Naval Academy . . . A Crucible for Warriors
(See J. Fowler, pp. 14-18, October 2007 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Andrew M. Biehn, U.S. Navy—As a former Naval Academy instructor (Strategy and Tactics Course from 2000-2002) I am heartened to read about Vice Admiral Fowler's efforts to refocus the academy on its core mission of preparing combat leaders for the Fleet and Marine Corps in the areas of competence, character, and compassion. His initial actions to tighten the rules governing midshipmen life are on target, but they are undoubtedly the low hanging fruit in the larger campaign required to ensure the Naval Academy is the premier undergraduate training institution for naval officers. Vice Admiral Fowler correctly points out that "midshipmen leading midshipmen" while valuable, does not provide the full introduction to Fleet leadership that will best prepare future officers. In order to better train Fleet leaders, the Naval Academy needs to conduct some serious soul-searching to determine how it can best prepare midshipmen in terms of competence, which may require significant change to its academic philosophy.
On my arrival at the Naval Academy fresh from my division officer tours (and having been commissioned through NROTC), I was stunned to see how little of the Brigade's time was actually devoted to professional development and learning the core skills of their future profession: seamanship and navigation, small unit tactics, and naval heritage. The midshipmen, being very bright young men and women, review their curriculum and see its focus on traditional academics and rightly conclude that their success or failure at the Naval Academy is more closely tied to their performance in electrical engineering than it is to any of their Professional Development curriculum. The situation is best summed up in the frustrated comments of a fellow instructor (an exchange officer from the Royal Navy): "This isn't a naval academy, it's a small engineering college with a ROTC program that's gotten completely out of hand!" In the area of professional competence, the nation should reap a larger return on its investment in the Naval Academy
I recently observed the results first hand as a cruiser's senior watch officer. Naval Academy graduates arrive in the Fleet with no professional advantage over their NROTC counterparts, despite the significantly larger investment of both time and money made in them during their four years at USNA. While this may be mitigated for some career paths with years of post-graduate training (such as nuclear power and naval aviation) it is most apparent in surface warfare, where newly commissioned ensigns arrive on board their ships (sometimes deployed in combat zones) within weeks of graduation.
The Academy is already well-positioned to meet the Superintendent's goal of increasing midshipmen understanding of Fleet leadership, with a strong staff of Fleet-experienced junior and senior officers in the Professional Development Division. Increasing the percentage of academic time devoted to professional development, as well as emphasizing the importance of the professional curriculum to both the faculty and the Brigade, will help improve the professional competence of Naval Academy graduates, easing their transition to the Fleet, providing better leadership to Sailors and Marines, and increasing the professional knowledge (and confidence) of our wardrooms and squadrons.
Don't Hate San Francisco! Engage, Don't Estrange
(See C. Hooper, pp. 64-68, October 2007 Proceedings)
Gregory J. Chase—I believe I have a unique perspective from which to comment on Professor Hooper's article on San Francisco's relationship with the military. I grew up in San Francisco, served six years in the U.S. Navy (USS Callaghan, [DDG-994]), my ship attended two Fleet Weeks in San Francisco (including the first in 1981), and I've lived here since my honorable discharge in 1985.
To emphasize the love/hate relationship between San Francisco and the military, I can tell you that San Francisco was the only place in the world where my ship practiced "repel boarders."
Captain Tom Spink, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Professor Hooper thoroughly describes the conflicting forces and long Navy history in the Bay area. From the Spanish garrison to Chester Nimitz and beyond, the Bay area has been a great Navy town. Professor Hooper wants the Navy to educate the populace on this naval legacy. Fleet Week, with its Parade of Ships and airshow featuring the Blue Angels, brings one million people to the shoreline. The majority clearly respect the military and want to show them a good time when they pull liberty in San Francisco. But a small antiwar group keeps trying to remove all military ties. I respect their position on war. No one wants war, least of all the military, but I do not understand why they cannot tell the difference between a museum dedicated to telling the story of our greatest generation and their efforts to save our way of life, and something that is only pro-war.
The USS Hornet (CV-12) took part in World War II, the Cold War, and the space program. It could be a tremendous draw for multiple generations of tourists in San Francisco and residents of the entire Bay area. The USS Midway (CV-41) is parked in downtown San Diego and had a million visitors in just 13 months. The ship is a great success and I am sure it is providing lots of tax revenue to the city. What the Hornet needs is a benefactor like the USS Intrepid (CV-11) had in New York City. It also needs the leadership of San Francisco to see the financial potential of the Hornet to the waterfront. Once the ship is in San Franciso, it will provide lots of tax money to the city and will be the venue for a variety of historical and educational events. The ship and her air group are in fantastic shape, because of lots of hard work and dedication. She needs to move across the bay or she will surely die. All that history gone—it is unthinkable!
We all love to visit San Francisco, but the city seems to have the mentality that if all is peaceful in their town then it doesn't matter if things are going to hell around them. They placate the fringe groups so they will not protest in the streets and thereby upset the almighty tourists. It is always about the money, so let's convince the politicians that the potential for tax revenues should outweigh a small group of well-intentioned but misguided folks.
