The potential for a seaborne terrorist attack is not limited to a WMD in a shipboard container. Maritime security specialists need to focus on the nation's huge undefended coastline and less visible port issues.
Those of us who work on the waterfronts of our nation are intimately familiar with Maritime Homeland Security (MHS). Formerly a program called Port Security, it represented the Cold War effort to secure U.S. ports and port facilities from the Soviet bloc. Today, MHS attracts the attention of politicians and the national press, focusing concern on terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Sadly, the most-heralded MHS efforts are being expended after potential WMD carriers have already arrived inside our ports. Apparently, we must await their detonation before action is taken. Something's wrong with the process.
Since 1917, certain Coast Guard officers designated Captain of the Port have exercised federal port security authority and responsibility under the provisions of the Espionage Act enacted during World War I. That law, amended by the Magnuson Act in 1950, and implemented by federal regulations promulgated by President Harry S. Truman, still provides most of the Coast Guard's enforcement teeth. Additional port security initiatives, including regulations derived from the Maritime Security Act of 2002, authorize certain other MHS initiatives. The Magnuson Act provisos are not limited to the detection of threats already within our ports. This measure and the Truman regulations authorize a far more proactive approach to deterrence than is presently employed.
Porous Security?
The present maritime homeland security strategy has been characterized as a layered defense. Each layer should be as seamless as possible, but any gaps in one layer would be protected by the next layer. In peeling away the layers, no gaps should be aligned, no specific weaknesses left unaddressed. As a former Cold War U.S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port, and having spent the last 24 years since my retirement working on the commercial waterfront, I believe this strategy is seriously flawed. The layered defense seems little more than a collection of bits and pieces of agency activity, too much of which addresses only certain favored elements within our seaports. Too little emphasis is placed on proactive deterrence, while first response receives a disproportionate emphasis. Some obvious aspects of port activity, such as containership cargos, get much attention, but focusing all our energy on shipments already in our ports ignores the potential for unobstructed enemy penetrations of the thousands of miles of our maritime borders. There are, indeed, significant gaps in the layered defense.
The problem may rest with our national policy of treating the war on terrorism as a law enforcement effort rather than a military campaign. In this strange war, we've come to consider our enemies as perpetrators, not non-uniformed combatants. Of course solid legal and bureaucratic reasons dictate this law enforcement approach, at least domestically. Given the natural flavor of law enforcement—respond to a reported crime, arrest the perpetrators, and bring them to justice—the MHS emphasis on first response is understandable. Nevertheless, waging a real war involves the application of many doctrines and behaviors that fall beyond the boundaries of conventional law enforcement. That's why Soldiers are not police, and vice versa.
Law enforcement operations tend to be reactive while military operations, even when defensive, are proactive. In war, the goal is to annihilate the enemy or, at the least, neutralize whatever threats he might present. Thus, the importance of MHS proactive deterrence emerges because it serves to prevent the enemy from achieving a position from which he may successfully launch an attack on our maritime homeland.
We Must Be Proactive
During the Cold War, the Coast Guard's Port Security Program integrated an aspect of military doctrine within its regulatory deterrence and surveillance measures. The thrust was to draw a line off our coastline and at our port entrances to keep Soviet-bloc merchant ships outside our critical ports. We committed to use whatever force necessary to achieve that objective. Back then, first responders were only a contingency in the event that the proactive deterrent efforts failed. Military doctrine also follows the line that you take your licks then resume operations as soon as possible. Therefore, reopening the ports after attack and the continuity of port operations played a far greater role in contingency planning.
While our self-imposed decision to regard this war on terrorism as a law enforcement issue is a practical fact of life, this should neither bar proactive deterrent measures nor should it inhibit the introduction of military doctrines advancing deterrence into our maritime domain. The port security regulations issued under the Magnuson Act not only envisioned such measures but actually called for their authorization with respect to harbor entry and security zones on land and waterways. Those port security measures should be revisited.
While we are all rightfully concerned that the enemy may slip a WMD into a shipping container being delivered to one of our seaports and then detonate it there or at an inland population center after transport by truck or train, we must not forget that the same WMD will surely fit into a 60-foot boat. Such boats can easily enter our home waters at leisure, which brings us back to the question: Does maritime homeland security apply only in seaports or is our entire coastline at risk?
