Book Reviews

Powerful and Brutal Weapons: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Easter Offensive

Stephen P. Randolph. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007. 401 pp. Illus. Maps. Notes. Index. $29.95.

Reviewed by Commander John T. Kuehn, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote an opinion piece in the Los Angeles Times (31 May 2007) comparing the Iraq and Vietnam Wars. In making the comparison he warned against drawing on the wrong lessons from Vietnam. Kissinger referred especially to the military defeat of the North Vietnamese Army's (NVA) Easter Offensive of 1972 that paved the way for America's total withdrawal-some have called it abandonment-from Vietnam. This new study by retired Air Force Colonel Stephen P. Randolph addresses precisely this very important episode of the Vietnam War.

Randolph, who teaches at the National Defense University, started out to write an air power-focused study of the Easter Offensive. This is natural since the United States' major military contribution to the defeat of the North Vietnamese offensive involved the use of overwhelming land- and sea-based aviation as well as mining and naval surface-fire support-the "powerful and brutal" weapons that the Hanoi politburo worried about in a cable regarding Nixon's possible response to their aggression.

In researching the period, however, Randolph expanded the scope of the book "to encompass strategic decision making in the Nixon White House, and then to include the North Vietnamese perspective on these events." In addition to his command of much of the recent secondary scholarship now available on the war, Randolph has exploited the very key primary resource of the White House tapes from the period which give the reader an incredible inside look at the machinations of Nixon, Kissinger, General Alexander Haig, and others throughout the lengthy crisis engendered by the NVA attack.

Randolph is objective and incisive in his judgments while at the same time providing a much-needed updated narrative of the final operational victory prior to the Paris Peace Accords of 1973. Randolph shows the good, bad, and ugly of the Nixon White House, and offers cogent civilmilitary commentary on the dysfunctional organizational relationships between the military, the President, and the Secretary of Defense. In particular, Nixon wanted to restructure the command relationships in Vietnam to bring more unity of effort to the conduct of the war, only to be stymied by secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and others who argued that a radical restructuring was unwise in the midst of the crisis.

Nixon's frequent bypassing of his secretary of Defense, however, provides evidence that a campaign can be successfully conducted without the participation of the secDEF. Among the more positive portrayals to emerge from Randolph's highly engaging account is the role played by Alexander Haig, who comes across as a bold and realistic strategist of the first order.

Similarly, Randolph's discussion of the strategic decision-making process in the North is welcome and he avoids the mistake of filling in the substantial blanks that still remain because of Vietnam's continuing status as a closed society. He also gives full credit to Hanoi's leadership for establishing the basis, in this hard fought offensive, for their ultimate success later in the war and observes that "This [North Vietnam] was probably the most thoroughly mobilized society in humankind's long and violent history." He makes certain the reader is aware that the United States' adversaries were thoughtful, flexible enemies who adjusted their tactics and operations at every turn to try and counter the superior U.S. firepower and technology. One comes away with the feeling that the North Vietnamese were the most competent foes the United States has ever faced in combat.

This superb book is a significant addition to the new scholarship on the Vietnam War and is essential to understanding its resolution. It also dispels a number of myths and contributes to an emerging interpretation that has identified the Watergate scandal as ruinous to the possibility of maintaining a viable regime in Saigon.

Scorpion Down: Sunk by the Soviets, Buried by the Pentagon: The Untold Story of the USS Scorpion

Ed Offley: Basic Books, 2007, 482 pp. Illus. Maps. Notes. Bib. Index. $27.50.

Reviewed by Captain James B. Bryant, U.S. Navy (Retired)

An act of war that killed 99 men and was hidden so well that the civilian chain of command and the press missed it has the makings of an interesting story. But Scorpion Down is a conspiracy yarn on the same scale as the theory that the 9/11 attacks were caused by the U.S. government and not Arab terrorists. The author explores the hypothesis that the Soviets sank the USS Scorpion (SSN-598), a nuclear-powered fast-attack submarine, and it was covered up by an unofficial U.S./Soviet agreement of senior submariners. In order to be told, this tale would require senior admirals involved to recant their stories years later to the author. Of those who allegedly did-including Vice Admiral Arnold F. Schade (Commander Submarine Force Atlantic) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas H. Moorer-only Vice Admiral Philip A. Beshany (Director of Submarine Warfare) is still alive. The Russians deny any involvement.

