Kabuki in the E-Ring
(See T. L. Wilkerson, pp. 12-14, July 2007 Proceedings)
Cmmander James J. Coogan Jr., U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)-Major General Wilkerson's article raised a number of interesting questions but one that didn't come up was whether the institution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) should be abolished altogether. In a 17 June 2007 Boston Globe editorial, retired Army officer Andrew J. Bacevich, professor of history and international relations at Boston University, made the case that the JCS is beyond salvaging in a piece entitled "Joint Failure."
Noting that the JCS has been ineffective since its creation in 1947, Bacevich claimed that the JCS has failed to oversee the maintenance of a cost-effective military force, failed to keep the United States out of unnecessary wars, and failed to effectively wage the ones that were necessary. From the damning characterization of the JCS as "Five Silent Men" in H. R. McMaster's book, Dereliction of Duty, which examined the failures of military leadership in the Vietnam War, to the present group of service chiefs who have consistently avoided confrontation with civilian leadership over Iraq war policy, there is an almost unbroken chain of what Bacevich sees as mediocre senior military leaders who avoided making waves while favoring the parochial interests of their own services, rather than looking toward the national interest.
That General Peter Pace will not have the opportunity to serve a second two-year term as CJCS should surprise no one. The chairmanship has been a political office since its creation in 1949, and the CJCS cannot help but be affected by the fortunes of the administration under which he serves. The quote by General George Patton about Americans loving a winner and hating a loser is particularly appropriate in this case. With the Democrats assuming control of Congress in the fall of 2006, and General Pace's close association with an increasingly unpopular Iraq war policy, his fate was sealed. secretary of Defense Robert Gates turned to Admiral Mike Mullen as the new CJCS for the simple reason that the admiral carried none of the baggage associated with the present combatant commanders, and confirmation hearings could not be used by war opponents to bash the administration.
But the appointment of Army lieutenant General Douglas Lute as the new war czar brings us back to the question of whether the JCS still has any real function-or future. If General Lute has the direct ear of the President, providing counsel in matters related to Iraq and Afghanistan, where does that leave the CJCS? In this case, it would appear that the institution and its new chairman are going to be dancing without a partner.
Treaty at a Crossroads
(See G. V. Galdorisi and S. C. Truver, pp. 50-56, July 2007 Proceedings)
Commodore Sam Bateman, Royal Australian Navy (Retired)-George Galdorisi and Scott Truver are absolutely correct in their arguments supporting U.S. ratification of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It is truly amazing that there are still people in the United States who are so bigoted and parochial as to oppose U.S. ratification. This hugely important treaty is now well accepted around the world as the framework convention for managing the global oceans and seas, and the United States must become a party to it.
I regularly lecture on the Law of the Sea both in Australia and Asia. When I refer to the U.S. Navy's Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program, there are always questions about the right of the United States to enforce navigational freedoms when it is not a party to UNCLOS. The argument that these freedoms are available under customary international law is becoming weaker, as customary international law evolves and some states act unilaterally to chip away at the balance of interests set out in UNCLOS. Excessive use of territorial sea straight baselines and "thickening jurisdiction" by coastal states over activities in their exclusive economic zones are key examples of where customary international law may be evolving in a way that is contrary to U.S. interests.
The FON by itself is no longer an effective means of dealing with these excessive claims. The United States should be prepared to take the offending countries to international dispute settlement but is unable to do so while it is not a party to UNCLOS. Quite simply, the United States could do much more to counter excessive claims to maritime jurisdiction from within the Convention rather than by remaining outside it. Sitting in the corner and crying foul is not an effective approach.
While the United States remains outside UNCLOS, the rest of the world is establishing rules and principles for managing the 70 percent of the earth's surface covered by water. One of the strongest arguments for U.S. ratification is that this would allow the United States to participate in the international dispute mechanisms available under UNCLOS. It would also allow U.S. involvement in key international bodies established by UNCLOS: the International Sea-Bed Authority, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. These bodies are open for business and doing their work regardless of U.S. non-involvement.
Lastly, it is not going too far to say that the 1,000-ship navy concept lacks substance while the United States is not a party to UNCLOS. This concept will only work if all nations concerned have what George Galdorisi describes as "a common frame of reference for the legal regime of the oceans."
Nolan Nelson-There are several valid reasons to be skeptical of this treaty, but I will just mention two.
Treaties provide illusions of protection from unreasonable maritime challenges, illusions quickly dispelled by lack of forthright action. Concerning the 2001 showdown between the United States (UNCLOS signed) and China (UNCLOS ratified) over the Navy EP-3E, China saw no problem in provoking the incident, notwithstanding UNCLOS and prior treaties defining freedom of the seas. Further anecdotal evidence emerges from taking of British (UNCLOS ratified) hostages by Iran (UNCLOS signed). In this day of instant communication, the fact the British captain did not fight his command means senior commanders and politicians, including some masquerading in military uniforms, failed miserably when exerting the authority they had confiscated to protect freedom of the seas.
