Cutting China’s "String of Pearls"

History teaches that land-based aircraft such as these U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles, can control the littorals and help counter China's maritime strategy.

Military analysts believe that China plans to aggressively challenge U.S. maritime superiority in the Strait of Malacca. A January 2005 Department of Defense report called this plan China's "string of pearls" strategy. It features a three-pronged approach. First, China is building a series of naval bases along the sea lanes to the Middle East. second, it is strengthening diplomatic ties with countries in the region. Third, the Chinese are rapidly building a blue-water navy, developing advanced missile technology, deploying new submarines, and stockpiling undersea mines to counter U.S. Navy capabilities and protect their energy security. Eighty percent of China's oil imports pass through the Strait of Malacca.

As part of this "string of pearls" strategy, China is constructing a new naval base and a listening post at the Pakistani port of Gwadar, building bases in Myanmar, and expanding its facilities on Woody Island. Hainan, and the Spratley and Parcel Islands. China also has signed a military agreement with Cambodia, strengthened its ties with Bangladesh, and is considering a plan to build a 520-billion-dollar canal in Thailand.¹ All these actions serve to reduce U.S. influence in and military access to the region.

In a 2005 Atlantic Monthly article. "How We Would Fight China." correspondent Robert D. Kaplan. author of Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground, predicts conflict as the Chinese navy increasingly seeks to project power and control sea lanes. "Given the stakes, and given what history teaches us about the conflicts that emerge when great powers all pursue legitimate interests." he says, "the result is likely to be the defining military conflict of the twenty-first century: if not a big war with China, then a series of Cold War-style standoffs that stretch out over years and decades."² It would be a serious mistake for the United States not to prepare and protect its vital interests in the region. One quarter of the world's maritime trade passes through the Strait of Malacca. This region is critical to the economies of close allies such as Japan and South Korea.

There is no doubt Alfred T. Mahan's ideas are shaping Beijing's geopolitical calculations and maritime aspirations.³ Mahan's theories are powerful, but the battle for maritime influence has changed since he wrote his seminal work, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, in 1890. To counter China's "string of pearls" strategy, the United States must also apply Mahan's theories while updating them to integrate air power. Specifically, land-based air power (to include Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force aircraft) can help control key maritime choke points, trade routes, and canals. Airfields can serve as the new "coaling stations." This idea has historical precedent. We should learn from our experience in World War II fighting Japan, an Asian power that at the time had similar resource aspirations as China does today.

The Pacific Theater of World War Il

In the war against Japan, land-based air power was a decisive element in our strategy to secure, exploit, and protect maritime lines of communication. Land-based aircraft were particularly lethal in the maritime domain, sinking almost 1.3 million tons of shipping. ⁴  In the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, approximately 100 Allied planes attacked and destroyed an entire Japanese convoy.⁵ In that raid, Japan lost more than 3,500 troops who were being ferried to reinforce critical areas. Land-based aircraft also established maritime supremacy across the entire South China Sea. Flying from the Mariana Islands, B-29s filled Japanese harbors with more  than 12,000 mines that sank 287 enemy ships and damaged 323 others. After April 1945, mines dropped by B-29s in Japanese harbors and inland waterways accounted for 50 percent of all ships sunk or damaged.

At the end of the war, the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey documented the effectiveness of land-based air power performing maritime interdiction. Land-based aircraft, through direct action and mines, actually sank a larger percentage of enemy ships than carrier-based aviation-23.8 percent versus 16.3 percent.⁶ Land-based aircraft also destroyed a large number of barges and vessels smaller than 500 tons gross weight that were not included in the survey.

These aerial efforts against maritime targets, combined with an Allied submarine campaign, strangled Japan economically and cut her supply routes. Land-based air power also combined with the fast carrier task force to carry the war deep into Japanese territory. The campaign so disrupted Japan's ability to import raw materials and oil that leading Japanese industrialists informed military leaders that the war could not continue. Air and sea power paralyzed the Japanese war machine and the country's industries.

Japan lost the war partly because the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force did not help its navy counterparts establish air superiority over shipping lanes. Japan did not fight a joint maritime campaign to protect its shipping. Captain Minoru Genda, the air operations officer for the Pearl Harbor attack and later the commanding officer of the Japanese Navy's elite ace squadron, commented, "The Army flyers didn't like to fly over the ocean (and) acted as through they didn't realize the importance of the control of the seas."⁷

Making Maritime Interdiction a Joint Fight

The U.S. Navy does not have to shoulder the responsibility to counter China's "string of pearls" strategy alone. The Air Force has much to contribute in the fight to control the littorals. General Paul Hester, Commander of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), remarked, "The capability for airmen to rapidly respond anywhere in the Pacific to sink naval vessels in all weather, day or night, is crucial for the Pacific Command."

