By tapping its informal arrangements and treaties in East Asia, the United States could be that much closer to its goal of a 1,000-ship world fleet.
The Chief of Naval Operations has called for U.S. maritime policy to take advantage of a 1,000-ship navy, a number based on allied and friendly naval forces joining the U.S. Navy in carrying out global missions of maintaining peace and freedom on the world's oceans. This innovative concept in part reflects the depressingly continuous reduction of the U.S. Fleet, a trend beginning in the early 1990s that shows very little sign of reversing.
The Navy's claim on Department of Defense funding suffers from a lessened role in fighting the global war on terrorism and will be further weakened when Congress and the DOD face the reality of having to recapitalize the Army and the Marine Corps after enormous equipment losses in Afghanistan and Iraq. The CNO has also launched an effort to write a new maritime strategy, a much overdue effort to rationalize the Navy's role in the dynamic but terrorism-oriented post-Cold War world of diffuse threats and shifting strategic priorities.
The 1,000-ship navy concept also represents an attempt to standardize the Navy's efforts on the high seas, to apply a force multiplier to the inherently diverse missions that only a highly mobile, multi-mission capable maritime force can execute. This idea in turn will significantly benefit from operating within a coherent strategic framework. NATO has long provided such a framework for our Atlantic and Mediterranean naval forces, but those arenas are at least temporarily in the back seat of American national security priorities. East Asia has suffered from the lack of such a framework, especially since the end of the Cold War cast U.S. strategy adrift in those waters.
Such a framework for East Asia, however, in fact exists in a nascent form. Defining and using this framework would be a major step in fulfilling the CNO's call for a new maritime strategy and for establishing a 1,000ship navy, serving to buttress our decreasing combatant forces while unifying the international community's efforts against criminal activity on the oceans, especially terrorism and piracy.
Large Established Fleets
East Asian waters include the great maritime sweep from the Kamchatka Peninsula at the Eurasian land mass's eastern extremity, south through the Japanese and Philippine archipelagos, then west through Indonesia into the Indian Ocean. Australia forms the southern outpost of this maritime territory, with India the primary force on its western extremity. While the U.S. Navy remains able to provide the dominant maritime force in this area, other significant combatant forces are present and must be engaged.
* Russia. The Russian Pacific fleet is a mere shadow of its pre-1989 Soviet forebear, but retains both significant capability and the potential for renewal. Should, for instance, Moscow acknowledge the economic and political threat posed by China to the Russian Far East, a strengthening of its Vladivostok-based naval forces might well be forthcoming.
* Japan. The euphemistically named Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) is East Asia's most capable naval force on any given day, especially in view of the U.S. Pacific Fleet's reduced numbers and operational requirements in the Southwest Asian theater. The JMSDF includes several air-capable ships, with the new 13,500-ton displacement helicopter-carrying destroyer programmed and almost certainly capable of operating fixed-wing VSTOL aircraft; its Aegis-equipped antiair warfare (AAW) ships; 16 modern conventionally powered submarines with three more under construction equipped with air-independent propulsion (AIP) engineering plants; and large force of P-3C patrol aircraft, contribute to its multi-mission capabilities. Most important is the professionalism and proven record of the personnel who man the JMSDF, which has been repeatedly demonstrated in exercises with U.S. naval forces, as well as during operations in the Persian Gulf and the North Arabian Sea. Politically, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has called for revision of Japan's pacifist constitution and more aggressive employment of Japan's military forces.
* Korea. The Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) is also a modern, expanding force. It includes nine German-designed conventionally powered submarines, with three AIP boats under construction. South Korea's surface combatant force is led by four Aegis-equipped AAW ships, with two more under construction; the ROKN is also an integral part of Korea's well-integrated, computer-based, nationwide command-and-control system.
* China. Deploying the numerically largest navy in East Asia, the Chinese fleet includes many obsolete-but still capable-submarine, surface, and aviation units. Beijing is focusing naval efforts on modernizing its submarine force that features more than 20 modern conventionally-powered boats-the Kilo-class acquired from Russia and the indigenously built Song-class. Two new Yuan-class boats are apparently in service, while 17 older Mwg-class submarines remain operational. In fact, the number of boats the People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) is able to deploy is limited not by platform numbers, but by trained crews.
The PLAN is also replacing its five old Hem-class nuclear-powered submarines with the new Type 093, being constructed with Russian assistance; two are in the water and up to eight more will be constructed. Similarly, the single, never successful Xia-class fleet ballistic missile submarine is being succeeded by the Type 094, at least two of which are under construction, with the final number unknown. China also fields a formidable force of landbased bombers and fighters, many capable of launching cruise missiles, manned by both air force and naval aviation personnel.
