The Few. The Proud. The (Harvard???) Marines
(See A. Pine, pp. 40-44, November 2007 Proceedings)
Owen West—Mr. Pine is mistaken when he writes that NROTC midshipmen are "as much at home at Harvard" as graduate students who served in the Marines. By focusing on business and political science graduate programs, bunkers of relative conservatism on campus, Mr. Pine missed the real story: the Harvard faculty's successful 40-year battle against undergraduate military participation.
I arrived at Harvard almost 20 years after ROTC's 1969 expulsion. We had to take a bus to MIT for military science classes that were often more rigorous than our Harvard courses. No credit was given. In 1988 there was so much anti-ROTC sentiment that a group of alumni founded the
Advocates for Harvard ROTC to shore up our cause. In 1990 the Faculty Council voted to sever all remaining ties to ROTC in two years and some professors suggested Harvard students be banned from participation altogether. In 1991 my roommate, who was also in ROTC, was asked to leave a classroom because he wore his uniform. In 1994 President Neil Rudenstine stopped paying the nominal fee Harvard sent to MIT to cover classroom overhead. It was a backdoor effort to wipe out ROTC, thwarted only by alumni who today pay MIT themselves. In 1996 the undergraduate council attempted to ban the ROTC commissioning ceremony from Harvard Yard.
My class commissioned ten Marine lieutenants, still the most to come out of Harvard since the 1960s. Nine selected combat arms, and the other became the communications officer for 1st Force Reconnaissance Company. On graduation day, neither outgoing president Derek Bok nor incoming president Rudenstine attended our commissioning ceremony. In 20 years, Bok refused to attend even one commissioning.
While we knew the professors and administrators were loath to be seen with us, we did look forward to a ceremony on the steps of Memorial Church, built in memory of the Harvard men who had died in battle. At the last minute we were forced into a dingy basement classroom by a forecast of rain, notwithstanding the Tercentenary Theatre's overhead tent covering. When we emerged as Marines, the sun was shining brightly. None of us will ever forget that treatment.
President Larry Summers buoyed Harvard's tiny undergraduate military community by attending every commissioning ceremony during his tenure, something that rankled Harvard's faculty. Professor Ernest May acknowledged this anger in the article but dismissed it as a product of "relics of the 70s." That's hard to believe. This year, interim president Bok and incoming president Drew Faust did not attend the commissioning ceremony.
The sympathetic fascination with Harvard is astounding given its steadfast refusal to allow any ROTC activity on campus and the faculty's clear disdain of military service. The next time Proceedings calls an illumination mission with stage lights instead of a steady glare, it should choose a more worthy paramour.
Getting It Right at Navy
(See H. Ullman, p. 8, November 2007 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral George R. Worthington, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Harlan Ullman wrote an incisive verbal biopsy on the cancer radical Islam infects us with today. But how to train for the war will remain a Navy challenge as long as the war on terrorism itself. Ullman laments that "the course of instruction at the Academy had not digested the impact of the changed world and the revolutions that were altering it." He wants the new Superintendent to provide specific steps.
Well, beyond requiring midshipmen to attend meals and curtailing weekday liberty, what in Vice Admiral Fowler's submarine background prepares him for these steps? The submarine community consists of the most academically qualified officers in the service—math and science in particular. How about their qualifications in world history, political science, military strategy, or world events? More to the point, how many naval officers are directly involved in the war on terrorism beyond the new Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, EOD, and SEALs? The Navy's mission is to drive and maintain a Fleet, and submariners don't get orders to advanced tactical bases in al Anbar province.
Assuming the Supe takes Ullman's suggestion, he's going to need a solid staff of iconoclastic thinkers to make it happen. The academic deans will probably protest. In fact, Academy grads pick up the "shooting" aspect of their profession at post-Academy service schools: surface, submarine, aviation, and Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL—and Quantico. To meet Ullman's ultimatum the administration is going to have to craft courses that stress warfighting across the board. It should go beyond the "Ring around Rabaul" approach we got back in 1961. A survey course on Islam would be appropriate. (We never had a course on Vietnam in 1961!) A course on special operations that focuses on counterinsurgency might be welcome. Case studies of engagements would be worthwhile, i.e., some of the books coming out of Operation Iraqi Freedom are excellent; although not replete with Navy contributions, they present good Marine Corps coverage. A look at the technical innovations available to friend and foe alike should be surveyed without delving too far into Bill Gates' domain.
