Over the past several years force protection has risen from the commander's fundamental responsibility in peace and war to a separate, distinct, and highly publicized battlefield function. It has, in effect, become the equal of tasks such as command and control, maneuver, and logistics. More important, the notion of force protection has engendered an insidious defensive mindset at the strategic and operational levels of war that focuses on absorbing the hit, often at the expense of developing the self-confidence, tactical skill, and simple ancillary equipment required to avoid it.
The result of this is the sad fact that 21st-century Soldiers and Marines more closely resemble the heavily armored 15th-century French knights at Agincourt than the lightly armed English bowmen who slew them in great numbers. And while no marquis in 1415 would have dreamed of charging into the local bois with armor and lance to hunt for his supper, French knights eagerly flicked their spurs and made themselves easy prey for English hunters armed only with longbows and daggers. The results were as predictable as they were tragic, and little has changed in the six centuries since. Combat is still about hunters, prey, and fully understanding who you fight and the ground you fight on.
It is no secret that a problem exists. The March 2006 Defense Science Board Task Force on Force Protection in Urban and Unconventional Environments was rightfully critical of the gravitation of force protection to a decidedly defensive mindset fixed on "bunkers and barbed wire."1 In all, the task force got it right by describing the distributed battlefield U.S. forces operate on, the absolute requirement to improve small-unit leadership training, and the need to foster an offensive mindset in tactical ground forces. But it fell short by failing to lay down a marker demanding that senior leaders support tactical commanders who reduce troop loads (including personal protective equipment) when it is justified by their unit's level of training and combat requirements.
Emergence of Distributed Operations
The Marine Corps began to aggressively study these same issues several years before 2006, although not under the rubric of force protection. Instead, the effort grew from the Commandant of the Marine Corps' decision to better man, train, and equip the smallest tactical units for the unconventional war that loomed in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Thus the Corps was already concentrating on one of the more prescient findings of the 2006 science board study: "It is the business of leaders at all levels—not to mention the Pentagon's bureaucracy—to ensure that tactical troops have the support they need."2 Force protection comes down to ensuring that Marines are imbued with tactical acumen and agility that cannot be replaced by any level of passive protection.
The Distributed Operations concept was approved by the Commandant of the Marine Corps in April 2005. It spawned an ongoing program of experimentation and capability development that is wholly consistent with the battlefield today's Marine knows well. In that arena, the unconventional enemy disperses and seeks cover amid the population. Insurgents operate in intimately familiar surroundings, thereby requiring our small-unit leaders to hunt them down and kill or deter them before they can strike. Distributed Operations is the bedrock of small unit capability development. It has manifested itself in a force generation model that is laying the groundwork for better manned, trained, and equipped infantry small units.
Many of these initiatives are long overdue. Most are inherently simple; all are needed urgently. They started with basic building blocks such as increased access to formal training and education for junior leaders, fielding the right equipment in the right numbers at the right levels, and fully manning deploying units well prior to commencement of pre-deployment training. But these aggressive efforts have not stopped there. Experiments are under way to develop, assess, and institutionalize a program of instruction that relies exclusively on simulation to train every infantry squad leader in the employment of air-delivered fires. Concurrently, training teams are introducing enhanced observation and combat profiling skills to all Marines. In summary, Distributed Operations is the embodiment of the Corps' warfighting ethos, which is predicated on a thorough understanding of the commander's intent and empowerment of superbly trained and equipped small-unit leaders. It is maneuver warfare raised to the level originally envisioned by the writers of the seminal Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1: Warfighting. Capability development based on operations in complex and distributed environments is not a static program.3
Hunter in Philosophy and Deed
Under the umbrella of Distributed Operations, and confident that counterinsurgency operations are here for the foreseeable future, the Marine Corps is conducting a number of supporting experiments to further enhance the ability of tactical units and make them as comfortable outside the barbed wire as inside. In the aggregate, these enhancements equate to a higher level of active force protection—i.e., going outside the wire with an attitude of justifiable confidence and offensive spirit. The recently concluded Combat Hunter and Squad Fires experimentation programs are noteworthy examples of these efforts.
