Instead of expanding the service to better accomplish its missions, the U.S. Coast Guard could lose its maritime safety arm if a proposal under discussion in a House committe shifts that responsibility to a new agency. Here's why that's a bad idea.
The long-standing comprehensive oversight of homeland ports by the U.S. Coast Guard is in jeopardy. Congressman James Oberstar, a Minnesota Democrat and chairman of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, is leading discussions about whether to split the Coast Guard in two by moving many of the service's maritime safety responsibilities and authorities to a new, smaller agency. While no legislation has been introduced yet, the issue is "still in debate by both parties in the committee," according to Representative Oberstar's office. The mere discussion of such a move has led Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Thad Allen to weigh in, emphasizing in a recent message: "This is not in the best interest of the Coast Guard or the nation."
A growing number of complaints from commercial operators-that the Coast Guard is not satisfactorily providing safety-related services-is the reason given for the action Oberstar is contemplating. The complaints point to two problems: the practice of regularly rotating personnel, thus undermining development of expertise; and regulatory tasks not connected to security receiving a lower priority since 9/11. One example cited of the latter is a slow-down in processing mariner documents.
The change under discussion, however, is simply a case of treating the symptoms, not the disease. And, if enacted into law, it will succeed only in exposing commercial operators to more bureaucracy while increasing the cost to the taxpayer. For example, a foreign vessel approaching the United States would be subject to a Coast Guard security boarding, followed by a safety boarding by this new agency-two boardings by two different federal agencies rather that a single boarding by a single agency; hardly efficient or desirable. So even the proposed cure for the symptoms is not a cure at all.
The Personnel Rotation Problem
Because the Coast Guard is a member of the armed forces, it follows many of the practices common among the other military services, notably the regular rotation of its military personnel. While this practice works well for Coast Guard assets engaged in offshore operations, it may not be as constructive for shore-based activities. Offshore, Coast Guard forces operate relatively independently, sharing the battle space only with the U.S Navy.
Inside the sea buoy, it is a different story, where state and local agencies have port safety and security authorities that overlap with the Coast Guard's. Success in the port environment requires formation of strong personal relationships and trust as well as solid knowledge of the locale. However, building such relationships and knowledge takes time. Rotation practices that change out port personnel as frequently as once every two years is clearly detrimental to these needs.
Regarding the impact of personnel rotations on professional expertise, the relationship is not as clear. The question of impact on competence relates directly to the nature of follow-on assignments. If personnel are being reassigned to the same or similar duties in another port, or to an administrative position related to a previous assignment, then expertise does not suffer. In fact it is enhanced, as the member develops a broader, more complete understanding of the subject. If, on the other hand, personnel are assigned to duties unrelated to their specialty, then clearly their expertise will fall off.
To address this problem, the Coast Guard must consider carefully its policy for shore-based personnel. Those positions involved with outreach and interactions or those that require in-depth local knowledge must be kept as stable as possible. If rotation is a must for career growth or other reasons, then other processes need to be implemented. One possibility would be to have deputies/subordinates automatically move up to replace departing personnel to ensure continuity. For positions that require professional or technical skills, care must be taken to ensure these personnel remain within their areas of expertise while providing a means for professional advancement. These may be prime assignments for warrant officers or for conversion to civilian positions.
Is Safety Taking a Back Seat?
The complaint that vessel safety programs are taking a back seat to security issues within the Coast Guard may be true in some instances and completely false in others. In many cases, safety is interwoven with security. The issue of mariner documentation is a perfect example. From a safety perspective, the Coast Guard has long managed mariner documentation to ensure merchant crewmen and commercial vessel operators are properly qualified to perform their tasks safely. With security concerns raised, the Coast Guard must now also simultaneously ensure these mariners are not a security risk. In other words, mariner documentation is both a safety and a security concern.
The problem of a lower priority being assigned to some safety responsibilities is a symptom of the real disease. Simply put, the disease is that the Coast Guard lacks the personnel and resources necessary to meet all of its responsibilities and therefore must prioritize its efforts based on risk-based decision-making.
That the Coast Guard is under-resourced for its missions should come as a surprise to no one. Prior to 9/11, the Coast Guard was at its smallest size since 1967. Following 9/11 the service revitalized a nearly dormant maritime security program and incorporated it into its primary mission alongside search and rescue. Yet the service has added only about 4,000 new members to its ranks. And the Coast Guard has done this while maintaining the status quo on all of its other missions (counter drug, alien migration interdiction, fisheries enforcement, aids to navigation, and its various safety missions, to name a few) in accordance with the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
Making a Bad Situation Worse
Splitting the Coast Guard in two would only exacerbate the problem. Taking an agency that is already understaffed and breaking off a piece along with some responsibilities to create a new agency would only make a bad situation worse. In creating the new agency, would enough staff be taken to adequately perform the safety missions? If so, this would leave the Coast Guard less able to perform its security functions. If not, the new agency would suffer the same problems the Coast Guard faces now in delivering service to the safety mission.
In fact it would be worse, as the new agency would have to use some displaced staff to duplicate administrative and support functions currently shared among Coast Guard programs. The only solution would be to create new billets and additional funding for the new agency, but this solution would work just as well for the Coast Guard as it is today and not require as many billets or funds.
Reducing the size of the Coast Guard by creating this new maritime safety agency would severely impact the service's nimbleness, which allows it to respond rapidly to national emergencies. Coast Guard personnel are cross-trained and multi-mission capable. When a crisis arises, personnel assigned to more routine regulatory duties can be temporarily reassigned to create the crisis response work force needed to mitigate the consequences of a national emergency. Once the crisis is over, they can then return to normal duties. A smaller Coast Guard would lack the capacity of personnel performing less critical tasks available for crisis response.
Don't Split it, Grow it
The Coast Guard is stretched thin, too thin to meet all of its responsibilities to the satisfaction of those it serves. However, the answer is not to split up the Coast Guard, but to grow it. For decades the Coast Guard has protected the nation's waterways, consistently providing the taxpayers an excellent return on their investment. When an investment is providing profitable dividends, you invest more, not less.
As discussed earlier, savings result when a single agency manages maritime safety and security (and mobility). This format eliminates seams and costly overlaps. In a world with separate maritime safety and security agencies, commercial maritime operators would have to work with both. Do commercial operators really want two federal overseers? Do the taxpayers want two for the price of one, or two for the price of two?
Granted, the price of the two-for-one arrangement needs to increase, but even after an increase, it would still be less expensive than two-for-two. The maritime industry is a very complex system, where safety, security and mobility are interwoven and cannot be neatly separated into discrete bins. Nor can the agency that oversees it all.