* Taiwan. This navy remains almost completely dependent on U.S. platforms and systems. It also suffers weak support in the legislature, which reflects the public's problematic attitude toward improving the island's defenses. The recent addition of four ex-U.S. Kidd-class guided missile destroyers has significantly improved the navy's AAW and ASW capability, but Taiwan lacks adequate submarine, mine warfare, and aviation capabilities.
Smaller Fleets
Southeast Asian navies are small and of widely varying capabilities. Singapore has a modern, thoughtfully composed navy of missile-equipped craft that has recently acquired four exSwedish submarines. Similarly, Malaysia continues to acquire modern AAW corvettes and has contracted for two French-built submarines. Indonesia's sporadic efforts to buy and man a large navy remain unfulfilled, with its maritime forces limited in effectiveness, and trying to cope with a daunting plethora of different platforms and systems. It has two submarines, with two more reportedly contracted for with the ROK. Thailand's navy features Southeast Asia's only indigenous aircraft carrier, but the 11,500-ton displacement, Spanish-built Chakri Naruebet seldom operates and is an unknown, even problematical, platform.
Sub-Continent Fleets
To the west, India and Pakistan have both made significant efforts at deploying capable navies, but New Delhi's force dominates. India's submarine force is led by 10 Russian-built Kilos, with construction of 6 French-designed Scorpéne-class likely. The refurbished ex-Soviet Admiral Gorshkov-renamed Vikramaditya-is slated to replace the 1940s-vintage carrier Viraat by 2008. The indigenous 40,000-ton flattop Vikrant is under construction. India also deploys significant sea- and shore-based aviation forces. Pakistan's navy cannot match India's in any respect, although Karachi is building a strong submarine force of up to 8 French-designed Agosta-class, some of them AIPequipped.
The U.S. Navy has relationships with all of these forces, from Russia to Pakistan, which could form a major contribution to the 1,000-ship navy. The relationships with Japan, the ROK, the Philippines, and Australia are formalized in the mutual defense agreements with those nations. Strong, less formal pacts are in place with Singapore and Thailand, while post-9/11 efforts by Washington have resulted in significantly improved cooperative arrangements with the Indian and Pakistani navies. The U.S. defense relationship with China continues to improve, highlighted by former secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's agreement to conduct a joint exercise.
Joint International Cooperation
Finally, the Navy has established significant operational relationships with several East Asian navies through the joint exercises of the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) program. CARAT began in 1995, formalizing the previously informal series of mainly bilateral exercises between the U.S. Navy and regional navies.
Strategically, the East Asian navies share with the United States the common goal of maintaining freedom of the seas, with a focus on ensuring that the crucial sea lanes remain secure for commerce, especially for the energy resources increasingly imported from Southwest Asia and East Africa. These interests are threatened primarily by terrorism and piracy, although the illegal activities of outlaw nations such as North Korea and Myanmar have the potential for seriously disrupting maritime accord.
In addition to the informal and treaty arrangements in East Asia to which the United States is a party, multinational organizations serve as vehicles for greater maritime cooperation. Chief among these is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its ASEAN Regional Forum (ARE). While ASEAN was organized in 1967 with a primarily economic rationale, ARE was created in 1994 to address security issues of concern to the ten ASEAN member states.
ARF's potential effectiveness has increased with the emergence of the informal ASEAN-Plus-Three, wherein China, Japan, and the ROK regularly attend ASEAN and ARE meetings, contributing dialogue and in some cases resources. The United States attends some of these meetings and has a direct interest in their activities, which although still largely in the discussion stage, appear aimed at the same objectives of maintaining security and freedom at sea.
More inclusive in its membership is the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), organized in 1989 as a vehicle for economic improvement. Its 21 member nations span the rim of the Pacific. APEC's substantive achievements are few, but it has usefully served as a venue for heads of state to meet with relative informality and discuss security issues of mutual interest. Hence, it could provide a continued means of communication and cooperation at the most senior levels of Asian and American governments.
Significant Efforts
The United States has also initiated two significant multilateral efforts that affect East Asian maritime security. The Proliferation security Initiative (PSI) is a global effort launched in 2003 to create international agreements and partnerships to search planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and seize illegal weapons or missile technologies. PSI exercises and operations have been conducted in Asian waters, with North Korean proliferation activities an obvious concern. Although not all Asian nations have agreed to participate-only Australia and Japan have been enthusiastic participants-in PSI activities, ASEAN has expressed support for the program's goals, and PSI gained credibility and increased potential with the July 2006 agreement of China and the ROK to take part, at least at the exercise level.