The history of enemy attacks defines the nature of the threat. Thus, we must expect that the enemy would convert any element of our waterborne commerce into a potential weapon. Transportation safety measures provide a handbook of potential scenarios available to the enemy. Within our port systems, the identification and protection of such potential weapons must receive top priority.
Some critics would urge that discussion about gaps be suppressed because such openness might give our enemies ideas and information they don't already have. Looking the other way, however, or pretending the gaps don't exist, is unrealistic. Let us consider several of these gaps.
Mine Warfare
Homeland Security seems to ignore the threat of mines. U.S. Navy mine countermeasures (MCM) possesses a significant MHS capability, but this remains untapped. Nevertheless, the homeland must be defended. As mines are a proven naval means for blockading seagoing commerce, the Navy should be involved. If the enemy ever opts for an economic warfare initiative, mine warfare will be a serious concern. Little would bring maritime commerce to a halt faster than the detonation of a few mines on the undersides of some merchant ships. Because the Navy does mine countermeasures, DHS agencies might have an excuse to compartmentalize the threat and ignore it. Mine laying operations are assumed to be the role of hostile navies, and hostile navies are the business of the U.S. Navy. And, since a blockade is an act of war, isn't lifting an enemy blockade of homeland ports a Navy function?
A concealed smart mine could be deployed anywhere from a terrorist's small boat. While the mine might not have the punch to destroy a large merchant ship, its detonation against a ship in a harbor entrance channel could stop ship traffic at that port. Simultaneous attacks at several ports might block an entire coastline. During the early days of the Iraq War, Allied units discovered and reported an Iraqi mine laying operation that used a commercial seagoing tug and barge. A replication of this activity along our coast, using surplus iron mines, represents a greater threat than do smart mines. Any mine blockade would endure until the infected waterways were swept. That could be weeks, if not months. But this blockade would not occur so much because of obstacles to navigation; it would be established because of the threat of future mine detonations.
The Navy likely has only limited MCM assets available to protect our commercial ports. There may, however, be a viable alternative. Local commercial or government vessels, equipped with side-scanning sonar, could make random sweeps, and report anomalies from an established base line that prompts further identification. (See "Mines in Ports," pp.48-51.)
Small Seagoing Vessel Threat
These vessels are not required to have the otherwise mandated Automatic Identification System (AIS) or to file Notices of Arrival (NOA). Because of their exclusion from these regulatory schemes, they are inherently more secretive than merchant ships. They also are far more capable of navigating in and out of the many small nearby foreign ports within easy cruising distance of the United States and can just as easily deliver lethal cargos in any number of U.S. coastal inlets and estuaries.
AIS is no panacea for tracking and identifying vessels, large or small, which might be used for hostile purposes. The system only works when the electronic device is turned on—it only works for compliant vessels. The same goes for NOAs. Radar surveillance is another matter. When focused on inshore waters it becomes a useful means of electronically identifying and tracking underway traffic, much of which may also be participating in AIS. However detailed this information may be, by the time it has been accessed, interpreted, and a threat detected, it's likely to be too late to interdict a USS Cole (DDG-67)–style attack. The proper enforcement of AIS and NOA regimes to identify offshore threats requires a complimentary surveillance tool that would locate, identify, and enable interdiction of all vessel threats while they were still offshore.
Identify Ripe Terrorist Targets
Ports are not simply sheds, docks and cranes, and places in the water to dock ships, and there is much more to a port besides that which is under the control of public port authorities. Federal and state MHS agencies, however, prefer to focus on the neat, governed portions of port systems and tend to ignore the private parts. These include the ships, ship service organizations, vendors, and marine insurance interests, among others, and most important, privately-owned terminals. Therefore, while the capital assets of public ports get the lion's share of federal protective attention, private-facility targets escape concern. Implicit in MHS is the obvious and extremely vital matter of securing the safety of port populations along with all port assets.
