Proposals are being put forward in Congress to resume construction of nuclear-propelled surface combatants-cruisers and. possibly, destroyers. The principal supporters of these proposals are Representatives Gene Taylor (D-Miss.) and Roscoe Bartlett (R-Md.). Taylor. recently appointed to head the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, has declared. "The Achilles' heel of the American military-and it's nothing that our enemies don't already know-is fuel." He continued, "Admiral |H. G.| Rickover had us well on our way in the early 1960s to a fleet that didn't count on foreign countries for its fuel."1
The U.S. Navy hail constructed nine nuclear-propelled cruisers and large destroyer-type ships, completed from 1961 through 1980 (see table). Admiral Rickover's plan was to construct four nuclear escorts for each nuclear carrier, a total of some 48 to 60 nuclear-propelled surface combatants. Rickover's efforts had led to Congress passing legislation in 1974 requiring that "major combat vessels for the strike forces must be nuclear propelled."2
Al that time Admiral Rickover wanted a fleet of so-called "strike cruisers"designated CSGN-that were to displace 15.1X)O-U)IiS standard and I7.2l()-tons full load, would be almost 710 feet long, and have Iw in nuclear reactors to drive them al aboul 30 knots. The CSGN would be primarily an antiair warfare ship, hut would earn a largo iiumher of untiship missiles, have limited antisuhniarino warfare capability, and would mount a single advanced 8-inch gun tor shore bomburdment. The estimated cost of the lead CSGN was almost S1.4 billion dollars at a time when nuclear carriers cost about S 2 billion.
But the head of the Aegis shipboard air/missile-defense system. Rear Admiral Wayne H. Mover, proposed that the system be shoehorned into the Spniance (DD-96?) destroyer design; those 7.800-ton ships were already on the building ways.3
Supported by the Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral James I.. Hollowav III. Admiral Rickover persisted with significant support from Congress although it became increasingly obvious that the strike cruiser was unafforduble. Finally, in January 1975, secretary of Defense James Schlesinger decided against requesting funds for any Aegis ships. Only when President Gerald R. Ford advised Congress that conventionally propelled Aegis ships were required in the national interest, and Admiral Holloway reversed his position, was the Aegis/Spniance program approved.4
Later the Reagan administration had included a nuclear-propelled cruiser in the last year of the Fiscal Year 1983-I987 shipbuilding plan, but that ship slipped into oblivion. According to Navy officials, the ship was placed in the long-range program tor "planning purposes" and was not pursued in future shipbuilding plans.
The nuclear cruiser program suffered another blow when, beginning in 1993 with the USS TCMIX (CGN-39), the nine nuclear cruisers were decommissioned and stricken, the last in 1999. The nuclear ships were expensive to operate compared to oil-burning ships and lacked the antisubmarine and antiair/missile capabilities of newer surface combatants. Reportedly. Admiral Rickover prevented their weapons upgradewith the Aegis system proposed for the larger ships-believing that such a move would delay additional nuclear warship construction.
Current congressional proposals for nuclear surface combatants focus on the planned CG(X), a large warship intended primarily for ballistic-missile defense. Representative Taylor noted that the new destroyer program-the DDG-1000-is too far along to effect changes in its power plant. Rather, Taylor is looking squarely at the follow-on design planned by the Navy, the CG(X) cruiser variant of the DDG design. The Navy plans to order the first CG(X) in 201 I. an interval that could probably permit a redesign of the ship to provide nuclear propulsion." This would especially be possible if the Navy adopted (doubled?) an existing submarine nuclear plant or provided half of a carrier's nuclear plant to power the CG(X) design.
However, the odds are overwhelmingly against the construction of nuclear-propolled cruisers in the immediate future. The obvious impediment is exist. The eurrent funding of naval ship construction is approximately $1.1 billion per year. The Navy's leadership estimates that to achieve the planned 313-ship fleet, the annual budget must provide $13.4 billion per year. But others inside and outside the Navy-among them the Congressional Accountability Office and Congressional Budget Office-believe $14 to $20 billion per year is a more realistic cost.
Despite congressional as well as Navy support for a larger shipbuilding budget, even the $13.4 billion per year may be difficult in view of the ongoing Afghan and Iraqi conflicts. Army and Marine Corps vehicle replacement needs, skyrocketing Department of Defense health costs, new aircraft programs, etc. In this environment the additional cost of nuclear propulsion, possibly an initial ?() percent increase per CG(X). is highly unlikely.
Representatives Taylor and Bartlett both seek nuclear propulsion for major warships in large part because of oil costs and availability. If there is a major effort to reduce U.S. military fuel consumption, ships may not be the most effieient place to start. The federal government uses about 2 percent of the nation's fuel consumption, or 330.000 barrels per day. The Department of Defense uses 91 percent of that, i.e., 300.000 barrels per day. Within DoD the usage is:
air 73%
ground 15%
sea6 8%
installations 4%
There are other nuclear ship issues:
* The engineering personnel of nuclear ships lire significantly more expensive to recruit, nain, and retain than lor conventionally propelled surface ships.
* Nuclear surface ship availability is less than conventional ships, i.e.. (hey spend more time in shipyards.
* Nuclear ship accessibility to ports is difficult, including certain U.S. ports us well as foreign.
* Nuclear ship disposal costs are considerable.
Thus, while nuclear-propelled surface ships are certainly desirable in many operational scenarios, the current forecast for shipbuilding funds and several other factors sharply reduce their feasibility. And. while oil consumption is a significant factor in naval operations, more efficient or different types of propulsion for military aircraft and ground vehicles would provide a much better return on investment.
1 Christopher P. Cavas, "New Committee Chair Wants More Ships. Nuclear Power." www.defensenews.com (13 November 2006).
2 Public Law 93-365, Title VIlI, 5 August 1974; the provision was repealed by Public Law 94-485, Title VIII. 20 October 1978.
3 The Spnutnct' class was the Navy's first large warship propelled by aircraft-type gas turbine engines. Adm Rickover had long opposed that type of propulsion because of the "threat" to nuclear-propelled surface ships. sec Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Alien, Rickover: Controversy and Genius (New York: Simon & Schustcr. 1982), pp. 232-236.
4 Subsequently, 27 highly effective Aegis "cruisers" were built based on the Spniam-e hull and propulsion design. This was the Timmlemxa (CG-47) class.
5 Cavas, op. cit.
6 Navy and Coast Guard ships and crafl.