As important as it is in today's warfighting, the Navy doesn't have much of a footprint in special operations. An aviation component could change that.
As the Global War on Terrorism has shown, 21st-century warfare has changed from previous conflicts. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the Navy has shifted focus from preparation for Cold War battles on the open sea to littoral/brown water operations. This move from a carrier-centric battle stance to an expeditionary force will most likely be the Navy's focus throughout the early 21st century. The current state of world affairs should be proof enough that the Navy cannot afford to maintain the status quo. A review of professional naval literature from the late 1920s and early 1930s illustrates that many leaders defended the ship-of-the-line concept. Fortunately, there were those leaders who believed that the future was in aviation and its ability to project power ashore.
Just as aviation had proven itself mature enough to form its own service in 1947 when the Army Air Forces became the independent Air Force, so have special operations come of age. The next 50 years may very well prove to be the half-century of the unconventional warrior.
This military evolution spawned Special Operations Command (SOCOM), which includes personnel from Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy, along with air components from both the Army and Air Force.
Important Questions
Where is the Navy's evolution? Where are its assets? Are the SEAL teams the Navy's only contribution to the command? The reserve Helicopter Combat Support Squadrons 4 and 5 (HCS-4 and-5), operating HH-60s, have been able to fill a gap for SEAL teams, but these units have been ridden hard for the past four years and are not manned for such high operational tempos. Further, both are scheduled for decommissioning in the near future with no replacement slated.
Special operations will continue to grow as the need for elite forces remains high. In what is possibly the newest and most important mission of this age, the Navy has not been able to do its part. The Navy must step up and help its sister services forge the special operations command into what will essentially be a new service.
Current Navy special warfare plans call for increasing the number of SEAL teams from eight to ten. This expansion will have some effect, but certainly not enough. The small, tight-knit character of the SEAL community is great for combat efficiency, but it is a definite drawback considering the Navy's ability to staff the Special Operations Command. Adding two SEAL teams will increase the requirement for operational frogmen, which will further strain the ability of Navy special warfare officers and senior enlisted to fill staff billets. This will also require an increase in the number of support/technical personnel. (A deployed SEAL team consists of about 105 SEALs and up to 110 support personnel.)
Contribute or Play Together Nicely?
How can the Navy increase its presence in the special operations world and do its part to achieve the special operations command goals? In the era of joint operations, it would appear that joint does not go as far as one would think. A joint special operation might involve an Army Special Forces team carried to an infiltration site by Army helicopters, supported by Air Force AC-130 gunships and Army artillery. The whole show would be covered by Air Force close-air support. Where is the Navy? It could provide the close-air support, or the ground force could be a SEAL team, but the joint question is: "Why are none of the helicopters piloted by naval aviators?" or "Why isn't the AC-130 navigator, or the MC-130 loadmaster, a naval flight officer or aircrewman?" To achieve true jointness, let us blur the inter-service lines. The goal should not be to "play together nicely." Now is the time to shed inter-service rivalry.
Why not create exchange billets for naval aviators and flight officers within the Air Force's Special Operations Command and the Army's 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR)? The Army has special forces Soldiers and 160th Airmen. The Air Force has para-rescue jumpers, combat controllers, and special operations command Airmen. The Navy has only SEALs. An organic pipeline must be designed to create aviators with special operations experience who will be capable of filling vital operational, planning, and staff billets for SOCOM and Naval Special Warfare Command (WARCOM).
Solution for Lost Platforms
As naval aviation continues its transition to common platforms, inevitably some personnel will be left behind. This has always been a fear for anyone whose platform is on the chopping block and was seen during the A-6 phaseout. Aviators are being shuffled from the CH-46 and the S-3. Instead of separation from the service or transitioning to a new airframe late in their careers, these highly-trained aircrews could be retained by allowing them to transition to a viable, extremely important community-the Naval Special Operations Air Component (NAVSOAC).
To develop a cadre of aviators and enlisted aircrews who are experienced and knowledgeable in special operations methods and tactics, officers would complete at least one tour operating aircraft with either an Air Force or Army special operations unit. This would be followed by a tour attached to one of the four Naval Special Warfare Groups (NSWGs). Prior to that tour, all pilots should attend Joint Tactical Air Controller training for qualification. Followon special operations community tours would include billets at WARCOM, Special Operations Command, or Joint Special Operations Command.
The Navy probably does not have the desire or the means to create its own special operations airwing, however, it can definitely improve its ability to wage unconventional war. Rather than fight to justify its existence in the special ops world, the Navy should capitalize on the vast experience of the Army and Air Force and court them. The Navy can, without increasing the number of pilots, create aviation special operations experts. The DoD move toward total force integration and joint operations is paving the way for this transformation. Pilot training is already a joint operation. In fact, any pilot in the multi-engine training pipeline could easily be pushed to an Air Force special operations unit to fly any of the C-130 platforms.
There are three stages of development in the evolution of the NAVSOAC program. The first is opening an exchange program, the second is the creation of an aviator-pipeline which would provide first-tour aviators, and the final stage is merging it with the Air Force and Army programs.
Stage One
This is so basic that it is amazing it has not been done. The Navy's gross under-representation in Special Operations Command is a shortfall that cannot be overlooked. Not only is a naval perspective important, the Navy needs to contribute to the special operations war effort.
