The Navy and Its DDG-1000-Heading Wrong
(See R. H. Smith, p. 10, August 2007 Proceedings)
Bob A. Gabbert-Finally! Someone has the nerve to expose the DDG-1000 for the folly it is. I was especially pleased to see it was the skipper of the USS Wilkinson (DL-5), because my ship, the USS Kearsarge (CVS-33), operated with the Wilkinson. I remember watching that greyhound streak away from us because she was the fastest ship on the West Coast at that time.
I find it ironic that this article appears in the Coast Guard issue of Proceedings, as the Navy trying to move into the shallow waters of the littorals at the same time the Coast Guard is moving into deep water.
Carrying Captain Smith's ideas a bit further, why spend limited budget dollars on creating ships with house sides sloped inward a few degrees in an attempt to make them stealthy when sea roll will cause the sloped side to be vertical 4 times a roll-cycle? I briefly worked on the Sea Shadow (IX-529), and it appears designers are trying to copy that design. But the Sea Shadow had 45-degree sides on a stable small waterplane area twin-hull platform, plus it had special coating and design elements to reduce infrared signature. The only time a slightly sloped side will be stealthy is when it is tied to a pier.
Why are we decommissioning Los Angeles-class submarines well short of their design lifetime, and spending huge amounts of money on Virginia-class boats? Why build Aegis cruisers when the DDG-51 class has the same system? Why build cruisers at all?
If the DDG-1000 does in fact have a tumble-home, whaleback design as depicted in the article, how is anyone going to remain safely topside forward of the bridge in any sea state above calm?
Let's follow Captain Smith's advice and start building ships we need rather than some pie-in-the-sky design exercise.
Commander Robert H. Downie, Suply Corps, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)-I commend Captain Smith on his candor and I believe his comments are right on target. I recently read Robert Sumrall's book on Sumner/Gearing destroyers, one of the best classes of ships our country has ever produced. There are many reasons for the success of this class, but some of the main ones are:
* They were versatile.
* They were a compromise.
* They made trade-offs.
* They could be built in large numbers.
* They were expendable.
The lessons learned from the Sumner/Gearings should not be forgotten. We need sufficient numbers of Captain Smith's ships that are "good at many tasks, master fully of none," not a "handful of gold-plated warships" capable of meeting all threats.
It is true that we have built some destroyer types with too close an eye on the budget. These ships turned out to be of little value and were retired well before the end of their service lives. But the answer is not to go to the other extreme and attempt to build a platform that is all things to all people. That has never been what tin cans were about.
Close the Gaps
(See R. F. Bennett, pp. 42-46, August 2007 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Charles F. Home III, U.S. Navy (Retired)-Captain Bennett is right on the mark with his powerful points on why our major ports need to prepare for terrorists' mine threats. While shipboard containers and their security are important, so are mines that come from many different venues, including small boats and even swimmers.
It is time for our Coast Guard Port Captains to address, along with other relevant government agencies, this serious mine threat from 21st-century terrorists and prepare their vital ports ahead of time. The key is to do harbor bottom surveys to locate all the bottom objects. Then, if terrorists mine or just say they mined the harbors of our major ports, port personnel can quickly and effectively find the potential mines or, if not there, call their bluff quickly. This is important to do now-not after the fact-in order to re-open our affected ports in days, not weeks. Our active-duty Coast Guard and Navy leaders need to closely study this timely and powerful article. They must "close the gap" between our very relevant "stove pipe" government agencies in order to respond as a team to mine attacks or threats to our vital ports.
The Coast Guard is Discovering a New Force-Multiplier-and it's Already on Board
(See A. Pine, pp. 32-37, August 2007 Proceedings)
Anthony M. Castelletti, Branch ChiefRecruiting (Atlantic West), U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary-Mr. Pine's article, first and foremost, was from my point of view a welcome addition for a Proceedings readership that may not be aware of the role or even existence of the uniformed, civilian branch of the U.S. Coast Guard. I found his assessment to be, by and large, an accurate depiction not only of Auxiliary membership and our role within the Coast Guard forces, but of the present condition of affairs affecting the organization.
I do, however, hold a differing take on that which Mr. Pine views as a disadvantage-the Auxiliary's seeming inability in most locations to train "and become fully familiar with" one particular vessel. While there is no denying either the truth or inevitability of this situation, there is an upside. As an example, I am part of a group of five (two qualified coxswains, two qualified crew and a crew trainee) that regularly participates together in patrols on the Niagara River and Lake Erie, an area of responsibility within Coast Guard Sector-Buffalo, New York. Alternating among three different privately owned vessels, I speak for all five when I state each and every one of us feels competent to perform any task or duty required of us on any of those three boats. This is in addition to experience gained on other boats owned by our flotilla members that are used in regularly scheduled weekly on-the-water training sessions.