Academy grads probably won't see an Arab submarine or battle fleet. Regardless of how the Supe restructures the course offerings, any future Navy will still require strong engineering and technical know-how—and, in addition, knowing how to fight those ships at sea. Keeping an eye on the Navy mission is paramount, the war on terrorism withstanding.
Naval Academy . . . A Crucible for Warriors
(See J. Fowler, pp. 14-18, October 2007; A. Biehn, p. 6, November 2007 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Egmond van Rijn, Royal Netherlands Navy (Retired), Former Chief of Naval Personnel and SACLANT's Representative in Europe—When I read Vice Admiral Fowler's article, my first question was "what is wrong with the present generation of naval officers?" My second was whether his severe measures will lead "back to the distant past" rather than to the future. Will these indeed prepare the future leaders in all respects?
Rather than locking up midshipmen for four years in a kind of prison, why not let them interact as much as possible with the society they will protect? Let them meet other people to exchange ideas and develop skills other than the military ones. Let them stand in the middle of society rather than isolating them from it. This will be valuable when they hold senior rank and more responsibilities, such as advising political leaders, because they will know the context.
If one quality needs developing most, it is creative thinking. This "out of the box" thinking will help them understand not only asymmetric warfare, but also Iraqis, Afghans, and even dissenting Americans and foreign colleagues like me. This is to be achieved at least as much outside the Naval Academy as the inside the Yard.
Preparing young officers "in all respects" for full command on the very first day of their commission is neither possible nor necessary. What is wrong with giving them the tools, as has been done in the past 200-odd years, to become good leaders?
Is excellence achievable for every officer? Is it necessary? Is "good" not good enough? A ship with a whole score of excellent officers may produce very little (as I have seen happen), whereas a ship with average (i.e. good) officers, who are aware of each other's strong and weak points, and who work together, can produce excellence.
In short, I have serious doubts about the road Admiral Fowler takes. His midshipmen will be the face of the Navy, but they need also to stand in the center of society. Yes, the Superintendent and his team must develop them morally, mentally, and physically to be leaders in the most challenging circumstances, but this implies a broad scope that is not limited to study and having meals only with their peers while locked up inside the Academy. Building a wall, either concrete or psychological, around one's domain has never been effective when confronting challenges. Neither will it help to take on present and future ones. Admiral Fowler had better remove it.
Lieutenant Commander Darrach G. Taylor, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—I certainly found Vice Admiral Fowler's dissertation on the mission of the Academy and other commissioning sources generally on target, but not his direction. His own personal example in support of ensign/second lieutenant readiness for division/platoon officer assignments on "day one" was questionable. His and the Purdue running mate's division officer assignments were as lieutenants (jg) after sub school—that's hardly "day one." Most first cuts go to sub school, flight school, as did my son in 1991, Surface Warfare School, as did some of my son's NROTC classmates, or to Basic School, as do all new Marine Corps officers.
My own experience, commissioned well before Admiral Fowler, was more like "day one." But even I benefited from the two month antisubmarine warfare officers course I attended. And his being confronted with a key Sailor's distressed family situation as a young officer is not anything out of the ordinary. It simply requires compassion and contingentcy planning as in any sophisticated organization.
And I found intolerable, at least as written, the admiral's Christmas punishment of the many, who were on board other ships, and their families, for the transgressions of a very few in the 2006 Civitavecchia bar incident; a poor example of his leadership. Who was he punishing, including the Italians? Put the bar off limits! I just wonder how many re-enlistments he has/will cost the Navy, to say nothing of morale.
But what I find really questionable in Admiral Fowler's piece are his solutions covering strictures such as reinstating nightly mandatory study time, new mandatory meals, charging optional extracurricular activities against liberty time, generally more restrictive liberty hours including only after meals, etc. I can't see these as being correlative with Fowler's war-readiness objectives. Certainly effective summer training is most important, and no one knows that better than I do (NROTC instructor). I was officer-in-charge for midshipmen who were assigned senselessly to a destroyer in a restricted operating mode. But treating midshipmen as inmates hardly develops qualities such as initiative or self respect.
