The U.S. Coast Guard is opening the door to a cooperative relationship with China.
China's maritime development is gathering steam. It is challenging South Korea and Japan for dominance of the global shipbuilding market. More than 1,700 ships carry the five-star red flag, giving China the world's second largest merchant marine.1 Seven of the top 20 container ports in the world are located in China, with Shanghai seeking to take the top spot by 2010.2 Beijing is moving into both civil and naval high-tech shipbuilding arenas, producing everything from liquefied natural gas tankers to area air defense destroyers with phased array radars. From a maritime perspective, China finally has "stood up."3
This rapid maritime development has engendered tension, not only between China and its coastal neighbors, but also with the United States. It was suggested during the 1990s that Asia's preeminent continental power would not dare to challenge the preeminent sea power in the region.4 Such a balance of power, however elegant, seems less and less feasible as Chinese shipyards turn out better designs while the United States remains largely focused on Iraq.
To ensure peace in the 21st century, the United States and China must reach a new modus vivendi on the high seas. Unfortunately, military-to-military engagement remains rather limited and tense, a tone that that is just beginning to change since the nadir during and after the April 2001 EP-3 incident. To be sure, the spring 2007 visit to the United States by China's naval commander, Admiral Wu Shengli, is a significant step in cooperative relations, but this maritime partnership must be built on a strong foundation of trust established over time through activities that have concrete benefits for both sides.
In contrast to the volatile military-to-military relationship, the U.S. Coast Guard's civil maritime engagement with China has been sustained and successful. The Coast Guard and corresponding Chinese civil maritime authorities have circumvented points of tension to cooperate on common interests in maritime governance. The United States and China both want safe, clean oceans, sustainable and fair extraction of resources, and security from seaborne asymmetric threats. Over the course of the last five years, the Coast Guard has worked with multiple Chinese ministries to develop a relationship that includes both exchanges ashore and operational cooperation at sea.
But in an era of increased missions for the service, this relationship cannot be taken for granted. In fact, accelerating Coast Guard engagement with China has the potential to pay enormous strategic dividends for the United States. Such an approach supports U.S. national goals to encourage the integration of China into a community of maritime stakeholders. The Coast Guard relationship with China and other coastal states is pragmatically realizing the vision of a multinational 1,000-ship navy to police the global commons.
An Emerging Capability
Chinese observers themselves are aware that China's development of civil maritime authorities has lagged behind the country's emergence as a maritime power.5 This weakness was illustrated by the occurrence of China's largest-ever civil maritime disaster: the 1999 loss of the Yantai-Dalian ferry Dashun to a fire in which 291 passengers and crew perished. This tragedy humiliated the PRC because the accident occurred within sight of China's coast, and because many victims actually succumbed to the elements while awaiting rescue overnight in lifeboats. Fortunately, this accident was not covered up and a number of post-hoc Chinese analytical surveys have been published that discuss its significance, noting in particular the weakness of China's maritime safety infrastructure.6
A year before the Dashun tragedy, China began reforming its maritime coastal infrastructure by creating the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) in 1998 under its Ministry of Communications (MoC). China MSA missions include supporting search and rescue, investigating accident and pollution incidents, inspecting ships, training and certifying seafarers, and maintaining aids to navigation. The MoC created Rescue Coordination Centers in each of the coastal provinces and along the Yangzi River, with power to task MSA ships, and helicopters and boats from the MoC's Rescue and Salvage Bureau (RSB).
Besides the MSA, several other institutions in China play a role in civil maritime governance, and many of them have ships with trademark stripes or designs that at a glance identify their vessels in a fashion similar to coast guards around the world. The Ministry of Agriculture controls China's fisheries enforcement service, while the State Oceanographic Administration (SOA) plays a role in environmental protection and oceanographic research. The "China Coast Guard" is actually a collective term for People's Armed Police maritime units under the Ministry of Public Security. The China Coast Guard's authorized missions include illegal migration, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism, but it is frequently involved in maritime rescue.