The author has the Scorpion returning from a Mediterranean deployment to Norfolk, Virginia, in a "running confrontation" with a Soviet Echo Il-class submarine beginning some time before 17 May 1968. On the 17th, the U.S. boat was diverted to conduct surveillance of Soviet surface ships and another Echo II near the Canary Islands. This is a matter of record. The author states the Scorpion could not escape the pursuing Echo II-despite being faster, quieter, and equipped with better sonar and torpedoes-and this was reported by radio to the submarine force commander. No record of this message exists. The Echo II allegedly torpedoed the Scorpion on 22 May, 400 miles southwest of the Azores; the correct date and location of the sub's loss. The author then describes a secret search that began on 23 May after the boat failed to reply to a message. The actual search began after she failed to arrive in port on 27 May.

The author believes the attack was retaliation for the USS Swordfish (SSN-579) allegedly sinking the K-129, a Soviet Golf Il-class diesel-electric-powered ballisticmissile submarine, after a submerged collision north of the Hawaiian Islands in March 1968. The Soviet boat's loss was more likely caused by an internal explosion.

Offley claims a torpedo exploded next to the Scorpion's control room, flooding the entire boat. A 1970 Navy report, declassified in 1998, concluded that a torpedo explosion was unlikely. There was no visual indication of an internal or external explosion in wreckage photographs or audio clues in acoustic recordings. Those sources, however, point to pressure hull implosion. This would not have happened if the hull had equalized with sea pressure, such as a result of a torpedo explosion. The Navy has never declared a cause for her sinking.

A key ship in the alleged secret search was the USS Compass Island (AG-153), which the author claims-based on interviews with several former enlisted crewmembers-to have left port on Friday, 24 May, three days before the submarine-missing report was issued. This ship was a navigational test platform and equipped with a Sonar Array Sounding System (SASS) used to make bottom topography charts. The author claims that the Russians told U.S. officials where the missing boat was, but not the who, when, or how. He also claims that the Compass Island found the sub's wreckage using the sonar sounding system in early June. The five-month search by the ocean-research ship Mizar's (T-AGOR-11) towed sled with cameras and sensors was part of an extensive coverup.

On 17 May 2007 I spoke with Captain Joseph E. Bond, U.S. Navy (Retired), commanding officer of the Compass Island during the Scorpion search. He denied that his ship left port on 24 May or discovered the wreckage in early June. He clearly remembers receiving a phone call late on 27 May instructing him to get under way, but, because of tides, they left at 0300 or 0400 the next morning. He also said that the sonar mapping system could not detect anything as small as the wreckage, especially at its 11,000-foot depth. I also spoke with two Sailors the author quoted. Their memory of getting under way was not clear and finding the wreckage in early June was scuttlebutt from other crewmembers.

Two months later, I spoke with Vice Admiral Beshany, who remains sharp at 92 and was recently remarried. He does not recall speaking with the author about secret searches, Soviet aggression toward the Scorpion, or any of the conspiracy theories described in the book. He vehemently denies that any such theories are true.

In 1993, a Russian captain claimed he saw the Scorpion's periscope as a junior officer on the Echo II involved with the operations monitored by the U.S. sub. He told me that his captain came to the Echo II's bridge and told him to wave because the Americans were taking pictures. This belies the book's position on Soviet aggression.

These are but a few of many factual issues in this book. While it is an entertaining yarn-and there are those who will enjoy reading it-Scorpion Down is pure fiction.

Fighting the War of Ideas Like a Real War

J. Michael Waller. Washington, D.C.: The Institute of World Politics Press, 2007. 152 pp. $19.95.

Reviewed by Lieutenant Dan Reiher, U.S. Navy

Discussions abound throughout government halls, think-tank board rooms, and academic circles regarding the lack of a cohesive communications message from the United States to the world. One has only to pick up the latest copy of the daily news to see instances in which the U.S. government is sending messages that do not clearly support its national strategic aims. In this book, J. Michael Waller proposes immediate steps the government can take to "course correct" its strategic communications message.

The author stakes the claim that we are losing a propaganda war within Iraq and then offers a way to "wage this pivotal battle in the immediate-term." One of his central tenets is that the United States is under psychological siege from radical Islamists who are still mistakenly characterized by many public officials as religious rather than political antagonists. The United States must do more than continue political diplomacy efforts which, though useful, can only produce resuits over the long term. What is needed, argues the author, are tools to break this siege now rather than later. Using U.S.Soviet Union relations as a case study, Waller demonstrates how the United States has allowed itself to be "semantically penetrated" first by the former Soviet Union, and now by global terrorists. He makes a strong argument that this has largely occurred and is occurring because of our reluctance to counter the terms and definitions handed out to the world public by our enemies.