The world-changing tragedies of September 2001 make it imperative that this treaty be re-evaluated. One of the many problems for interpretation against us could be Articles 19 and 20 defining innocent passage while within territorial seas. Acts prejudicial to the peace of a coastal state include launching and landing aircraft and using undersea craft for mine detection. Also a self-interested reading of the article says using any electronic device other than navigational radar could be considered an act of propaganda or an act aimed at collecting information. The State Department may assure friendly government relations, but how many nations can and/or would provide practical sea, air, and undersea supremacy guarantees allowing our warships to forgo defensive measures provided by aircraft, boats, sonar, radars, and communication nets?
Supposedly, the "military activities exemption" would allow us to maintain adequate defenses in territorial waters. However, I do not see the exemption as one of the articles. A hostile Council should have no problem defining this term to place our ships at risk of terrorism. Dr. Truver contends the Convention does not permit an international tribunal to frustrate Navy operations, but without reference to the treaty, he assures us some undefined protocol can (not will) exclude military activities from treaty resolution provisions.
Before ratification is the time to force meaningful treaty changes, rather than later going hat in hand to ask for modifications in our interest. In reading this treaty, I believe you will find latitude in article language allowing a hostile U.N. Council to write an enormous body of regulations directed against our ships and planes.
The present provisions also codify flaccid senior military/political responses by allowing shelter within prospective rulings from an international tribunal, and avoiding authorization for immediate, direct action to confront challenges. These articles and regulations will bind our Sailors as they go into dangerous situations largely undefined in this era of violent peace. When something goes wrong, operators on 285 commissioned ships will pay the price, while 290-plus flag officers, Pentagon lawyers, and politicians in Washington, D.C., express profound sorrow and outrage, as all bullet-proof their resumes.
Carrier Aviation on the Move: But Going Where?
(See N. Polmar, pp. 86-87, June 2007; R. F. Dunn, p. 7, July 2007 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral David Architzel, U.S. Navy, Program Executive Officer, Aircraft Carriers-In response to Norman Polmar's article in the June issue, I feel compelled to offer some corrections to inaccuracies in areas pertaining to the acquisition of aircraft carriers. On the subject of cost, Mr. Polmar cites the cost of the Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) "is estimated at some $12 billion, in addition to about $12 billion being spent for research and development (R&D) efforts related to the design." In fact, the cost to build the CVN-78 is estimated at $8 billion, in Fiscal Year 2008 when the ship will be procured. In comparison, CVN-77, was procured in FY 01 for $6 billion (vice $7 billion as reported by Mr. Polmar). When corrected for inflation and shipyard workload, procurement of a another Nimitz-class ship in FY 08 would be approximately $300 million more than the current cost projected for the lead ship of the CVN-78 class.
The decision for CVN-78 to be a largedeck aircraft carrier was made after a comprehensive three-year analysis of alternatives, where all options were carefully considered, and not quickly dismissed as Mr. Polmar suggests. The cost to design the new Ford class is approximately $6 billion and two-thirds of this work has already been completed.
Consider the value of this one-time design effort. This is the first development effort funded for the aircraft carrier since the design of the venerable Nimitz class nearly 40 years ago. This non-recurring design effort will serve not only the lead ship of the class, the Gerald R. Ford, during its service life from 2015 to 2065, but an entire class of carriers replacing the USS Enterprise (CVN-65), and the ten ships of the Nimitz-class. The investment in this new ship class is prudent and essential when viewed against the backdrop of the improvements we will expect to see in a century of development in naval aviation.
The long service life of these ships is a critical factor in the design of the class as is the build strategy, which supports operational requirements. CVN-78-class carriers are a vital part of the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan, which supports the proposed 313-ship Navy. It is imperative that we support the plans for the Ford class. This provides the combatant commanders with the capability they need, and gives industry a stable plan from which to make sound business decisions.
Adam B. Siegel, Senior Analyst, Northrop Grumman Analysis Center-Norman Polmar's normally excellent column did a disservice to Proceedings' readers with "Carrier Aviation on the Move: But Going Where?" Factual errors and omissions might lead readers to conclusions that might not be merited. Here are just a few examples:
* CVN- 78: "Ford's cost is estimated at some $12 billion, in addition to about $12 billion being spent for research and development (R&D) efforts related to the design." In fact, combining shipbuilding (SCN) and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) funds, CVN-78 will total about $13.7 billion, of which about $5.6 billion is RDT&E costs (split roughly $3.2 billion in RDT&E and $2.4 billion in SCN funding lines) according to an April 2007 Congressional Research Service report. The recurring Ford class costs will be about $8.1 billion (and less if carrier construction is accelerated, as RAND research has recommended).