These agencies collectively have an impressive array of boats, ships, helicopters, and maritime patrol aircraft, but since these resources are split among various single-mission chains of command, they are not deployed with maximum efficiency. SOA maritime patrol aircraft do not support the patrols of the Fisheries Bureau; China's North Pacific fisheries patrols, however, would be futile without international maritime surveillance support. MSA has ships with helicopter decks, while the RSB has helicopters but no decks, and neither has fixed-wing aircraft. So China's immediate rescue capability is limited to incidents where the location of the vessel in distress is known and is within helicopter range from shore bases. In contrast to coast guards in both the United States and Japan, the China Coast Guard only has patrol boats. It lacks aircraft and centralized command and is subordinated to regional border defense commands, limiting it to inshore enforcement.7 Recent PRC analyses reflect a distinct envy of the more robust coastal patrol forces of its regional neighbors, South Korea and Japan.8
Notable Progress
While China has been slow to prioritize its coast guard missions, the progress over the last several years is noteworthy. By 2001, a Yangzi River maritime rescue and aid network had been established with branches in all the major port cities. In 2003, the RSB created China's first maritime rescue heliports in Shanghai and Dalian.9 That year, Chinese authorities announced their goal of increasing the speed of rescue reaction time within 50 miles of the coast, from four to five hours to under 150 minutes, in addition to expanding the geographic scope of maritime rescue operations.10 China has enjoyed the advice and training of Hong Kong's Government Flying Service, which inherited the advanced capabilities of the Royal Flying Service when Hong Kong reverted to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. In stark contrast to the Dashun disaster of 1999, when a major fire broke out on board the Liaohai near Dalian in November 2004, all 291 passengers and 49 crew were rescued.
With some pride, China reported in 2006 that both accidents at sea and fatalities in those accidents were reduced significantly in the Tenth Five Year Plan when compared to the preceding period.11 The same Chinese source reports that ship inspections increased by about 150 percent. Successful helicopter-assisted rescues were performed in the vicinity of Tianjin during 2006.12 Both China MSA and the China Coast Guard are developing larger patrol ships. The 3,000-ton Haixun 31 is the first-ever China MSA ship with a helicopter deck.13 The 5,000-ton Bei Hai Jiu 111 illustrates a continuing commitment to large and modern rescue vessels.14 A further innovation is the use of catamaran hulls for rescue patrol vessels, such as the Bei Hai Jiu 201.15
There was, moreover, speculation in March 2007 that the PLA Navy was in the process of handing over two Jianghu frigates to the China Coast Guard. Thus, according to one recent report, "[The China Coast Guard] has become one of the [more] powerful civil defense organizations, equipped over the past eight years with a fleet of 34 patrol ships . . . ." Assessing the goals of Beijing's new interest in civil maritime authorities, a Hong Kong-based analyst is quoted in the same report, suggesting: "The [China Coast Guard] system can not only proclaim and defend ocean sovereignty, but also avoid mobilizing military [forces] to solve arguments when disputes take place."16 Sovereignty issues do indeed seem to weigh heavily in discussions of the development of Chinese civil maritime capabilities.17
It is also significant that China has begun to hold major search-and-rescue exercises. Such exercises, occasionally involving dozens of ships and aircraft, took place off of Hainan and Jiangsu in 2004, near Shanghai in 2005, and along the piers of Qingdao in 2006. As significant as these new equipment acquisitions and training exercises is a vibrant intellectual atmosphere for exchanging information on Coast Guard development initiatives.
At the center of this activity is the new professional journal, Zhongguo Haishi [China Maritime Affairs], which features, for example, detailed case studies of maritime accidents.18 Articles from this and other related academic journals occasionally touch on sensitive but important matters, such as a "Study of the Independence of Marine Traffic Accidents Investigation."19 It is common in these articles to profile the activities of other coast guards around the world, including the U.S. Coast Guard.20 Such sources also applaud the growing ties between China's various coast guard organizations and similar organizations around the globe.