Certain preventative measures meant to protect all waterfront terminals derive from Maritime Security Act of 2002 regulations that mandate industry-developed vessel and facility security plans. These requirements are similar to those mandated by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 to prevent and mitigate oil spills. Hence, they read like terrorist spill plans. Safety plans, such as those for pollution prevention and port safety, are cooperative ventures. They try to educate people about prevention, then involve them in developing response plans, exercise them at drills, and hope that all will go well. Their intent is to prevent accidents, not deliberate attacks.
Private terminals usually include petroleum and chemical waterfront facilities associated with manufacturing and bulk distribution. At some terminals, the liquid and gaseous cargos being transferred, stored, and distributed can present far more fertile terrorist targets than might containerships filled with watertight steel boxes moored at state docks. Many bulk liquid/gaseous products, even while safely handled and stored under strict regulatory compliance, still represent serious population threats when exposed to deliberate attacks. Some of what is stored and handled at private waterfront facilities is the material that can provide the attention-getting, man-made disasters on which terrorists thrive.
The corporate legal departments of private terminals typically forbid the use of weapons by their security personnel. The Magnuson Act gives the Coast Guard abundant authority to establish security zones to protect such facilities. Assigning the security responsibility to facility owners who forbid guns begs off the government's responsibility to protect port populations. Considering the potential vulnerability of the adjacent populations, these terminals must be afforded the same level of shared intelligence and protection as are public facilities. A system is needed that would enable the quick interchange of information between MHS agencies and private terminal security resources—and their security people must be armed.
Treat Merchant Ships As Allies
This gap represents strategic ignorance more than oversight. Every naval officer knows that in wartime the U.S. Merchant Marine and allied shipping are vital parts of our total force. Moreover, international maritime commerce is essential to the national economy. Perhaps the most significant and visible aspect of maritime commerce is the merchant marine. Therefore, MHS must also extend to the protection of merchant ships that trade at U.S. ports, at least while they are in our waters. The protection of merchant ships in our ports is every bit as important as the protection of their cargos.
Unfortunately, the approach taken by MHS agencies appears to protect the ports from the merchant marine. Too many law enforcers tend to consider these merchant sailors as perpetrators or suspects. One particularly egregious manifestation of this policy restricts seamen from shore leave. While the restrictive security measures applied to merchant seamen has become acceptable, the application of similar restrictions to the many alien nationals among us—legal and illegal—including some who profess sympathy for the enemy, has not.
The focus of the Cold War NOAs was to ensure that only cleared merchant vessels could enter our ports. Armed Coast Guard harbor patrol craft enforced clearance requirements. Unfortunately, the present NOA policy determines the place of arrival in port to be the terminal berth rather than the harbor entrance. This simple interpretation seriously contradicts Magnuson Act strategies. As a result, any ship can enter U.S. harbors unhindered. It needs only not to file its NOA, switch off its AIS, and proceed into a seaport. A suicidal crew with a WMD couldn't care less about NOA compliance regimes and AIS schemes.
Benign animosity toward merchant shipping is evident in the policies associated with the 96-hour NOA estimated-time-of-arrival (ETA) regulations. The policy requiring at-the-dock ETAs virtually ignores the possibilities of berth congestion as well as other unavoidable delays such as poor visibility and bad weather. This is a bureaucratic program that has taken on a life of its own. Not only does this policy adversely impact ship schedules, it also affects dockside labor contracts. The delay-related labor costs to our merchant marine allies attributed to homeland security policies can run to millions of dollars. While the costs of doing business mount, unreasonably excessive civil penalties are also being levied for violations of NOA regulations. If the enemy were indeed waging warfare against our economy, their best allies might be the DHS agencies. Ridiculously, these violation citations only evolve from vessels that are trying to be compliant.
Experts cite our abundant economy as one reason why the enemy hates us. Therefore, it must be protected. In view of their importance to our economy, our merchant marine partners in world commerce must not be viewed as criminals.
It will take time to close the material gaps that are dependent on technology and resources. However, those gaps resulting from ignorance, misguided policy, and agency retrenchment can be reduced at any time. Our government has delayed having a cohesive maritime homeland security strategy long enough. We can't afford to wait another year.
Captain Bennett, a 1958 graduate of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, retired in 1982 after 30 years of service. As commanding officer of units in Georgia and South Carolina, he was responsible for those states' port security. He serves on the South Carolina Maritime Security Commission and the Federal Area Maritime Security Committee.