I wonder where joy, friendship, fun, laughter, exhilaration and most important, dignity, come into Admiral Fowler's equation for our young Navy and Marine Corps officer candidates. They are seemingly not found in the Superintendent's words, or "solutions" to today's societal problems that the Academy faces, just like all other universities. By undoing his predecessors' humanizing decisions, won't his successors wonder where all the best and brightest have gone? The class of '08 will be relieved upon graduation in just a few months to have escaped this throwback regimen in less time than subsequent classes. There may be problems to fix, but these seemingly draconian measures will only teach future division and platoon officers the wrong way to lead their enlisted personnel. "Honor, courage, and commitment" can't be achieved in a lockup; it takes a more intelligent approach.
Vice Admiral Fowler has obviously been a highly respected officer, having achieved his exalted status in the Navy in rapid order, as well as being given the stewardship of the Academy. But for now, the CNO had better provide oversight or future Academy Superintendents will really have a major problem to fix.
Helicopter Procurement: Playing with Fire
(See G. V. Galdorisi and S. C. Truver, pp. 64-68, September 2007; J. Stark, pp. 84-85, November 2007 Proceedings)
Captain Wayne A. Tunick, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Galdorisi's article concerning the Helicopter Concept of Operations (CONOPS) was misinformed in numerous instances. I believe I can talk with authority on this topic since I was the Head, Helicopter Maritime Requirements in N78 from 2001 to 2003. When I briefed the CONOPs to then-CNO Admiral Vern Clark, he was not satisfied with the analysis that had been done to support the force structure recommendations. I spent the next nine months performing that analysis with my fellow requirements officers in N78, the program office, and the Fleet. Ultimately, the analysis was completed and briefed throughout OPNAV and the Fleet including then N8, Admiral Mike Mullen, and finally to the VCNO, Admiral William J. Fallon, who approved it and set it in motion.
The article provides hasty analysis, stating the Navy needs a medium-lift helicopter. This is simply not supported by further analysis. The concept of bringing a surgical suite to wounded troops is not a validated Navy requirement. If that's needed (which would require changes to the ROC/POE and ORD) it doesn't mean a new helicopter is needed. That mission could be performed with additional aircraft or sorties—considerably less expensive than buying a new helicopter. Adding a medium-lift helicopter involves establishing additional training and logistics pipelines that will cost more money and be less efficient. This issue can be summed up in the form of a question: Would you rather have a medium-lift helicopter capable of delivering 12,000 pounds, but unable to fly for five days waiting for parts replacement (because of a weak logistics tail) or have two MH-60S provide the support on time?
We should resist the urge to abandon the CONOPs before it even begins (not uncommon in the Pentagon). Its implementation will take years to accomplish (full implementation will not happen until 2015). In fact, the first MH-60R squadron was just commissioned last month. We won't understand the efficiencies gained until the CONOPs is fully implemented. Follow the aviation adage: Plan the flight, fly the plan.
The Helicopter CONOPs force structure should continue to be reviewed based on validated requirements. This review of force structure is already in its third iteration and the process is healthy. Prioritization is required and the process exists to identify what is required from what is simply "nice to have." Rather than focus on the CONOPs, the discussion should focus on what comes after. The next major helicopter acquisition should not be a block upgrade or remanufacture. We need to start out with a clean slate and establish what the real requirements are and design to meet those whether it is a helicopter or tilt rotor. Believe it or not, the MH-60R and MH-60S will begin to drawdown due to service life in the 2020s. The Navy must send the signal to industry to provide concepts for delivering desired capability and do so in time to include specific budget inputs for POM 12.
Storm Warning for the Royal Navy
(See J. Blackham and G. Prins, pp. 20-25, October 2007 Proceedings)
Eric Grove—I read with concern the article "Storm Warning for the Royal Navy." My concern was not at that which its authors were trying to create, but rather at the totally spurious sense of crisis, a highly misleading proposition that can only have the most negative effects on the perceptions of our closest allies of what is still a world class navy and which will, on current plans, remain so for the immediate future.