A New Priority
The high priority of China in U.S. Coast Guard engagement reflects the commitment of Commandant Admiral Thad Allen and his predecessor, Admiral Thomas Collins. The buoy tender USCGC Sequoia (WLB-215) was the first cutter to visit China, calling in Shanghai in May 2006; the USCGC Rush (WHEC-723) visited Qingdao the following month, and the USCGC Boutwell (WHEC-719) will visit Shanghai in 2007. Less well known is that Chinese officers have attended courses at the Coast Guard Academy in New London, Connecticut. Chinese fisheries patrol boats join U.S. Coast Guard cutters and maritime patrol aircraft, and Russian and Japanese Coast Guards in a coordinated annual enforcement effort against illegal North Pacific driftnetters. Chinese fisheries enforcement officers have actually served temporarily on U.S. cutters in the North Pacific, using the U.S. Coast Guard deck to take enforcement action against Chinese fishing boats. Chinese officers have also attended fisheries enforcement school in Kodiak, Alaska.
The Coast Guard has also been a key player in ensuring that the huge volume of U.S.-China maritime trade would not be severely interrupted by the post-9/11 international ship and port security compliance requirements—a fact recognized and appreciated by the Chinese government.21 Effectiveness in this role is not surprising, since Coast Guard inspectors have frequently visited Chinese ports and shipyards since 1980 to inspect U.S. flag merchant vessels.22
China has been an active participant alongside the United States in the multilateral North Pacific Coast Guard Forum, the only maritime security organization in East Asia. The forum has provided opportunities for international coast guard leaders to interact on a regular basis, and also initiated at-sea combined exercises beginning in 2005. The North Pacific Coast Guard Forum has particular promise to enmesh strong bilateral ties in a solid regional context and may play a role in alleviating tensions in other relationships such as between China and Japan. Within this vital forum, China currently has the important responsibility of organizing joint activities to counter illegal drug trafficking.
The U.S. Coast Guard is also working with the China MSA to negotiate and update the bilateral maritime search-and-rescue agreement, and the two countries have already agreed to coordinate their respective positions in advance of International Maritime Organization (IMO) meetings. In fall 2006, the IMO Tripartite Technical Experts Group from Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia solicited help from interested states in maintaining safety and security in the Malacca Strait. The Coast Guard has been discussing possible related joint safety initiatives with China's Ministry of Communications. Given the salience in Beijing of the "Malacca Dilemma"—a problem dictated by the Chinese economy's extreme dependence on seaborne oil shipments through the strait—in Chinese thinking about maritime security, joint endeavors could serve as an important step toward bilateral maritime security cooperation on a larger scale.23
To be sure, China and the United States are not mirror images in civil maritime matters, and the relationship has been hindered by differences in organization. There are also some notable differences in priorities as the Coast Guard is focused more then ever on the terrorist threat, while Chinese authorities are currently most focused on trade, safety, and of late, environmental issues. Still, the fundamental tie between the organizations is that the U.S. Coast Guard has centuries of experience in civil maritime management, while the issue is a comparatively new priority for China. Though significant progress has been achieved over the last decade, major deficiencies remain among Beijing's coast guard-like entities. Thus, it is readily conceded in Chinese sources that air rescue and command, control, and communication problems remain acute.24 These are precisely areas in which the U.S. Coast Guard excels, as demonstrated after hurricane Katrina. Clearly, coast guard-type missions form an area where China looks forward to learning from U.S. experience. While a paternalistic outlook must be carefully avoided, this is a genuine opportunity to build good will.
A Strong Foundation
This engagement between the United States and China has built a foundation for the creation of a broader maritime security partnership. The civil focus and pragmatism of coast guard-type activities has lowered suspicions, allowing a genuine exchange of organizational and operational know-how. Indeed, U.S. Coast Guard officials have been duly impressed by transparent and candid interactions with their Chinese counterparts. Success has also resulted from an approach in which Coast Guard interactions with China have been formed in concrete mission areas that correspond to the complex, transnational threat environment of the 21st century.