I am sure the Coast Guard and Auxiliary alike would welcome the funding required to provide each Auxiliary Division or Flotilla with its own vessel. Changing that circumstance, as pointed out by our National Commodore, Steven Budar, "won't be easy." The alternative, as practiced at every level of the Auxiliary, in every District, Division, and Flotilla is not merely to make do with the current situation, but rather take advantage of it. Nationwide, the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary trains, patrols, and becomes familiar with as many vessels as possible in order to more expertly do our jobs in support of the Coast Guard, to be "Always Ready."
Charles Warren-As Flotilla member training officer I reviewed the crew qualifications guide for both Auxiliarists and regulars. At the time, several years ago, the principal differences were the absence of physical fitness tasks for Auxiliarists and some information in the regular crew qualifications on rescue from downed helicopters. I'm told that the helicopter information is no longer in the regular manual.
That is not to say that evaluation of those tasks is absolutely comparable. And, in many cases, Auxiliarists' performance is adversely affected by age and physical condition. This is not to say that evaluation should be made more stringent. In fact recruitment and retention might be improved if possession of a U.S. Coast Guard Motor Boat Operator or Masters license, with assistance towing endorsement, was recognized as equivalent of the crew and coxswain books.
The one operational area in which Auxiliarists excel, however, is maritime domain awareness. Regular personnel rotate through assignment every couple years. Granted they work full time on the water in their assigned area of operations, but that still may not provide the depth of knowledge that some Auxiliarists bring to the task. I've been sailing San Francisco Bay, for instance, since I was in my teens, and regularly for the last 25 years. That depth of knowledge is rarely critical, but in the post-9/11 world we are looking for rarities. Another incremental advantage is that Auxiliary vessels are not recognizable at a distance because of their diversity.
Have I actually seen anything out of the ordinary? Well, I've put six buoys (Private Aids To Navigation) on Chart No. 18649 over the years, reported several ATON discrepancies, and notified Station San Francisco of various floating hazards, dead marine mammals, and so on. The one rescue I undertook was declined by the distressed party, a windsurfer more concerned about his board than his life. He was eventually recovered by Station Golden Gate. Wonder if my disappearing over the horizon influenced his ultimate decision?
Ron Darcey-Mr. Pine's article should be a wake-up call for both the Auxiliary and the Coast Guard in direct relationship to retention, recruitment, and, most important, operations. The Auxiliary national leadership is remiss in its assumption that large numbers of member departures (10 percent) can be blamed on required security checks. On the contrary, members are leaving because of lack of operations. Budget cuts reduced operations and missions (up to 70 percent) to such an extent that many no longer enjoy the reason they joined. If recruitment and retention is a critical objective, then Auxiliary officials and the Coast Guard should comprehend a basic reason people volunteer-that of personal benefit. In the case of the Auxiliary, that spells operations. While many Auxiliarists perform numerous administrative, training, instructional, inspection, and other important duties-and superbly so-membership is centered on service aboard vessels and aircraft, not administration.
The Auxiliary has other issues that it must address, including the cultural crutch of "civilian volunteer," that hampers respect in some Coast Guard circles. Although civilians, Auxiliarists operate in a military environment and should be expected to serve accordingly. As Mr. Pine candidly outlines, Auxiliarists have no duty to respond, "no watch-bill in which they are expected to show up when they're scheduled or risk expulsion." He points to the ease at which Auxiliarists can turn down a request previously committed to; an issue that needs to be addressed and ratified.
Training is also of concern. Auxiliary training is fragmented and haphazard in many Districts, Divisions, and down to the Flotilla level. Especially lacking is a consistent, standardized mission- and asset-specific national training program. Again Mr. Pine is right on track when he refers to the "good-old-boy network" in which buddy qualifies buddy without the requirements, recurrent training, or currency standards accomplished. Instead of a once- or twice-a-year operational qualification, the Auxiliary should impose greater standards of training in all categories, especially that of currency, to retain operational qualification. Members not in compliance simply go non-operational until qualifications are met. Such requirements should be regarded as paramount for operational capability, excellence, and safety.
Many Auxiliarists are growing weary of the continual accolades of "force multiplier" that are not reflective of the current, low-operational situation. Month after month Proceedings publishes Coast Guard articles relating to operational planning that are devoid of Auxiliary inclusion as part of that planning process, or suggestive of where the Auxiliary fits as a force multiplier. While the Auxiliary does not contend the organization's mission should assume that of a second Coast Guard Reserve, the reality of 9/11 has unequivocally changed the course of history. Since 9/11, the Auxiliary has assumed tasks and missions never before Auxiliary-oriented. Who would have thought as the 20th century drew to a close that Auxiliarists would be inspecting cargo containers, carrying out commercial fishing and ferry boat inspections, and other non-traditional Auxiliary operations? Who would have thought the Coast Guard would be tasked in low-speed air intercepts and that it would fall on Auxiliary aviation to provide the aircraft that helicopter crews would depend on to train and maintain currency?