Starting with Combat Hunter, the experiments seek to engender a small-unit offensive mindset, underscored by a greatly improved combat street sense. From the time Marines enter recruit training to the day they depart for overseas deployment, they are imbued with the notion they are hunters and our nation's enemies are their prey. It is not idle talk or false bravado. And this conceptual frame of mind is not limited to the Corps' infantry battalions. All Marines will undergo the requisite training to raise their skill levels and convince them they have the tools to beat the insurgent at his own game on his own turf. Every Marine is a hunter, whether walking point on a combat patrol or driving a 7-ton truck in a resupply convoy. The warfighting outlook cuts across military occupational specialties and exceeds the time-honored adage that every Marine is a rifleman.
Combat Hunter epitomizes the Corps' approach to small-unit and individual excellence; it is focused on developing an ambush mentality that includes police and detective skills, tactical cunning, and use of micro-terrain analysis. It is, however, much more than an attitude. History is replete with examples of overconfident and offensively oriented armies that were beaten to their knees by so-called second-rate (and frequently unconventional) forces. The Combat Hunter philosophy is buttressed by a hunter's view of the battlefield, itself supported by advanced observation skills combined with innate understanding of the enemy and the combat environment he chooses. This philosophy includes no such thing as the presence patrol. Rather, every patrol is an opportunity to proactively find, fix, and finish the enemy. Marines venture onto the counterinsurgency battlefield with the certainty that they have the tactical skill and baseline familiarity with the territory to seek out and defeat the insurgent in his own backyard. By so doing, they can best provide enhanced overall security and moral authority to forces engaged in stability restoration.
The parallel Squad Fires effort seeks to take small-unit empowerment to an even higher level by putting the power of the entire Marine air-ground task force at the disposal of that same small-unit leader, allowing him to operate over large swatches of terrain with firepower far beyond that of his organic weapons or even those of his parent unit. Experimentation has shown that squad leaders can be trained to use close air support entirely through simulation, thus reducing the training burden on the naval aviation community.
Why Combat Hunter and Active Force Protection?
Several recurring themes appear in force protection—related combat lessons learned, especially those involving operations in Iraq. First, Marines conducting routine presence patrols believe they are at a serious disadvantage in dealing with snipers and IEDs. In effect, they feel like sitting ducks, drawing fire in order to find and fix the enemy.4 Second, Soldiers and Marines are carrying too much weight and bulk. Their loads have reached the point of near absurdity—and not only in terms of pounds carried. Often overlooked is the impact of bulk on individual agility and overall mission performance. The biggest culprit, according to junior Marines and their leaders, is personal protective equipment. A direct cause-and-effect relationship is immediately apparent.
If the perception is that you or your Marines are likely to be on the receiving end of the first volley, be it sniper or IED, the obvious solution is to survive that initial contact. This is the theory behind full body armor, armored utility vehicles, and what is often referred to as a forward operating base mentality. Perhaps journalist-historian Army Colonel S. L. A. Marshall said it best: "What the machine has failed to do up to the present moment is decrease by a single pound the weight the individual has to carry in war. He is still as heavily burdened as the soldier of 1,000 years B.C."5 Marshall wrote these words more that 50 years ago.
The real dilemma, however, is where the knee in the curve exists relative to getting hit because you are an easy and immobile target, and not getting hit because you have advanced tactical skills and are more agile. Marines will tell you that the bulkiness of their protective gear prevents them from both moving with sufficient agility on the battlefield and employing their weapons properly. As a logical start, commanders might consider full personal protective equipment for Marines in vehicles, less than full equipment for dismounted Marines, and less yet for Marines engaged in outreach-type programs. The best way to compensate for less passive protection is to incorporate far more powerful active capabilities.
Using a combination of renowned big-game hunters, experienced urban police detectives, seasoned infantry trainers, human performance engineers, and even a veteran of the renowned Rhodesian Army Selous Scouts, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, Training and Education Command, and the Office of Naval Research collaborated to produce a training and equipment package that was put through its paces over the course of three limited objective experiments in seven months.6 These experiments focused on infantrymen with combat experience, infantrymen fresh out of school, and non-infantry Marines recently graduated from basic Marine Combat Training (schooling for all entry-level non-infantry Marines).
If Napoleon Bonaparte's alleged musing that the moral is to the physical as three is to one is valid, then Combat Hunter is an unqualified success. Not only did Marines demonstrate the ability to absorb the training—combat profiling, spotting anomalies in tactical environments, urban and rural tracking, tactical assessment, and reporting—but their own opinions of their improvement were extraordinary. Combat veterans routinely commented that this training would have prevented a large percentage of the casualties their units incurred on previous deployments.7 Given the consistent consensus among senior Marine Corps leaders that casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan could be reduced by better individual tactics, the potential payoff of the Combat Hunter initiative is extraordinary.