Where's the Beef?
(See B. Hanley, pp. 16-20, September 2007 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander David M. Wallace, U.S. Navy, Deputy Joint Force Trainer—Doctrine, Joint Warfighting Center—Lieutenant Colonel Hanley makes a strong point that our national strategic documents look pretty. This, however, appears to be his only legitimate argument against them. Rather than providing a comprehensive analysis of the documents, he analyzes their slick marketing look and concludes that our military leaders are simply unable to "think through strategic problems" and have therefore not produced a strategy.
Initially, the author confuses the word strategy with the concept of the strategic level of war. Using the author's example, Normandy, Paris, and Antwerp were operational objectives during the invasion of Western Europe in 1944. These flowed from the Allies' strategy to "expel Nazism from Western Europe," which in turn flowed from the national strategic objective to bring about the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany. So, we see that the Department of Defense Dictionary definition of "strategy," quoted by the author as "muddled thinking" is, in fact, correct: "A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives."
Lieutenant Colonel Hanley goes on to complain that the current National Military Strategy (NMS) does not address ongoing operations in Iraq, does not provide details on our nation's enemies and potential enemies around the globe, and simply assumes American hegemony. I would direct the author's attention to both the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (both available on the JCS website). These strategic documents lay out definitions of victory, descriptions of the enemy and the enemy's tactics, strategic objectives, and a detailed strategy for achieving those objectives. The strategies consider both an indirect and direct approach in the employment of military power in support of national objectives. While one could (and perhaps should) argue about whether the strategies outlined are the correct ones, to argue that our military leadership has not developed strategies is false.
Finally, Lieutenant Colonel Hanley repeatedly states that our strategies must reflect reality. He outlines several trends in world events and bemoans the fact that the NMS does not specifically address them. He misses the point that the NMS recognizes that there is danger in trying to predict the next point of conflict; rather than attempting to counter every possible threat to the United States simultaneously (an approach that does not reflect fiscal reality), the NMS provides a construct to counter any threat. From the NMS flows several other strategic documents (including the two mentioned previously) that describe our preparation for, and response to, some of our nation's most pressing threats.
Our national strategic documents are pretty, and they do contain more than a fair share of buzzwords. It is unfortunate that Lieutenant Colonel Hanley was so distracted by the glossy covers that he was unable to provide a cogent analysis of the strategies inside the covers—whether they are correct and whether we are, in fact, following them. I look forward to reading that article.
Helicopter Procurement: Playing with Fire
(See G. V. Galdorisi and S. C. Truver, pp. 64-68, September 2007 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral James R. Stark, U.S. Navy (Retired)—George Galdorisi and Scott Truver were right on target in their article highlighting the vulnerabilities on the current Navy Helicopter Plan. The Navy made a reasonable decision nearly a decade ago to neck down our helicopter type/model/series to a single platform—the SH-60. As a surface warfare officer, I have always been a great fan of the Seahawk for its ability to bring a whole new dimension to the antisubmarine warfare, command and control, and surveillance capabilities of our surface forces. And the MH-60R promises to continue that winning tradition. But that is only half the picture.
The problem is that we have loaded far too many new missions on the MH-60S—missions for which it was never designed—and then exacerbated this problem with a much higher operational tempo because of the ongoing global war on terrorism. Unfortunately, the MH-60S has neither the capacity nor the range for all that it now must do. As always, the Fleet will do its best to get the job done with whatever assets it possesses by dint of workarounds, longer hours, and diverting from other tasks. But that should not be the way the Navy structures for the future.
Special operations, combat SAR, medical evacuation, Fleet logistics, humanitarian assistance, and airborne mine countermeasures all beg for a more robust and capable platform that can better meet the Navy's needs while still operating from smaller vessels such as the LCS. There are good candidates out there now which could meet those challenges.
It is time the Navy took a new look at its overall helicopter requirements, especially in the area of medium lift, and examined the possible alternatives. Who knows, with more modern platforms having greater capability and lower life-cycle costs, we might even be able to get the job done better and still save on the budget. The real beneficiaries will be the Fleet and the American taxpayer.
Carrier Aviation: Dollars and Sense
(See N. Polmar, pp. 90-91, September 2007; C. Berlemann, pp. 7, 76 October 2007 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral John P. Cryer, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Nuclear aircraft carriers are unquestionably more expensive than smaller, STOVL-equipped LHDs. However, there is no inexpensive substitute for the aircraft these platforms bring to the fight. The venerable AV-8B has served the Marine Corps well for over three decades, but its operational contribution to ordnance delivered or aimpoints serviced is extremely small when compared to conventional carrier-based attack aircraft.