The new Coast Guard Strategy advanced in January 2007 states that "The Coast Guard is a versatile instrument of US foreign policy."25 Within a relatively small organization focused on domestic security issues, however, it is difficult to justify robust international engagement. Numerous Department of Defense entities all have China desks at both national and theater levels, and dozens of China experts within supporting organizations. Yet there is no China desk at any level in the U.S. Coast Guard. Moreover, there is also an understandable tendency, as part of the war on terrorism, to deploy the Coast Guard abroad to strengthen "weak coastal states [that] are not able to regulate . . . the legitimate movement and safety of vessels within their waters," and China does not fit that description.26
Nevertheless, China has been designated as a priority by successive leaders of the Coast Guard. An important symbol of this priority has been the unusual assignment of a captain's billet to Beijing as the U.S. Embassy's Coast Guard liaison officer, a position that has facilitated much of the positive interaction enumerated here. A further concrete step in this promising bilateral relationship would be the affirmative designation of aerial rescue operations as an area of special priority within the much broader relationship.27
If China's coast guard-like entities embark on a process of unification and rationalization as some Chinese maritime analysts are predicting, the U.S. Coast Guard will also have a wide experience in institutional consolidation to share.28 The commitment to further cooperation should be expanded with the recognition of China's priority place in Coast Guard international relationships. Such a commitment can be made possible by an enhanced capability for international engagement, perhaps supported to some extent by Department of Defense funds and advice, as recently proposed in Proceedings.29
With China's growing capacity on the seas, forming and maintaining a strong maritime partnership with Beijing should be a major priority for Washington's 1,000-ship navy strategy to achieve global maritime security. Preliminary evidence regarding Beijing's outlook with respect to the concept is not necessarily positive.30 But by relying on the close linkage between safety and security issues, the coast guard component in U.S.-China relations will naturally lead to a broader maritime security relationship that should gradually, in a step-by-step process, come to encompass enhanced naval cooperation as well. Over time, this process could lead to a strong partnership between equal and responsible maritime stakeholders, preserving peace in the vital Pacific region for the 21st century and beyond.
Dr. Goldstein is an associate professor and Director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.
1. www.nationmaster.com. More than 5,400 ships are registered in Panama, technically giving Panama the world's largest merchant marine. However, though Panama's merchant fleet is largest, Panamanian registry is considered a "flag of convenience," whereas the PRC actively manages its fleet. In fact, many Chinese-owned vessels are carrying other flags. back to article
2. Choe Sang-hun, "Asian Ports Struggle to Keep up with Shanghai," International Herald Tribune, 20 December 2006, on the web at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/12/20/business/transcol21.php. back to article
3. This phrasing is that of Mao Zedong at the announcement of the founding of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949. back to article
4. Robert Ross, "The Geography of Peace: East Asia in the 21st Century," International Security 23 (spring 1999), pp. 81-118. back to article
5. 2005 U.S. National Strategy for Maritime Security quoted in CAPT Bruce B. Stubbs USCG (Ret.) "Making the 1,000 Ship Navy a Reality," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (January 2007), p. 62. back to article
6. µÀ∫È'¬ [Deng Hongzhang] "÷–π?µƒ∫£ ¬æ»÷?œµÕ≥" [The Maritime Rescue System of China] ¥¨≤∞ [Ship and Boat] August 2006, p.1. back to article
7. See, for example, ∫?˘[Hu Zi] ""÷–π?'éÃπƒ·øÀ'µƒ°±‡"Ù""[The Story of China's 'Titanic'] ÷–π?¥¨ºÏ [China Ship Survey] July 2000, pp. 37-38; and ∫¬°±¬£??? [Hao Yong and Tong Fei] "ÀÆ…œΩªÕ® ¬π ÷¬°∞ڿ̬€ÃΩÃ÷" [A Discussion Regarding Marine Accident Causation Theory] ¥¨∫£π§≥à [Ship and Marine Engineering] February 2006, pp. 83-86. back to article