If the officers of the navy I first associated myself with at the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth in 1971 had known that by the middle years of the next decade the Royal Navy would be deploying its two largest ever warships, more than worthy successors of the carrier program canceled in 1966 (a decision from which the Royal Navy was then still reeling), they would find the article's carping over the decision very strange. Its authors clearly cannot see that Britain has indeed had a strategy since 1998, and that expeditionary maritime forces have been at its heart. The interim reconfiguration of Britain's carrier aircraft pool to a "Joint Force Harrier" of strike aircraft has seen an increase in the potential striking power of the existing carriers, one that is more suited than that provided by the old Sea Harriers to the hot climates where we are likely to operate in the next few years.
Totally unmentioned in the piece was the revolution in British amphibious lift that has taken place, with seven new major units commissioned over the last decade. The general comparison with other navies also, simplistically and rather mischievously, leaves out the impressive overall mix of capabilities maintained by the fleet. What other medium-power navy has as capable a force of cruise-missile firing SSNs as Britain? Not the Chinese, not the Indians, not even the French. Overall, what other medium-power navy can deploy a similar significant level of maritime power at a distance?
Even the frigate/destroyer fixation of the authors seems strangely ill informed. The basic architecture of the Sustained Surface Combatant Capability program, as already revealed, promises to do more or less what the article calls for in the mix and numbers of significant surface ships it should produce. New modular C3 corvettes supplementing highly capable C1 and perhaps more austere C2 frigates, plus 6-8 Type 45 destroyers (each of the latter with channels of fire exceeding that of the whole force of Type 42s) should provide sufficient quality and quantity.
I am sure Admiral Blackham and Professor Prins are well intentioned. Their scare mongering can only have one effect, however: to confirm for the enemies of Britain's maritime power at home and abroad that the Royal Navy is a basket case best put quickly and quietly to sleep to concentrate national capabilities on other things. This impression is the opposite of the truth and is profoundly unhelpful to able naval policy makers struggling with a defense budget overstretched by ill-considered government foreign policy. Most important, it does a grave disservice to a Royal Navy that, in my view, is an institution the British people do not appreciate anywhere near enough.
John Neimer—The article by Admiral Blackham and Gwyn Prins was a very interesting exposition of the state of the Royal Navy today and of its minimum requirements for the near future. There are, however, two aspects of the situation that need to be explored in order to set their article in context.
The first of these is how the UK allowed its armed forces in general, and the navy in particular, to sink to this appalling situation of too many commitments with too little resources. Looking back over the last three or four elections is instructive; defense played no part in any of them. All the major parties concentrated on the health service, education, transport, and like social themes. The fact that the present government has thrown money at all of them with no real improvement to show for it is neither here nor there; the point is, that is where all the major parties think the votes come from.
So, assuming that no great strategic revelation is going to strike our leaders or persuade them that, while hospitals and schools are important, they are no use if the country cannot be fed, powered, or defended, where are the resources to come from?
This is the second aspect of the Royal Navy's plight not discussed in the article. At present the RAF, which has long rested on its World War II laurels, is being equipped with the Eurofighter Typhoon, an aircraft marginally superior to the F-16 that has been in service for 20 years. Furthermore, without over-flight rights in the Middle East, it is limited to the European theater; it cannot operate from carriers and cannot therefore support the government's stated global foreign policy. These aircraft cost around £60M each (approximately $124M USD) and the RAF is to have more than 200 of them, further shoring up that service's reputation as the "best flying club in Europe," where it has no obvious opponents.
The UK's defense ministries should instead be asking themselves if the country can still afford an independent air force and if its roles could not be better and more economically performed by the other two services. Such a decision would concentrate minds so that (at the very least) never again would the UK buy expensive aircraft that could not, when the need arose, be operated from carriers. In addition, the army could at last control its own supply helicopters.
But above all, assuming that the defense budget remains the same, it would free large financial and manpower resources and drastically reduce the overburdened procurement offices and other central defense operations. Most of all however, it would once again put maritime considerations at the forefront of the UK's strategic thinking and defense procurement where, for a country of Britain's geography and history, it should always be.
I have no great expectations that such a change to Britain's armed forces is about to be announced, but the time is surely approaching when economic pressures will force the question to be addressed. There will be a huge outcry by latter-day Billy Mitchells and Lord Trenchards who will maintain that independent air forces are the sovereign cure for everything from wars to in-growing toe nails. Once there was a case for an independent Royal Air Force; that day has passed.