* Joint Strike Fighter. "The [VSTOL] F-35B will be a high-performance aircraft, comparable with advanced land-based fighter/attack aircraft." To be clear, the F35B will fulfill an important role in U.S. (and allied) defense capabilities, but what is meant by comparable? Staying within the JSF, the F-35B will have shorter range, less endurance, and a smaller payload than either the F-35A (Air Force variant) and F-35C (Navy variant). Would discussing the F-35C's greater range and payload have changed readers' perspectives and conclusions about relative big-deck/littledeck operational values?
* N-UCAS: The article, supposedly about carrier aviation's future, doesn't mention the N-UCAS, which is part of the Navy's plan. As the N-UCAS will serve two of the missions that Polmar suggests Navy aviation currently underserves: reconnaissance and medium/long-range strike.
* UK Carrier (CVF): The article states that "our British cousins have had a radically different approach to carrier design in their aborted CVA-Ol and current CVF designs" in support of an attack on the Navy's handling of alternatives to the design concepts behind the Nimitz and, now, CVN-78 classes. It might merit mentioning that the CVF's "radically different approach" includes no catapults (which will limit interoperability with French and U.S. Navy aviation; precludes Royal Navy procurement of carrier aviation from other nations; and precludes command and control platforms like the E-2D from operating from its decks), significantly smaller aviation capacity, less ordnance on board, and much lower survivability.
Sadly, these are just some of the issues that one could raise with this article.
Editor's Note: Northrop Grumman's Newport News sector is building CVN-78.
How the Twig is Bent: Developing Young Bubble Heads for the Challenges of Command
(See M. Dobbs, pp. 28-33, June 2007; J. K. Hafner and G. Yeakley, p. 6, July 2007 Proceedings)
Captain John D. Peters, U.S. Navy (Retired)-This article misses the most critical "what went wrong." The terrible idea to combine ratings and get rid of quartermaster (QM) is the underlying cause of many or not most of the groundings, collisions, and other navigation stupidity in submarines, not junior officer training. The QM was dedicated to safe navigation! Now no one is. A dedicated QM would have prevented most if not all of the groundings we have seen. We needed a non-nuclear Rickover to prevent stupidity in the front end detailing and training programs.
A Goldwater-Nichols Bill for Government - Part Two
(See H. Ullman, p. 10, June 2007 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander John Callaway; U.S. Navy-Mr. Ullman's analysis and recommendations were disappointing. The National security Council is designed to manage the flow of national security information from the relevant departments to the President and then coordinate the implementation of policy. This interagency process is a reflection of the President's desires and the national security adviser's style. The real issues are not the chain of command examples he uses (to compare NATO and Central Command in Afghanistan with the interagency coordination of Homeland security is to compare apples and oranges.) Rather, the resourcing of the other departments aside from DoD that contribute to our national security needs closer examination. The military leads the government in interagency training, professional education, and emphasis on "jointness." Lessons for the other departments will be found in those areas. Additional layers of bureaucracy and the shifting of wire diagrams, as Ullman suggests, are not the answer.
Subs in the Littoral: Diesels Just Blowing Smoke?
(See J. Buff, pp. 40-43, June 2007 Proceedings)
Commander Sam Johnson, U.S. Navy (Retired)-There are major omissions from the big picture represented by Joe Buff's article.
First, he ignores the potential capabilities of non-nuclear submarines as compared to SSNs regardless of class. Virtually every advantage he ascribes to SSN ability to operate in the littorals can just as easily be put on non-nuclear submarines. His article leaves the impression that he thinks it's physically impossible to build non-nuclear submarines any bigger than what other countries' presently are. That is simply not true. There have been numerous designs for non-nuclear submarine supertankers as much as 1,200 feet long, and the only reason they've not been built is because of economics or other factors not related to the actual ship. A non-nuclear-powered submarine can carry any equipment and just as much of it if designed to do so.
Next, he ignores the political risk and liabilities associated with nuclear vessels of any type. With the number of groundings and collisions in the much smaller submarine force today, one must consider the likelihood that an SSN operating in the littorals might run hard aground or have a collision that rips open the reactor vessel, causing an environmental calamity of cosmic proportions. Which would you rather have bust open, an SSN or a nonnuclear powered boat?
Third, he ignores the security risks associated with sending an SSN close in to shore. The possibility of capture cannot be ignored. Then the question becomes, "Would you rather a potential enemy got a nuclear or a non-nuclear-powered boat?"