A keystone of this argument is the use of the term jihad. Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are quick to justify their actions as examples of jihad, a term with multiple meanings, many of which are seen as palatable by the greater ummah-community of believers. Waller argues that by using the term handed to us by our enemies, we cede the field of battle in the war of ideas. He proposes instead the introduction of the term hirabah in official statements to counter the false use of jihad by our enemies. Hirabah, which carries a connotation of unjust warfare, is more aligned to the context with which the United States wants to frame al Qaeda and other groups in the war on terrorism.

Rife with citations that support this argument, the text clearly demonstrates that the new thrust in the war of ideas does not have to originate in U.S. government public releases. Public statements against terrorist organizations who claim jihad as their moral cover have already been made from within the ummah, most notably in the Spanish fatwa of 2005, which condemned Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. This fatwa is an example that the U.S. government can use as a ready-made weapon in the cognitive-domain battleground. By moving to the ideological offensive, Department of State and Defense communicators can reclaim the operations tempo in this war of ideas.

By focusing primarily on the offensive aspects of strategic communications, the author has made a worthwhile contribution to what must be a key component of U.S. strategy in the terrorism war. For those who find themselves in a position to affect U.S. communications efforts, or to influence our image among allies and adversaries, this book should be placed at the top of their must-read list.

The First Marine Captured in Vietnam: A Biography of Donald G. Cook

Donald L. Price. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2007. 334 pp. Illus. Appen. Notes. Bib. Index. $35.

Reviewed by Major General John S. Grinalds, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)

The first Marine captured in Vietnam, Captain Donald G. Cook, persevered through three years of captivity before his death in 1967. Retired Marine Colonel Donald L. Price's riveting biography of Cook is based on extensive research, including interviews with Cook's surviving fellow POWs. His account lays open to the reader an intimate but horrific picture of life as a Viet Cong prisoner. He also captures the essence of the man and his character, and how Cook's life was molded by a strong family, professional training, and a deep faith preparing him for his ultimate crucible.

At the time of his capture on 31 December 1964, Captain Cook was assigned as an observer with the 4th Battalion, Vietnamese Marine Corps. The battalion engaged a reinforced VC regiment near Binh Gia, 40 miles southeast of Saigon. Cook was wounded on the last day of the battle and soon found himself a prisoner of the Viet Cong. Several others taken captive during his three years of incarceration survived to tell Cook's story. Their testimony became the core of the recommendation that Cook be awarded the Medal of Honor. The medal was presented posthumously to Cook's family on 16 May 1980.

From the outset of his capture Cook assumed the responsibility of leadership for his POW group. "It is easier to die; it is harder to live," became the reality of the POWs' lives as they were moved from camp to camp throughout South Vietnam. They lived under a reign of brutality, hunger, and disease and the reader is inextricably drawn into the daily cruelty that Cook and his men endured.

Fear was ever present from the moment of capture. The threat of execution shrouded them. Boots were taken away to hinder escape. Starvation enfeebled them. Malaria, beri beri, intestinal worms, hepatitis, amoebic dysentery, festering wounds, and exposure took their toll. Guards beat and harassed the prisoners regularly. Throughout, Cook defied the Viet Cong's demands for information and confession, encouraged his fellow prisoners to do the same, and shared the meager resources of food, medicine, and clothing he possessed. As Cook's actions brought him closer to death over the passing months of captivity, it is a wonder that he was able to persist.

Clearly, his training as a Marine officer created a sense of duty that drove him to assume this leadership role to help his fellow captives survive and resist. This Marine indoctrination reinforced an already strong character developed by his God-fearing family and Catholic upbringing. But there was more. On one occasion, Cook attempted escape and was recaptured and returned to the POW camp. A Viet Cong officer forced him to his knees and held a pistol to his head. The officer announced, "I will kill you and I have the authority to do it." Cook looked into the man's eves and said, "You can't kill me. Only God can decide when I die." The officer backed off.

This powerful statement was not bravado; Cook sincerely believed this. He saw his duty as serving his men until the end. To him, this meant laying down what meager resources he possessed to ensure his men's survival, until finally his resources were no more and he succumbed to the ravages of malaria.

This book should be read for what Captain Cook teaches us about how to lead under duress, and to understand what it means to be a Marine. Honor. Courage. Commitment. Faith.