The Washington debate over the pullout from Iraq splits into two camps. One says stay until the mission is accomplished. The other argues for a pullout as fast as possible. There is a third alternative, a termination strategy that should have been written and delivered with the initial plan to invade Iraq. We started this war to remove the murderous Saddam Hussein and eliminate the threat of WMD-mission accomplished.
This strategy would drastically reduce U.S. casualties. Learning a lesson from our rapid departure from Vietnam, this time we would not abandon the "purple thumb people"-the ink-stained Iraqi people, police, and military who risked death by voting to obtain freedom.
Most arguments for our withdrawal are driven by a desire to end the daily roll call of American casualties in that wartorn country. There are no similar calls to bring troops home from places such as Germany, South Korea, or Okinawa. The strategy I propose would result in dramatic downturns in the number of U.S. casualties, potentially to no casualties.
A lesson I took away from my time in Vietnam was that conflict termination in a situation of that nature should not be abrupt. Once the major combat power of the United States departed South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese massed their forces-something we had been waiting for throughout our involvement there. They came south and defeated an almost-ready South Vietnamese Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps held together by a handful of gallant U.S. advisers. Had we left significant combat power in position to support the South Vietnamese military, the outcome of that war might have been vastly different.
Back to Iraq. On a preset date to be determined by the U.S. commanders-it could be in one year or ten-we withdraw all U.S. forces into three pre-established, large, sprawling, fortified combat bases strategically spread throughout the country. Marines and naval forces would be sea-based in the Persian Gulf or the Mediterranean, along with ample carrier support housing naval aviation assets. For Army, Air Force, and allies, Al Assad might accommodate significant air and ground assets.
These combat bases would house predominantly allied forces-no local labor. We would no longer use ground transportation outside the wire except in extreme situations. Necessary troop movements, reinforcement, or resupply would be done mostly by helicopter, with armed escorts. The major threat would shift from IEDs, placed at the enemy's choice of time and location, to a very real ground-to-air threat-but U.S. forces would pick the times and routes. Vertical/ airborne assault could be supplemented by armored cavalry operations at the commander's discretion. The on-scene commander would assign missions based on the situation and guidance from the National Command Authority.
At this point, we could turn the war over to the government of Iraq, retaining sufficient combat power as a support force if the enemy massed for battle. This would place the Iraqi armed forces under the command of their government, directly responsible for its own fate. If the enemy inside their borders does not mass, Iraqi forces should grow steadily stronger until they no longer need us as backup. This strategy also forces the Iraqi government to sort out and solve its domestic problems-one way or another. The signal to the world would be that the United States will stand by its commitments but not offer an open-ended promise to fight another country's battles indefinitely. Gradually, at a time of our choosing, we would withdraw completely.
Since the Iraqi armed forces have not reached a performance level that permits them to overwhelm the enemies they face, we will continue our training program. We would establish a major training center adjacent to one of our bases. We could establish a secure route between the two, eliminating the possibility of enemy intrusion. Billeted in our bases, our troops would move to the Iraqi forces' area only to conduct training.
This strategy will allow us to carry out what should be our two most pressing goals at this point: drastically diminishing U.S. casualties yet supporting the people of Iraq and its duly constituted government.
Lieutenant Colonel Madonna is vice president of sales for Syntonics LLC and resides on Maryland's Eastern Shore. He is East Coast vice president of the U.S. Naval Academy Class of 1962 and served for 21 years as a Marine infantry officer.