In the mid-1990s, the Navy announced plans to build a new guided-missile destroyer designed to operate in the shallow coastal areas that planners believed would become a major focus of future naval actions.
The warship, known initially as the DD-21, was supposed to become a mainstay of the surface combatant fleet. It would carry advanced electronics and weaponry and perform a wide array of blue-water and near-coastal missions, from launching long-range missile attacks against land targets to providing massive fire support for Marine Corps ground assaults. To top it off, the vessel would be affordable, costing only $750 million a copy-relatively inexpensive for a ship of its size. At one point, the service said it hoped to build 32 of the new ships. Later, it pared that back to between 16 and 24.
Today, the effort, which was restructured in 2001 to become the DD(X) program, is a shadow of its former self-and a symbol of the budgetary challenges posed by today's new high-technology weaponry. Bloated by a seemingly endless stream of add-on costs, the initial price-tag now stands at between $2.8 billion and $3.8 billion a vessel-almost three times the current price of the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) -class Aegis destroyer introduced in 1991. Congress has authorized construction of only two of the high-tech ships and seems reluctant to build more than five beyond that. And the DD(X), recently designated DDG-1000, may well end up being folded into plans to build a new ballistic-missile-defense cruiser, known as the CG(X), which is now on the drawing boards. Some in Congress already regard the DDG-1000 as essentially just a laboratory for testing technology for the new cruiser.
Quality versus Quantity
Indeed, the price-tag has grown so large that some defense analysts are worried that the Navy won't be able to build enough ships to replace the current crop of Arleigh Burkes as they retire, leaving the service with what one analyst calls "a spectacular shortage'' of cruisers and destroyers in the 2030s and 2040s. With so much money needed for the DDG-1000, the Navy could find itself unable to maintain the overall 313-ship fleet of surface combatants, carriers, and submarines that planners now envision.
"It's the ship that's threatening to shrink the Fleet,'' says Robert Work, a retired Marine Corps lieutenant colonel and now a senior analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), a Washington-based research group that specializes in defense issues.
Harlan Ullman, a defense analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington and columnist for Proceedings, points to the former DD(X) as a prime example-along with the Air Force's F-22A Raptor, the Joint Strike Fighter, and the modern aircraft carrier-of the inherent conflict between today's growing demands for costly high-technology weaponry and the increasing pressures on military procurement budgets in the face of wartime spending and competition from domestic needs.
According to the Government Accountability Office, in the face of soaring costs for high-tech weaponry, the Air Force has trimmed the number of Raptors it's ordered to 181, from the 648 originally envisioned. The Army has cut the number of Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles it is buying to 138, down from 181 previously planned. And the Pentagon is ordering only 2,458 Joint Strike Fighters instead of the 2,866 it initially sought.
"The issue isn't whether these weapon systems are necessary,'' Ullman says. "It's that we've designed all of them with such high capability that there's increasingly a clash between the cost of these weapons and what the budget can accommodate.''
A Quantum Leap
To be sure, the DDG-1000 isn't just an upgraded Arleigh Burke with a handful of new-fangled gadgets. The futuristic-looking, 600-foot-long warship is a genuine technological marvel that contains virtually everything on the Navy's wish-lists in a proven sail-away form. Included are 80 enlarged vertical-launch cells for Tomahawk or evolved Sea Sparrow missiles; two 155-mm advanced gun systems with rocket-propelled, precision-guided projectiles that give it one and a half times the range of the guns on an Arleigh Burke; and a multifunction radar system that incorporates both the S- and X-bands. It has a 150-foot-long flight deck that can handle two MH-60R helicopters and three unmanned aerial vehicles; a new integrated power-generation system will deliver about ten times as much electrical capacity for equipment, paving the way for laser or electromagnetic guns; and an autonomous fire-suppression system. Finally, the ship features a new, extra-stealthy, tumblehome hull and other design changes that help reduce its magnetic, infrared, and acoustic signatures and keep its radar image no bigger than that of a fishing boat.
To the Navy, that translates into three times as much surface fire-support capability as the DDG-51, enabling the ship to provide backup for the Marines; a ten-fold improvement in overall battle force defense capability; a three-fold increase in the ability of the ship to defend itself against antiship cruise missiles; a ten-fold gain in the operating area for dealing with mines in shallow-water regions; and a 50-fold reduction in radar cross-section, which dramatically enhances survivability and cuts in half the number of missiles that must be fired in an intercept engagement. To save on operating costs, it will cut crew size by 62 percent from that of the DDG-51, requiring a complement of only 142 men and women, compared to 314 for the Arleigh Burkes. (Both sets of figures include the ships' air detachments.)