Air power can provide combatant commanders with the ability to rapidly conduct maritime interdiction against enemy combatants and merchant ships. This is not a repackaged Billy Mitchell argument to replace the Navy's battle fleet. The idea is to leverage all our assets to contribute to a joint maritime fight. Land-based air power can complement sea power, especially when Navy task forces are employed elsewhere. For example, naval operations in the China-Taiwan strait may take priority over other regions. Carrier-based aviation may not have the range or be able to generate enough sorties to simultaneously cover the Strait of Malacca.

Resultant Fury, a Pacific Command exercise conducted in November 2004, demonstrated the lethality of air power on shipping. The U.S. Air Force and Navy worked together to destroy multiple mobile seaborne targets, to include the ex-USS Schenectady (LST-1185), a decommissioned tank landing ship. The exercise showcased the technology we have developed for all-weather precision engagement of mobile-maritime targets and demonstrated the value of a complementary, joint approach to maritime interdiction. Air Force Major General David Deptula, the PACAF director of operations, said, "Although the F/A-18s missed their target, the B-52Hs scored direct and simultaneous hits on both moving targets."⁸

Despite this success, the U.S. Air Force is currently illprepared to accomplish a sea strike mission. In his Resultant Fury briefings, General Deptula acknowledged the Air Force's ability to contribute to the maritime fight has "atrophied." A recent Air Force Weapons School (roughly equivalent to the Navy's Top Gun school) paper stated, "In general, the Air Force is unprepared for maritime interdiction because of a lack of familiarity and training."⁹ The Air Force's Ready Aircrew Program defines the annual training requirements for fighter and bomber crews. Joint maritime operations training has virtually been eliminated from program requirements. The AGM-84D Harpoon has been removed from the weapons inventory, leaving a gap in our maritime interdiction capability. Laser-guided munitions offer an alternative, but Air Force pilots do not train to drop them on ships. Besides, weather patterns and cloud cover in the Strait of Malacca would degrade their effectiveness. Resultant Fury showed the GBU-31vl joint direct attack munition, coupled with the affordable moving surface target engagement system, to be promising. But that technology has yet to be funded beyond the prototype stage.

In June 2006, Pacific Command conducted Valiant Shield, a joint exercise that involved three carrier strike groups and more than 300 aircraft. There is an increasing awareness in the Pacific of the value of land-based air power in a maritime fight. We should heed the advice of the Strategic Bombing Survey: "In the Survey's opinion those air units which had anti-shipping attacks as their prime mission and employed the required specialized techniques, equipment and training achieved against ships the best results for the effort expended." The Air Force needs to prepare and budget to contribute to the maritime fight. Countersea will remain an underdeveloped Air Force mission until we take steps to elevate it from a collateral mission.

It's time to revisit the 1948 Key West and Newport Agreement that defined the traditional demarcation between the Navy and Air Force. Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," artificially limits Air Force participation in maritime operations. As a result, maritime interdiction has become the de facto exclusive purview of the Navy. A better approach would leverage all our nation's air power assets. The question should no longer be who does what, but how do we ensure the right set of capabilities is identified, developed, and fielded to meet the needs of unified commanders."¹⁰ Carrier-based aviation seamlessly integrates with land-based aircraft to perform strategic bombing missions, close air support, and other air-toground missions. We should work toward making land-based aviation and hence, Air Force jets, an integral part of the air-to-water mission. The current division of labor between the Navy and Air Force should be re-examined to counter the growing Chinese threat to our naval supremacy.

Robert Kaplan warned, "The effect of a single Chinese cruise missile's hitting a U.S. carrier, even if it did not sink the ship, would be politically and psychologically catastrophic, akin to al Qaeda's attacks on the Twin Towers."¹¹ Effectively integrating land-based air power into maritime operations provides commanders more options and hence, reduces risk. Simply stated, land-based air power is effective at sinking ships and controlling the littorals. It should be a vital part of our strategy to deter threats that challenge American influence over sea lines of communication. If necessary, land-based air power can help cut China's "string of pearls."