By collaborating with Training and Education Command, specifically the staffs from the East and West Coast Schools of Infantry and the Basic School, transition of the program to the schoolhouse has been practically instantaneous. Just as important is creation of individual lessons on compact discs that have been distributed to tactical units Corps-wide. This methodology will engender a two-pronged approach to capability development: one that starts with entry-level training for all Marines and continues with unit training conducted by the tactical chain of command.
Exploiting Success
The excellent results of Combat Hunter have not gone unnoticed even outside the Marine Corps. The Joint IED Defeat Organization asked to be informed of the program's objectives, methodologies, and results. That office is now a vocal and financial supporter, which is in itself a significant institutional sea change tacitly acknowledging that better battlefield situational awareness and tactics might well be an equal—or even greater—tool in defeating the IED threat than technology alone. The old adage that the best defense is a good offense appears to be gaining traction. Rightfully so, for on the 21st-century battlefield, a good offense is one comprised of small units made up of individuals with extraordinary skills.
It is now up to senior Marine leaders on and off the battlefield to capitalize on the success of Combat Hunter and Squad Fires. The fundamental question is simple: Does the increased capability of small units to find, fix, and finish their enemies, whether with organic weapons or with the entire panoply of Marine air-ground task force supporting assets, justify a reduction in the amount of equipment Marines carry or wear on some missions? As with all battlefield decisions, this depends on the commander's mission analysis. Even so, the short answer has to be yes. Tactical commanders at the battalion, company, and platoon levels must be confident that rational decisions made on the battlefield will be supported by their chain of command. Absent that, there can be no Distributed Operations and no Combat Hunters.
The Next Level
The Marine Corps continues to look at the offensive aspects of ground operations and better preparation of Marines for the irregular battlefield. These include ongoing limited objective experiments in Combat Fitness, Lightening the Load, and Company Level Intelligence Cells. Equally important, follow-on experiments are being planned to technologically advance the Combat Hunter and Squad Fires initiatives. In the case of Combat Hunter, an initiative is ongoing to explore enhanced simulation technologies that allow small-unit leaders to establish their environmental baseline using current imagery downloads and conduct virtual rehearsal. For Squad Fires, development and experimentation proceeds with better and lighter rangefinders and target illumination devices. While the Marine Corps approach to capability development is focused on training, it is not averse to technology. Every Marine deserves the best equipment money can buy to complement the world-class training he receives in the training pipeline and in his parent unit.
The face of war changes daily and, in the global information age, our technological edge is declining. The Marine Corps recognizes that small-unit leaders and individual Marines are going to win or lose its battles in the foreseeable future—and it is committed to winning. In keeping with their heritage of caring for their Marines, the Corps' leaders have fully committed themselves to the 2006 Defense Science Board's admonition to "ensure that tactical troops have the support they need."
As Lieutenant General Sir Giffard Martell noted, the result will be tactical leaders who truly understand that, presupposing good judgment, "willingness to take a chance will usually pay off."8 After all, war is, "a game not for fools or suckers but for those who have the courage to dare greatly."9
1. Defense Science Board Task Force on Force Protection in Urban and Unconventional Environments report, March 2006, p. iii.
2. Defense Science Board report, March 2006, p. 7.
3. In January 2007, a follow-on to the original Distributed Operations concept, Marine Corps Operations in Complex and Distributed Environments, was signed by the Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration.
4. Interviews with 150 Marines (sergeants and below) prior to the Combat Hunter seminar and war game in January 2007.
5. Col S. L. A. Marshall, The Soldier's Load and Mobility of a Nation, Association of the U.S. Army, 1950 (1965 reprint by the Marine Corps Association), p. 5.
6. In 1973-1990, the Selous Scouts were a special forces/counter-terrorism branch of the Rhodesian Army that was especially adept at man-tracking techniques.
7. Sample comment from a sergeant: "I'm definitely more confident after receiving this training. . . . During this course, I couldn't help but think of situations that could have changed for the better had I known some of this," as quoted in the Combat Hunter Limited Objective Experiments 1 Quick Look Report, 17 April 2007.
8. LtGen Sir Giffard Martel, as quoted in Marshall, The Soldier's Load, p.119.
9. Marshall, The Soldier's Load, p. 119.