This initial entry into truly joint operations involves Navy personnel embedding in the Army and Air Force (aviation) special operations units. This begins with the creation of a joint memorandum of understanding that outlines the embedding process. Experienced Fleet aviators/Naval Flight Officers would be placed according to their backgrounds. Because the active-duty Navy does not operate C-130s, the best source of pilots for the transition to the Air Force MC/AC-130 mission are those in the P-3 and S-3 communities. Because of the many similarities in aircraft handling and design, the transition from the P-3 to the C-130 is quite simple and could provide the Navy with a large contingent from which to select special operations aviators. With the downsizing of the P-3 community and the elimination of the S-3, there will be a fertile crop of second- and pre-third-tour pilots who would gladly fill these billets. Because the Army and Air Force have an established training pipeline, creating a pilot exchange should be relatively simple. There is no need to create new training commands or fleet readiness squadrons, or to increase the number of Navy aircraft. All pilots would attend training in the same units that the Air Force and Army personnel use.
With the Navy's push to an all SH-60 force, there should be little difficulty finding exchange pilots for the Army's 160th SOAR. One need only look at second-tour HS/HSL/ HCS pilots. As seasoned Fleet aviators and qualified SH60 aircraft commanders, they would only require a short training track to polish those aviation skills not typically used by maritime rotary-wing pilots. (The Army's 160th SOAR policy is to not accept first-tour aviators.) This advanced training would take no more than three months before placing the individual in an operational unit. Because of aircraft similarities, former CH-46 pilots would make excellent candidates for transfer to the MH-47. For trainees who don't have an obvious platform translation, they could attend the Army's equivalent of the Fleet readiness squadron for a complete training syllabus. After training, pilots would be assigned a 30- to 36-month tour in an operational command where they would be fully integrated into the unit. The experience gained would allow Naval special warfare to cultivate a crop of aviators capable of filling future special operations staff billets.
The final touch to stage one is the similar placement of naval flight officers as navigators and fire control officers/electronic warfare officers and enlisted personnel as aircrews. This would follow the same pattern as the pilot program, with highly-qualified enlisted helicopter crewmen and P-3/S-3 NFO's and crewmen placed in platform specific training with follow-on orders to an operational unit.
Stage Two
The creation of an initial pipeline for pilots to fill Fleet seats in AFSOC could not be easier. Because all prospective Air Force C/MC/AC-130 pilots receive their advanced multi-engine flight training at VT-31 and -35 at NAS Corpus Christi, Texas, everything is in place. The same is true for navigator/electronic warfare officers who receive joint navigator training at VT-4 and -10, at NAS Pensacola, Florida. This should be an easy transition as the pilot and NFO training pipelines for all Air Force special operations fixed-wing assets are already joint and hosted at Navy facilities. All that is needed to complete the change is to create a platform-selection category for prospective aviators to choose NAVSOAC, and to account for the number of crew pushed to the training program.
For rotary wing, the inclusion of Army specific training into the programs at the advanced helicopter training squadrons, HT-8 and -18, at NAS Whiting Field, Florida, is less important. The Army has wisely chosen to only include experienced aviators in their elite 160th SOAR. Therefore, the Navy would be obliged to integrate only second-tour pilots and aircrews.
Stage Three
This final stage involves the evolution of AFSOC and the 160th SOAR into truly joint units manned, and sometimes commanded by, different service personnel. While this may seem too much to swallow, it is really just a matter of perspective. The Navy and Air Force already share joint training squadrons and are each able to accomplish their mission. The exposure to other services' operating procedures is a strengthening tool which makes each service stronger.
The primary requirement to realize these changes is the ability to transcend petty inter-service rivalries. Not unlike society in general, we must learn to overlook our differences and focus on the strengths of each service. Instead of having a service-specific manning plan, a joint manning document would be issued. Along with this, the joint memorandum of understanding would cover which service will have command of the unit at what time. Simply stated, every third commander could be non-traditional (i.e., a naval officer in an AFSOC or Army Unit). Although it would seem to be a quick solution to transfer HH-60s from HCS-4 and -5 to the 160th, the expansion of the 160th's assets is a separate can of worms best addressed elsewhere.
Just as the Air Force gathered missions to itself during the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Navy and its special warfare command must do the same. As the need for special operations forces increases, the Navy must secure its future in this combat operations boomtown. The reliance of special operations command and its related entities on the Army and Air Force is extremely short sighted. The burden needs to be spread among the services. The Navy's ability to influence policy and procedures concerning the employment of unconventional forces is limited because of its small footprint. The only way to gain solid footing is to provide a healthy cadre of experienced and knowledgeable officers and senior NCOs who can be incorporated into the special operations units and staffs.
The creation of the Naval Special Operations Aviation Component will allow the Navy to achieve two goals. The first will secure the Navy's place in the future of SOCOM and the second is to take the DoD transformation edict to heart and to create a truly joint warfighting machine.
Lieutenant Commander Ostrom, an instructor pilot at VT-4, is a former EP-3E mission commander/instructor pilot and a C-130 aircraft commander. He has completed assignments as a T-45A instructor in Kingsville, Texas, and as a staff member at Training Wing 5, Whiting Field, Florida. He has deployed with Naval Special Forces to both Afghanistan and Iraq.