 This requires that well-meaning officers step aside and allow the chiefs to do their jobs, while chiefs step forward to act for command-wide excellence.

Overcome the Programs

The Navy has created many "people" programs over the years. Each has somehow diminished the role of the Mess. Not one of these programs is a replacement or substitute for sound CPO leadership. Chiefs, it is time to return to your roots. Not only do your Sailors need you there, your officers want you there.

There was a time when the chief was a ratings expert, financial adviser, chaplain, mentor, marriage counselor, career counselor, banker, Sexual Assault Victim Intervention rep, Equal Employment Opportunity representative-and, I might add, sometimes mother and father. When I was a second class petty officer in 1978,1 would never have considered going above my chief about anything. As a petty officer, I never spoke to my division officer; there was never a need. My leading petty officer was the beginning and the chief was the end of the chain of command for me and the other Sailors in our division.

Things have changed too much. Today it is not uncommon for Sailors of nearly every paygrade to approach officers to ask for one thing or another. Stop! Send them back to their chiefs.

Sailors would be hard-pressed to come up with a question that can't properly be answered by the Chiefs' Mess. On Navy Knowledge Online (www.nko.navy.mil), Sailors have posted more than 1,000 questions that bypass not only their chiefs but the entire chain of command. They're looking for answers to questions that are clearly inside the lifelines-that is, within their chief's domain.

We need to push these Sailors back to the chiefs before it is too late. The chief in their command has the right answer and can provide it. The continued credibility of the Mess depends on it.

Chiefs need to provide that intrusive leadership so often talked about and so rarely practiced. Get involved in your Sailors' lives. Avoid broad statements like "All Sailors are leaders." This type of statement only confuses people. All Sailors are not leaders. Sailors can't be left to their own devices. They need to be led, and chiefs must provide this leadership.

Lead the Sailors

Even some of our senior officers are not the type of leaders we need them to be. The Navy Inspector General's report from December 2004 showed that during 2003 and the first six months of 2004, 38 commanding officers were relieved. Just six months into 2007, 10 commanding officers have already been relieved, according to Captain Michael Reed, Fleet Forces Command's Inspector General. That is one fewer than for all of 2006.6

Half of these dismissals were due to personal misconduct. Neither the wardroom nor the CPO Mess has a monopoly on quality leaders. But a strong CPO Mess can make us all-from seaman to admiral-better at our jobs if we let the chiefs do their jobs and stop trying to turn them into division officers.

As the MCPON said, "Leadership on the division and deck plate level is a leadership dynamic that requires two people."7 We need chiefs and officers, and both have their roles.

The division officer develops initial management and leadership skill while being responsible for the division's performance and conduct, watch bills, material condition, and readiness of equipment and spaces, work supervision and damage control readiness. Foundational leadership begins on the deck plates, which is where the chiefs come in.

MCPON Campa is making many positive steps in the right direction to reset the Mess. Chiefs, if you follow his guidance, you have a good chance of getting the CPO Mess back to its critical role in the success of our Navy. Then it will genuinely contribute once again to command excellence. MCPON Campa may not be the first to have thought of these improvements, but he's forging ahead with them by:

* Issuing MCPON's CPO Season Guidance

* Providing new policy on CMC badges and a single name for our command master chiefs

* Scrapping what had been called the CNO/MCPON Leadership Panel and renaming it the MCPON's Leadership Mess

* Opening the Senior Leadership Academy to CPOs

* Recognizing the difference between the CPO Mess and the wardroom and ensuring the lines of authority are not blurred any further

* Establishing and formalizing standards for the CPO Mess afloat and ashore through appropriate Navy instructions and directives

* Recognizing once and for all that experiments similar to the Decatur CPO Division Officer effort are not necessary and waste the Navy's time. CPOs possess the intellect and skills to be division officers, just as master chiefs can excel in the demanding academic environment of the Naval War College. We don't need experiments to prove these things; they are self-evident.

These actions alone will not reset the CPO Mess, but it's a start. Remember officers, the chiefs have the deck. Chiefs, anchor up. Help the MPCON get the job done. "The tone of the ship, the tone of the service itself must come more directly from the chief petty officers than from any other group of people in the Navy. You have the standard; live up to it."8