The second program was discussed by Pacific Commander Admiral Thomas Fargo in December 2003, and during testimony to Congress in early 2004. Although widely misinterpreted and inaccurately reported in the press, the Regional Maritime security Initiative (RMSI) aims to develop a partnership of regional nations to identify, monitor, and intercept transnational maritime threats under existing international and domestic laws. RMSI is neither a treaty nor an alliance, but a collective effort to provide participating nations with the information to act against maritime threats in their own territorial seas. No mandatory action is stipulated, and each nation would decide what response, if any, to take.
RMSI is based on information sharing to create an environment hostile to terrorism and other criminal activities in accordance with existing international law. Coast Guard or other law enforcement vessels are expected to normally conduct maritime interdiction missions based on RMSI information, although naval forces may be needed for more significant threats, especially on the high seas.
Wary Partners
Southeast Asian nations have been particularly sensitive to potential incursions against their sovereignty under the PSI or RMSI programs, but nonetheless have embraced the proposals' objectives. In addition to continued participation in CARAT exercises, 17 ships of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore's navies initiated Operation Malindo in July 2004 to provide year-round anti-piracy and anti-terrorism protection in the Strait of Malacca. Each participating navy supplies five to seven warships, with a hotline to provide rapid communications among the different navies.
Indonesia and Malaysia are particularly wary of these international efforts, but have agreed to accept financing, equipment, and training from non-Southeast Asian nations. In July 2004, Malaysia and Singapore announced increased intelligence sharing, while in August of that year Kuala Lumpur announced that the new Malaysian Coast Guard (modeled on the U.S. Coast Guard) would begin providing security along the Strait of Malacca. These new efforts by Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia will supplement the efforts of the Maritime Rescue Coordinating Center in Kuala Lumpur and will also fall under the aegis of the Singapore-based Anti-Piracy Center, with extensive Japanese funding, under the Regional Cooperation Agreement on the Prevention and Suppression of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia.
As part of these efforts, air and sea patrols will be conducted by the Malacca Strait nations and Thailand. Additionally, 34 nations signed the September 2005 "Jakarta Statement" to strengthen maritime security and protect the Malacca Strait environment.
All of these treaties, alliances, international agreements, multilateral organizations, and common aims form the skeleton of a framework for the 1,000-ship navy to operate in East Asia in pursuit of U.S. maritime strategic goals of security and freedom on the high seas. Required now is a coherent ordering of the skeleton into a framework usable by the Pacific commander and his component commanders. This is as much a diplomatic as it is a naval task, and one not easy to accomplish.
Diplomacy to the Fore
Significant international differences throughout East Asia will have to be ameliorated; these include the historic ROK and Chinese enmity toward Japan, the nationalistic sensitivity of Southeast Asian states, especially Malaysia and Indonesia, to Western participation in regional security efforts; and India's determination to be the hegemonic maritime power in the Indian Ocean as well as its looming role east of Malacca. Particularly troublesome is the dispute between Beijing and Tokyo over seabed energy deposits in the East China Sea, and the dispute between Seoul and Tokyo over ownership of the Dokdo/Takeshima islets in the East Sea/Sea of Japan.
Other issues also intrude, displaying South Asia's potential for international discord. Beijing continues not to view North Korean proliferation and nuclear adventurism with the alarm of Tokyo and Washington, and the Taiwan imbroglio, although relatively quiescent at present, remains a potential time bomb of confrontation and possible military conflict. India is concerned about Chinese intrusion into the Indian Ocean and with Pakistani hostility and possible sponsorship of terrorism.
In fact, diplomatic difficulties outweigh maritime differences in the region; the navies of the United States and many East Asian nations are already able to communicate with each other, have exercised together, and share common practices and goals at sea. Fighting terrorism and piracy are maritime missions ripe for agreement among the maritime nations of East Asia. Ensuring energy security at sea is another likely mission on which the U.S. and East Asian navies could agree.
Maritime strategy has long ceased to be "navy only," however, and while the East Asian political environment already contains the organizations and agreements necessary and even amenable to solidifying U.S. maritime strategic goals in the region, an extensive inter-agency process between the departments of State and Defense will be required to fulfill the CNO's goals. Several regional disputes will almost certainly need to be addressed before major East Asian navies will be able to cooperate at sea. Even then, an almost constant U.S. naval presence will likely be required in some of the multi-national efforts. This in turn is likely to require national level re-ordering of American naval priorities.
Even more important, strong action at the most senior levels of the U.S. government is required for the interagency actions necessary to secure the active, coherent participation of the region's navies in coordinated action to keep the seas free and secure. Turning the strategic fragments that exist in East Asia into a usable maritime strategic framework will be a difficult political-military process, but is the best way to establish a useful maritime strategy carried out by a 1,000-ship navy.
Captain Cole is professor of International History at the National War College in Washington, D.C. He served 30 years as a surface warfare officer and has written numerous articles and four books including Taiwan's Security: History ana Prospects (London: Routledge, 2006).