"This is a quantum leap from anything you've ever seen on a surface combatant ship,'' says Cynthia L. Brown, president of the American Shipbuilding Association, the Washington-based trade group for the nation's largest shipyards.
To CSBA's Robert Work, the list of technological developments not only spells out the stunning capability of the DDG-1000's equipment and weaponry, it also accounts for the eye-popping cost-increases.
While the initial DD-21 concept was relatively modest, "the Navy started to hang all sorts of operational requirements on the ship,'' Lieutenant Colonel Work says.
tumblehome hull, and that necessitated a higher displacement; they
wanted to do away with antennas, so they went to conformal arrays
that are hidden in the deckhouse. They needed an extremely high
level of automation to trim the size of the crew that will be needed.
And they introduced a new electric power system, designed to move
away from turbines. It shouldn't be any surprise that the cost started to
skyrocket.
What's more, critics began to complain that the ship was outdated and no longer necessary. "Although the ship's centerpiece, its two advanced gun systems, would give the Navy the ability to provide sustained, high-volume fire support to troops ashore, that capability has not been in high demand in the United States' past several conflicts,'' the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office said in a study issued in May. "If the [DDG-1000] had been available, it would have been of no use against land-locked Afghanistan and of very little use against Iraq, where U.S. forces invaded from neighboring Kuwait and moved rapidly out of range of a [DDG-1000's] guns. In the future, if U.S. forces do not have access to a base such as Kuwait and must perform an opposed amphibious landing from the sea, the new ship's guns could prove valuable. But the United States has not conducted such a landing in more than half a century, although it has had opportunities to do so.''
"It's not so clear why the ship has so many requirements, given the environment in which we find ourselves,'' says Loren B. Thompson, chief executive officer of the Lexington Institute, a research group in Arlington, Virginia, that specializes in defense issues. "We're building a very versatile warship at a time when the threats we face are relatively modest.''
In 2001, the DD-21 effort was morphed into a new DD(X) program, which would provide designs for a destroyer, a cruiser, and the littoral combat ship (LCS). In the process, the cost of the destroyer was bumped up to between $1.4 billion and $1.6 billion and the capabilities were expanded to include air defense as well as land attack.
"The ship that was originally designed to replace frigates suddenly became the top end of the Fleet-and very expensive,'' Lieutenant Colonel Work says. "The Navy would argue that the requirements changed over time and they had to do this, but most outside analysts would say that this is a ship that got out of control.''
But How Much Will It Cost?
To add to the controversy, there's a serious disagreement within the government over just how costly the DDG-1000 is likely to be. While the Navy now estimates the cost of the first two vessels at $3.3 billion, with the next three weighing in at $2.5 billion apiece, the Defense Department's Cost Analysis Improvement Group puts those figures at $4.1 billion and $3 billion respectively, according to the GAO. Last year, the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office estimated them at $4.7 billion and $3.4 billion. And both the GAO and the Congressional Research Service have voiced similar views.
The Navy itself says only that the ship is "transformational,'' meaning that, unlike previous cruisers and destroyers, it isn't merely an upgrade of a previous ship-class. The old Spruance-class destroyers, for example, were only a step or two ahead of their post-World War II predecessors, adding a larger hull and gas turbines. The Ticonderoga-class cruiser contained the Aegis radar-and-gunnery system, but was built on a Spruance hull. Even the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, built on a newly designed hull, weren't that great a leap forward.
By contrast, the DDG-1000s have a new hull, a new propulsion system, a new fire-fighting system, a new, networked computer system, and new weaponry. Small wonder that the vessel is costly, Navy officials say. But they argue it's worth the cost-and necessary to conducting modern-day naval operations.
The Navy also contends that, partly because of the DDG-1000's smaller crew size, its average operating and support costs would come in some $12 million to $13 million less each year than those of an Arleigh Burke. But CBO questions such assertions, arguing that the savings would be no more than $10 million at most, if indeed there is any at all.
The high cost of each ship-and the slow pace at which Congress is expected to finance the program-has implications for the nation's industrial base as well. Ronald O'Rourke, a specialist in national defense for the Congressional Research Service, figures that buying essentially one DDG-1000 a year, as Congress now seems bent on doing, would provide each of the two big shipyards involved-General Dynamics' Bath Iron Works in Bath, Maine, and Northrup Grumman's Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., in Pascagoula, Mississippi-with the equivalent of only about nine-tenths of an Arleigh Burke a year. It's a slice of the pie that is small enough to "raise questions about the potential future financial health of the two yards,'' he says.