As an air operations director in the Combined Air Operations Center during Operation Enduring Freedom, I witnessed first hand the value of having persistent, long-range strike fighters (F-14, F/A-18) available throughout Afghanistan for a variety of missions, from on-call close air support to time-sensitive targeting. When OEF began, there were no other tactical aircraft closer than Kuwait, and while F-15E and F-16CJ aircraft were eventually used, the one-way trip to central Afghanistan was 1,700 nautical miles. The fact that all of these aircraft required big-wing tankers does not support the use of V/STOL aircraft; if we had to rely on AV-8Bs or even F-35Bs were they available, many more tankers would have been required. (Incidentally, big-wing tankers were available for naval TACAIR from the first day of combat operations, contrary to Mr. Polmar's assertion.)
It is interesting that Mr. Polmar leads his article with a 1977 quote from Admiral Holloway citing the value of V/STOL aircraft, while ignoring the words from the admiral's 2007 book Aircraft Carriers at War. Although the F-35B will be an enormous improvement over the Harrier, as Admiral Holloway states, "Today for example, the V/STOL version of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is 10 to 15 percent less capable than its conventional counterpart, although both use common parts and systems except those required for V/STOL operation. This 15 percent reduction in capability could be the difference between winning and losing air superiority" (p. 270). Admiral Holloway clearly understands and appreciates the value of V/STOL capability, but also recognizes its limitations.
Afghanistan is not an anomaly. We can't predict when the next requirement to project power at long ranges from the sea will occur, but it's critical that we have the capability to do so when (not if) that time arises. I applaud Mr. Polmar for starting this debate, but hope his mind remains open to the possibility that his premise is flawed.
(The writer is the Corporate Director of Naval Aircraft, Northrop Grumman Corporation)
Scorpion Down: Sunk by the Soviets, Buried by the Pentagon: The Untold Story of the USS Scorpion
(See J. B. Bryant, pp. 82-83, August 2007; E. Offley, pp. 78-79, September 2007; J. B. Bryant, pp. 78-79, October 2007 Proceedings)
Stanley L. Carmin, Ernest Castillo III, Edward K. Dalrymple, Frank Gambino, Joseph C. Guilfoyle, Charles D. Harding, Frank Harwood, Louis E. Haskins, John J. Holdzkom, Commander Donald B. Leach, U.S. Navy (Retired), George Miller, C. L. Polk, Bruce Rule, Ronald F. Smith, George P. Widenor—Author Ed Offley alleges that an Echo II class Soviet nuclear-powered submarine torpedoed and sank the USS Scorpion on 22 May 1968 and that the U.S. Navy engaged in a conspiracy to cover up Soviet involvement.
Declassified Navy documents provide two completely independent lines of evidence (acoustic and photographic) that conclusively establish the Scorpion was lost because the submarine's pressure hull collapsed at great depth from hydrostatic pressure. The first and strongest acoustic signal received by Canary Island underwater sensors on 22 May was produced by collapse of the pressure hull, probably at a depth near 1,900 feet. Subsequent, weaker acoustic events were produced by collapse of small internal structures such as spherical tanks, at depths as great as about 5,000 feet.
Extensive photographic coverage of the Scorpion wreck shows no structural damage consistent with explosion of a torpedo, nor any torpedo wreckage.
Offley alleges a U.S. Navy conspiracy to confiscate, suppress, and destroy SOund SUrveillance System (SOSUS) acoustic detections of an "underwater dogfight" between the Scorpion and the Echo II to prevent this detection event from being examined by the Navy's Scorpion Board of Inquiry.
We fifteen individuals, with a collective total of 400 years of experience at SOSUS sites and/or at activities that analytically supported SOSUS, agree that all acoustic data from 22 May were forwarded to the SOSUS Evaluation Center in Norfolk, Virginia. The analysis of these data was disseminated within Navy channels and beyond as appropriate. Most of these 15 individuals participated in this analysis effort.
Offley further alleges that a strong SOSUS detection (recording) of the "underwater dogfight" was viewed at the ASW Training Center in Norfolk circa 1982. Such a detection would have involved a range in excess of 1,500 nautical miles. This is difficult to accept when the more sensitive Canary Island acoustic sensors did not detect such an event at a range of only 400 miles. Offley does not explain how the purported dogfight tape first appeared 14 years after it was supposedly made or what has happened to it since. These, and other anomalies and inconsistencies indicate the tape was created at the ASW Training Center by copying three separate, unrelated detection events, a U.S. nuclear submarine, a Soviet Echo II class nuclear submarine, and a torpedo, onto a single tape for training purposes. This tape was then misrepresented to Offley's sources, a junior instructor and a basic-level student, as a real event. Bottom line: there was no SOSUS detection of a hostile encounter between the Scorpion and a Soviet submarine.
In summary, Ed Offley's allegations that the USS Scorpion was torpedoed and sunk by a Soviet Echo II submarine and that the U.S. Navy engaged in a conspiracy to cover up Soviet involvement are total fabrications. There was no Soviet involvement; there was no explosive event from a torpedo or any other source; there was no SOSUS tape. The Scorpion collapsed at great depth, most likely because of an on board problem the crew could not overcome.