In addition, diesel powered submarines proved their capability to operate close in more than half-a-century ago. SSNs certainly have some experience operating close in, but the author omitted any discussion of that because it is not a prime area for promoting SSNs over non-nuclear-powered boats.
Finally, the author makes a comparison of building costs, but says nothing of operating, maintenance, overhaul, or decommissioning and disposal costs. The non-nuclear ship would have no depleted core to deal with and could probably be decommissioned and scrapped at your neighbor's shipyard down on the riverfront.
I served on two SSNs, two diesel submarines, and three SSBNs and rode on some 25 to 30 additional SSNs. Mr. Buff's statement near the end of page 42 that "Sometimes-such as during a commando-launching operation or an electronics intelligence mission-it is all but impossible to maintain quiet" leaves it quite clear that he never made an operational deployment on a diesel-powered submarine. Today's non-nuclear submarines, with alternative propulsion systems, only widen their margin of capability in close-in operations over SSNs further.
Certainly, the overwhelmingly large majority of submarine operational scenarios favor nuclear-powered attack submarines. The first three factors I mention above simply cannot be ignored, though, because these are very real risks and very different times even from when the Virginia-class submarines were designed.
Finally, the picture of the Swedish boat on page 43 is downright disingenuous. The reason that ship was hauled to San Diego was because of crew union requirements and had nothing whatsoever to do with a limitation on the cruising range of the ship. Hauling the boat saved Sweden a ton of money.
Bob Gabbert-The title of this article is apt, because there is a lot of smoke being blown here sounding more like a sales brochure for a nuclear shipbuilder than a logical argument of nukes over air-independent propulsion (AIP) submarines.
I spent 17 years of my life designing, building, and repairing nuclear submarines and submarine support ships. No one has to convince me of their merits, but this article does not add weight to our stance.
Mr. Buff suggests that the greater vertical size (15 to 25-feet) of an SSN or SSGN over an SSI is not a significant difference when approaching shallow water. I doubt any submariner would agree. The question that should be asked is why any aggressor submarine would want to approach the shallow water of an enemy where that enemy has all of the advantages.
To suggest that because we have satellite mapping we know more about local waters than the locals do is not worth comment.
Mr. Buff states that the hovering controls of modern nuclear submarines allow them to operate in shallow water effectively, apparently without regard to the significant difference created by ground-swell and other shallow-water features.
The author further claims that length is not a major factor in maneuvering or turning a submarine. This is like telling a Cadillac buyer he can park in a Smart-Car space. Even if both submarines could turn within their own length, as stated the SSI is only half as long as the SSN, and by definition can turn more sharply.
The article says that an SSN can maintain ultra-quiet until the food runs out whereas the SSI must run environmental machinery, bilge pumps, etc. Does the author think the crew of a nuke does not require environmental machinery, bilge pumps, and other support equipment to run? In any submarine or other ship the amount of noise equipment transmits into the sea has to do with the design, size, and foundation mounting. Equipment is just as quiet on an SSI as it is on a nuke provided they are identical in design and mounting. The author should have pointed out that when given equal equipment and conditions, the SSI will almost always be quieter, not because of said equipment, but because the propulsion system is quieter.
An overwhelming case can be made to support nuclear over AIP, but this article is not it. In discussing the greater cost of a nuke, the author had the opportunity to indicate that initial cost of a nuke includes enough fuel to run for more than 12 years without requiring tankers and their crews, but he did not.
There are more "sales pitches" in the article, but the horse is dead already.
Let's Hunt the Hunters
(See P. G. Wasielewski, p. 74, June 2007 Proceedings)
Remo Salta-Colonel Wasielewski suggests bringing back the old Q-ships in order to lure pirates into the open. But why should the U.S. Navy be given the responsibility to combat piracy on the high seas? Why would the Navy want to jump into the role of "universal policeman" to keep the world's shipping lanes free of predators? The Navy would certainly have a role to play escorting American-flagged ships if threatened on the high seas, but why do we want to protect all the world's shipping against international piracy? In addition, what do we do with pkates once we capture them on the high seas? This is a local law enforcement problem, not one for a professional fighting force.
A more proper solution would be to encourage nations with coastlines to develop their own coast guards to combat piracy or smuggling in their own waters. For chaotic countries such as Somalia, perhaps a U.N.-flagged task force, with contributions from various coast guards around the world, could be used to patrol these areas. There is no reason why economically viable and politically stable countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, or Singapore cannot enlarge their forces to deal with piracy off their own coasts. This is not a military problem and to have American warships enforcing criminal laws would send a bad message around the world.