The Navy initially had sought to hold a winner-take-all competition between the two companies, but senators from each of the affected states intervened. Congress eventually decided to parcel out construction of half a DDG-1000 a year to each yard, at least for the first two ships. The shipbuilding association's Cynthia Brown says the industry is satisfied with the compromise. The first ship to come off the ways will be named for the late Admiral Elmo R. (Bud) Zumwalt Jr., former Chief of Naval Operations.
For now, the Navy is standing behind its request to build at least seven DDG-1000s. Rear Admiral Charles S. Hamilton, the Navy's program executive officer for ships, insists that after the first few vessels, the Navy will meet the $2.3 billion-a-copy cost cap that Congress has placed on the ship. Rear Admiral Hamilton, who also serves as the chairman of the U.S. Naval Institute's board of directors, further disputes critics' suggestions that the DDG-1000 is the wrong ship for today's challenges.
"The capability of this ship is ideal for the global war on terrorism,'' he says. And, while congressional critics are doubtful, Navy officials say if the going gets rough, the DDG-1000's hull can easily be used for the still-being-designed CG(X), so the current program won't be a waste. Even so, the CG(X) isn't likely to be cheap, either. CBO estimates that the first CG(X) could cost about $5 billion, with an average cost of $3.9 billion for 19 ships.
But outsiders still are skeptical, and the betting is that after the first two prototypes are built, the Navy will be under increased pressure to pare back the cost-and capabilities-of the DDG-1000 or shelve it entirely in favor of a far less ambitious destroyer.
Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-Md.), chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Projection Forces, says 12 months ago he asked four of the Navy's top military and civilian leaders to estimate privately how high the cost would have to soar before the DDG-1000-then still the DD(X)-became unaffordable. While Bartlett never disclosed the figures, he has indicated that all four answers suggested that the program was already unaffordable.
"In my judgment, the [DDG-1000] has become too expensive in its current design,'' Congressman Bartlett says. "It will be little more than a technology demonstrator for future generation destroyers.''
"I think that what most people don't understand is that the DDG-1000 is really a dozen different programs all converging into one warship,'' says the Lexington Institute's Loren Thompson. "The technologies needed for next-generation warships are all being developed for this one particular program, and it makes it look more expensive.''
Impact on the Fleet
From the Navy's point of view, there are no easy choices. Sketching out various options for Congress in a report in May, the CRS's Ronald O'Rourke suggested that lawmakers could defer procurement of the second DDG-1000 for a year, buy only one or two as demonstration platforms for the new technology, or start work now on a lower-cost naval gunfire-support ship (either a destroyer or cruiser) to take the place of the DDG-1000.
CBO suggests even more sweeping alternatives, involving revamping plans for the entire Fleet. One would build all seven DDG-1000s and 19 CG(X)s that the Navy wants, but would cut 34 of the 62 Burke-class destroyers and keep the remaining 28 on station longer. It also would slash the number of submarines, amphibious ships, and Sea Base ships. Another would maintain the number of nuclear attack submarines at 55, but reduce the number of carriers to seven, cancel the DDG-1000 and CG(X) and halve the number of DDG-51s. A third would keep the current array of 11 aircraft carriers, but shrink the submarine service, cancel the DDG-1000 and all but eight of the 19 CG(X) cruisers, and curtail the number of amphibious and littoral combat ships. None of these choices would be very palatable to the Navy.
In the meantime, the DDG-1000 program is moving ahead, albeit slowly. In November, the Navy granted the new ship so-called "Milestone B status,'' enabling Rear Admiral Hamilton's office to complete detailed designs and begin buying materials for construction of the first two vessels. The Navy hasn't given up. And Congress seems to be biding its time before making any decisions on how many DDG-1000s to build.
But the Lexington Institute's Loren Thompson is unconvinced that lawmakers ultimately will go along with financing the full DDG-1000 program. "The handwriting is on the wall,'' he says. "If we build this ship at all, we're probably not going to build very many of them, which probably means that the CG(X) won't be built at all, either.''
Mr. Pine, a former naval officer and veteran reporter, covered military affairs for the Los Angeles Times and also reported for the Baltimore Sun, the Washington Post, and the Wall Street Journal. He is a free-lance writer living in Chevy Chase, Maryland.