8. "People's Liberation Army Navy Organization" from Wikipedia at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Liberation_Army_Navy_Organization. back to article
9. See, for example, ∞◊ø°∑· [Bai Junfeng] ÷–π?∫£—ÛæØ≤ÏΩ®…ËππœÎ [A Conception for Building the China Coast Guard] ∫£—Ûπ‹¿Ì [Ocean Management] (March 2006), p. 35,37. back to article
10. This fact and the prior sentence are both attributed to High Beam Research, accessible at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-98789604.html. back to article
11. "China to Expand Maritime Administration Scope," Xinhua, 12 February 2003, http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/55774.htm. back to article
12. "ÆŒÂ∫£ ¬≥…π°ª°ÆªÕ∫Õ–≥∑¢°Øπªπø¥ΩÒ≥Ø," [Great Maritime Achievements During the Time of the Tenth Five Year Plan and Harmonious Development Now and in the Future] ÷–π?∫£ ¬ [China Maritime Affairs] (January 2006) p. 11. back to article
13. Interview, Beijing, March 2007. back to article
14. On Haixun 31, see ≥ñΠ[Cheng Biao] ∫£—≤31∫≈¥¨Õ®µº…˱∏∞≤◊∞µ˜ °ÆŒ µƒ∑÷Œˆº∞Ω‚æˆ∑Ω∞∏ [Analysis and Program of Resolving Problems of Equipment Installation Aboard Haixun 31] π„¥¨ø?ºº [Guangdong Ship Science and Technology] (February 2005), pp. 5-6. back to article
15. A photo of this vessel and some details are available in "±±∫£æ»111"∫≈∫£—Ûæ»÷?¥¨ [Northern Rescue No. 111 Ocean Rescue Ship"" Ω¢¥¨÷™ ∂ [Naval and Merchant Ships] (February 2006), p. 67. back to article
16. Minnie Chan, "Network of Ocean Patrols Will Monitor Key Resources," South China Morning Post, April 7, 2007. back to article
17. ∫Œ°¬°∞¡? [He Zhonglong] ÷–π?∫£∞∂æØŒ¿∂°±◊ÈΩ®—–æø [Research on the Organization and Development of China's Coast Guard] (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2007), pp. 3-4. Thanks to Prof. Andrew Erickson for directing me to this important source. back to article
18. See, for example, "÷ÿ«Ï≥§ Ÿ""°∞?°±2∫≈"¬÷¥•Ω∏ ¬π µ˜≤È"" [Investigation Report on the Grounding Accident Involving M/V Yin He 2 of Changshou, Chongqing] ÷–π?∫£ ¬ [China Maritime Affairs] February 2006, pp. 22-24. back to article
19. –Ï√˜«ø£¨ÕiŒ® [Xu Mingquiang and Wang Wei] "ÀÆ…œΩªÕ® ¬π ∞≤»´µ˜≤È∂¿¡¢–°Æµƒ—–Ã÷" [Study of the Independence of Martime Transport Accident Investigations] ÷–π?∫Ω∫£ [China Navigation] September 2006, pp. 19-22. back to article
20. ¬Ìµ¿æ¡ [Ma Daojiu] "√¿π?∫£∞∂æØŒ¿∂°±ºÚΩÈ" [Introduction to the U.S. Coast Guard] ÷–π?∫£ ¬ [China Maritime Affairs] (February 2006), pp. 57-59. back to article
21. Ibid, p. 59. back to article
22. LCDR Nicholas Caron, USCG, "U.S. Coast Guard Activities in China," on the web at http://www.nautinsthk.com/archive/documents/USCG/uscg.htm. back to article
23. For the information in the preceding three paragraphs, the author is indebted to the assistance of both CAPT Barney Mooreland, USCG Liaison of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, and also Pacific Advisor Patrick Markowitz of Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, DC. back to article
24. µÀ∫È'¬ [Deng Hongzhang] ""÷–π?µƒ∫£ ¬æ»÷?œµÕ≥"" [The Maritime Rescue System of China] ¥¨≤∞ [Ship and Boat] August 2006, pp. 2-3. back to article
25. The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security and Stewardship, Washington DC, 17 January 2007, p. 51. back to article
26. Ibid, p. 51. back to article
27. No doubt, critics will assert that such assistance will help the Chinese military become more proficient in helicopter operations, a major Chinese weakness at present. This is true to some extent, but some risks will be necessary if genuine trust is to be built between the two militaries. Moreover, this is likely an area where even very basic assistance will be much appreciated. back to article
28. ∫Œ°¬°∞¡? [He Zhonglong] ÷–π?∫£∞∂æØŒ¿∂°±◊ÈΩ®—–æø [Research on the Organization and Development of China's Coast Guard] (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2007), p. 4. back to article
29. Stubbs, "Making the 1,000 Ship Navy a Reality," p. 65. back to article
30. Yan Guoqun, "Why Has the United States Put Forward the 'Thousand Ship Navy' Proposal?" Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, 29 November 2006. back to article