Cut-and-run? Stay the course? Perhaps Iraq's future lies in its division. The author explores the implications of such a policy.
The United States' strategy in Iraq has failed. Iraq is not evolving into the secular, multi-ethnic democracy envisioned by U.S. leaders; it is fragmenting into three autonomous regions—Kurd, Shia, and Sunni. Which group will control the Iraqi government is rapidly becoming irrelevant. The fighting is over how the territory of Iraq will be divided among the three ethnic groups. In short, the balkanization of Iraq is unfolding before our eyes with significant implications for U.S. policy.
The term balkanization emerged in the first decade of the 20th century, when the decline of the Ottoman Empire led to the fragmentation of the Balkan Peninsula as several small regions, almost all defined by their ethnic identity, sought independence. This fragmentation was opposed by the major powers, which feared it would be a source of conflict that could invite meddling by external states and lead to war among the great powers. World War I justified those fears. Subsequent history of the Balkans through the collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s shows that the aspirations of ethnie groups for recognition as independent nation states cannot be suppressed by forcing them into a multi-ethnic state-be that state an empire, communist dictatorship, or government imposed by a foreign power.
The threat of balkanization in Iraq has long been apparent to experts on that country and the Middle East. It was a significant consideration in the U.S. decision in the first Gulf War not to occupy Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein's government. Because there was not an Iraqi government in exile led by a charismatic leader who could unify the three major Iraqi factions, regime change was not a viable option in 1991. The inevitable fragmentation of Iraq into Kurd, Shia, and Sunni areas would have invited military intervention by Turkey and meddling by Syria, Iran, other neighboring countries, and possibly even oilconsuming nations.
The U.S. Role
The lessons of history and the ethnic and political realities in Iraq were ignored when the United States made the decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Its plans for Iraqi regime change were based on several untested assumptions. First, U.S. forces would be welcomed as liberators rather than seen as foreign occupiers. second, there would not be an insurgency against U.S. troops. Third, the universal aspiration of all people for democracy would result in the secular, multi-ethnic Iraqi government put in place by the United States having immediate legitimacy and the loyalty of all three Iraqi ethnic groups. And last, the groups shared a national identity as Iraqis, the unifying power of which was much greater than the divisive impact of ethnic identity. These have all proven false.
The strategy for the invasion and occupation made civil war inevitable. It assumed there would not be an insurgency, so it did not include measures to prevent one. Iraqi army ordnance storage sites were left unguarded. Its borders were not secured to prevent the entry of foreign fighters and arms. U.S. forces—seriously under strength for the magnitude of their mission-never were able to gain control over the nation and provide security for the population other than in small areas for limited periods. The establishment of the Green Zone in Baghdad was a highly visible indicator of the failure to provide stability and security. Those areas thought to be secure and stable are either empty desert or under the unilateral control of one of the three ethnic groups. Where U.S. forces attempt to provide security, there is insurgency and civil war.
The United States failed to establish an Iraqi government that could unify the ethnic groups and prevent a civil war. Because U.S. leaders expected a spontaneous flourishing of secular democracy, the power of deeply rooted ethnic animosities and the central role of Islamic faith in matters of governance were discounted. This serious miscalculation made it all but inevitable that the legitimacy of any government established by the United States would be undermined.
Reconstruction efforts were excessively slow in starting and bungled in execution. The "shock and awe" campaign caused significant damage to critical civilian infrastructure—far beyond what was required to defeat the Iraqi military-which increased civilian suffering, created a reconstruction burden greater than planning projections, and contributed to eroding public confidence in the new government. In addition, the insurgency has successfully derailed reconstruction, strengthening opposition to the U.S. occupation and discontent with the Iraqi government.
Whatever portion of the Iraqi population may have aspired to live in a secular, multi-ethnic democracy in March 2003, the United States provided the opportunity, means, and motive for them to resort to violence to fill the power vacuum created by the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
Ethnic Cleansing
The Iraqi civil war, according to some observers, began on 29 August 2003 when an influential Shiite cleric, Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, and about 80 Shiite worshippers were killed in a massive explosion outside the Imam AIi Mosque in Najaf, one of the holiest Shiite sites. Ethnically-motivated killings of Sunnis and Shiites had been occurring on a small scale since shortly after the U.S. invasion, but this event marked the emergence of recurring vengeance attacks and sustained, concerted efforts by both factions to achieve dominance in Iraq through violence.1 For the next two years the civil war resembled that in Lebanon in the 1980s, as armed militias emerged, the police and military became embroiled in ethnic killings, and the government became increasingly incapable of asserting control and restoring order.2 In retrospect, the elections in December 2005 only served to exacerbate ethnic animosities, strengthen opponents of the U.S. occupation, and escalate the civil war.