Perhaps the time has arrived to reevaluate the Auxiliary and decide if this highly capable organization should be tasked with operations justifying the term "force multiplier," included in the Coast Guard's operational plan, or returned to its original intent of recreational boating safety and education.
Mines in Ports: A Serious Threat
(See A. Cappabianca, pp. 48-51, August 2007 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Charles F. Home III, U.S. Navy (Retired)-Arthur Cappabianca's article outlines dramatically that the time has come to move out smartly on protecting our vital ports from mines by preparing ahead of time and having the critical teamwork between the Coast Guard and Navy in place to respond effectively and quickly.
The harbor bottom surveys of our ports that he strongly recommends are absolutely vital to rapid and effective port responses to mine threats, both actual and bluffs. To do these critical ahead-of-time and after-the-fact harbor bottom surveys, Mr. Cappabianca recommends the Navy pre-position some MCM or MHC mine sweepers on the East Coast as well as in San Diego. I would suggest that a more practical approach would be to have port militias, consisting of local retired Coast Guard and Navy members, voluntarily man small boats equipped with side-scan sonars with the help and funding of local industry leaders. When I was commander of Mine Warfare Command (1979-1984), we had the very effective Craft of Opportunity Program (COOP) in each major port with Fleet Reserve Units manning local small boats to do the critical harbor surveys. The key is to have locally talented and committed people in each port to do the harbor surveys.
Our Coast Guard and Navy need to work together, starting now, to prepare for and respond to mine threats against our ports that could be the next 9/11.
Carrier Aviation on the Move: But Going Where?
(See N. Polmar, pp. 86-87, June 2007; R. F. Dunn, p. 7, July 2007; D. Architzel, A. Siegel, p. 78, August 2007 Proceedings)
Carrier Aviation on the Move
(See N. Polmar, pp. 86-87, July 2007 Proceedings)
Admiral Richard C. Macke, U.S. Navy (Retired)-Admiral Bob Dunn's comments on Norman Polmar's June column were superb. Not unexpected since Bob is one of the leading experts on naval aviation.
Then I read the July rendition of Mr. Polmar's opinions. Though I spent 36 years defending his right to say what he wants, I certainly do not have to believe or support it. Citing the GAO and Greenpeace in an analysis of what type of aircraft carrier should be procured in the future is like asking the fox to develop the hen house security.
Mr. Polmar cites Greenpeace in stating, "Nuclear-powered carriers do not transit faster to a region." Bob Dunn will surely remember the 25 knot SOA from Naples, Italy, around the horn of Africa, to the Persian Gulf made by the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) since he was on board for the first part of the transit. And the Nimitz arrived on station with a full load of ammunition and aviation fuel sufficient to support a week of sustained combat operations. No conventionally powered aircraft carrier could have performed this feat.
Taking advantage of nuclear propulsion versus her conventionally powered Russian "tattletales," the Nimitz was able to "condition" her uninvited escorts such that when the helicopters were launched for the Iranian rescue mission in 1980, there were no observers present. A conventionally powered carrier would have had great difficulty in doing so because of the need to refuel her propulsion plant.
There are many more instances of events where the advantages of nuclear power in an aircraft carrier were equally obvious. Somehow Mr. Polmar and Greenpeace have overlooked them.
Scorpion Down: Sunk by the Soviets, Buried by the Pentagon: The Untold Story of the USS Scorpion
(See J. B. Bryant, pp. 82-83, August 2007 Proceedings)
Ed Offley-Several weeks before Scorpion Down, my book on the 1968 loss of the USS Scorpion (SSN-589), was published last May, I received an e-mail request from retired Navy Captain Jim Bryant, who stated that he was planning to review the book for Proceedings. He requested my contact information, explaining: "When I review books I like to make contact with the author so I can check points and make sure I understand what the author was saying." It was the kind of "walk-the-extra-mile" gesture I have long associated with the Naval Institute and the professionals who write for it; I replied the same day but never did hear back from him.
I was therefore truly disappointed to read in the August issue of Proceedings Bryant's intemperate and vicious attack not only on the book, but on my professional reputation as well. Had he been sincere about making an effort to fully understand the information I had gathered over a 23-year period, I am confident he would not have come to the ill-founded conclusions he did as to the accuracy of my reporting.
