Iran Exercises Coastal Defense
Accounts of a recent Iranian naval exercise, Noble Prophet, give some idea of how the Iranians view coastal defense. Clearly, a possible U.S. attack is the concern of Iranian naval strategy. Indeed, the theme of defending the Islamic revolution against the "Great Satan" is constantly deployed as a means of unifying the Iranian people and heading off suggestions that the current government should be reformed. Many who have pondered attacks to disable the Iranian nuclear program have commented that such attacks may have the unfortunate byproduct of cementing support for the current regime, which can then resume work as soon as the rubble clears. According to an Iranian spokesman, the exercise began with the firing of a Shihab-2 ballistic-missile as a "gesture of friendship" to the Gulf states. It should be interpreted more as a warning that these states can be struck if they allow U.S. forces to use their ports. Bahrain, the 5th Fleet base, is presumably the main target of such intimidation.
The Iranian exercise demonstrates again and in a new way why sea-based missile defense matters. If we can negate Iranian attempts to frighten local governments, because we can deal with whatever the Iranians might fire, then we benefit enormously. The Iranians are undoubtedly aware of this possibility. With that in mind, one of their spokesmen claimed that they had just demonstrated a stealthy missile, impossible to shoot down, and capable of attacking several targets with a single shot. That may have been a rather poetic and overblown description of a MIRVed ballistic-missile (some months ago a German source claimed that the new Iranian missile had three warheads). However, the Russians have pointed out that Iranian capabilities are nothing like what would be needed to create such a weapon. The Russian writer saw the Iranian statement as a move in a war of information. For us, it may be vital to demonstrate to local governments in the Gulf area that our sea-based missile defense can really work for them.
The exercise combined the efforts of the regular Iranian forces and the Revolutionary Guards. The latter presumably operate the numerous small combatants that are usually the subject of discussions of swarm boat attacks. Although initially they were speed boats, such as Boghammers, armed only with infantry weapons (recoilless rifles and rocket-propelled grenades), some of these boats now carry lightweight Chinese anti-ship missiles and torpedoes, reportedly ASW types modified to hit surface ships. The Iranians claimed that 1,500 boats took part in the exercises, but that was probably a gross exaggeration. However, the figure may have included large numbers of civilian craft among which attackers would hope to hide. If the Iranian figure is anywhere near accurate, it suggests that the main problem in dealing with swarm attackers will be to distinguish them from numerous non-attackers.
The new generation of unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), which can be vectored to inspect approaching boats, and which can also carry stabilized remote-controlled guns, may answer this particular problem. A potential attacker would not be able to disregard such craft, particularly if there was a chance that they could detect masses of explosive if they got close enough. Conversely, the small craft's attack against the USV would reveal both its nature and its intent, and that in turn would go a very long way to separating the attackers from the innocents around them.
The account of the exercise also mentioned both intelligent and rocket mines. Intelligent mines probably refers to influence mines using microprocessors to attack ships with specific signatures. Such mining generally requires that the user collect signature data in peacetime, using a dummy version of the mine. Although the Iranians may well have such systems, it seems unlikely that they have been able to systematically collect U.S. signature data. It is also possible that intelligent refers to a new generation of remotely-controlled mines, currently advertised by a Chinese manufacturer.
Then there are the rocket mines. They are almost certainly a reference to the Chinese EM 52 mines that Iran was said some years ago to have bought. This mine in turn is a near copy of the earliest Russian rising mine, introduced in the late 1950s, just before the rupture with China (hence available to the Chinese at the time). The great virtue of a rising mine of this type, which flies straight up and explodes by timing, is that the same mine can deal with both surface ships and submarines. That is, it can handle targets at a wide variety of depths. Unlike later rising mines, it does not maneuver on the way up, so it cannot cover a much wider path than a conventional influence mine. Typically such a mine lies dormant until it receives a signal it interprets as the signature of a potential target. Given the vintage of the original Russian mine, that is most likely a rise in broad-band noise (but the Chinese may have substituted something more sophisticated). Once the mine is alive to the possibility of a target, it pings both to confirm that the target is present and to gauge target speed and depth. Given sufficient data, it computes a firing solution and sets the mine timer accordingly.
In effect, then, the rising mine is a mixed active/passive acoustic mine. Unlike most acoustic mines, it will not respond simply to a target signature; it wants an echo when it pings. Given an appropriate echo (which can be created by a countermeasure), it fires its single rocket. If that is a response to a countermeasure rather than to a real ship, then the mine in effect has neutralized itself. Given this description, one might speculate that an appropriately-designed vehicle with the right sort of signature enhancement would be a very useful means of neutralizing such mines.
Journal Article Provokes Russians
In March, Foreign Affairs published an article, "The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy," by two university professors, Keir A. Lieber of Notre Dame, and Daryl G. Press of the University of Pennsylvania. This article has had interesting repercussions. Lieber and Press claim that the United States is on the verge of gaining first-strike capability against its two nuclear rivals, China and Russia. Their claim rests on a computer simulation they have carried out, and on their interpretation of various ongoing programs to improve U.S. strategic weapons. Much of what they say is questionable. For example, they claim that the cruise missiles which arm B-52s and other bombers are "probably invisible" to Russian and Chinese radar. Such invisibility would indeed make it possible to attack command centers by surprise. Another point they make is that the B-2 is now being flown at low rather than high altitude, which, they think, makes it even stealthier. A cynic would suggest that the new flight profiles demonstrate the bankruptcy of the airplane's stealth design. They may remember that in several wars B-2s flew only when they had jammers as escorts.
Given this sort of insight, it is unlikely that the article represents official U.S. policy. Unfortunately foreign, particularly Russian, readers see it otherwise. This article may well be a blow in the ongoing war between the current administration and much of the foreign policy establishment, which does not like the policy of modernizing U.S. nuclear forces. Several prominent Russians have taken the article as a challenge and that may have real consequences.
Many Russians see the end of the Cold War as a defeat that should be redressed. They would like to return to a time when the world trembled at Moscow's blasts. Some have noticed the rather gaping holes in the published analysis. It is actually rather difficult to find mobile missile launchers, and the Russian ballistic-missile submarines probably are not constantly tracked. Indeed, tracking will become considerably more difficult as the U.S. attack submarine fleet unavoidably shrinks and as it is detailed for more pressing Third World missions. Nor has it escaped the Russians that the United States lacks (and probably will always lack) missile defenses capable of dealing with large-scale attacks, i.e., providing insurance against the inevitable gaps in any pre-emptive attack. That is apart from recent, rather hopeful, Russian claims that the maneuverable re-entry vehicle under development for new-generation missiles is impossible to intercept.
The irony of all this is that computer analyses such as the one just published were commonly used in the United States to prove that the Soviets were approaching the point at which they could mount a first strike; at the least, the point at which they could feel comfortable fighting a nuclear war. The flaw was the same then as now: no sane analyst can be sure that systems will work as advertised. The Soviets could indeed have wiped out the United States with a perfectly-timed first strike. But who could be so sure that their timing would really work, when they had never fired more than ten missiles in anything like close succession and not in the sort of close succession needed to win? Who could be sure that the Americans would not counter-attack? What sort of victory would be counted with half of each country turned into radioactive craters? The logic is still the same. The weapons are for use only as last resorts. They do not, and cannot, offer governments the sort of confidence leading to first strikes. But that is psychology, not neat computer calculation. It is also reality. It is a pity that a computer exercise will probably provide the ammunition that rearms Russian strategic forces.