The civil war grew rapidly to a higher level of violence and brutality-ethnic cleansing-in the wake of the bombing of the Askariya mosque in Samarra, another revered Shiite shrine, on 22 February 2006. Sunnis and Shiites launched sustained campaigns as each group sought to eliminate the presence of the other in cities, villages, and neighborhoods claimed as their own. Families of the wrong faith have been driven out of their homes, and thousands of innocent civilians, including women and children, killed outright.3 The civil conflict in Iraq increasingly resembles the Balkans of the 1990s when Yugoslavia disintegrated.4
Ethnic cleansing's emergence marked a shift in both sides' goals in the civil war-from who would have greatest influence in the government, to how the country would be divided among Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. Yet U.S. leaders continue to assert that there is no civil war in Iraq, even as ethnic violence spirals out of control.5
Implications for U.S. Policy
The outcome of staying the course in Iraq appears bleak. U.S. policy has failed because the assumptions on which it is based are not valid and the manner in which the United States has conducted the occupation of Iraq has crippled the legitimacy of the Iraqi government and driven ethnic violence. secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's declaration that the United States is not responsible for halting the fighting among Iraqi factions and President George W. Bush's statement that halting the violence is not a precondition for withdrawal of forces have laid the foundation for the United States to cut-and-run while declaring victory.6 The long-term result of this "victory" can only be a protracted humanitarian disaster, as ethnic cleansing continues unabated, regional instability persists because of Iraq's fragmentation and weakness, and it becomes a fertile breeding ground for jihadists lured to extremist Islamic groups out of disgust with what the United States wrought in their homeland. This is the worst possible direction for U.S. policy.
Three steps are needed to craft a policy that serves the needs of the Iraqis while protecting U.S. vital interests in the Middle East.
First, the United States must accept the reality that Iraq is in the midst of a vicious civil war. The government must drop the fiction that the insurgency is driven by terrorists and Middle East anti-American factions.7 Although there are terrorists in Iraq bent on establishing a fundamentalist Islamic government and enemies are exploiting the lack of security to pursue their anti-U.S. agenda, these are not the fundamental causes of the ongoing Iraqi conflict.
The top priority must be to work with the Iraqi government, leaders of the major ethnic groups, and the international community to de-escalate the civil war, halt ethnie cleansing, and alleviate the Iraqi population's suffering. The United States cannot do this on its own. U.S. credibility and moral standing have been too badly eroded by three years of occupation. Only the international community, acting to support implementation of solutions agreed to by the three groups, can make progress in Iraq.
Second, the United States must recognize and accept the fact that its vision of a secular, multi-ethnic, democratic Iraqi government is not a viable alternative for the foreseeable future. If the Iraqis shared this vision and were devoted to it, there would be no civil war and ethnic cleansing.
The only viable alternative for an Iraqi state is a federation of three autonomous, self-governing regions-Kurdish, Sunni, and Shia. In forming their own governments, each of the self-governing regions would likely reject secular democracy as espoused by the United States; but a range of governmental models in the Middle East and Muslim world would be effective in preventing seizure of control by secular totalitarian regimes or the emergence of Iranian- or Taliban-style fundamentalist Islamic regimes.
A federation would bear little resemblance to the current U.S. vision for Iraq. The authority of the government probably would be limited to specific matters in which their individual interests are better served by cooperation than unilateral efforts, perhaps including water management, transportation, and some aspects of energy (electrical power and transport of oil exports). Additionally, by providing a framework for ending the civil war and building trust among the groups, an Iraqi federation would provide a foundation for a stronger central government to emerge—one based on a vision of representative government that is consistent with their religious and cultural traditions. The Dayton Accords that ended the fighting in Bosnia provide a model for establishing such a federation.8
Third, the United States must directly address the potentially serious regional consequences of the balkanization. The concerns heeded during the first Gulf War remain important today.
If the balkanization emerges from ethnic hatred and unbridled violence, establishing boundaries and asserting control over areas in which the groups are mixed will lead to protracted conflict and enormous loss of life. The alternative is for the United States and the international community to play an active role in shifting the division of Iraq from civil war and ethnic cleansing to negotiations and agreements among the three parties on boundaries and issues of mutual interest. An international peacekeeping presence would most likely be needed to stabilize relations among the self-governing regions. The regions will need significant international assistance for restoration of utilities, critical infrastructures and basic services, and economic recovery. These political, humanitarian, and economic requirements must be a core component of international efforts to achieve peaceful resolution of the ethnic conflict.
Turkey will strongly oppose an independent Kurdish state on its southern border and undoubtedly would retaliate against it for acts of violence allegedly committed by Kurds in Turkey unless there is outside intervention. The United States and the international community, especially the European Union, which Turkey aspires to join, would need to play an active role in building a security regime that prevents conflicts between the two from erupting.
The United States must address the threat of other nations-Iran and Syria in particular-meddling in the internal affairs of the regions and attempting to manipulate tensions among them. This threat is greatest if three mutually hostile states emerge from ethnic cleansing without the United States and the international community having played a constructive role.