Captain Bryant's assault on my book-where, let's be frank, he all but accuses me of fabricating information-centers on an assertion on which we both actually agree. He wrote, "In order to be told, this tale would require senior admirals involved [in the Scorpion incident] to recant their stories years later to the author." He then added that the only survivor of three key Navy officials I had interviewed had denied what I reported him as having told me. The other two flag officers, Bryant continued, were dead and by implication unavailable to defend themselves.
This is in fact what happened: In April 1983, former COMSUBLANT Vice Admiral Arnold F. Schade revealed in an interview that his command was searching for the Scorpion at least four days before its failure to reach port on 27 May 1968 triggered the highly publicized SUBMISS alert. Former CNO Admiral Thomas Moorer confirmed Schade's allegation in an on-the-record interview. And in 1997, former Director of Submarine Warfare Vice Admiral Philip Beshany did the same, providing even more details about how the Atlantic Fleet was looking for the nuclear-powered attack submarine in secret the week before the incident went public.
This revelation remains crucial to understanding how the Navy's accounts of the Scorpion incident-including press releases, contemporaneous interviews, and even sworn testimony before the court of inquiry-were misleading to the point of deceptive. Four surviving members of the court said years later they were told that the Scorpion incident began only with the submarine's failure to reach port that Memorial Day, a surprise so stunning that Submarine Squadron 6 was forced to deal with dozens of family members who stood huddled on a rain-swept pier for hours thinking their loved ones were due in that day. Declassified court transcripts-including sworn testimony from Schade himself-reiterated the official narrative that no one suspected anything amiss with the submarine until mid-afternoon on 27 May.
Had Captain Bryant bothered to ask me, I would have gladly provided him the transcripts and tapes from the interviews I conducted with Admirals Schade, Moorer, and Beshany. They revealed that intelligence information gathered the week of 20-26 May (the Scorpion went down on 22 May) had sparked a top secret search for the submarine. I would have also been glad to show him Navy documents I discovered in the naval archives last year that indicate the secret search actually began on 18 May 1968, four days before the submarine even sank.
I would particularly like to disabuse Proceedings readers of Captain Bryant's insinuation that I cynically interviewed Admirals Schade and Moorer, waited nearly two decades for them to pass away, and only then sprang my findings in my book at a time when they obviously could not explain or defend themselves. Published articles of mine that explored the classified, pre-27 May search for the Scorpion and the two admirals' on-the-record confirmation of same, appeared in four newspapers between 1983 and 1998. At no time during that 15-year span did either the former CNO or former COMSUBLANT utter a single word challenging the accuracy of those accounts. In fact, Schade agreed to a follow-up interview with me on 14 March 1986, where he provided even more details about the secret, pre-27 May search, well aware that I had already published two major articles centering on his 1983 disclosure. Neither did Beshany object when his revelations appeared as part of a package of stories that ran in The Seattle Post-Intelligencer on 21 May 1998, and have remained posted on the newspaper's Web site to this day.
I respectfully submit that the official Navy account of the Scorpion incident, and not my reporting, meets Captain Bryant's definition of "pure fiction."
Peter G. Claymore-I think that Captain Bryant did a better job of researching his review of Ed Offley's book on the loss of the USS Scorpion than the author did in writing the book originally. As in many theories of massive conspiracies, lack of evidence is further proof of the conspiracy.
Decades ago, as a junior surface warfare officer, I was on the distant periphery of the Scorpion story. In the spring of 1968 I was on board the USS Independence (CV-62) in the Mediterranean. We operated with the Scorpion prior to her departure for home and were affected by her mysterious loss with all hands. This was not that long after the USS Thresher (SSN-593) disaster. All we could do was speculate on the basis of virtually no facts and some recent articles on the dangers of the ocean faced by subs.
One of the facts we did have was that the Scorpion failed to arrive home on schedule. My wife was in Norfolk at the time, and she still remembers vividly the gray day and the families waiting on the pier for the boat that is still on patrol. Apparently this was part of the conspiracy. About a year after the loss, I reported aboard the USS Compass Island (AG-153) as first lieutenant. Captain Bond was still the CO when I reported, and a number of other officers who had been in the Compass Island during the Scorpion search including the XO, the special projects officer, my predecessor, and the ship's boatswain, were still on board as well. As part of my briefings for relieving, I was told about the mission to help in the search but that the Compass Island was sent home after a short stay because she did not have the proper equipment for finding the Scorpion.
The Compass Island was involved in navigation research for the Fleet ballistic missile program, an activity in which she was very successful. But knowing exactly where you are does not mean that you know where everything else is. In order for Mr. Offley's conspiracy to be successful, those in on it would not only be a few senior officers, most of them conveniently dead, but a large number of lower ranking officers and enlisted personnel. Did he even examine the log of the Compass Island, or was that too doctored to hide the truth?