A federation of the three self-governing regions would be the best solution for minimizing the threat of external meddling, but the United Nations or other international organization acceptable to all Iraqi parties will need to play an active role.
Similarly, the United States must address the threat of al Qaeda and other terrorist groups that share its vision of an Islamic caliphate ruling the Muslim world and seek to establish fundamentalist regimes in the self-governing regions of Iraq. The outcome would be extremist governments such as the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan providing sanctuary and support for terrorist groups. Ending the ethnic violence in Iraq is the essential prerequisite for countering the threat from Islamic terrorist groups.
The Oil Obstacle
One of the most important issues for ending the civil war is determining who gets the oil revenue. Allocating the revenue would have been relatively straightforward under the federal government of 18 governorates the United States tried to establish, but the Iraqi civil war has destroyed that opportunity. Today's reality is that oil revenue allocation cannot be divorced from the morass of Iraqi ethnic politics. Staying the course or near-term withdrawal can only result in almost all of the oil revenue falling into the hands of the Shias, who would control about 60 percent of the nation's oil, and the Kurds, who would control about 40 percent.
Establishing a federation of three autonomous regions is the best alternative for ensuring an allocation of the oil revenue that best meets the needs of all Iraqis and supports U.S. vital interests there and in the Middle East. Given that oil money provided 95 percent of Iraqi government revenue prior to the Gulf War, the international community has powerful leverage over the policies of the autonomous regions by regulating oil exports and revenue distribution as part of agreements to end the civil war.
Those agreements should stipulate a revenue sharing plan supervised by an appropriate international organization under United Nations auspices and close daily monitoring on site by its personnel. A portion of the revenues would be allocated to the federation government to carry out its functions, including funds for rebuilding critical infrastructures that span the three regions. Another portion of the revenues would be allocated to the Sunni Arab regional government in proportion to its population, as long as that government protects the rights of its Kurd and Shia minorities. Compliance with such a revenue sharing plan would be enforced by regulating the flow of oil exports from the northern and southern oil fields.
The strategy is simple: let the Iraqi people decide their own destiny. The best course of action for the United States is to accept the reality of Iraq's balkanization, work with the international community to facilitate it through negotiations rather than ethnic cleansing, and help create a federal structure for stability and cooperation among the three self-governing regions.
1 Scott Peterson, "Iraq Enters a Tense New Phase," Christian Science Monitor, 2 September 2003, p. 1; Drew Brown and Hannah Allan), "Cleric's Slaying Raises Fears of Civil War in Iraq," Philadelphia Inquirer, 2 September 2003, p. 1; Neil MacFarquhar, "After Cleric's Assassination, Fears for the Future," Nm York Times, 2 September 2003, p. 1; Dana Priest and Thomas E. Ricks, "Growing Pessimism on Iraq," Washington Post, 29 September 2004, p. A01.
2 Rod Nordland, "The Lebanon Scenario," Newsweek, 22 September 2003, p. 29.
3 Sabrina Tavernise, "Iraq Power Shift Widens a Gulf Between sects," New York Times, 18 February 2006, p. 1; Robert F. Worth, "Blast at Shiite Shrine Sets off sectarian Fury in Iraq," New York Times, 23 February 2006, p. 1; Eric Schmitt and Edward Wong, "U.S. Study Paints Somber Portrait of Iraqi Discord," New York Times, 9 April 2006, p. 1; Richard A Oppel, Jr., "100,000 Families are Fleeing Violence, Iraqi Official Says," New York Times, 30 April 2006, p. 1; Dexter Filkins, "Armed Groups Propel Iraq Toward Chaos," New York Times, 24 May 2006, p. 1 ; Andy Mosher, "Iraqi Factions Implored to End Violence," Washington Post, 20 July 2006, p. A14.
4 Jeffrey Gettleman, "In Iraqi Divide, Echoes of Bosnia for U.S. Troops," New York Times, 16 April 2006, p. 1.
5 Ann Scott Tyson, "U.S. Commander in Iraq Says 'Crisis Has Passed'," Washington Post, 4 March 2006, p. A13; Pauline Jelinek, "Joint Chiefs Chairman Says Iraq is not on Verge of Civil War," Washington Post, 5 March 2006, p. 1.
6 Ann Scott Tyson, "U.S. Sets Plans to Aid Iraq in Civil War," Washington Post, 10 March 2006, p. AOl.
7 Tracy Wilkinson, "Resistance in Iraq is Home Grown," Los Angeles Times, 2 September 2003, p. 1.
8 Joseph R. Biden, Jr. and Leslie H. GeIb, "Unity Through Autonomy in Iraq," New York Times, 1 May 2006, p. A19.
Captain Bouchard, who holds a PhD in political science from Stanford University, is a retired surface warfare officer and strategic planner who served on the National security Council staff. He now works in the area of homeland security and counterterrorism.